Prima Pars
113. Aquinas on the Trinity (Summa I, q.30 a.4 and q.31): 'Person' Shared by Three, the Word 'Trinity' and Saying 'the Father Alone'
Class of 2008-01-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/113-aquinas-on-the-trinity-summa-i-q-30-a-4-and-q-31-person-shared/

[0:00] Article four here. To the fourth one proceeds thus: It seems that this name "person" is not able to be common to the three persons. And that's how we're tied up here with language, huh?

[0:20] For nothing is common to the three persons except the essence, the nature of God. But this name "person" does not signify the essence in recto. It signifies these what relations, right?

[0:38] So, what's common, you know, to the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit? What's common is the divine substance, huh? The divine wisdom, everything that is the same thing is the divine substance, right? Well, person doesn't signify the divine what substance. Otherwise, you couldn't say three persons, could you? Or there are many persons, right? So you just can't say it's one person of these three.

[1:08] Moreover, common is opposed to the what? Incommunicable. But of the notion of person is that it be what? Incommunicable. As is clear from the definition of Richard of Saint Victor, well, it's incommunicable. Therefore, this name "person" is not common to the three, huh?

[1:36] Because that's still like the problem, you know. Are you an individual? Yeah, and I'm an individual, so it's said of all of us. But individual is something that's not communicable, right? And yet, we all share the name "individual," right? Huh? So you're a unique, unique person, yeah. In some ways, you're unique. I'm unique too. Just like everybody else.

[1:57] Yeah. You can see how we get tied up with the language, huh? As I say, the distinction between, you know, sometimes, like Boethius says, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood, right? And this is one way he distinguishes between the senses and reason, between the singular and universal. But who is it that sees the distinction between singular and universal? Do the senses know that distinction?

[2:28] No. Only reason. So reason, in some way, knows the singular, right? But it knows the singular in this kind of universal way. It's kind of a strange thing, you know. But that's the way it is. Moreover, if it is common to the three, right, to the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, either this community is secundum rem, right, or by reason, right. But it can't be sekundum rem because then the three persons would be one person.

[3:05] Nor again by reason only, because thus the person would be universal. But in divine things there is neither universal and what In particular, neither genus and species, huh? Because the universal is said of many that differ in their being, right? Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, the same being, right? Because they're all the same God, and He is I am who I am, right? So there aren't many other.

[3:35] Okay. But again, this is what Augustine says in the seventh book of the Trinity. When it's asked what three, we say three persons, right? Because it's common to them that which is a person, right?

[3:56] I answer: It should be said that this way of speaking, but the very way of speaking shows that this name person is common to the three, right? So God the Father is a person, God the Son is a person, right? God the Holy Spirit, is a person. Since we say three persons, right? Just as when we say three men, we show that man is common to the three, right?

[4:24] But it's manifest that it is not a community of what a thing, as the one essence or the one nature is common to the three.

[4:36] Because thus would follow that one is the person of the three, just as the essence is one. But now this is a little more hard to understand than you might think. Of what sort, however, is this community, Or this commonness? Those investigating it have spoken in diverse ways. Huh?

[5:02] For some say that it is a community of negation. On account of this, that in the definition of person is laid down what incommunicable, the definition of Richard of Saint Victor. Some say that it is a community of a intention, huh? Mental thing. In that in the definition of person is laid down individuum, huh? Individual substance. Just as if one were to say that to be a species is common to what horse and cattle.

[5:42] But both of these understandings are excluded through this fact that the name person is not the name of a negation, nor is it a name of an intention, that's something in the mind, right? But it's a name of a thing. It's a nomen rei, okay. So don't let them tell you that person is not a thing. First things.

[6:16] And therefore, it should be said that also in human things, right? This name "person" is common, right? By a community of reason, but not of genus or what species, but as the individuum vagum, that means like some man, right? Okay. Now, some man. I'm some man. are you some man too? Okay.

[6:50] For the names of genera or species, as man or animal, are imposed to signifying the very common natures, right? So to say that I'm a man, to say I'm an animal that has reason, right? To say I'm an animal, or that the dog and the cat are an animal, say I'm a living body that has senses. Okay.

