Prima Pars
103. Summa I, Q. 28, Art. 2: Relation and the Divine Essence, Why We Think About God, and Perfection Divided Among Creatures
Class of 2007-11-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/103-summa-i-q-28-art-2-relation-and-the-divine-essence-why-we/

[0:00] To the second one proceeds thus: It seems that the relation in God is not the same thing as what His essence, His nature, His substance.

[0:14] Now he's going to take Augustine, right? As Boethius in the first and what second objections in the first article, and now in the first and second objections here, he's did texts from Augustine, right?

[0:34] For Augustine says in the fifth book about the Trinity, and as I mentioned before, that's the one where he talks about relations. Gets into that. That not everything that is said in God is said secundum substantiam, right? Okay. For something is said towards something ad aliquid. Augustine's got the right words there, right? As the Father ad filium, right? Pater ad filium. But these are not said according to what substance, right?

[1:10] Therefore, the relation is not the divine essence, right? Okay. There's a subtle distinction there that's being overlooked in that objection. Now he often comes

[1:31] back to that fact that we see that person is mistaken, is that he's what mixed up, right? Didn't see some distinction, he's overlooking some.

[1:43] Moreover, Augustine says in the seventh book about the Trinity that everything which is said relatively is also something apart from that what relation, as man who is a lord or master, and the man who is a what servant, right? Something apart from my being a servant, namely a man.

[2:10] If therefore there are some relations in God, it is necessary that there be in God something besides these relations. But this other cannot be anything other than but the divine substance or essence. Therefore, the essence or substance or nature is something other from the what relations. So

[2:37] you got a more subtle thing here because when you speak of is there a distinction between the divine substance and fatherhood? Well, there's only a distinction of reason between the two, huh? Was that

[3:03] real distinction, right? Okay, that's a very subtle thing, right? Moreover, the being of the relative is to have itself to another, as is said in the Predicamenti, son. It's Aristotle's book on the what categories, right? Predicamenta is the Latin word for the the categories, son. So in both in both or Albert the Great, you have the De Predicabilibus, which is about genus, species, difference, property, accident, the Isagoge of Porphyry, and then the Predicamenta, which is about substance, quality, quality relation, and so on.

[3:55] If therefore relation be the divine essence itself, right, it would follow that the being of the divine essence is to have itself to another, which is repugnant to the perfection of divine being, which is most of all absolute and subsisting by itself.

[4:21] Therefore, the relation is not the very divine essence. That's me tough. Tough love, you know, teacher, you know. But against all this nonsense is that everything which is not the divine what essence or substance is a creature.

[4:52] But the relation really belongs to God. If therefore is not the same thing as the divine essence, it will be a what creature, and therefore there ought not to be what shown towards it the adoration of Latria Now that's that's the Latin word for the translate the Greek word, right? For the adoration is owed to God alone, right? It's a very precise word.

[5:20] And against this, it is said in the preface there, this. My text says the preface and the first and the second and the third and the fourth. That, ut in personis proprietas and in majesty, equality should be adored, right? So, we shouldn't be adoring these relations, these subsisting relations, if they're not really there.

[5:46] Now, Thomas says I answer it should be said that about this Gilbert Porretanus is said to have erred, but afterwards he called back his error in the Council of.

[6:06] Oh, it could be. It could be Reims, yeah. That's it, Reims, okay. I think Reims. For he said that the relations in divine things are assisting, or outside. extrinsic, Attached to it, you know. Okay. The gods are getting both important these taxes things up.

[6:33] Now, to the evidence of these things, it should be considered that in each of the nine genera of accident, these are the ones that Aristotle distinguished. So Aristotle distinguished the ten categories. Let's just recall that for those who have become. I'll just talk about substance. We'll use the abstract reason. Quantity,

[7:08] quality, relation. These are the main ones. And substance, he said, more concretely, is what a thing is, right? Quantity is how much of it or how many of it is. Its size, quality is how it is, the disposition of it, and relation, what it is towards another, right? Okay. And these all signify something in it, right? Either absolutely or towards another, right? And then the last six, which are not as important, is where something is said of you by reason of something outside of you.

[7:48] And there's one of these last six that is our peculiar one, right? I kind of said to be clothed, right, or shod or something, right, or helmeted or something, you know. And that's something man himself alone has. But then, where you are, when you are, your position, right? And if you're acting upon something or you're being acted upon, right? Okay. Now Thomas is talking about the these three, the last six, and say the nine genera of accident.

