Prima Pars
106. Summa I, Q.29, Art. 1: Boethius' Definition of Person as an Individual Substance of a Rational Nature
Class of 2007-11-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/106-summa-i-q-29-art-1-boethius-definition-of-person-as-an-individual/

[0:01] In the Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order to illumine our images, and rouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. and help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Henry Hyde died, by the way. Oh, did he? Yeah, he was like eighty-three, eighty-four, I think it was.

[0:30] Was he still alive? No, he's just retired the last year or so. you know So, requiescat in pace. Let's look at the premium here to the twenty-ninth question, which is also premium to the questions here, the fifteen questions on the divine persons. So, having sent before, he says those things which seem to be known or necessary to be known beforehand about the processions and the relations, right?

[1:07] Is necessary in the Greek Latin word is aggredi de personis, huh? Well, I remember in I think it was a commentary on the fourth book of Natural Hearing where Aristotle's going to take up time, and time is a very hard thing to understand, huh? You know, they always quote Augustine there in the Confessions. If no one asks me what time is, I know what time is. But if someone asks me what time is, I don't know.

[1:31] And so Aristotle says he's going to aggredi, right? He's going to approach time, right, and insinuate the difficulty, right? And so I'm kind of reminded of that explanation of the word that he uses here, right? We're going to kind of approach the question of the persons, yeah. Okay.

[1:52] Now, as they say, this is taken up in fifteen questions, and Thomas divides this into two parts. And first, according to an absolute consideration, huh? An absolute in Thomas usually is what distinguished from relative, right, or comparative. And that's going to be the first ten questions, and then according to a comparative consideration, we'll find out where these persons are equal and other things like that. Now, one sent by another one, and so on.

[2:25] Okay. So ten and five questions then. As necessary, huh, to consider absolutely about the persons first in general. that would be the first four questions, and then about the what singular persons, huh? And there would be one question about the Father, two about the Son, and three about the Holy Spirit. But they're definitely based upon the names of these persons, huh? So you have one on the Father, and then when he gets to the Son, he says we won't talk about him as Son because that's Clear from the other guy being the father, right?

[3:00] But then he talks about him as the Word. That's one question, and then about him as the Imago Dei, the image of God, and then he has three on the Holy Spirit. Is being called what the gift of God, the Holy Spirit, and the love of God. So he has three.

[3:19] Now the but the first four questions will be about persons in general. To the common consideration of persons, four things seem to pertain. Of course, this order of the common before the particular is the same order that Aristotle talked about in the beginning of the what, Natural hearing And Paul VI one time when he was addressed, he, says this is the common rule of all teachings. So, it's generally true.

[3:48] First, he says about the what, meaning or signification of this name person, okay. That's what question twenty-nine is going to be about, huh? Secondly, and that'll be thirty, the number of persons, huh? In case you don't know, or in suspense it's going to be three. three.

[4:15] Then those things which follow upon the number of persons, um, or are opposed to it as diversity and likeness and things of this sort, and then fourth, those things which pertain to the knowledge of persons, how we know the persons, huh? Okay.

[4:37] Now about the first, he says four things are sought. First, about the definition of persona, and secondly, about the comparison of person to essence or nature, to subsistence, and this Greek-derived word hypostasis, right? You've heard of the hypostatic union, right? Now, notice those first two articles are general, right? And they could

[5:13] be put before a consideration of, in particular, of what a human person is, as well as what a divine person is, huh? But here he's going to go after those two general articles to apply it to the divine, right? And the third article, whether the name of person belongs in divine things or is suitable to divine things or competent to that, right? And if so, what does it what signify, right?

[5:43] Should you use the name person there, huh? And what does it mean? You speak up. Three persons, huh? Okay. So you see the difference between how the first two articles are divided against the the last two, huh? We've got to follow that rule two or three, so far as possible to understand these things, huh? Now the definition of person comes from none other than the great what?

[6:11] Yeah. What other famous definition that we ran into in the Summa so far came from Boethius? Yeah, yeah. The definition of of eternity comes from the consolation of Philosophy, and the definition of person here from the work of the Two Natures,

[6:33] huh? To the first, therefore, one proceeds thus. It seems that the definition of person which Boethius assigns in the book on the Two Natures is incompetent, right? And what is that definition? That a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Okay.

[7:00] Now, if you look at these objections, most of them will what single out some part of the definition for criticism. You see how appropriate this is for a beginner, because you're made to think about that particular part of the definition in that objection, and in the response to that objection. Because every word is what important.

