Prima Pars
118. Summa I, Q.32 a.3–4 and Q.33 intro: The Five Notions, When Opinions About Them Become Heresy, and Whether the Father Is 'Beginning' Without Being 'Before'
Class of 2008-02-14
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/118-summa-i-q-32-a-3-4-and-q-33-intro-the-five-notions-when-opinions/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Help us to understand what you've written.

[0:24] So I guess you're up to the third article here in question 32, whether there are five notions. To the third, one proceeds thus: It seems that there are not five notions.

[0:41] For, in the first objection, says the proper notions of the persons are nothing other than the relations by which they are distinguished. But relations in divine things are not except four.

[1:01] That was in our second question, I think. Four relations. The relation of the Father to the Son, and the Son to the Father, right? Then the relation of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit to them. Therefore, there are only four what notions whereby the persons are known and distinguished. That's not a good objection, huh?

[1:29] Moreover, an account of the fact that in God there is only one essence or nature, there is said to be one God. An account of the fact that there are three persons, God is said to be three, huh? Trinus. If, therefore, in God there are five notions, He should be said to be fivefold, huh? Which is unsuitable. Doesn't fit with the rest of it.

[2:04] Moreover, if three persons, if there are three persons, three persons existing in God, there are five notions, is necessary that in one of those persons there are what two or more notions, huh? As in the person of the Father is laid down in nascibilitas, huh, not being born, huh?

[2:30] And fatherhood and common breathing. Now, either these three notions differ in reality in the thing itself, or they don't. If they differ in the thing, it would follow that the person of the Father is composed from three things, or from many things. If, however, they differ by reason only, it would follow that one of them could be said of the other. Just as we say that the divine goodness is is wisdom, on account of the lack of any difference in the thing, so common breathing would be the same thing as what fatherhood, which is not agreed to, not conceded.

[3:17] Therefore, there are not what five notions. So those objections are saying there's less than five, right? Now they said contra. It seems that Thomas is going to reply to both sides. Yes, he is. Okay. So sometimes you know you have what usually the said contra is the position Thomas is going to adopt, but sometimes it's in between the two. But on the other side, it seems that there are more,

[3:52] because just as the Father is from no one, and according to this is taken the notion which is called unbornfulness. So from the Holy Spirit there is not another person, right? And according to this, we're not to take a sixth notion, right? So just as it's a what a notion of the Father that he's not from anybody else, right? So it ought to be a notion of the Holy Spirit.

[4:24] There's no one from him. That gives you six, right? Moreover, just as it's common to the Father and the Son that the Holy Spirit proceeds from them,

[4:42] so it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that they both proceed from the Father. Therefore, just as there is one notion that is laid down to be common to the Father and the Son, that's this common breathing, right? So there ought to be one notion that's common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that they're from the Father, or they're from another.

[5:07] So is it more or less than five? What Thomas is going to say? Yeah, he's going to say the truth is in between these two positions. Says five.

[5:20] So Thomas says I answer that notion, huh, is called what is a proper what thought or reason for knowing the divine person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by origin, the origin of one from another. Now to origin it pertains two ideas here, that one from another, right? One from whom is another, and the one who is from another.

[5:57] From whom is another, and who is from another. Okay. And according to these two ways, one can make known a what person. Therefore, the person of the Father is not able to be made known the fact that he is from another, but only from this that he is from no one. And thus, on this side, his notion is not born him unborn or unbornness. Without birth, let's put it that way.

[6:36] That's what it tells us, right? But in so far as someone is what from him, right? He is made known in two ways. Because in so far as someone, because in so far as the son is from him, he is made known by the notion of fatherhood.

[7:01] And in so far as the Holy Spirit is from him, he is made known by the notion of common breathing. Now the son is able to be made known through this that he is from another being born, huh? And in this way, he is made known through the notion of what? Yeah, sonhood. And through the fact that there is another one from him, namely the Holy Spirit.

[7:33] And through this, he is made known in the same way as the Father, to wit, by common breathing. The Holy Spirit, however, is able to be made known through this that is from another. Or from what others, huh? And thus he is made known by, for want of a better name, proceeding, right? Procession. But not, however, through this that another one is from him, because no divine person proceeds, right, from him, right?