[8:35] So he says, to the evidence of this, it should be considered that in each of the nine genera of accident, there are two things to be considered. One of which is that belongs to each of them, according as it is an accident,

[8:53] and this is commonly right in all of them to exist in a what subject. See, Aristotle makes this distinction a little bit earlier before he distinguishes the ten. Right, he distinguishes between something that exists only in others in a subject, and something that what by itself, yeah, like a substance, right? Okay. So distinction between something like a a dog and the health of the dog, right? Or the dog and the size of the dog, or the dog and the shape of the dog, right?

[9:30] So the shape of the dog or the health of the dog is something that exists in another, right? But the dog is not something that exists in others in a subject, right? Might be in some place, but not in a subject. For the being of an accident is to be in another, right? In that say.

[9:52] Another thing that can be considered each of these is the proper definition of each of these what genera, right? And in other genera, formulation, as for example, quantity and quality, also the what proper definition of the genus is taken by comparison to its subject. As quantity is said to be the measure of substance, right? The size of substance and so on. Quality, the disposition of substance.

[10:28] But the proper definition of relation is not taken by comparison to that in which it is, but by comparison to something what outside, right? Okay.

[10:45] If therefore we consider even in created things relations, according to this that they are relations, thus they are found to be what assisting, right? Not what intrinsically affixed, right? Because the meaning of relation is towards another, right? Okay.

[11:08] As they were signifying a certain respect, huh? Yeah. The way touching the thing related, insofar as it's what towards another, right? Okay. You kind of see that when Aristotle talks about large and small things like this, he says, well.

[11:33] Is that something absolute, large or small? See, what might be a large party in my house would be a small number at the Super Bowl or something, right? You see, so large and small doesn't seem to say anything about how many people I had or how many people were at the game, right? But something towards another, right? But as an accident in general, right, it's something, you know, son.

[12:05] If we consider a Harvard relation according as as an accident, thus it is something existing in a subject, right? And having accidental being in that subject, right?

[12:18] But Gilbert Porretanus considered relation only in the first what way? Now, whatever in created things has accidental being, right? As it is transferred to God, has what substantial being? This goes back to what part did we see this first of all in the treatise on God?

[12:50] What question did we learn that there's no accidents in God? Yeah, simplicity of God, right? That was one of the articles in there, right?

[13:02] And this goes back to the fact that God is pure act. Okay. So if there was an accident in God, something existed in God that was not God, right? Like my health existed in my body, was not my body, right? God would be to that as ability is to act. He would be pure act.

[13:22] So nothing that is in there's nothing in God as an accident in a subject, right? But whatever is in God is his what essence, his substance, his what his nature, right? Okay. Now we've talked about that before. We talked a little bit about the the words in and the word to have. How are those things related? Those two words, in and have. Well, in

[13:56] Aristotle, takes up the word to have in the in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? He says that there's as many meanings of the word have as there are of the word in.

[14:11] And of course, in the fourth book of Natural hearing, the Physics, he distinguishes the eight meanings of in, right? So corresponding to each meaning of in, there's a corresponding meaning of have. Okay. Now, just think of yourself a moment now. Do you have some knowledge?

[14:34] And can we also say that there's knowledge in you? Yeah. So knowledge is said to be in you, or maybe you could say knowledge is in your mind, right? And your mind is not in the knowledge, but your mind has that knowledge, right? Do you have any health? It says health in your body. Your body has health, right? Okay. Does your body have a shape? Yeah. But the shape is what?

[15:03] In your body, right? So they kind of correspond, right? Okay. But now in God, when we say that something is in God, is there a real distinction between the haver and what is in it? Or if we say that God has something, is there a distinction between the haver and the had? It's only. In reason, right? We distinguish between the two, and that's because we what start from creatures where the haver and the had are distinct, right?

[15:39] And what is in something and that in which it is are not the same, yeah. So whatever God has is God, and vice versa, whatever is in God is God. Okay.

[16:04] In a sense, it goes back to you know the first thing we learn, huh? The distinction of matter and form, these things that change, right? And the matter is said to have a form, and the form is said to be in the matter, okay? And that's what our mind knows about as a proper object, right? So we turn to God, and say, what's in God? What does He have?

[16:34] Eventually, realize whatever God has is God, and there's no real distinction, right? And that is this variety of haver and had, a distinction between what is in something and that which it is is in, is what something in creatures, right? Okay. And so we borrow those words to talk about God, but then we have to realize that what is in God is God, and what God has is God, right?

[17:02] Okay. So if there are three persons in God, or there are some relations that are really in God, are they really distinct from God?

[17:21] Just as if there's some knowledge in God, right? Or God has some knowledge, is there any real distinction between God and the knowledge that He is said to have, or the knowledge that is said to be you know, interesting. I'd like to ask you some time, What do you think about thinking about God, right? I mean, does does thinking about God make you a saint?