[7:23] I used to say to students, you know, that in one way, defining is like spelling. Now, if you say before, you know, you leave one letter out, you haven't spelled the word, correct? And you leave one part of a definition out, you haven't defined something, right? And there's an order in the letters when you spell, and there's an order in the parts of the definition. It's a very exact thing, but the definition is more by nature than the than the word, right?

[8:01] You know, people like Shakespeare know how to spell their own name, right? And and words down through through time, you know, sometimes get variations in how they they are spelled, huh?

[8:18] So the first objection is nothing singular is defined, but a person signifies something singular. Therefore, person is not suitably defined. You don't define a singular.

[8:37] That's curious, isn't it? You know, sometimes I ask students, you know, we're in natural philosophy, and we talk about mathematical physics too. Sometimes I say to them. Which is more fundamental, knowledge in words and sentences, or knowledge in mathematical symbols and equations? Which is more fundamental?

[9:09] Words and sentences. Yeah. And one sign of this is the fact that you can say in words what a word is, but you can't write a mathematical equation that tells you what a mathematical equation is. I can write a mathematical equation that's an example of an equation, but doesn't tell you what an equation is. And I can put a mathematical symbol on the board there, but it doesn't tell you what a symbol is.

[9:42] So it's a kind of knowledge that can't be used in talking about itself. And therefore, like Plato would say, a kind of knowledge that doesn't really know itself. Of course, the first thing the seven wise men in Greece said was,know thyself, huh? That's kind of interesting, huh? Now, likewise, you talk about a metaphor, right? Well, in the book on the poetic art, there Aristotle helps us to understand what a metaphor is.

[10:18] Thomas, you know, in the comments on the Epistles of Saint Paul explains what figurative speech is and what a metaphor in particular is, and so on. But can you define what a metaphor is, what metaphorical speaking is, by using metaphors? You can.

[10:39] So I can explain speaking properly and not figuratively the difference between speaking properly and speaking figuratively, right? But speaking figuratively, I can't explain what it is to speak figuratively. Those kind of interesting things to see, right? Now, if you talk about the singular and universal, what similar point could you make about that?

[11:11] You need the universal concepts in order to explain singularity. Yeah, yeah. What you mean in general by singularity? You can explain that universal things, right? But you can't do the reverse, huh? And explain what a universal is by the singular.

[11:32] So I'm sure Thomas will be playing out something along these lines, huh? But it's kind of interesting. It makes you stop and think, right?

[11:46] Moreover, substance. Now, it's the first objection, kind of concentrates on the word individual, right? The individual, right? How can you define the individual? Second objection is concentrating on the word substantia.

[12:03] Moreover, he says substance, in so far as it is placed in the definition of person, is either taken for what Aristotle calls first substance, right? Or what he calls second substance. First substance would be Socrates or Plato. Second substance would be the species of the genus in which they are, like man or animal. Now, if you take it to mean first substance, it's superfluous to add individual, because first substance is an individual substance.

[12:38] If you if it stands for second substance, it's falsely added, and there would be a direct opposition there. For the second substances are said to be the genera or species in which the first substances are. Therefore, the definition is badly assigned. huh

[13:03] And studying Aristotle's book called The Categories, I found that there are four different meanings of the word substance there. One day I ran across a text of Thomas where he distributes all four of them in the text.

[13:21] this makes you stop and think: how is the word substance being used there, right? It's being used for first substance, then individual is superfluous. It's being used for second substance; it's false. Okay, but this concentrates your mind upon each part of the definition. You may recall when he took up the definition of eternity, each part of the definition was called into question.

[13:47] Moreover, the name of an intention, something that is in the mind, should not be placed in the definition of a thing. Person is a thing, believe it or not.

[14:02] Person is something, okay? For it would not be a good assignment of a definition if one were to say that man is a species of animal.

[14:16] For a man is the name of a thing, and species is the name of a what? Intention. Since, therefore, person is the name of a thing, it signifies a certain substance of rational nature. Unsuitably, individual, which is the name of an intention, right, is placed in its definition. Okay, so you you go down like say you know from substance you say you got material substance and immaterial substance and material substance is divided into the living and non-living bodies and living into animals and plants and animals into man and then man into Socrates and Plato.

