Prima Pars
116. Exclusive Words About the Divine Persons (ST I q.31 a.4) and Why Natural Reason Cannot Know the Trinity (q.32 a.1)
Class of 2008-02-07
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/116-exclusive-words-about-the-divine-persons-st-i-q-31-a-4-and/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us and help us to understand all that you've written. The Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. So we have one more dictio exclusiva to go with here in the 31, Article Four, right?

[0:33] This is whether a exclusive diction, right, like only or alone or something, can be joined to a personal name, right, personal term. So he says to the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that an exclusive diction can be joined to a personal term, even if the predicate is something what common to the three persons. This famous text here.

[1:07] For the Lord says, speaking to the Father, that they might know you, the only true what God. Therefore, the Father alone is the true God.

[1:23] Thomas Aquinas replied, as you can see there in the Ad Primo. Moreover, it is said in Matthew chapter 11, verse 27, that no one knows the Son except the Father, right? Of course, he goes on and says, no one knows the what Except the Father except the Son, right?

[1:47] Which seems to signify the same thing as if the Father alone knows the Son, right? Can you say, no one knows except so and so? You seem to be saying he's the only one who does. It seems equivalent to that. But to know the Son is common to all three. Therefore, the same as before, right?

[2:13] Okay. Moreover, an exclusive diction does not exclude that which is of the understanding of the termed which is joined. Whence it does not exclude the part, nor does it exclude the what universal. It does not follow Socrates alone is white, therefore his hand is not white, huh? Or that man is not white, huh? Because Socrates is a man. But one person is in the understanding of the other, as the Father is in the understanding of the Son.

[2:45] That's true in general about relations. That's why you see you can't argue, you know, that this is an argument. A is double of B, therefore B is half of A. Because really they're known at the same time.

[3:00] Can't argue that Paul Berkwist is my son because I'm his father. You know, they kind of seem to agree. Yeah, yeah. They're known together.

[3:16] Therefore, not when it is said that the Father alone is God is the Son excluded, right? Or the what Holy Spirit? Huh? And thus it seems that this speaking is is true.

[3:31] Moreover, by the church it is sung, and this is in the what Gloria, right? You alone are most high, Jesus Christ. I would say in church there on Sunday, other days sometimes. Okay.

[3:49] But against this, this locution, this speech, the Father alone is God, huh? Has two things in expounding what it means and laying out what it means. To it that the Father is God, right? And no one other than the Father is God. Huh? But the second is false, because the Son is other from the Father. Alius there in the masculine, and who is God, right? Therefore, this statement is false that the Father alone is what God.

[4:29] And that's about I think so. I know to me it seems a little different than saying the Father alone is God, and the Father is the only God.

[4:42] The first one is is more seems to be false than the second one, right? Because what God is the Father, but the one who's the only God. Okay, still got to be kind of careful about that saying, even the Father is the only God.

[5:00] Just like I'm only a man, so say sometimes right. That's more acceptable than saying I alone am a man, which I would say is false, right? Because no one else is a man, right? But so I'm only a man, right?

[5:22] So I answer it should be said, Thomas says that when we say the Father alone is God, right? This statement can have a multiple understanding, right, or multiple meaning.

[5:41] For if the word solus lays down solitude, right, about the Father, then it is false, according as it is taken what categorematice right? We had that distinction before, right?

[5:58] Notice the difference between saying the Father is alone and the Father alone is God, or the Father alone is wise, or what do you want to say, right? Because in one case it's what, what's the word there is, categorematice, right? But you're saying something about the Father, right? That he's not with anybody else. You say the Father is alone, right? But when you say the Father alone is something or other, then you're talking about how the predicate belongs to that subject, right?

[6:28] So alone is not really a predicate being said of the Father, like we say the Father is alone, but it's saying in what way that predicate belongs to him, right? Something about the way it belongs to him, just like Thomas says, every or no, you know, he says every man is good or no man is good. You're not saying something. You're talking about how good is said or not said of man.

[6:55] But according as it is taken in the other way, syncategorematice I hate to be trying to translate that into English, right? It's a thankless task, as I told my brother Richard, he was translating the commentary in the Posterior Analytics. The translator's task is not that. Then again, it can be understood in many ways,

[7:23] because if it excludes from the form of the subject, thus it is true. That is the sense that the Father, what, alone is God. That is the one with whom no one else is the Father is God. That's kind of a clumsy thing he says, right? And this way Augustine expounds it in the sixth book of the Trinity. That the Father alone we say, not because he is separated from the Son and the Holy Spirit, but saying this we signify that what, they together with him are not the Father, right?

[8:07] But this sense does doesn't come from the custom way of speaking, right? Unless one understands something implied that the one who alone is called the Father is God. That's that's that's really stretching the thing.

[8:25] But according to its proper sense, it excludes from consortium in the predicate, from union in the predicate. And thus this proposition is false if it excludes another masculine, right? It is true, however, if it excludes something what? Yeah. Because the Son is alius from the Father, right? I don't know how they translate that in English,

[9:01] Not, however what? Aliud, right? Likewise, the Holy Spirit. But because this diction, solus alone, respects or regards properly the subject, as has been said, it is more for excluding aliud than aliud, right? Whence one ought not to extend such a speech, right?