[18:07] No. I hope Give you a push in the right direction No. I don't. But why do we think about that anyway? Intellect moves us toward affection. Okay, that's part of it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. There's two definitions of theology, right? One which is quoted by Thomas in the beginning of the book, right?

[18:44] Where takes taken from Augustine, right? The science by which faith is what engendered, nourished, strengthened, and defended, right? And then another one that's sometimes attributed to Saint Anselm, that it's faith or belief seeking understanding, right? Although you might say that really goes back to Augustine too, because Augustine says, "I'm just the sort of man who wants to understand what I believe." Okay, but notice if you look at those two definitions,

[19:18] you can't define theology without what faith, right? Okay, so one says theology is fides, quaerens intellectum It's belief seeking understanding, right? That's the one that's those were taken since Saint Anselm,

[19:45] but really goes back to Augustine too. And then the other one is the one that is at the very beginning of your book here, when Thomas asks whether theology is a science, right?

[19:59] And it's Article Two, right? And in the said contra of Article Two, and it's taken again from this great work of Augustine, the Fourteenth Book of the Trinity, right? Okay.

[20:16] And to this science is attributed that by which faith, the most saving faith, right, is engendered, right, nourished, defended, and strengthened, right. Do you see that? Okay. Now let's just put down that again. Okay.

[20:51] Now let's just put down that again quo fides? Solid very hard. Deutero. They have to care about Deutero because he's talking about other people, right? Okay. It helps you to. Deutero. Defend Deutero. Wrong word. Okay. Now Augustine says, you know, another place that heresy is necessary for theology to develop, right? Now, heretic, what he denies an article of the faith, and some church father, right, has to defend that article of the faith, right?

[21:35] And in defending that article of the faith, he came to what understanding better, right? Okay. But kind of the first impetus, you might say, is to defend this article of the faith that's being denied by Sabellius or some other heretic, huh? Okay. Now, if you look at these two definitions here, they're kind of different, aren't they?

[22:01] Because the second definition says is is belief for the sake of theology, or is theology for the sake of belief? What would you say if you're asked that question?

[22:15] Yeah, yeah. And in the second definition here, you can see that theology is for the sake of belief, right? In other words, if you have theology, this will help you to what? Be missionary, right? To bring someone else to the faith, right? And your own faith and that of your, you know, flock and so on. You can nourish that, right? You can defend it, right? Huh? Yeah.

[22:53] And your faith will become stronger, right? But this definition brings out that theology is for the sake of belief, right? But now, if you look at the first one here, does it seem like? Faith first. Yeah, it seems like you're what? You're seeking to go beyond faith to an understanding of this, right? Well, I got to be careful about that because I'm not going to understand it very well, right?

[23:20] But this shows the harmony there of belief with what reason, right? Because reason naturally wants to understand what it believes, huh? So even if I believe Euclid, let's say the Pythagorean theorem, you know, everybody's heard about the Pythagorean theorem, but I actually want to understand what I believe, right? Of course, in the case of the Pythagorean theorem, I can completely understand that and the reasons for it, right?

[23:54] Here, I can never completely understand what I believe, huh? I will completely understand what I believe only when I what? See God face to face, huh? And I have to be a Christian. So this here is kind of consolation before I get to be a Christian, right? But my seeking to understand that.

[24:19] Shows, as I say, the harmony of reason with what faith. Then it's natural we want to understand so far as we can, right? Thomas often quotes a beautiful passage from

[24:37] Hillary, huh? In the question, I think he's taking from Hillary's work on the Trinity. It's It's probably in here later on here. The one where Hillary says, "You know that I know I should never arrive fully understanding it, but I make some progress." You know, and the one who sets out to go to something that's kind of infinite, right? You know, he's not going to arrive, but you get a little bit of consolation, a little bit of understanding, right?

[25:19] Okay, so it's sort of natural. To want to understand what you believe, right? And insofar as you know, the definition there of faith that's given in St. Paul is the substance of things hoped for, right? It's kind of like the beginning things hoped for, and until you get what you hope for, eternal life, to see God as He is, this is kind of

[25:52] consolation in between, right? A little bit. Okay. Nevertheless, the relation there between theology and faith is a little different in these two, right? So, would you say the beatific vision, seeing God as He is, the famous text is in what? St. John's Epistle, right? To see Him as He is. Is it due to the vision for sake of faith?

[26:28] No. No. Faith is for ultimately the beatific vision, right? So this seems to be a little bit on the way towards the beatific, right?