[15:01] They're not divisible any further, right? See, this is dealing with the intentional order, right? Why do you use a name like that when you talk about a thing, which a person is? See, Thomas gets in trouble with these priests of talking person not being a thing. This name of intention—it's misnamed. What was he? Okay, but, intention is something in the mind, not in things. Okay.

[15:32] Some people want to use the word attention rather than intention. And finally, an objection to the word nature, right? Nature is a beginning of motion and rest in that in which it is per se as such, and not by happening or by accident, as is said in the second book of the physics. Well, the physics is for the Greek word for nature, right? And in the second book of the physics.

[16:02] Or natural hearing, as it says in Greek, Aristotle defines what nature is, right? Natural philosophy is about things that are by nature, not things that are by art. So, what's the difference between nature as a cause and art as a cause? And eventually defines that cause called nature, right?

[16:25] So, nature, as defined there, is the beginning of motion, rest, and that in which it is, as such, and not by happening. But person is even in what unchanging things, as in God, right, and in the angels, huh? Therefore, one not ought not to place in the definition of person, nature, but more what essence, huh? Okay.

[16:54] So we got to all four parts of definition there, right? Objection everyone. Fifth objection, is, a little bit different. Moreover, the separated soul is an individual substance of a rational nature, but it is not a what person, huh? Unsuitably, therefore, is person thus defined, huh?

[17:16] So you know, is Saint Peter in heaven? I don't think we speak that way Yeah, but that's a synecdoche, right, huh? See, you're using the name of the whole there for the part. Mary's in heaven. Jesus Christ is in heaven, right? But it's a soul, Peter, that's in heaven, right? But he doesn't really explain why the separated soul can't be a person. Well, you apply to the objection.

[17:49] you apply to the objection, you'll explain. Okay. Now Thomas is going to explain why, in part here in the in the article, that the name of a individual substance of a rational nature has a name, like person, right, huh? And the importance of that. Even though, as he goes on to say at the very beginning here, universal and particular are found in every genus, right? Okay. But why do you know my knowledge of geometry?

[18:30] Does that have a name? Okay. Okay. Or my health? What's the name of my health? Doesn't have a name, right? I have a name that my mommy and daddy gave me, right? You see. But why do I get a name and my health doesn't have a name, and my knowledge of geometry doesn't have a name, my shape doesn't have a name, my hand doesn't have a name?

[18:55] You see, okay. What Thomas will explain, huh? I answer. It should be said that although universal and particular are found in All genera and substance, quantity, quality, relation, so on, right. Nevertheless, in a very special way, individual is found in the genus of what? Substance, huh? For substances are individuated through, for a substance is individuated through itself. But accidents, like the quantity, my size, right, my health and so on, are individuated through the subject in which they are.

[19:48] So my health is individually different from your health because my health is in my body and your health is in your body, right? Okay. And if you and I know this, the Pythagorean theorem, but my knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem individually is different from your knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem, because it's in me, in me, my soul. And your knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem is in your soul.

[20:19] For, for example, this is called this whiteness, right? Just a name of accident, quality. In so far as it is in this subject, right?

[20:34] Whence also suitably, right? Individuals of a substance have some special name before others, for they are called in Greek often hypostases, right? Or in Latin, first substances.

[20:56] Now, but still in a more special and perfect way, are found particular and individual and rational substances, right? Which have what the control you might say, dominion of their own act, and are not only led as other things are, but they act what by themselves. For actions are found in singulars, and therefore also among other substances, singulars of a rational nature also have a certain special what name.

[21:42] And this name is person, and therefore in the fore said definition of person is laid down individual substance, in so far as it signifies a singular genus of substance, right? And there's additive of a rational nature, insofar as it signifies a singular in rational substances, huh? That's all very clear, isn't it?

[22:16] When Thomas died, what did Albert the Great says? The light of the church has been extinguished. I said I see the book by adventure. Thomas.

[22:30] Yeah, I wasn't going to make a comment. He came to see Bonaventure, and someone said he's working on his life of Saint Francis, right? And Thomas says, "Well, let us leave a saint to write the life of a saint." And

[22:48] now the first objection was saying you don't define a singular, right? The first, therefore, it should be said. That although this singular or that cannot be defined, you can't define me. He can point to me. Yeah, he can say he's a he's a man. He's white. He's in his seventies. But all that could be common to other people, right? Huh? Okay.

[23:17] Nevertheless, that which pertains to the common what notion singularity can be defined. And in this way, the philosopher, and that's what Aristotle, by antonomasia, defines first substance in the book called the Categories. And in this way, Boethius defines persona. That's interesting, huh? That we can say in general what it is to not be in general, right? To be altogether singular, right? I can't give a definition of of this singular, right?