[7:15] They are not imposed to what signify the intentions of these common natures, right? Which is signified by these names, genus or species. Huh? We're talking there more about the what the relation of reason there, right? That animals, the dog, cat, and horse, like quadrilaterals to square, oblong, and oblong, right? Huh? Okay. It's a name said with one meaning of many things, other in kind signifying what they are, right?

[7:50] But the individuum vagum, right? We call it vagum because some man we're talking about, right? Okay. Well, some man came into the shop, and you know, a little bit vague, right? But I'm thinking now of a what individual man, yeah. But the individual vagum is some man, it's not like Socrates came into the shop or something, right? It signifies a common nature with a determined way of existing, which belongs to singulars.

[8:21] That it be subsisting by itself and distinct from what others. But in the name of a singular designated, to signify something determined, right? Not vague, right? Just as in the name of Socrates, this flesh of Socrates and these bones, right? Huh? Stood out in the cold a lot, huh? He's a soldier.

[8:48] But this difference there is that some man, right, signifies a nature, an individual from the side of his nature, right? With the way of existing that belongs to singulars, huh?

[9:08] But this name, person, is not imposed to signify the individual from the part of his nature, like some man, but to signify a thing subsisting in such a nature, individual substantia. Right.

[9:29] So this is common by reason to all the divine persons that each one of them, right, subsists in the divine nature, distinct from others.

[9:44] Okay. Now we go back to definition of person: individual substantia, right? Of a rational nature, right? Okay. In this case, the rational nature is divine nature, right? But substance means you subsist, right? By yourself, and individua, you're distinct from all the others, right? Okay. So to say that the Father is a person, you say he's subsisting, right? In the divine nature here, distinct from the Holy Spirit and from the Son, right?

[10:22] And thus, this name "person" by reason is common to the three what? Divine persons, huh? This is like what he said about the person back here about whether it signifies relation. Person has said signifies the relation as subsisting. Yeah, yeah, yeah. If you said the word God or the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, would that be common secundum, rationum, or secundum, realm? Yeah, yeah. Okay.

[11:09] But does person signify something that is really common to the three? Doesn't doesn't signify what's common to. Yeah, but by reason, right? Right. Reason sees that each one of them is subsisting in the divine nature, distinct from the other two.

[11:32] Okay. Now the first objection says nothing is common to the three persons except the divine nature. But this name "person" does not signify the essence in recto, and recto means what?

[11:48] If you go back to the definition, it signifies an individual substance of a rational nature, right? So that "of" is is indirect, it's called the oblique, right? So it signifies directly the individual substance, right? But this name "person" does not signify the essence in recto, right? Therefore, it's not common to the three, right? Well, Thomas says in reply to the first: it should be said that that reason or that argument proceeds from the community of what?

[12:16] A thing. So it's common not as one thing that is common to them, right? But as something that's common by reason to the three. Okay. Subtle distinction, right?

[12:38] The second one says, "Well, without the notion of person, it'd be incommunicable, right? Definitely can't have the same common to the three, right? " And Thomas says, "Although person is incommunicable, right? Nevertheless, the way of existing. Incommunicably right can be common to three right, and I was taking something more known to us the way we'd say that you are an individual right, or you are unique. In some sense, every human being is unique, right?

[13:11] And they say, "Well, unique means what? No one else has it, right? " So how can I be unique if you're unique too, right? You see, okay. Well, we say although to be unique is to be incommunicable. This way of being incommunicable is common to all of us, right? Okay. You see that? Okay. Kind of a subtle thing, right? Or, but going back to more more known, I say, when Boethius says the thing is singular in sense, universal and understood, right?

[13:48] Well, you understand the distinction between singular and universal. Universal is common to many, set of many, right? The singular is what? Not common to many, right? Okay. So how could you be a singular and me be a singular when singular means, right? Is it?

[14:09] Well, reason can understand singularity, right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But it's strange, huh? You see. Um. Uh. So reason that knows directly the universal can understand singularity, right? While the senses that know directly only the singular cannot understand or cannot sense universality.