[26:44] Well, how can it be both then? How can you have this double relation to to faith? Well, I mean, why do I, for example, think about God, right? Is it because I want to strengthen my belief,

[27:20] or is it because I'm curious about these things? They're very interesting. They're very wonderful. Can it be both? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Thomas in in the commentary on the De Hebdomadibus Here look at the little premium he has to the De Hebdomadibus Thomas quotes scripture from one of the Sapiential books, and the Sapiential book says, "Run into your house and play with your thoughts."

[28:00] And Thomas says, "Well, why does he compare this to play, right? " And then, of course you gotta be careful, right? There's a twofold likeness here. One is that play is what Enjoyable. enjoyable, and also that play is to some extent for its own sake. Okay.

[28:29] But Aristotle takes up play in the tenth book of wisdom, and he shows us that happiness is not play play. See? So can something be for its own sake and still be for the sake of something else? And so what Aristotle is saying, you know, in the the ethics, right, that something can be for its own sake, it can be desirable for its own sake, right, and yet be for the sake of something else.

[29:02] In terms of take example of medicine, right? The medicine tastes awful. You take medicine only for the sake of something else to get healthy, right? But if the medicine was delicious,

[29:26] then you might enjoy the medicine apart from the fact that it's going to lead to health, and you might even, you know, to some extent, enjoy it for its own sake. Is that a contradiction? I remember as a little kid having some medicine for something, and it came out in little red things, like the cinnamon things you get in the store sometimes, and actually tasted good, the cinnamon candy, right?

[29:51] I remember one time instead of swallowing it, I, I, no, suddenly I sucked it through the others, and it went awful taste. You know, I realized that was just, you know, I mean, there was something for its own sake that, you know, it was like piece of candy, and,

[30:10] you see, so, I can both, right, think about God because it's enjoyable, right, and I think about God to some extent for its own sake,

[30:34] and it's kind of anticipation of seeing God as He is, right? Because we see God as He is, are we, are we doing this for His sake or something else? Well, if we are, it's also being done for its own sake, right?

[30:55] And so here you you see, in a sense, this understanding is in part at least for its own sake. It's desirable in itself. Often saying, I think about God because can't think of anything better to think about, don't think more interesting to think about, right? You know, so I try to think about God a little bit every day. See?

[31:21] And I think about other things so I can think better about God. It's kind of thing about relations of reason, all that sort of stuff, right? Because it helps me to think better about the Trinity and so on, okay? But I should also think about God in order to, what, engender faith in others, right? To nourish the faith in them and in myself, to defend it, right, from these crazy attacks on, to strengthen the faith, right?

[31:50] Um, and that's not incongruent with this, right? But it's a little different thing, right? Okay. But if you answer the other question, there it is: thinking about God make you a saint? I'd say, no, no. Um, make you holy? No.

[32:21] But now when you go to the to the prayers, right, which is hope and so on, you say, "Hallowed be thy name." Well, even that doesn't make you holy, but you're asking God's help to be holy, right? Or like in the, uh, I'm a Christian, you know, Sanctificetur right? Hallowed be thy name, right?

[32:49] So you're you're seeking to be holy, right? Okay. But you're told, you know, in the Psalms to seek always the face of God, right? In a sense, you're trying to see them a little bit here when you try to understand them, right? Because understanding is called seeing, in a sense, isn't it? So you're supposed to seek always the face of God, then it's quite in harmony, right, to have the fa to try to understand these things so far as you can, right?

[33:20] Even though you know you're not going to arrive any, some just are going to really understand these things, right? Okay. But if you, you know, if the Mohammedans take over, anything may one of these days, you know, and I got to defend now, you know, that you know there's only one God, despite the Father being God and the Son being God and the Holy Spirit being God, right?

[33:45] I got to know a little bit theology to to defend this, right? I told you I had a you know student from Saudi Arabia. I told that little story, right? And and he he he's Mahommedan, Islam, and he said he objected to Shakespeare calling reason God-like, right? And so I I tried to explain to him in what sense we speak of the creature being like God, and I was going to the the fourth chapter of Dionysius On the Divine Names you know, where it says you can never notice a likeness of the creature to God, without a greater what, unlikeness, you know?

[34:19] I don't know if that satisfied him much but I was trying to defend a little bit, you know. We were not, you know, too naive in saying that something in creatures was like God, right?

[34:33] Okay, so we're in the still by the article, the second article here, I think. Let me take a break, a little break, little break. Okay, yeah. Okay, so we're in the middle, the last third, almost of the body of the article, right?

[34:57] Whatever, therefore, in created things, has accidental being, the being in, what, being in a subject rather than by itself. As it is transferred to God, as substantial being. For nothing is in God as an accident of subject, but whatever is in God is his what, essence, huh? His nature, his substance. And I say you can do the same thing with the word what, have, right? Whatever God has.