[23:55] But I can give a definition of what it is to be singular, individual. That's kind of that's what that saying is. You're you're unique, and you are unique and unrepeatable, just like everybody else. Yeah, yeah, that's kind of what I'm doing.

[24:15] So only reason knows the relation of the universal to the singular. But they have to know the singular in some way to talk about the relation of the universal to the singular. So I can talk about how man is said of each of us individuals around the table, but the senses don't know anything about that.

[24:38] Albert the Great says the first thing to be considered in logic is universal, what is said of many, right? And some universals are said of many individuals. So reason has to know in some way what individual is, But you can't define. the. Individual can't define my my health. Define health can't define my health.

[25:14] My friend Jim says a woman likes to be told you can't understand her. But in some sense, no individual is understandable. I mean, no material. And on second objection was what does the word substance mean in definition? Right? Does it mean first substance or second substance? To second, it should be said that according to some substance in the definition of person is laid down for first substance, which is an hypothesis.

[25:49] And then reply to that objection to that. Nevertheless, superficies is not an individual. Because by the name hypostasis or first substance is excluded the what idea the universal and the part right huh? For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor also do we say that the hand, since is only a what part huh?

[26:21] But through this that is added individual is excluded from a person the notion of assumptibility, for the human nature in Christ is not a person, because it is assumed by something more worthy, to wit, by the word of what God huh?

[26:42] Okay, but it's better Thomas says and simpler to say that substance is taken what commonly in so far as it's divided through first and second right? And through this that is added individual is drawn to standing for what first substance huh? So those are three different meanings of the word substance that we have in the categories of Aristotle right? Distinguishes first substance and second substance, but then he also speaks in the category substance which includes both right?

[27:16] And this is the way it's to be taken here right? But Plato and Aristotle they often use the term substance in a fourth sense meaning what a thing is. Okay, so when he say the Father and Son you know consubstantial, right? talking about what it is huh? We don't mean that they're the same person, but they have the same nature.

[27:41] What would be the third sense of substance? Substance is common to prime subs first substance and second substance. Second substances are universal. Yeah. How can you? Well, you see second substance is said of something else right? First substance is not. Okay. But what's common to them is they exist not in another as in a subject. So that gives rise to like another notion of substance. Yeah, you just you you leave out that other part huh?

[28:17] The way Aristotle does it in the in the one chapter of the categories is you'll say said of another and not said of another. Okay.

[28:38] And then he'll crisscross that with another division right? Exists in another in the sense of in a subject right? And not exists huh? In another is

[29:04] any subject. Okay. So he crisscrosses two divisions, right? Incidentally, you know, I mentioned the last time I was looking up the etymological dictionary, the origin of the word crisscross. Oh. It comes from Christ's cross. Oh, really? Yeah. See, another great example is like a, you know, crisscross. We're crisscrossing two divisions here, right? We get cross, right? But goes back to Christ's cross. Kind of, kind of nice little thing.

[29:37] So, what exists in another is any subject. The sub-sub of another would be universal accident. I would say geometry, right? Geometry exists in another, like in the mind, and geometry said Your geometry."My geometry and so on. Okay, what exists in another subject but is what not said of another would be an individual one, my knowledge, right, of geometry, etc. What does not exist in others in the subject but is said of another would be universal substance, right?

[30:22] So man is not the kind of thing that exists in others in the subject, or dog, a man, say here, or a dog. And then, but it's said of another, right? Because man is said of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, and dog is said of Fido and so on. And then this man, right, labeled, right, Socrates or Fido or Champion or Horse of Kinok, right, dead now,

[30:52] okay. So he gets universal substance, singular, universal accidents, singular accidents, universal substance, singular. Okay, and these are called prime substances, and those are called second substances, the species of genus. But if you just leave out this crisscrossing, right, and just say a thing that exists not in another, right, in subject, that's kind of the idea of substance in general, right? And you can divide into these two, right?

[31:27] So you have three different meanings of substance, right? This is a common thing when you have a division into four. Often you to follow the rule two or three, you crisscross two divisions of two, right?

[31:46] Just like when Euclid divides quadrilateral, well, in the elements he begins he divides it into five, right? So you have the square, the oblong, the rhombus, the rhomboid, and the trapezium, right? But as you get into geometry, you realize that the first four square, oblong, rhombus, rhomboid, are all what parallelograms, and so they should be divided the parallelogram against the trapezium. That's a division into two, right?