[14:40] Maybe they can see some of the likeness of things, right? But they can't really see the universal as such. They can't separate out the idea. Okay. It's a hard thing to get to your. own. And you can see how sophists would have a lot of fun with that, right? I'm going to

[15:03] talk about Shakespeare's plays, you know, and you divide them into roughly four kinds and so on. But I sometimes, you know, say you want to press us too much, you know, because to some extent each play is unique. Well, people will see that, right?

[15:19] And what are you saying? So that that's common to all of them and not unique, right? Isn't that a common example though of of that subtle thing we talked about—the central question of philosophy?

[15:46] That the way we know does truth require that the way we know be the way things are? And you say there's two answers to the question, yes or no, right? And Plato seems to answer yes, right? And Aristotle answers no, right? And Boethius in the Consolation of Philosophy, after announcing the first book that he's a member of the Academy, the school of Plato, right, he gets to the fourth, the fifth book, right?

[16:19] He has Lady Wisdom introduce Aristotle as her true follower, and then he follows Aristotle as opposed to Plato, right? Because he has to understand how God can know the past, the present, the future, how they're going to be present to God now in the now of eternity, without there being any what falsity in God's knowing. So, in a sense, when I understand singularity as opposed to universality, what it is to be singular or unique, I'm understanding the singular universally.

[16:52] Does that make me false? Do you think you're being false? When I say Socrates is an individual man, a singular, right? And man is a universal, and I see the distinction between them, right? Or my cat Scrappy, my first cat Scrappy, we called him Scrappy. He's

[17:18] a singular, right? But cat is universal. So I understand singularity universally. So my way of knowing is not the way the thing is, but I don't attribute my way of knowing to the thing and say that, well, therefore, to be singular man is to be something universal, right? That would be the mistake of thinking that the way I know must be the way things are. What I say about the thing has to fit them, right?

[17:46] That's a very solid example of it, isn't it? You have to admire Aristotle for seeing this, right? And as great a mind as Plato, the other, the chief philosopher, there's something to get from Plato, you'll get from Aristotle, but, but the, you know how attached Augustine was to to Plato and so on. Ah, but Plato was mistaken about this. A lot of other people, most people, in fact, don't think.

[18:13] mistaken. Okay. Now, the third objection says there's no what universal and particular in God, right? So how can you have the community right? Says to the third, it should be said that although this is a community of reason, right, and not of the thing, nevertheless, it does not follow in divine things that there be the universal and the what particular, or a genus or a what species.

[18:51] Both because neither even in human things is the community of a person a community of genus or a species, right? The same way the community of individual, right? You see. Because a genus or a species, species in the sense of the lowest species is a what? Name said with one meaning of many things, not other in kind, right? only individually, signifying what it is, right? Okay. In genus is a name said with one meaning of many things, other in kind, signifying what it is.

[19:26] Well, this person signify that not signifying something, but directly individual, right? And unique and not common to many, right? Yes. So neither in human affairs is a community of person. You say I'm a person, you're a person, right?

[19:46] Told you that joke? We we We had a kind of a of a uh of a nun who was uh uh uh thought women should be ordained, you know, but it's not going to happen with this John Paul. II and so on, but maybe eventually, you know, and so on, all things. But her last name was Person, right? And so, and so this old guy that worked around there, he said, "Oh, I didn't know you were a person."

[20:14] She said, What did you say? you know, I thought it was so funny. You know, in the context there, you know, I didn't know you were a person. I

[20:24] know he was trying to cut it off. That was her name, Person. So, that's me. She said, "Who do you think I was? A nun? I don't do that. I'm not a nun. I'm a someone."

[20:52] That's almost as silly as when they want to read her history. to her story. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, so although he says it is community of reason and not of a thing, right? In that sense, it resembles genus and species, right? Nevertheless, it does not follow that it is this, is universal in particular or genus and species. Both, because neither in human in human things is community of person a community of genus or species, huh?

[21:27] And also because the divine persons have one what being, right? But genus and species and every universal, right, is said of many differing in their what being, right? Okay.

[21:47] That's a subtle thing that Episcena pointed out, right? Okay, Thomas picks up on it, right? So we'll have to rest there, I guess. Let's look at the framing here, though, to the 31st question here, right? So where are we now, right? Well, let's go back to the beginning, right? And Thomas says, according to the order of teaching or learning, the divine persons are distinguished by what relations of origin, right, or proceeding.