[9:27] But it ought to be expounded in a pious way, right? If it is found anywhere in authentic what scripture. So, may recall, you know, the the use of the word fate there, right? Where Augustine said, "What do you mean by fate?" Right? And there's a meaning of fate, which is what the stars control our destinies and so on, and our wills and so on, and this is false. And then, but some people use the word fate for some aspect of the divine providence, what's behind things.

[10:07] And then Augustine as well. You mean that latter? Hold your opinion, but change your yeah, yeah. But I think I think weight is used in that second, you know, orthodox sense, right? So it's not that he's mistaken, but we ought not to extend that way of what speaking.

[10:27] Just like we don't say there are three substances of God. Well, I mean by substance, you know, individual substance or rational nature. There's three of them in there. Yeah, but you know, for another reason, we tend to think too much of substance as being what a thing is, and you'd be saying there's three natures, there are three essences, right? Three gods instead of one God.

[10:56] Now that first text there from John, there they might know you, the only what true God, right? He seems to be addressing the Father. Okay.

[11:07] There might be misunderstandings. He says to the first, therefore it should be said that when we say you, the only true God, this is not to be understood about the person of the Father, but about the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds it.

[11:25] And the reference in my text is to the De Trinitate, Augustine's work, the sixth book, right, where he talks about that particular text. Or he says, and this another turn to an explanation he gives, if it is understood about the person of the Father, right, it does not exclude the other persons on account of the what unity of the essence. In so far as what solus excludes only what alio, now as has been said, huh?

[11:59] Okay. Now the second text there is a little more puzzling here. No one knows the Son except the Father. Well, Scripture itself is saying that. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah,

[12:18] yeah. And similarly, it should be said to the second, for when something essential is said of the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit is not excluded on account of the unity of the what essence.

[12:37] Never it should be nevertheless it should be known that in the foresaid authority, this wording nemo no one is not the same as no man, right? Which it seems to signify, for one cannot what take away the or except the person of the Father. But is taken, according to use of speaking, distributively for any what rational nature.

[13:08] That's a little bit like the text, you know, where they say the Holy Spirit is not God because a number of places Paul will say, you know, may God the Father be with you and the Son, and then he's out the Holy Spirit. And Thomas says, well, he wants wants to insinuate, right, that the Holy Spirit is a bond of the Father and the Son. So when the Father and the Son are mentioned, then the Holy Spirit is implied, right?

[13:43] Well, when you say that the Father alone knows the Son, you're supposed to stop and think, hey, doesn't the Son know himself, right? Is the Oracle Delphi? Is the Oracle

[14:01] Delphi? You know, know thyself is that is addressed to the Son and to the Father too, because only the Son knows him. But you to understand, right, that since this is something that pertains to the nature of God, right, to know himself, then in such a thing as said the Father, it's to be understood of the what others on account of the unity of the what nature, yeah.

[14:28] Now there are other examples of that sort of thing. You know, we say in the name of the Father and of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Well, it seems you know to be incorrect. There's three names there, right? So if I just say in the name of the Father, and then those are three names you give: the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. It seems to be, you know, like the one name.

[14:52] So no, no, you're supposed to think of what the name of God, right, and the one nature of God, right. So those are kind of difficult ways of speaking, right? And they're used by Scripture. Sometimes, even in Scripture, sometimes when they say all, they only mean some or many. Yeah, different what each kind. Yeah. So when when when says all of Jerusalem went out to John the Baptist.

[15:26] Later Scripture says, but the Pharisees didn't know. Yeah. They didn't get baptized. They from well, it said all. Yeah. But here it says they didn't all. Yeah. Which is it? Yeah. So there are some difficult ways of speaking, you know. All right. The thing I notice myself a lot is, you know, it says and his mercies upon those who fear him, right? Why doesn't he as mercies upon those who hope in him?

[15:50] Because hope corresponds to mercy. I say, well. You got to have this balance of hope and fear, and Thomas says hope without fear is going to become presumptuous, fear without hope, with despair. So you need a balance of hope and fear. So in some of the psalms, there both hope and fear are brought together in the same psalm, but in other places, just mentioned hope, which is more directly related to mercy, right?

[16:15] Other times they mention fear, and say, you have to stop and think. Why does he say fear instead of hope? Because you've got to balance. Obviously the hope is implied there, right? But you've got to balance the hope with the fear of the Lord, right? And so you you recognize right away in in the discrepancy or apparent discrepancy, they are saying fear instead of hope. You think you know that should be hope, you know, but then you understand the hope is there, but you might leave out the fact you've got to have fear of the Lord, right?

[16:44] And like I mentioned, I was in the Catholic bookstore one time and saw a little book there. I think it was Saint Anselm, you know, the meditation to gain the fear of the Lord. It's exactly what we do in the Trinitarian. You know, but you need you need that balance of hope and fear, see. Just like Socrates in in the Phaedo there, right, shows his friends that they got to have this balance of hope and fear in philosophy.