[32:17] But then how do you get four kinds of parallelogram? A parallelogram is a quadrilateral whose opposite sides and angles are equal, right? But the distinction of the four is that the either all four angles are what right angle or not right angle, and all sides are what or not equal, right? And then you crisscross those and you get four things, right? As a square has both its sides all equal and the four angles right angles, the the oblong has the four sides what not equal, but it has the right angle.

[32:59] The rhombus has the four sides equal, but not the angles equal. And the trapezoid is the one one, which has neither the four sides equal nor the four sides, the four angles right angles. So, but you but you cross some two things, right? Right angled or not right angled, equal or not equal, right sides and you know. Yeah. Okay. That's what Aristotle does here in that particular thing.

[33:27] He divides them four, right? You run later on to a very subtle division of Thomas. There, you know, where he talks about how the substance of God and the persons, which are relations, are the same thing. And so sometimes it signifies the substance in the form of relation. Sometimes it signifies substance in the manner of substance. Sometimes it signifies relation as relation. Sometimes as a substance. So you get four, right?

[34:11] So he has signifies a substance or signifies relation. Signifies in the manner of substance. Signifies in the manner of relation. That's a very subtle distinction coming there. So, is second substance and first substance related to the common notion of substance as species to a genus? No, no, no. But I mean, there's something like that, right? So, how what is the relationship of the common notion of substance and first substance, second substance?

[34:41] Well, it's something involved in both of them, right? A thing that exists not in another as a subject. And then that can be signified in general. I can say man or dog, or in particular, you say Socrates or champion or something.

[35:04] I met champion one time. Very, very, very. Do not do one around the whole the whole thing with champion going sideways, you know, facing you like that, and that beautiful horse. Yeah, give us an horse. So I was quite quite enthusiastic about that.

[35:26] Okay. Now, say apart from those three meanings of substance, right? There's a fourth meaning of substance where it means what a thing is. Okay. And you'll find in Aristotle and Plato before him, they'll speak of like a definition or speech signifying what a thing is is a logos, tes ousias which I'll translate in Latin as literally as ratio substantiae, right? Okay. So, but that's another meaning of substance, right?

[36:03] And you could have a logos tes ousias in a category other than substance. Do you say what is what is what is geometry? Well, it's a science. You can define what it is. Okay.

[36:24] So, but notice that most, as De Koninck used to say, there, you know, every respectable word in philosophy is equivocal by reason, and it's an example here that substance is equivocal by reason. People are often deceived by such what words, right? So St Thomas is saying that the first use of substance here is the third thing, and then then then he qualifies it by individual to show that it's the third thing.

[37:03] Yeah, yeah. Did you define first substance like constricting it? You know, just like if I if I say here, this column here is substance, right? The thing that exists not in others in the subject, and then that may be said of others or not said of others, right? So dividing substance into universal or second substance and first substance is these are substances most of all, right? You get the book of wisdom Aristotle.

[37:35] These are substances. Those aren't, if you know, Plato, right? You think that there's a world of forms out there where these things, but it's our mind, you know, understanding the others in a general way.

[37:52] Now the third objection is saying is an individual more the name of an intention than the name of a thing, right? Well, this brings out the weakness of our mind. To the third, then it should be said that because the substantial differences of things are not known to us, right, or also because they are not what named,

[38:21] is often necessary to use accidental differences in place of the what substantial ones, right? For example, I use this example from the ancient science. It's harder to say that fire is a simple body, hot and dry, right, or water is a simple body, cold and what wet, right? Well, hot and and dry are in the category of quality, right, and wet and Cold in the category of quality, the third species, sensible qualities.

[39:01] While fire or water was like a substance, right? But the substantial difference between fire and water is either unknown to us or at least unnamed, right? And so, in place of that, we use what? Some contrasting accidents, yeah. And likewise, Thomas says the names of intentions can be taken to defining things, according as they're taken for some names of things which have not been laid down.

[39:38] And thus, this name individual is placed in the definition of person, to designating the modus assisting which belongs to a particular substance. I was thinking of the beginning of of the mercy of God, right? And how is that named? You know. And you know, and you have to understand the justice and the mercy of God. Well, justice is the name of a virtue that's in the human will, right?