[22:33] So we first of all have to talk about the origin or proceeding that takes place in God, right? That's we did in the first question, right? And then we have to talk about the relations that are based upon these what proceedings, right? Like one proceeding is what generation, right? And according to that proceeding, you have two relations, father and son, right? Then there's another proceeding which is not a generation, right?

[23:02] And that gives rise to the distinction of the Holy Spirit and those who breathe them. And then he's going to have 15 questions, right, of the 17, on what the persons, right, who are distinguished by those relations of origin. Now, how how is the 15 questions on the persons divided into two or three?

[23:30] Yeah, kind of the absolute consideration of persons, which is the first ten questions, and then the comparative consideration of the persons, like are they equal, are they, you know, things of that sort, right? Okay, and it is one send the other one somewhere, and so on. And now we're in that first part, the ten questions, the absolute one, right? How's that divided into two or three?

[23:59] We talks about the persons in general in the first four questions, and then in the last six he's going to talk about the persons in particular, right? So in those six questions, there'll be a question on the father, and especially the name father, right? And then there'll be two questions on the son, and then three questions on the Holy Spirit. Okay.

[24:29] But now, how are these four questions in general related, right? Okay. Well, let's look back now, because the first one is about what a person is, right? And then something about the plurality of persons, right? And that's actually two questions. If you go back to the, this is divided into four, but it's not really violating the rule, right? It's just combining a division with a subdivision, right?

[24:57] So let's look back at the beginning, 29 there. Okay, having sent before those things which seem to be what. Known beforehand, right? About the processions and relations right? And there was that. It remains to what? aggrediendum to take up, right? To and aggrediendum as I say is the same word that he has in the fourth book when Aristotle takes up time, right? Going to take up time, but kind of you know going to approach time, right?

[25:30] It's a hard thing to know, right? But it's kind of interesting because Aristotle says the difficulty in knowing can be in us or in the thing. In the case of time, the difficulty in knowing is in the thing, because it hardly is.

[25:45] But in the case of these persons, the difficulty is in us. Okay. And first he says according to an absolute consideration, and there'll be ten questions as we said dealing with that. And then a comparative consideration, there'll be about five questions there. Okay. And now about the absolute consideration, first in general, and that would be the first four questions, right, of which we've done two so far.

[26:09] And then about the singular persons, there'd be six questions about that. Make sense? Now, to the common consideration of persons, four things seem to pertain. He breaks down the rule of two or three, right? First, the meaning of this name person, right? So it's subdivided into the meaning of person in general, and then the meaning of a divine person, right? Remember that distinction? Okay. Two articles in each.

[26:36] Secondly, the number of persons, right? And third, the one we're going to be getting next time, those things which follow upon the number of persons, right? But who does not see it? The second and the third question, kind of what? Are involving a subdivision, right? Huh? Okay.

[26:57] And then the fourth pertains to the knowledge of persons, meaning our knowledge of the persons, right? Okay. So first of all, what a person is in general and in divine things, right? And then the number of persons, right? Considering itself and then things that follow upon it, that subdivision, right? And then our knowledge of the persons, right? Huh? Okay.

[27:25] This is interesting. Again, we're going to be taking up next time about this thing here. Those things which follow upon unity or plurality. First, about this name Trinity. What does that mean? He's he's asked about the name person, right? Huh? But now this Trinity. What does that mean?

[27:47] Was it from Antioch? I think. Was it from Antioch? I think is the one they trace the name Trinity to him. I can't remember his name. Secondly, whether it can be said that the Son is other than the Father, right? Okay. Let's get a little bit into even the Latin grammar, right? Alius. You'd say alius, but not Aliud. Okay.

[28:19] I guess very complicated here. Whether the exclusive diction, right, which seems to exclude otherness, right, can be joined to an essential name in God, right?

[28:38] What the heck does this mean? And whether it can be added to a personal name, right? Okay. Now, just a little bit of thinking about that a little bit there, because the English comes up.

[28:58] Is the Father alone God? The Father by himself, alone God. Yeah. Is the Father God? Yes. Yeah. Well, then, isn't the Father alone God? A certain way you can say. You can see how it's kind of complicated, right? And I am not sure, you know, that that isn't, you know, we won't have a little difficulty in going between the Latin, you know, in the ways.