[17:11] Different hope and fear than we're talking about in regard to God, but you have to have hope of finding the truth, but if that's not balanced with the fear of making a mistake, then you're going to what easily make a mistake, right? But if you have the fear of making a mistake and not the hope of knowing the truth, you'll kind of give up, you know, and say it's too difficult to know the truth.

[17:34] So there are some things that Scripture says that make you to stop and think, right? Why does he say that the Father alone knows the Son, right? It's kind of strange way of speaking. We say why does the Father know the Son? Because he's God. You have to stop and think, right? Well, the Son is God too. Well, therefore the Son knows himself too. Oh, okay, yes, but if it is a difficult way of saying, you can see how people can get kind of puzzled by it, huh?

[18:11] The third argument was saying, well, the alone doesn't exclude what universal or a part, huh? But Thomas, in rejecting this as a common way of speaking, says to the third, should be said that the exclusive diction alone does not exclude those things which are of the understanding of the term which they are joined. If they do not differ, what in the individual as the part and the what universal?

[18:41] So Socrates is white. Socrates alone is white, the only white man, I say. It doesn't mean to say that his hand is not white, or that man is not white. Because at least this man is white, but the son differs, right? As an individual substance or person, from the father, and therefore it's not a what similar reason, right?

[19:09] So if you say the father alone is wise, then you seem to exclude the son, right? Huh? Well, if you say Socrates alone is white, you don't exclude his hand from being white, huh? Because the white is the hand is a part of Socrates, right? But the son differs from the father as a what person, right? So

[19:31] he's not a part, he's not a person. He's not part of the person. Okay. Now, the last text there. To the fourth, it should be said that we do not say in the glory that the son alone is most high, but he alone is most high with the Holy Spirit, in the glory of God the Father, right? Huh? They take the whole phrase there, huh? And but the and the objection is in a sense of taking it by itself. Right, the first part of the phrase.

[20:13] Glad we did that right. Okay. Instead of taking the psalm, saying Scripture says there is no God. Yeah. Now, if you recall, before we begin the thirty-second question here, we have ten questions here that are about what the persons, right? Absolutely. Then there'll be five questions about the comparison, consideration, comparative consideration of persons, right? And then there were of these ten questions, there's four questions about the persons in general, and we're about to begin the fourth of those four questions, and then there'll be six questions about the persons in particular, right?

[21:05] Okay. And following the rule of two or three or more or both, we had what one question about what does person mean in general and in particular in God, right? And then we had two questions on the what multiplicity, the plurality of persons, right? And one was more basic, and then the other one was things following upon that. And now we have really the third part, which is about the knowledge of the divine persons.

[21:41] And again, here is division into four, right? So I've got to force it into my. There you go. And about this, consequently, we're not to inquire about the knowledge of the divine persons. And about this, four things are sought.

[22:00] First, whether, by natural reason, the divine persons are able to be known, right? Secondly, whether there are some notions, huh, thoughts that should be attributed to the divine persons. Let's see if there are. And then about the number of these notions, and these are ways of what identifying or distinguishing the persons in our knowledge. And there's going to be five of them, huh? And then whether it is licit or lawful to think diversely about these notions, huh?

[22:41] Now, would you divide those four into two twos or one and three? Yeah, because obviously the first one. Would be divided against the last three, right? The last three are all about what, notions, yeah. But the first one is different one, huh? You see that, okay? But Thomas is not being pedantic like I am, but you can see what he's doing, right? Okay.

[23:21] So to the first one proceeds thus: it seems that the Trinity of divine persons is able to be known by natural reason, right? I was kind of thinking about Thomas. You know, Thomas named after the doubting Thomas, right? Because he always begins with doubting what himself, even right, doubting what the church teaches,

[23:48] and then like Thomas, it comes around. So he's got that. Okay, the philosophers, huh? Did not come to a knowledge of God except by natural reason. But there are found by the philosophers many things said about the Trinity of persons. For Aristotle says in the book de Caelo et Mundo, which is actually the book about the what universe, huh? Hence the book in natural philosophy that comes right after the books of natural hearing, the so-called physics, huh?

[24:29] But the Greek word you know, which is translated there by Caelo, the Greek word can mean the heavens or can mean the universe. And actually, he does talk about the heavens there, but he's talking about the whole universe in that book. So it should be translated about the universe. But the Latin word Caelo tends to mean just the heavens, and so they stick on et Mundo. So that happened.

[24:56] He says through this number, to wit, number three, right? We use that to magnify the one God, right? Who's eminent in his properties of those things which have been made. So Aristotle said we use the number three in praising God, right? Let's let's test some idea of the Trinity, right?

[25:26] And I mentioned before how in the first book of natural hearing there, Aristotle argues that three is enough, right? Three is all there is, right? And how often that comes up, right? Two is not enough; you need a third thing. And the first place where Aristotle talks about this is in change, right? Where everybody sees the changes between opposites, so you have to have two things involved to change the opposites.

[25:54] And then Aristotle goes on to show in the next reading, the eleventh reading, that you need a third thing besides the two contraries. Otherwise, change would involve a what? Contradiction, right? And so, what's his name? Heraclitus was saying, you know, that the hard and the soft, and the young and the old, and the hot and the cold are the same because one becomes the other. Well, unless you have a third thing there besides the heat and the coldness, you'd have heat itself becoming coldness.