[40:14] And this can be carried over to God because God has a will too, right? Mercy names originally what? An emotional feeling, right? And just like anger does, right? Now, when you carry the word anger over to God, this is a metaphor for the divine what? Justice, right? So, when we speak of God's justice, we're speaking properly and not figuratively. When we speak of God's anger, like in the ninety fourth Psalm, other places in Isaiah, it comes up a lot.

[40:53] We're speaking what? Metaphorically, or figuratively, right? There's no anger in God. Okay, but there's a likeness between what the angry man does who punishes you, right? what you've done, and God, who by justice punishes us, right? Okay. Now, is there a word that is to the emotion of mercy, right? Like justice is to anger, or is there no name?

[41:30] I don't think there's any name. But so we use the name of a what emotion or feeling to talk about the divine will to relieve our misery and so on, right? Because you don't have a name, right? I don't think, though, when we talk about the mercy of God, we're speaking figuratively, as we are when we speak of the anger of God, right? Because there is, apart from the word anger, a name to properly name what's in God.

[42:01] That's justice, virtue of justice, distributed justice justice. But there is no name for the other. We we we see a problem arising, you know, that when we talk about the the Holy Spirit, right? You'll find out that when you get to talk about the name Holy Spirit, well, gee whiz, God the Father is a Spirit too, and He's holy, right? See. And so,

[42:32] unless you stretch the name in a bit, you're kind of using a name for what has no name, right? And it's because of the kind of unique way in which the Holy Spirit proceeds, being the same substance as the Father and the Son, this soul-like creature, right? We don't have a name for it. And but we have a name for something that proceeds a bit like the.

[42:59] The son does because I just had a son. I got a grandson and grandson too, and so this reveals our ignorance sometimes that we lack a name.

[43:15] The thing is that since the incarnation, now we can speak of the mercy of God because Christ had a merciful heart and he's still in heaven. I guess he's not. Is it sorrowful in heart? Is it the well? No, but I mean, like like saying the mystery of the sacred heart, and the way it's been explained by by those who study a lot is that you begin with with the physical heart of Christ, right?

[43:40] And his emotional warmth towards us, right? And then you go from that to the love which is in God's will. That's something different than his emotional attaching to us. And you go from the love which is in Christ's human will to love which is in his divine will, right? So there's a kind of an ascension there, right?

[44:08] It's interesting, you know, like if you take the the standard professions of faith, the one of Peter in Matthew chapter 16. Who do men say I am? And all these false answers, the wrong answers, and then he said, "What do you say? What do you say? I am Peter." Peter says, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God." Let's read a complete profession of faith that Peter is making, and then Christ says, "No, blessed are you because flesh and blood did not reveal this to you, but my Father is in heaven."

[44:43] And then he talks about building the church in it, right? Remember Paul the sixth one time saying, "You know, as you know, he says the whole church is built on the faith of Peter." But notice the order there, right? Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God. He ascends from his what humanity, huh? That is anointed to his divinity, right? Okay, that's kind of the order that's appropriate to beginning because of our what being animals that have reason.

[45:14] It's got to begin from the sensible, right? Okay. Um, but now when you get to the last gospel, then he begins with the word, right? And beginning with the word, and the word was towards God, and the word was God, and so on. And then later on, you say, "And the word was made flesh." Using that synecdochically flesh there for humanity, the word was made man, huh?

[45:40] So then the order is reversed, isn't it? Okay, and you can say in the in the order of definition, an understanding of God and the persons of the Blessed Trinity, which are in here, right? And also an understanding of what man is, it comes up a little bit later on in the final parts. Both of these, in the order of definition, are presupposed to an understanding or defining what the incarnation is, because incarnation is God, the Word of God becoming man, right?

[46:17] So you have to understand what God is and the Word of God is, and what man is before you can understand what it means for the Word of God to become man, right? But then the order is reversed,

[46:34] and the Word of God can be without being a man or becoming a man, right? And before He became a man, He was not a man, but He was the Word of God, right? So in definition, it's before meaning, right? But in the profession of faith of the Great Peter, right, you begin by what?

[46:57] There is the Christ, the Son of God. Now, at the end of of John's Gospel, right? Now Peter and John are very close together. You can see them like at the end of the Gospel, this and then the Acts of the Apostles and so on. Well, Saint John says, "These are written that you might believe that Jesus is what the Christ, the Son of God." It's exactly the same profession, the same order, right?