[29:42] Would you say the Father is the only God? That's all right. It's it's you have to distinguish Um the word "alone" alone may" mean the same thing. See, would you say the Father alone is God?

[30:07] Not excluding the other persons. Yeah. See, what would mean to say if I say the Father alone is God? To me, that seems to be saying that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not God, right? See.

[30:26] Just like if I said, "I alone am a man." But you guys aren't men, right? Good sound. Now, maybe the way you can understand, I alone, you know, I don't need you guys to be a man. I by myself am a man, right? Or if you were surrounded by farming, most of you were out there feeding the cows, and yeah, and they're all acting stupid that day, and yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[31:01] I think it's a difficult way of speaking, right? Huh? See, see, if I am all by myself in my room studying there, I alone am a man. True. See, but. In another way, you could say, you know, if I say I alone am a man, then nobody else is a man.

[31:23] Yeah, if you gave that a presidential address, you'd be in trouble. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Oh, Taylor, special Taylor. I am so. But you see, you know, if you if you say the Father alone is God, you might seem to be a to exclude the Holy Spirit and the Son. On the other hand, you know,

[31:50] if you deny that the Father alone is God, you might see well, then he's only a part of God. You got to have the, you know, the other two there. Well,

[32:00] see, is there any distinction between the Father and God? So isn't the Father alone God? I find I. I find, you know, when I think about the thing in English, you know, I see the difficulty, and you have to see. I am not sure that there isn't a problem going between the English and the Latin, but I can see why you could have analogous difficulties in the Latin, right?

[32:27] We'll try to sort them out, you know. But, but now you say the Father is the only God, right? Is that the same thing as saying the Father alone is God?

[32:49] Is it more admissible to say that the Father is the only God there is? Seems more admissible because it seems to be referring more to the nature. Yeah, because there is only one God, see. So, the Father is the only God there is,

[33:08] and the Son is the only God there is too, and Holy Spirit. It kind of tricky, this this alone and only stuff. There is a problem, right, as to how exactly you should speak, right? Even God would say, "I alone am God." Yeah. Then he's not using, you know, the Father, the Son, you know.

[33:36] But then we go back to the Gospel of John. There, he said, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God." Right. So, what does the word "God" stand for there? The Father, yeah, and the Father by Himself, because because the the Son is the Word is towards, right?

[34:02] So it seems like the Father by Himself is God. Then the next sentence says, "And the Word was God." So, those last two articles going to give us. We'll get to those next time. but I'll get to those two articles. Just the entire full end. Yeah, yeah, yeah, But you've got to think very carefully of these things, huh? Just look at it. We've got a few minutes here before we have to.

[34:36] Okay, let's look at the first article a little bit. Just look at the Jetson, so we've got our appetite a bit here. To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that there is not a trinity in divine things. Why? Well, here is a either-or argument, right? Every name in divine things either signifies the substance of God or relation.

[35:08] That this name trinity does not signify the substance, because then it would be said of each of the persons, huh? Each of the persons is God, right?

[35:22] Nor does it signify relation, because it is not said towards something, right? It's a little bit like the problem you have with the word "person," right? How does the word "person" signify relation in God when it doesn't what? Yeah, person is not towards something, right? It's something subsisting, right? And Thomas saw kind of a very subtle thing that signifies a relation per modum substantiae, right? Huh? Okay.

[35:54] And remember we had that text from Augustine, right? Augustine said that person signifies substantially, right? And that seemed to contradict what Thomas was saying that signifies a what? Relation, right? And Thomas resolved that objection drawn from the text of Augustine by saying Augustine is talking about what? The way it signifies, right? Not what it signifies, right? Okay.

[36:19] I think I mentioned there was a text there. Maybe I'll look it up someplace. But the text where Thomas says that because the relation and the substance of God are the same thing, right? Huh? He had these four ways of speaking, right? It can sometimes signify the substance per modum substantiae, right? And sometimes per modum relationis, And the relation per modum relationis, or relationis, and per modum substantiae.