[26:27] and that'd be a contradiction. This is kind of the first place there in natural philosophy where three is enough, right? Okay. But you know the famous one in geometry or in mathematics or quantity is that there's only three what? Dimensions, right? And the dimensions are done by taking what? How many straight lines can you draw that are what? At right angles to each other? Well, I can draw two lines here that are right angles to each other, right?

[26:55] And then I could have a third one coming in perpendicular, right? But is it possible to draw a fourth line that would be at right angles to all those three? No. So three seems to be all there is, right? Okay. And so that context Aristotle makes this point, right? But he gives a sign drawn from language, huh? That for the most part in language we don't say all until we get to number three.

[27:25] So if you and I are going to movies, we'd say we're both going to movies, right? But if all of us are going, the three of us, that's the first time we say all. Aristotle just takes that as a sign that it's very common, not always so, but that three very often is all there is, right? Now if you go through the different sciences, you will see this, huh?

[27:52] Okay. And one example in theology, without talking about the Trinity, is in the Second Vatican Council, right? Where it says that the sacred scripture, tradition, and the magisterium of the Church, no one can stand without the others, right? Need these three, huh? Okay. That's a very interesting example of three, huh? And so this shows up again and again.

[28:25] Um. In in music for forms, huh? It seems you better have at least what? Three movements, right? So you have a lot of concertos and just three movements very commonly usually concertos in just three movements. Very common. Usually concertos just three movements, right? Mozart's trios are in three movements, huh? In the Baroque period, you know, the trio became a very famous what? Musical form. And it can do so with anything with a trio of instruments.

[28:55] You can have more, but a trio is enough to really do all these wonderful things. So three is enough, or three is all. Very common. When Aristotle wrote the the rhetoric, you know, the rhetoricians before Aristotle were saying this is the way you move the crowds, the emotions, and so on, right, and so on. And maybe there's a little hint there. You have to give a bit of an argument too, you know.

[29:18] But Aristotle said, Hey, no, there's three means of persuasion. The image of the speaker, and then the way he moves the emotions of the audience, and then he said the arguments or apparent arguments or at least the points, of course.

[29:33] See, but three is all you need, right? And so you find this again and again. So it seems to be a sort of perfection in three: beginning, middle, and end, and so on, right? Does that mean that Aristotle knew about the Trinity? A twice moving number, maybe.

[29:56] But it makes me a little stop and kind of wonder, right? What's this business here? I was seeing something there was it about the was it Incas I guess who didn't invent the wheel or didn't have the wheel, but they knew about the circle. But they saw the circle as representing what perfection, right? Now Thomas talks about this in Aristotle about the circle being perfect, right? Because you can't add anything to the circle.

[30:23] It's a straight line you can always add to, it. So there's something kind of complete about it. But the circle symbolizes what? Yeah, that's why give you know wedding rings are a circle, right? You know, kind of a representation of this of this. Well, they say the Incas didn't want to use a circle for a wheel because it would be degrading to the circle to be. I don't know if that's true or not, but it's interesting, you know.

[30:49] So you see a certain perfection in the number three, huh? Okay. Augustine says also in the seventh book of the Confessions, right? There I read in the books of the Platonists, right? He was kind of Platonist. Not in these very words, but the same altogether. In many and multiple reasons, in the beginning he saw that was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word, right?

[31:18] So Augustine is saying now, he's seen things like that in Plato. And things of this sort, which there follow, in which words the distinction of the divine persons is treated, huh?

[31:36] Moreover, it said in the gloss on Romans one and Exodus that the magi of the Pharaoh failed in the third sign, right? That is in the knowledge of the third person of the Holy Spirit. And thus at least they knew two of them, huh? That's a little bit like Plato too. I mean, that's a friend of Plato. And Trismegistus says that the monas genuit the monad and what comes back upon itself with heat and warmth and love.

[32:08] You got the Trinity, right? To which it seems that the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit are intimated, right? Therefore, a knowledge of the divine persons can be had by natural reason. So you all convinced now?

[32:27] These are some of the famous texts. Moreover, the great Richard of Saint Victor, right? In his book about the Trinity, says, "I believe without doubt that for every explanation of the truth, not only probable things, but even necessary arguments are not what lacking.

[32:49] Whence to proving the Trinity of persons, some induce a reason from the infinity of divine goodness, right? Which communicates itself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons. Some horror through the fact that what, through this statement that there cannot be a joyful possession of any good without some what, Consortium, without some companions, right?

[33:20] And St. Augustine proceeds to manifesting the Trinity of persons from the procession of the Word and Love in our mind, which way we ourselves above have what, Followed, huh? Therefore, by natural reason, one can know the Trinity of persons. huh? I was reading that in Thomas today there was talking about how, talking, about the image of the Trinity in in our, soul there, so when my reason, thinks about what itself is, and it forms a thought of itself, right?

[33:53] There proceeds from my reason, a thought about what reason is, like Shakespeare's definition of reason. When I understand that definition of reason, the ability for a large discourse looking before and after, then there proceeds from my reason, and there isn't my reason, a thought about what reason is. And when I realize what reason is, then I love reason very much. So there proceeds from my knowledge of what reason is a great love of reason, huh?