[8:10] Therefore, there are five notions in God. Without birth, huh? Without a beginning, fatherhood, sonhood, common breathing, and procession. Now, of these four, four of them are what relations, huh? For without birth, is not a relation except by what reduction. Now, this is the thing that comes up even in logic. You know, when we talk about the ten categories, right? And some things are in the categories which are genera, because they are what species, huh, of that genus, huh?

[8:56] But the. Negation of one of these species is reduced, led back to that genus, not as a species, but as a negation of something in that genus, huh? And sometimes something is led back in another way because it's the beginning of something in there, right? Okay. So, in what genus do you put point, for example?

[9:23] Quantity. Yeah, this point of quantity. Does it have some size? No, but because it's the beginning of a line, which is in the genus of what? Continuous quantity, which is the species of quantity. Okay. And where would you place blindness? Quality.

[9:45] Yeah, not that it's a quality. It's not quality, but it's led back to that genus, huh? Because it's a negation of a species, huh? Okay. So, without birth, which in a way is saying. Doesn't have a beginning, right?

[10:05] It doesn't signify beginning or relation, but it's kind of like the negation, and so it's led back, right? I'll explain again later on, as he says.

[10:20] Now, four of these are what? Proprietates, properties, right? It's a little bit like we say in logic. What is a property in the strict sense?

[10:36] Is less than ten a property of two in the strictest sense of property? No. What? Has to belong to one thing, particularly or only. Yeah, there's actually three things in the definition of property in the full sense: it belongs to only one species, to every member of that species, and always, right? So half of four is a property of two. Every two is half of four. Only two is half of four.

[11:08] And always two is half of four, right? Then you have properties in lesser sense that have, you know, two or even one of these things. So it's a property of man to be a logician. Was every man a logician? No. Is man always a logician? No. Well, but only man is a logician, right? No dog, to my knowledge, or cat is a logician, right? Only man is a logician.

[11:39] Okay, so he's speaking of properties here. What does he mean? What's something that belongs to what? Only one person, right? And not to the other ones, right? Okay.

[11:56] So common breathing would not be proprietas, because it belongs to both the father and the son. So although it makes known in a sense the father and the son, in their distinction from the Holy Spirit, it doesn't make known the father as distinguished from the son. Okay. But father belongs to, or fatherhood belongs to the father alone. Nobody else is a father there. And sonship

[12:25] belongs only to the son, right? And to no one else. And proceeding or procession being breathed belongs to what? Only the Holy Spirit. Okay. And being without birth or without a beginning belongs only to the Father, right? I don't know. Doesn't it seem like the Holy Spirit and the Son aren't really? I mean, the Holy Spirit. Yeah, there's a question about the naming of that. You see, but I think Thomas understands, you know, this as being.

[12:59] Understood more generally, right? Is negating any one from whom he proceeds, right? Okay. Not only that he's not born from someone as a son, right? You made a couple bit about the the meaning of that, right? But so notice of these five, four are relations, and four are what properties, right? But they're not the same four.

[13:27] Because common common spiration is a relation but not a property. And then what's the other case? Property, not a relation. Without birth is a property but not a what relation? Yeah. Okay. Would be accurate or a little less confusing instead of saying without birth to say without origin. Yeah, it maybe could understand in that broader sense. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I guess this has it become so so ingrained this term in actually proprietates And usually Thomistic thinkers don't come from Thomas originally the words, right?

[14:08] Okay. Well, in logic, this is a little different meaning. It's not species, right? Yeah. But in logic, the definition of property is something outside the nature of a thing, right? But following upon the nature, right? In the strict sense, it belongs to only one species to every member of that species and always, right?

[14:36] So it's a property of two, as you say, to be half of four, right? It's not a property of two in that full sense to be less than ten, but every two is less than ten and always is less than ten. But does belong only to two, right? That's a property in a somewhat lesser sense, right? So the word property there can be taken in a less strict sense, but here he's taking it in a way like that.