[36:49] It's a very subtle thing, right? Huh? So I'm sure there's going to be some very subtle distinctions here, right? Um. I don't use this stuff for a sermon, you know. Not even for Trinity.

[37:07] Yeah. But. Moreover, this name Trinity seems to be a what? Collective name. Since it signifies a multitude, right? But such a name does not belong in divine things, since the unity implied by collective name is the least unity, right? But in God there is maxima unitas, right? Saw it back in the treatise, right? Therefore, this name Trinity does not belong in divine things.

[37:51] Moreover, every three is threefold, but in God there is no threefoldness, because threefoldness is a species of inequality. Therefore, neither is there a trinity. I guess that's enough to say it's going to make one heck of a problem. when talking about the trinity, huh?

[38:20] Moreover, whatever is in God is in the unity of the divine essence, because God is His own what essence. If, therefore, there is a Trinity in God, it would be in the unity of the divine essence, and thus in God there would be three essential unities, which is heretical.

[38:48] Moreover, in all things which are said of God, the concrete is said of the abstract, for the deity or the divine nature is God, and the fatherhood is the Father. Right.

[39:01] But the Trinity cannot be said to be three, because thus there would be nine things in God, which is erroneous. Therefore, the name Trinity is not used in divine things.

[39:16] Now it's interesting. You know, I would kind of laugh a little bit. You know, though we're all Orthodox here, I think. But if you if you look at Boethius's great work on the Trinity, right, which Thomas has a commentary on, Boethius is writing in a very contracted and brevity, you know, uh, style, so that no one will make fun of what he's going to be saying. He's in a sense hiding what he's going to say, right?

[39:44] Huh? You see. Now you get an irreverent person out here, and he he would be you know quoting these things in a way to make what fun of them, you know? It's like talking about how many angels dance, and that you know all that sort of stuff. They didn't really argue about it that way, but but he would make fun of it, you know, all this you know, complication, right?

[40:02] huh? Well, I'm just a humble guy. who. Wants to know what you mean when you speak of the Trinity, right? And that's the way Thomas is, right? Huh? But you can see why Boethius wrote the way he did, right? Huh? Trying to kind of hide things so people would not make what fun of it, right? You see.

[40:29] I think that's true. Also, Saint somebody said that Saint John Chrysostom, he spoke about the Eucharist one way in his sermons, and he wrote a letter to the Pope, something about I don't know some concrete thing like particles being lost or something during liturgies, and he wrote to the Pope speaking a different way about the Eucharist. He wouldn't speak in his sermon. I I don't remember the exact things, but the different way of speaking about the mystery.

[41:04] Well, later on you'll see the you know part of the reason why we had this appropriation, right? Chris, the objection is that when you appropriate something that is. Pertains the substance of God to one of the persons, you know, that you give a danger of what, of, of misunderstanding, right? That the Father alone was all powerful, the Holy Spirit alone was responsible for the incarnation, right? You know, the Spirit overshadowed, you know, it says.

[41:33] And Thomas says, "Well, no, that's a misunderstanding. What you're doing, you're appropriating, right? " He's saying the the substance of God and those things we say about it are more known to us than the Trinity, right? And so when you appropriate this to that or that or this or that person, the Trinity is by reason of a connection between what's proper to that person, right, and that general attribute, and therefore using the more known to manifest the what, less known, right?

[42:06] In a sense, that's what what we do in the creed, huh? And in Scripture very often. And that's more appropriate in the sermon, right? To speak that way, right? But Thomas will defend the way of speaking that's not the way Scripture does speak, huh? It does say the Holy Spirit overshadowed her, right?

[42:27] But that's not the work of the Holy Spirit. It's the work of the whole Trinity, the incarnation. Why is it appropriate to the Father that he be the Creator?

[42:47] Yeah. And this of course goes back to Aristotle, right? That the the definition of power is the beginning of change in another, right? And so the idea that he's been the beginning of the Trinity, right? This fits in. Thomas says another way of doing it too, because the Father down here gets kind of flabby and weak, you know, and so on, and so it's by way of negation, right?

[43:14] Just as wisdom's attributed to the Son because the Son is more foolish than the Father. You've got to take a double way that these things are appropriated, but they're very sown, right? They're not appropriate.