[34:25] Like Augustine says, intellectum volo ut sis ama, love very much the the understanding the reason, huh? And that's like the Trinity, isn't it? Okay.

[34:37] Yeah. Okay. So the first objection is taking things from these pagan philosophers like Aristotle, right, huh? And so on, and the second objection is taken though from, Richard Saint Victor and even Augustine stuck in there a bit, although Augustine is not, claiming that he's knowing it by natural reason, right?

[35:07] Now the third objection is something quite different. It's saying it seems superfluous, for man to tweet of those things which are not able to be known by human reason. But should not be said that the, tradition, the divine tradition about the knowledge of the Trinity is superfluous, right? Therefore, the Trinity of persons is able to be known by human reason, right? In other words, God wouldn't talk about it, or reason wouldn't talk about it, if it couldn't know it.

[35:41] That's a little different argument, right? But against this is what the great what Hillary says, huh? Hillary. Seems to be after Augustine, quite after Augustine, but quoted very often by Thomas in the Treatise on the Trinity. Hilary of Poitiers, I guess it is. But against this is what Hilary says in the second book that he has about the Trinity. That man should not think that by his intelligence, right, he can follow the what sacrament of the generation, the secret, huh?

[36:18] The secret sign, the secret of the generation of the Word. And Ambrose, one of the great Ambrose, one of the great four doctors of the Western Church, is impossible to know what the secret of the generation, right? The mind what fails, the voice becomes silent.

[36:44] But by the origin of generation and procession is distinguished the Trinity and divine persons. The Trinity is what these persons are distinguished by the relations of origin, right? So if you can't know the generation, and if, you can't know the generation and, the procession, which is harder to know than generation, then you don't have any knowledge of these things. Since, therefore, man is not able to know and follow out by his intelligence

[37:20] for which a reason, a necessary reason, cannot be had, it follows that the Trinity of persons is not able to be known by what reason, okay? For which a necessary reason cannot be had, right? Okay, I can't give any necessary reason. Um, Two Aristotle, is here today. If he's here today, why there must be three persons in God, right? And therefore I can't really know it, I have some probable reason to say so, right?

[37:51] Right, but so what do you think about this question? Well, Thomas is going to go back to the fact that natural reason knows God only through his what effects, right? And these effects are results of the divine what power, the divine substance, and that's what common to the three persons, right? That's going to be the best basic reason he's going to give, I think. I think it's interesting because it also seems to be that it's maybe been here forever, but it seems to be kind of a current trend.

[38:36] You know, I can't no, you can't really give me a reason, and so persons cannot be known by reason, and so we just don't. The whole mystery of the Trinity just doesn't really, in general, be touched by people. Yeah. Okay. I answer. It should be said that it is impossible, by natural reason, right, to arrive at a knowledge in full sense of the Trinity of the divine what persons?

[39:06] Huh. For it has been shown above that man, by natural reason, right, can arrive at a knowledge of God only from what creatures? Huh.

[39:21] But creatures lead us to a knowledge of God as effects lead us to a knowledge of the cause. But that only by natural reason can be known about God that necessarily belongs to Him, according as He is the beginning of all beings. Huh. And this foundation we used above in considering in our consideration of God.

[39:51] But the creative power of God is common to the whole what Trinity? Huh. Whence it pertains to the unity of the essence. Essence, and not to the what distinction of persons.

[40:07] Through natural reason, therefore, huh, we are able to know about God those things which pertain to the unity of His essence, huh, the unity of His nature, His substance, not over those things which pertain to the what distinction of persons.

[40:28] That's the only reason that Thomas gives that I can recall, you know, even elsewhere, right? Come back to the same reason, right? That natural reason knows God only as a cause is known to its effect, right? But the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit are causes of the creatures by one power, right? Huh? Which is the same as as their common nature, their common essence, right? So we can only know things that pertain to the common what nature of the three persons, their common power, their common essence, um, through by natural reason, huh?

[41:08] From the effects, huh? Now he says those huh who attempt to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason. They what take away from faith in two ways, huh?

[41:31] First, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which is about unseen things, huh? Which exceed human reason, right? Whence the apostle says, huh, at Hebrews chapter eleven verse one, that faith is about things that are not what seen, huh? And that's where you have at Hebrews eleven one the the definition of faith, right? Which in Latin is what substantia, the substance of things hoped for, huh? The conviction of what is not what seen, huh?

[42:12] Argumentum non apparentium, right? So you're you're lowering the dignity of of faith. It's something above our reason, right? Or what's being proposed, right? It's about things not seen, right? And so you're what

[42:26] taking away the excellence, right? The excelling character of faith, huh? In the apostle, the apostle now is Saint Paul, Saint Paul, right? In the apostle says one Corinthians chapter two verse six, we speak wisdom among the perfect, right?

[42:50] Not the wisdom of this world, right? Nor that of the princes of this world, huh? Which Thomas interprets to mean the philosophers, right? Wow, we're the prince of the world. But we speak the wisdom of God in mystery, right? Which is what hidden, right?