[35:34] Yeah. Is God. Is God. Whatever God has in Himself is God. Okay. Thus, therefore, in that part by which relation in created things has accidental being in the subject, a relation really existing in God has the being of the divine essence of the divine substance, existing the same entirely with Him, right?

[36:11] But in this that it is said to be towards something, right? It does not signify some habitudo, some having itself towards the essence, right? But more towards its what, opposite, okay?

[36:31] And thus it is manifest that a relation really existing in God is the same as that essence, right? Secundum rem, huh? Okay. And it does not differ except according to the what, definition or the way of understanding it. In so far as in the relation is implied a respect to its what, opposite, right? Which is not implied in the name, essence, right?

[37:09] It is clear, therefore, that in God the being of relation is not other in the being of its essence, right? But they're one and the what, same thing, right? Okay.

[37:25] So clear to everybody now? No, it's hard to understand how you can have distinct persons. Well, you think if you compare the relation to the divine substance, it's the same thing, right? But if you compare the Father to the Son, they're what? Distinct. Yeah. Okay, and that's one kind of opposite as Aristotle said. the relative, son. So that is a very subtle thing, right? But you got to see that.

[37:56] Okay, now let's go back to the first objection. As Augustine says in the fifth book of the Trinity, not everything that is said to be what in God is said according to substance, right? For something is said towards something, as the Father to the Son, and these are not said according to the substance, right? Okay. Now, as Thomas said, To the first, therefore, it should be said that those words of Augustine, right,

[38:31] do not pertain to saying this, right, that the fatherhood or some other relation which is in God, according to its what being its existence, is not the same as the divine essence, but that it is not predicated, right, according to the way of substance, as existing in that of which it is said, but as having itself what towards another, right? And account of this there are said to be only two predicaments, son, in God, huh?

[39:12] Because the other predicaments imply a what relation to that of which they are said, both according to their being, right, as well as according to the notion of their genus, son. So the size of something, right, is not only in that of which it is the size, but the very meaning of size is to be the measure of that thing, and quality is a disposition of substance, right, as well as being in substance, son.

[39:51] Okay. But nothing that is in God, right, can have what a relation to that which it is or which it is said, except the relation of what identity of being the same thing, right? An account of the what highest or most complete, right, simplicity of God, right? So he's saying whatever is in God, right,

[40:28] must be altogether the same thing as God himself, right? Because of the what God being completely simple, right? Like Dionysius says, right, God is altogether simple, right? And the closer you come to God, the simpler you become. Okay.

[40:51] But since there really is relations in God, right, which are the same, right, as the substance of God, but because they're really relations, then compared to each other, they are really distinct from each other. But compared to the divine substance, they're entirely the same. And I say, how can this? How can something be a one thing and yet be three things? Right. Well, it's because thing doesn't mean one thing.

[41:33] Okay. Now, notice, Thomas goes back to relations, right? Okay. And my being, let's say, a father, right? Is something that exists in me, right? And it's really distinct from me, right? And by my fatherhood, I am something towards my children, right?

[42:06] Now, when you speak of relations in God, though, right? Relation can't be something in God that's really distinct from God. But it really is in God something towards another. And therefore, it is really distinct from that which is towards, right? But not really distinct from that in which it is. Do you see the idea? Because if it is really distinct from that in which it is, then God would not be altogether simple.

[42:47] But if it was not really distinct from that towards which it is, it wouldn't really be relation. It wouldn't be really a relation in God.

[42:59] Put that in your pipe and smoke it for a while. Yeah, yeah. But it's got a good expression, though. You got to think about this, right? Huh? Okay. You should. When I in bed, and a lot of times I can't fall asleep. By the way, I got thinking about these things, you know. Yeah, yeah. I was thinking about this last night, but in a sense, that's the most quiet time of the night.

[43:22] Frankly, in bed there, things are most quietly done, you know, and so you think, "Yeah." Now I see the way it is, huh? So you see, there is really relation in God, right? But what is really in God? Is God, right? So there can't be any real distinction between God and what is said to be in God, right? But since there's really relation in God, then it really has relation, has, which is to be what towards another, right?

[44:01] Okay. Just like you know, take a little different example here, but you know, is there knowledge in God, right? Is there really knowledge in God? Yeah. But what is in God can't be really distinct from God, right? So the knowledge that is in God is really God, right? But since there's really knowledge in God, then God really does know. See? Okay. But that he really knows is not something distinct from what he is, right?