[47:21] Now our Lord Himself follows an order when He says, "I am the way, the truth, and the life," because He's the way as man, and He's the truth, truth itself, and life itself as God, right? So He goes from the human to the what? Divine, yeah. But Saint John, beginning his Gospel, goes the other way around, right? Now Thomas and the Summa Theologica is following the order of Saint John there, right?

[47:52] Because we're going to learn here about the we learn about God and we're learning about the persons here, right? And about the Word of God in particular among these, and then it's not until we get to the third part that we learn about the the incarnation and so on, huh?

[48:10] But you can follow both of those orders, but for different reasons. But the first one you have to do is the humanity of Christ, right? And so when we we instruct little children about these things, we begin with what the human nature of Christ, right, and the Nativity and so on in the crib and the rest of it, and then gradually lead them on to the divinity, huh?

[48:35] Yeah, master, when the grandchildren, little two-year-old, God's there. You say that, you know, mouths of babes, you know, because some people don't don't don't believe these things. Okay.

[48:58] So he's pointing out how sometimes when we don't know the substantial differences, right, or at least they're not named, right, and therefore we use accidents sometimes to name what is substantial, and sometimes we use an intention to what name something that is of a thing. And similarly, the names of intentions can be taken to defining things, as according as they are taken for some names of things which are not laid down.

[49:34] In another way, he said we have to do the Holy Spirit, right, and his way of proceeding. And thus this name individual is laid down in the definition of person to designating the way of subsisting which belongs to particular what substances.

[49:53] Now sometimes when he takes something that we know somewhat man, and how do we define man? Well, he's the rational animal. Right, the animal that has reason. But is reason really the substance of man?

[50:10] Reason is really an ability that man has, and it belongs in the second species of quality, which is an accident, right? The soul has many abilities, huh? But we name this soul from the ability of reason, huh? Just as we name the what? Animal soul from it's a sensing soul, right? Okay. So we're using reason there for what it is in the substantial nature of man, whence he has this ability.

[50:44] Or by sensing, you know, it's named really an ability of the animal, right? But if you're using it to name the substantial difference of him from the plant, right? The animal differs from the plant because he senses. You're naming what is perhaps unknown, right? The substantial difference between the animal and the plant by something that follows upon the substantial difference, huh? Or there's at least a name placed upon that differently, huh?

[51:16] So it takes someone like Thomas to understand the definition here and to defend it, huh? Now the fourth objection was saying this name nature, right?

[51:30] Now in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle considers the names that are equivocal by reason and that are used most of all in wisdom itself, but also in the axioms, right? Because they're so common, but to some extent everywhere. And among these words in the fifth book there is the word nature. First word is beginning, then cause and element, and then nature, huh? What's the word, huh?

[52:08] And he's give you a little bit of this teaching about it here, huh? According to the philosopher in the fifth book of wisdom, the name nature or phusis in Greek first is placed upon in positum, right? To signify the generation of living things, which is called what? Nativity. Okay. Now you can see that somewhat in the English word nature, because we have other words like prenatal, postnatal, nativity, right?

[52:40] Are you a native of this city? You know, were you born here? You can see the original meaning of the word nat there, birth, huh? Okay.

[52:51] And then the word nature was carried over and applied to the source. Of the baby within the mother, and then was generalized that idea of a source within, for not just birth, but for any kind of change that has its source within the thing. And because this generation is from an intrinsic beginning, right? The name was extended to signifying the intrinsic beginning of any motion. That's actually the third sense that Aristotle distinguishes there.

[53:26] And thus nature is defined in the second book of the what physics. And because this beginning is either a form or a matter, right? That's what you learned in the first book of natural hearing. We saw over that back a while. Commonly, both matter and form are called what nature. And finally, because through the form is completed the essence of each thing, in a very general way, the essence, the substance, what a thing is, of each thing, which its definition signifies, is called nature.

[54:04] Now, notice in English there we tend to use the word nature then in that last sense, forgetting all the meanings leading up to it. So in that sense, we could speak of the nature of God, the nature of a tree, the nature of tragedy, you know, the what it is of anything, right? Okay.

[54:26] And in that last sense is taken here in the definition the word nature, right? Okay. So the objection you could reply the objection that you're taking the third meaning of nature rather than the sixth or seventh meaning, shall we say, of the word nature, right? Okay, the last meaning of the word nature. Now, you know, I was saying you know last week I think was it that it's very important to understand names equivocal by reason, right?