[43:12] Now the second reason why this is bad, right, is regard to the usefulness of drawing others to the faith, right? For when someone, approving the faith, brings in reasons which are not what cogent or force of mind, he gives way to the faithful, making fun of it, huh? Okay, to the laughter, might say.

[43:42] For they believe that resting upon these reasons, and I counter them, we what believe, right? So if you give, I used to say, even in philosophy, you know that a a bad defense of the truth is worse than a good attack upon it, right? If someone makes a good attack upon it, well, kind of force somebody else to defend it, right? But if you make a bad defense, they say, well, we've heard that side, and you know, it's just going to end up.

[44:13] Well, this is a little different case, but something like that, though. Is that what you believe, huh? Because you your reason has a definition of reason, and and is impressed with what reason is. Therefore, there must be a trinity of persons in God, huh? Say, well, these two things in me are not one substance or one or three persons, right? You know, there's some likeness there, right?

[44:41] But sort of like when the church is in power. Well, how do you know that? Because the church says so. Church defined. So the things that are of faith, right? One should not attempt to prove except what the authorities, right? And with those who receive the authorities, right? Okay. Not? Now Thomas said in the beginning, you might remember that, huh? He said, contrasting philosophy and theology, that in philosophy the argument from authority is the weakest, right?

[45:22] So if I say the Pythagorean theorem is true because Pythagoras said so, well, I suppose the reason you know to accept it, but it's the weakest one I could give, right? But in theology, it's the strongest, right?

[45:41] Now when Thomas is writing, the Summa Contra Gentilis, he's dealing with those who do not receive the what authorities, right? And Thomas contrasts, and he says, with the with the heretics, we can you know at least argue from sacred scripture, right, from the Old and the New Testament. With the Jews, you can at least argue from the what Old Testament, but with the Mohammedans, right? We can't do that, right?

[46:04] We can't do this reason, right? But Thomas is thinking you know, like Averroes and Avicenna, right? Who did do this reason, right? But among others, it suffices to defend that what the faith says is not impossible, right? Okay. If you look at Thomas, say like in the Summa Contra Gentilis, he will show the Trinity or or the incarnation, the truth of it from Sacred Scripture, right? Okay.

[46:42] But then you also have arguments drawn from reason against the possibility of being many persons in God, or against the possibility of incarnation, and then he'll show that the arguments against it are not sufficient.

[46:58] Once Dionysius says in the second chapter of the Divine Names, if there is someone who what totally resists the Sacred Writings, I guess right, he will be a long way from our what philosophy, right?

[47:15] If, however, he he looks towards the truth of the sayings, the Sacred sayings, then also what we will use the canon of them against him, right? If he denies these things.

[47:35] So, what does Thomas do then? The body article. He first gives the reason why natural reason cannot know the Trinity, right? And then why you should avoid right trying to show by natural reason there is a Trinity. I mean, should try to avoid demonstrating it, right? For two reasons, right? One that you will lower the dignity of faith, right, which is above the things that are above our reason, and secondly, because people will think that's why you what believe, huh?

[48:11] Okay. Okay. Now the first objection was a slew of things from the philosophers. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosophers did not know the mystery of the Trinity of the divine persons per propria, right?

[48:37] Which are the Fatherhood, the Sonhood, and, for want of a better name, the procession, right? The name, the relation, the Holy Spirit, according to that of the Apostle Saint Paul, one at Corinthians two, we speak the wisdom of God, huh? Which none of the princes of this age, right, knows. That is the philosophers, according to the gloss.

[49:07] Now, careful here, see. they did know certain essential attributes, though, right? Which are appropriated to the what persons? And we said later on there'll be an article here about appropriation, right? Questions about appropriation. Just as power is appropriated to the what Father, and we'll see why, is appropriated to Him, right? That's in the Creed, right? I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth and so on.

[49:41] Is the Father alone Almighty? No. Is the Father alone the Creator of the world? No. But these are appropriated to the Father, and we'll see the reason why they are when we get to that point, right? Wisdom to the Son, huh? Okay, he proceeds by way of God knowing Himself, right? But is the Son alone wise? No, it's appropriation. and goodness to the what? Holy Spirit, because goodness is tied up with the attribute to the will, right?

[50:18] So they could know about the power of God, the wisdom of God, the goodness of God. They could know attributes that we appropriate to the three persons, right?

[50:29] But they wouldn't know the three persons as such. What Aristotle therefore says that to this number, right? You know, we honor the gods and so on.

[50:47] It should not be understood that he laid down a number three in God, but he wished that the what? He wished you wanted to say that the ancients use a number three in sacrifices, right? And in prayers, on account of a certain perfection of the number three, right?

[51:12] So we see that it's perfect. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So the number three seems to designate a certain what? Yeah, a certain completeness. huh? since God is altogether perfect, it's appropriate to use a number three, right? Does that understand the Trinity? Well, obviously not. But it's interesting, right, that we see a certain perfection there in the number what? Three.