[44:40] Okay. It's a little different thing, right? But. If God didn't really know by His knowledge, there wouldn't really be knowledge in God. Okay, but since God's altogether simple, the knowledge that is really in God must be God, right? Okay.

[45:06] In the case now of these relations, right, they're really in God, like we saw in the first article, right? And therefore, they can't be really distinct from God, but because they're really relations, then they must be distinct from that towards which they are. There.

[45:27] So in the beginning was the Word, Saint John says, right? The Word was towards God, right? And the Word was God. So the Word is in no way really distinct from God, because the Word was God. But since the Word was towards God, God there is standing for the Father. Then the Word was really distinct from that which is the Word, the Son from the Father.

[46:14] Okay, so. Okay, would you finish the first objection here? I guess, yeah, yeah. Okay. The second objection is also taken from Augustine, right? And Augustine says that everything which is said relatively is also something apart from what relative, as man from master and man from servant. To the second, it should be said that just as in created things, right, in that which is said relatively, there is not only to be found a respect to another, but also something what absolute.

[47:06] Now, when Thomas uses the word "absolute," I don't think in the contemporary use of the word "absolute," right? But "absolute" is the distinguished distinguished from towards another, right? Okay, "absolute" is not towards another, but sometimes they they say "I'd say to itself," right? Okay, something in itself or or by itself, right? So also is it true in God, right? Okay, but nevertheless in another way, right? The way they say in Latin it's tamen aliter, aliter," right?

[47:36] Okay. So he's saying both in the creature and in God, right? Done. You don't have a relation or something relative without also having something absolute, right? Okay. But now this is found in a different way in the creature and God.

[47:59] For that which is found in the creature, apart from that which is contained under the meaning of the relative name, is another thing, right? It's an aliud it's another thing. So what's found in me apart from my being a father is that I'm a man, and my being a man is really a different thing from my being a father. Okay. My being a father is something added to my being a man, right?

[48:30] And that's why not every man is a father, right? Okay. But in God, right? What there is besides as being a father or a son or Holy Spirit is not another what thing, right? Okay.

[48:50] But in God, it is not another thing, right? But one and the same thing, right? But one and the same thing which is not perfectly expressed, right? By the name of relation, right? Okay. Just like when we say, you know, that God knows and God what loves, right? Well, God and His knowledge are the same thing, but the name God doesn't perfectly express the divine knowledge and the divine love.

[49:27] The same thing is true here. But one and the same thing which is not perfectly expressed by the name relation, as it were, comprehended under the meaning of such a what name, right?

[49:47] And Thomas then goes back, like I was doing just just now, for it has been said above that when we treated about the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine substance than is able to be signified by some name.

[50:07] Whence it does not follow that in God, apart from the relation, there is some other thing secundum rem, really different, but only considering what the definition of the name, right? Okay.

[50:27] So neither the name of the divine substance or the name of this divine relation, right, expresses either one of them fully, what. God is, or what is in God, right?

[50:47] In the case of the creature, the relation and what has the relation is what really a different what thing, right? So when Aristotle distinguished the oh it's not on the board anymore right What Aristotle distinguished substance, quantity, quality, relation. Relation might be based upon quantity, like double and half, or taller and shorter, and so on, right? And you know, he's like so and so, right? Might be based upon quality, right?

[51:17] But the quality that is based upon is something other, another thing, right? Than the what relation of likeness, son. Okay. And my size is something another thing from my being taller or shorter than you. You see, but in God, the relation and the substance are what the same thing, right?

[51:50] And they differ only in our what having two thoughts, neither which expresses perfectly what is in God or what is God, right? Subtle enough.

[52:08] But that goes back to the general thing about no names, huh? No name said of God expresses perfectly what God is. Thomas, you know, quotes that passage from the prophet there, you know. In that day there will be one name, and that's what when you see God as He is, right? Then you can have a name for what you see. We'll talk about this when we do.

[52:37] I hope. And we'll and we'll have a name, right? One name for God, right? Because we see God as He is. But in this life, we only know God from creatures, and what is one and simple in God is multiplied in what creatures, right? So you have many thoughts imperfectly expressing what is in God, huh? Based upon the fact that what is one and simple in God is divided in creatures.

[53:07] Like my simple example there that usually gives the circle, right? Okay. With the center of the circle is the beginning of all these what lines, right? But the end of these lines, which is in creatures, are all different what perfections, huh? Okay.

[53:37] So I have a certain perfection in understanding things, right? I also have a certain perfection in loving wisdom and loving my wife, I guess, loving my neighbor, and so on. But these are different perfections in me.