[54:58] And one of the many reasons I gave for that is that the most common mistake in thinking comes from mixing up the senses of a word. And people are not apt to mix up the senses of a word equivocal by chance. Roger Maris hit 61 home runs with the bat. The bat is a flying rodent, huh? Therefore, Roger Maris hit 61 home runs with the bat. We just laugh at it like a joke, right?

[55:26] Because the meanings have no connection at all. You're not going to mix them up at all. Um, but words that are equivocal by reason, there's a connection among the meanings, maybe a likeness among the meanings. And then people very commonly, Aristotle in the book on fallacies, there, the book on sophistical refutations, this is the most common mistake in thinking.

[55:52] I know when I teach the students the word before and after, right? They're equivocal by reason, huh? And I distinguish the four senses of before, principal ones, and so on. And try to get them to understand, and they say now later on the course they say, you will all mix up some of these senses and be mistaken. This actually has been explained to the different senses, right?

[56:13] And later on, that's actually what they do. I said I told you before you'd do this. I know you'll do it now. Well, that's what's happened with the word nature. Boethius, in the same book, says that nature is what? What informs each thing with its specific difference, right? What completes its nature, in other words, what it is.

[56:39] What specific difference is what completes the definition is taken from the proper form of the thing. It must be enough to up to that point. I'm going to go and make another subtlety about this, but that's enough to to respond to the objection, right? You're taking nature and the different sense than is intended in the definition.

[57:07] And therefore, more suitably, is it in the definition of person that the singular is some determined genus to use the name nature than essence, which is taken from from being, which is most what common, right?

[57:24] Now, the fifth objection was a different kind of objection, right? One about this person in heaven, right? Soul might be, but he's he's not. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the soul is a part of human species. And therefore, although it is separated, because nevertheless it retains the nature of its what being united to the body, right? It cannot be called an individual substance, which is an hypostasis or first substance, just as neither a hand, right, nor any other of the parts of man, right.

[58:10] And thus does not belong to either the definition of person or the name, right? Now, I guess when when Charles De Koninck was one of those theologians, you know, had a conversation with Pius the twelfth before he defined the assumption. And among his arguments was that Mary would not be in heaven if his soul would not be assumed to be in heaven. And that's kind of impressed, they say in Pius XII, you know, this argument, right?

[58:35] But it's based upon this, right? That'd be a serious thing for Mary not to be in heaven, right? See, when you say Peter pray for us, you know, say Peter, then this is what a figure of speech, a synecdoche, the part for the whole.

[59:06] And Augustine says that we'll enjoy seeing God even more when our soul is rejoined to our body, because we'll be more perfect things seeing God, because a part is something perfect compared to the whole.

[59:25] That's kind of interesting about that that psalm there, is it sixty two or sixty three? Oh God, you are my God, and I seek for you. My flesh pines, and my soul thirsts, being the body as well as the soul. There, right? Okay. And then the riches of a banquet shall my soul be filled, and with exultant lips, my, you know, because that's talking about the body being reunited, it seems to the soul, right?

[59:49] Thomas says explicitly that in heaven there will be what vocal praise of God as well as this interior stuff. There will be music, properly in heaven, huh? Thomas says that there will be pleasures of the senses that are compatible with the immortal state, right? So it won't be the pleasure of drinking wine. I'm sorry. So he's asking me the other day about about you know scripture talking about you know so this is metaphorically you know about eating at his table, right?

[1:00:19] It won't be the pleasure of eating or drinking or reproducing, because that's all ordered to this what corruptible state. But there will be the pleasure of what the eyes and the ears, um, the senses of the beautiful.

[1:00:38] Won't be chief delight, but so maybe you know Mozart be up there, you know, in Palestrina and so. on, I hope it's not going to be up to us. That's all. I

[1:00:53] say it's just I'm not too much attached to the music of Mozart, you know, or or or Benedict the sixteenth, right? If the piano parting goes on occasion, he plays Mozart, right? And I like to hear a concert given concert, you know. Probably I don't know how good a pianist he is, but he's pretty he's pretty pretty good, you know. Maybe amateur, but still pretty good at.

[1:01:15] But I guess to attach the music of Mozart, you know, but but it's going to be even better music I bet up there, huh?

[1:01:27] They say you know no one realized how beautiful the female voice could be until Mozart wrote some of these arias for it. And he realized, oh my goodness, you know, but the arias up in heaven are going to be the human voice to be even more beautiful up there. Please, you take a little break before we go on to the second article. I'll see you next time.

[1:01:44] Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.