[51:43] In the books of the Platonists, there is found in the beginning was the verbum, the thought, right? Not according as thought signifies a person,

[51:57] gendered in divine things, but in according as by verbum is understood the what? Ideal notion or ideal ratio, the ideal species to which God what makes makes all things, and this is appropriated to the what? Sun, huh? Like in the. Timaeus there, right? He speaks, you know, of the Demiurgos, right? And he's got the pattern out there, and he's making things according to it, right? That's a little bit like God making things according to His thought, right?

[52:39] But you're not seeing it as a what? Distinction of persons in the thing there. huh? They are said nevertheless to fail in the third sign, that is in the knowledge of third person, because from goodness, which is appropriate to the Holy Spirit. They what deviated right, okay? When knowing God, they did not glorify Him as God, right? As is said in Romans one twenty one.

[53:11] Or because the Platonists lay down that there is one first being, right, whom they also called the Father of the whole what? Yeah, now even Homer speaks of it, right? He speaks of of Zeus as the Father of gods and men, right? Okay. And then consequent he placed under it another substance, which he called the what paternal intellect or mind.

[53:38] You had that same idea in, uh Um Avicenna, right? He doesn't seem to believe the Trinity. He's a Muslim, but he has the idea that the first being, right, produces this greater mind and so on.

[53:55] In which were the reasons of all things, as Macrobius recites, or the dream of Scipio, right? Very famous little work. Most of you wrote some music for the dream of Scipio.

[54:10] but they did not lay down some what third substance, right, which would seem to correspond to Holy Spirit. Of course, the Holy Spirit is more hidden from us, even. Okay.

[54:25] But thus we do not lay down Father and Son, as differing in their substance, right? But this was the mistake of Origen and Arius, fouling in this respect the what Platonists, huh? So Thomas is very hard on Origin sometimes, right? He gets into some trouble, you know.

[54:50] Now, what Proclus says that the monas, the one, generates the one, right, and it turns back upon itself with heat. Does not refer to the generation of the Son or the procession of the Holy Spirit, but to the production of the world, for the one God produces the one world on account of the love of Himself, right? So he brings the whole world back to himself, right?

[55:17] Okay. So I mean, the philosophers knew that. They knew that God was the beginning of all things and the end of all things. Aristotle says explicitly that God is the end of the whole universe, right? So, but that three is not the what Trinity. There is something complete about that, right? And although there is all kinds of you know particular differences between the division and order of the two sumas, say of Thomas and so on, but underlying both of them is the what consideration of God in Himself and the consideration of God as the beginning of all things.

[55:54] An consideration of God as the what end of all things, right? This is especially noticeable in the In the way the Summa contracentilis is divided, right? But it underlies this too. huh?

[56:10] Well, modad is a Greek word for one, right? And Thomas says the what the one God produced the one world, right? On account of the love of himself, right? So that's why they compare it to a circle, right? That in the circle, what is the beginning is also the end, right? It's in Acts and Andrew said, but they understood in a material way, right? Thus thou art, and to death thou shalt return, right?

[56:41] But God is the beginning in the sense of the maker, not of matter, and the end in the sense not of destruction of things, but their last good, right? So it's kind of a circle there, right? So he says the one God produced the one world and brought it back to himself, right? By love. Okay, that's a good thing. Well said, right? That's not the Trinity, right?

[57:06] But you do see these kind of likenesses there to the Trinity in some way, the three. Now, what about these reasons that they say he can give? Well, to the second, it should be said, and this is kind of a famous text of Thomas because so is a little understanding of experimental science too. To the second, it should be said that to some thing we can bring a reason in in two ways.

[57:34] In one way, to proving sufficiently some root, as in natural science, is induced a reason sufficient to proving that the motion of the heaven is always of a universal what velocity, uniform velocity. In another way, a reason is induced, not which sufficiently proves the root, but to the root already laid down, it shows the effects to be what congruent. And he gives the example from Ptolemy, right?

[58:08] As in astrology, or we'd say astronomy today, is laid down the ratio of what, eccentrics and epicycles, huh? And you could get very complicated, right? Because you had things traveling around a circle, and then around that circle there was a circle on top of it, right? Got more and more complicated until someone said, let's try to explain some other way, right?

[58:34] From this, that such a position laid down, one can save the what sensible appearances about the celestial motions. But this is not a sufficient reason proving it, because perhaps by some other position one could say the same thing, right? Now Einstein's example there is a guy looking at the face of a clock, right, and saying, "Well, what do we explain these motions?" And it's maybe one way to construct a clock, I guess.

[59:05] And so you can imagine a way that the mechanism of the clock might be that would explain these motions, but is that actually the way these motions are being produced? You don't know, right?

[59:21] So, one reason it kind of forces the mind, right? Another reason, so well, it could be this way, but I don't know. In the first way, therefore, one can induce a reason to proving that God is one and things of this sort, right? Things about unity of God, but in the second way, reason a reason is induced to manifest in some way the Trinity, right? Because the trinity being laid down, these reasons.

[59:52] Good with it, yeah. Not that to these reasons sufficiently is proved the what trinity of persons, right? And this is clear to each of the ones if you go through them. For the infinite goodness of God is manifested even in the production of what creatures, because it takes an infinite power to produce something from nothing.

[1:00:23] Nor is it necessary, if by an infinite what goodness He communicates, that something infinite proceeds from God, but according to its own way, it receives a divine goodness.