[53:57] Perfection I have in understanding is not the perfection I have in loving, and vice versa, right? And, but in God, right? It's one thing that corresponds to understanding and loving, but why do I have these two words about God, and I say both that God understands and God loves? Well, it's because I'm starting from myself or other creatures in whom understanding, loving are two different things, but they both, in an imperfect way, reflect the one simple perfection of God, one simple infinite perfection of God, huh?

[54:44] And so, just as the perfections. of The creatures imperfectly, right, represent the perfection of God, right. So the thoughts we have, starting from the perfections of creatures, imperfectly reflect the perfection of God, right.

[55:04] And this is a special example of it, right. When I speak of God and the substance of God and the simplicity of God, I don't bring out everything involved in the substance of God, right.

[55:23] I don't bring out these what relations that the substance of God is. And vice versa, these names that I have of these relations, which are taken from creatures, they don't perfectly express the substance of God, right.

[55:42] So some things, you know, are said of God. You might say per modum substantiae, right, the way of what he is, huh? Of the very way of what he is towards what. Someone, okay. That's expressed in a sense in Saint John's word. He says, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God, right. And the Word was God, right. What's the difference between the second and the third phrase, right?

[56:16] You say the Word was towards God. You're saying what the Word is towards, really, the Father, right? You're saying the Word was God. You're saying what the Word is. So one is signifying in the manner of substance, meaning what it is. The other is signifying in the manner of what relations towards something, right, huh? Okay. And you have those two different thoughts because in creatures, what I am and my being towards another, right, are really different things, huh?

[56:50] But in God, they're not, huh? But they correspond to what is in God and perfectly, what Understood, right? You understand in a multiplied way what is one in God.

[57:13] It's interesting, this guy. Interesting. Okay, now the third objection. Boethius says, "Let's look at the objection again. The being of the relative is to have itself to another, right, It's said in the predicaments. If, therefore, relation is the very divine essence." It follows that the being of the divine essence is to have itself to another, and this seems to be repugnant to the perfection of the divine being, which is most of all absolute, right, and subsisting by itself, right.

[58:04] For the third, it should be said that if in the divine perfection nothing more were contained than what the relative name signifies, right, it would follow that his being was what imperfect, right, as having itself what to another.

[58:31] Just as if, and he makes a comparison now to something more known to us, if we're not contained there more than what is signified by the name of wisdom, right, he would not be something what subsisting. But because the perfection of the divine essence is greater than what is able to be comprehended by the meaning of some name,

[59:01] it does not follow if a relative name or any other name said of God does not signify something perfect that the divine essence has imperfect being. Why? Because the divine essence comprehends in itself the perfection of all genre, as has been said above. and this is what Aristotle says in the what fifth book of wisdom, right? He takes up the word perfect, right? He gives three meanings of the word perfect as said of the what creature, right?

[59:36] And then makes a distinction between what is perfect simply or universally perfect and what is perfect in its kind. And this perfect simply there, what is lacking in nothing, as Boethius said before Thomas, Aristotle's talking about the perfection of God, right? It's interesting Aristotle to give the sense in which God is perfect, right? Notice what he's saying in this text here. The divine essence comprehends in itself the perfections of all genera, right?

[1:00:09] See, Why the perfection of creature is always of what one kind, okay? Like you might have what perfect health, right? That's one kind thing, right? But the perfection of health is not the perfection of understanding, it's not perfection of loving, it's not perfection of even strength, right? My friend Jim there, you know, he was next golden glove boxer, right? But he had some health problems, right? And so he said to me, you know, Dwayne, he says, he says, I'm I'm strong, he says, but not healthy.

[1:00:46] Now I was more healthy than Jim, but not as strong as Jim, right? And so that's where our perfections are, right? All the different perfections that we have, but each is one kind. But God is what universally perfect. He has perfection of all of all genera.

[1:01:13] So you say, is is Homer perfect? Period. Is he lacking in nothing? He might have been ugly man. He might have been blind. Some people say he was blind, right? You know, there's a he represents the poet there in the Odyssey, right? Demodocus sticks down the thing and he sings the fall of Troy and so on. And some say this is a self-portrait, but Demodocus is represented as being blind, right?

[1:01:40] Maybe this is the origin of the legend that Homer himself was blind, right? But I think you know what Homer is saying is that the poet is what working out of his imagination, and therefore, like the lover works out of imagination, is said to be blind, right? Love is blind, we say, right? Not strictly speaking, right? But because the lover is, you know, imagining things that no one else sees in the beloved, right?

[1:02:05] Things that maybe aren't there, you know. Now, as Homer is not the eyewitness of the Trojan War, right, that took place centuries ago, right? He's imagining things, right? It may not be right, just like in the Battle of Agincourt. You know, if you read Shakespeare, Henry the Fifth, you can understand why the English won, right? Read Churchill, you'll find out, but you won't find out from Shakespeare, right?

[1:02:29] You know, and so is Homer perfect? I could say Homer is the perfect poet. Mozart is the perfect musician, but you wouldn't say the perfect without saying in what kind of perfection he had, right? What genus?

[1:02:55] Aristotle was maybe the perfect philosopher, but he wasn't Mozart. He wasn't Homer, right? Didn't have the perfection that Mozart has, but perfection in creatures

[1:03:09] always limited to one kind. You and I are one kind of thing, you know that. But strictly speaking, is God one kind of thing?

[1:03:25] Thomas quotes you know, God says to Moses, "I will show you every good." But Thomas says, "That is myself." But he he has every good in a simple way, right? So

[1:03:41] the word father or son, let's say. Doesn't say everything that what God is, right? It brings out something about what is in God, right? Just like the word understanding and loving both bring out something that is in God, right? But either one, I put it right, because God's understanding and God's loving are not the two different things.

[1:04:23] Sometimes you know you say about men and women, you know that maybe man has a little excellence over woman in understanding. So the greatest minds in philosophy or in science or in theology, you know, are usually men, right? But then when you take loving, you see a woman has an imperfection of loving maybe that a man doesn't. have huh

[1:04:49] And uh Aristotle in the in the in the uh Ethics, when he's talking about friendship and he says friendship consists in both loving and being loved, right? And then he says, well, but is it consist more in loving or being loved? Or both, because there's mutual love, right? And he says it consists more in loving than in being loved, right? Then he takes the example from the woman who gives up her baby because she doesn't have enough milk to to feed the baby, right?

[1:05:25] So she gives up to another woman to to feed, right? Why should she do this? Yeah. But that baby is going to be attracted to the mother that feeds her. So she seeks more to love than to be loved. See? You see that like in the Vietnam War, you know, when the science put a little child on the boat, you know, to escape, you know, and that child's going to go to America or some other place and be raised by someone else and therefore love that person, right?

[1:05:54] But they see this is the only way to save the child, right? So they seek more to love than what? Be loved, huh? I was reading the you know was it that great general, the Sherman, during this you know the Southerners don't like him too much, but Sherman came from a family of what eleven children, right? But his father died when he was very young, and so that's how he got adopted by by Ewing, you know.

[1:06:21] And by might even mother couldn't support eleven children, right, without the husband and so on. So he went to the person who was very very good man. You know, he was a Catholic too, Ewing. Yeah. So Sherman eventually married, you know, his daughter, and she was very strong Catholic, you know. Kind of drove Sherman crazy. But one of his sons became a priest, you know, a Jesuit priest.

[1:06:50] Now, in fact, he said when funeral masses when Sherman finally died. So, but Thomas remarks upon the fact that Aristotle takes the example from a woman there, right? Because we have some perfection in loving. And so you see a lot of you know like in St. Francis, the Sales and so on, the treatise on love, they take a lot of examples from woman saints, right?

[1:07:20] Not that Thomas Aquinas or Augustine didn't love; they loved very much. I think you know, but didn't stand out in the same way it does in the women saints. So, but I think it's kind of a sign that the perfection of understanding and loving may be a little bit you know divided between the the male and the female, right? So the perfection in creatures is kind of what

[1:07:44] divided, yeah, divided, yeah. See. So one's more perfect in this way, another more perfect in that way, huh? I always take example there, you know. but a time when he had a kind of serious case there, and I was teaching in college, and you know, somebody writing threatening letters to somebody, you know, and so on, and they finally, you know, brought the FBI in, which has a handwriting analysis, and so on.

[1:08:12] And they're pretty thorough about this, right? So when the case came down, finally, you know, the father, mother of the boy was there, you know, and and the uncle who was a DA, and so on, and so on. But when the FBI evidence all come in, the father admitted, you know, his son was guilty, you know. Mother went, stop it. So you kind of see the the reason and love there, you know, huh?

[1:08:33] That sort of a thing, you know. You know, there's an old saying, only mother could love him, right? And a woman has a certain perfection of love, right? You know. And but I think that's what you have. Preachers, the the the perfections are divided, huh?

[1:08:57] That's encouraged in monastic life. It's an old monastic saying: when a monk is sick, he should be cared for in such a way that he doesn't regret the absence of his mother. Yeah. When I get sick in the parish, where do I want to be? If I can't drive 125 miles to get home, I go home.

[1:09:29] Just being there, you feel better. You don't have to do much of it all; just get there. So we should stop there, huh? Halfway through the question 28 here, huh?