[1:00:40] Similarly, when it is said that without some company, some fellowship, one cannot have a joyful possession of some good, right? This has place when in one person is not found what perfect goodness, right? Once, he needs for a full goodness of joy the good of another associated with him. But that's not true about God, right? It's like the people who say, that God had to create the world because he'd be lonely without the world.

[1:01:24] Likewise, the similitude of our understanding does not sufficiently prove something about God, on account of the fact that intellect is not found univocally in God and in us, right?

[1:01:38] And hence it is that Augustine says upon John that through belief one comes to knowledge, and not the reverse. That's good. Well said, at least good say so.

[1:01:55] Some might say, you know, well, when I think about something, I form a thought of it, right? If when God thinks, He must have a thought too, right? Yeah. Some possibilities that, right? You know, but the divine, you know, thinking and our thinking are not really exactly the same, right? For me, what's true about my thinking is not exactly true about God's thinking, right?

[1:02:30] Now the third objection was: Why does God bother revealing something to us that excels our reason, right? Thomas says to the third, it should be said that a knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us in two ways, huh?

[1:02:54] In one way, to what having the right opinion, you might say, about the creation of things. For from this that we say that God made all things by His what word, we exclude the error of those laying down that God produced things from the necessity of what nature. Even people like Avicenna and so on into that position, right? And and what

[1:03:28] Spinoza, right? They said, yeah. So that's that's a common thing, right? And to this that we lay down in Him the procession of love, right? It shows that God did not what produce creatures in account of some need, but in account of the love of His own what goodness, right?

[1:04:01] Whence Moses, after he said Genesis one, in the beginning God created heaven and earth. He subjoins, God said, "Let there be light," to the manifestation of the divine what word. And afterwards he says, God saw light that it was what good, to showing the approval of the divine what love as to the goodness of the thing, and similarly in other words.

[1:04:30] That's the first reason Thomas gives, right? But then he says in another way, and principalios, which means what? Yeah, the more chief reason for it is to write the what opining about the salvation of the human race, which is perfected by the incarnate Son. And through the gift of the what? Yeah.

[1:05:00] So you might say that logically speaking, in the sense, the the Trinity is presupposed to the incarnation, right? Because in the definition of the incarnation is that the Word, the second person of the Blessed Trinity became man. So the way to understand the Trinity is before an understanding of what? Yeah. Even though when we first what introduce these things, we start with the human nature of Christ, right?

[1:05:31] It's interesting, huh? Because in someone just sent me a translation to look over recently, the name of the book in the translation is Who Do Men Say That I Am? Okay, it's kind of interesting, huh?

[1:05:54] It's a French priest wrote the book, but anyway. This is going back to Peter's confession of faith, right? And what does Peter say? Yeah, the Son of the Living God, right? So he starts with the human nature of Christ, because it's human nature that's anointed, right? Then he ascends to the divine, right? Okay. That's one order, right? An order quad nos, let's say, towards us. But then you get to the last gospel, which you gradually lead up to.

[1:06:27] Then you begin with the beginning was the Word, and the Word was toward God, and the Word was God. That's all dealing with the Trinity, right? And then later on, it says, "And the Word was made flesh."

[1:06:39] So, so the order is just the reverse, huh? So, because man is an animal, and and uses senses, right? You begin with the sensible. But you're you're led by the sensible to what is what.

[1:06:57] Yeah, yeah. Like in the song, I let the words of my mouth and the thought of my heart find favor before you. You know, the words first, right? Then that's not the ultimate thing, right? But when you define these things, right, you really have to understand the Trinity before you can understand the what. Yeah, yeah. But you know, as a little child, you begin with the human nature of Christ, right?

[1:07:22] And you take him to the crib and and these sort of things, huh? One of my little one of my sons is a little boy there. You know, he thought that the priest there was this Christ there up on the altar, right? Oh no, no, he's like, well, the way he is, Christ, but altar pistols, yeah,

[1:07:46] Yeah, yeah. yeah, yeah. It's flattery, isn't it? Very sobering. But so, where we begin. you say. I don't think six people are so proud. But when your reason tries to understand what it is that you believe, right? And we say theology is belief, you know, seeking understanding, understanding, right? Then, in a way, you have to understand the Trinity before you can understand the incarnation. And then you have the order there of Saint John beginning the gospel, right?

[1:08:24] Yeah, yeah. But then you know, at the end of the gospel there, just almost the next to last chapter there, says these things are written that you might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God. So he makes almost identical profession, a profession, I should say, of faith that Peter gave, except that he has the noun Jesus because he's not sticking to the man, you know.

[1:08:48] Why, why Peter's is replying to Christ, right? So he says, "You are the Christ, right? " But then he has the same order that Peter has, right? Because what's nice there about the end of John's Gospel is you see kind of the the union of Peter and and John, right? Huh? The older man who's outrunning the younger man, going to the tomb and so on. But they're they're they're being together.

[1:09:12] And John or Peter asked me, "What about this guy? You know, is he gonna is he gonna be put on the cross too?" So we

[1:09:21] take a little break here, and then we'll go on to.