[15:04] He's talking about what belongs to only what one of the three persons, and in no way to the other two. Well, to be without birth or to be without origin belongs only to the father, because the son has an origin which is the father, right? And the Holy Spirit has origin which is the father and the son. Okay. So to be without origin belongs only to the father.

[15:28] To be father belongs only to the father. To be son belongs only to the son. And to be breathed, to proceed in that way belongs only to the Holy Spirit, right? Okay. So four of the five are relations, and four of the five notions are properties, but it's not the same four exactly, right? There's one property that is. What? Not a relation, and one relation that is not a property.

[16:02] Okay, so you got a distinct notion of these. Okay, and that makes another distinction here. Three notions are he calls them what? Personal, meaning by that constituting persons, right? For fatherhood constitutes one person,

[16:21] sonship another person, and proceeding by being breathed, a third person, right? But common breathing and without birth or without origin are said to be notions of persons, right? But not personal, not constituting the person, as will be more clear later on, right? Okay.

[16:50] There'll be any questions on the person and the persons and so on. So you got the five down now. Philosophy begins with what other five? Genus, species, difference, property, and accident. And Porphyry says, "O Chrysaorius," he says, "it's necessary to know what genus is, what species is, what difference is, what property is, what accident is." Actually, says difference before property before before species, but anyway, to understand Aristotle's categories, right, and to understand definition, to understand division, and to understand demonstration.

[17:34] So those five really, you know, of course, his book was originally called the Isagoge, the introduction to the categories, but then they dropped out the last part. It is the introduction, kind of introduction to the whole philosophy, right? Because logic, in a way, is is an introduction to philosophy, and this introduction to almost the whole logic, right? The categories, and definition, and demonstration, right, and division too.

[17:59] Well, this is something. These five are what? Notions or thoughts whereby we what? Know the persons and distinguish one from another, right? And there are five of these, right?

[18:14] But only four of them are relations. One of them is not a relation except by reduction, right? Only four of them are what? Properties, right? And only three of them are what? Personal, right? Okay.

[18:34] That's over that five for three, right? Okay. Now the first objection says that the proper notions of the persons are the relations which they are distinguished. But there's only four relations in God, right? So why do you add this fifth notion, right?

[19:06] Well, what do they say about the Father? He's the beginning of the whole Godhead. You have to be careful about that. You understand that, huh? But he is, you know, for excellence the beginning, right? And you know, in the beginning of St. John's Gospel, says, "In the beginning was the Word, right? And the Word was towards God, and the Word was God. But how do you understand that first sentence?

[19:33] In the beginning was the Word. From all eternity. That's one meaning of it. Yeah. In the beginning, right? It was always there. So eternal. But another meaning is, is in the beginning, meaning the Father. And there will be, you know, for the Father is the beginning, right? In this next question, you know. But nevertheless, this in a way is is more the negation of a relation than a relation.

[20:12] Now, the second objection says, "Got five notions, then you speak of God as being fivefold, right? " Okay. But notice the notions are not signifying what what is found in God so much as notions whereby we distinguish what is found in God.

[20:33] Unlike the essence and unlike the what persons, right? To the second, therefore, he says it should be said that the essence in God signifies as a certain what thing, and therefore we say there's one what God because there's one nature, right? And likewise, the persons signify as some things, huh?

[21:02] And therefore, we say there are three persons in God, right? Now, notice the the equivocation there of the word res, right? Okay. And a definition of person that you find in Boethius too, in a way like the one we had, but you know, in Latin says res, a thing subsistens in intellectuali natura or something like that, a thing subsisting in a rational nature, right? Intellectual nature. So you know, I ask this question sometimes:

[21:38] Are the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. Spirit one thing or three things? Yes. And if you say at one time they're one thing, and then another time you say they're three things, you would seem to be what? Yeah. But it's because the word "thing" has more than one one meaning, right? It goes back in a sense to Aristotle and the categories

[22:03] there, right? Um. So there's one absolute thing, right? But then the other three things are what Relations, huh? So they signify as something in God, right, or things in God, right? Okay. The essence or the divine nature is a thing, and the three persons are three things, huh? But the notions signify not as what things in God, but thoughts making known the persons, right? Okay. There's two more thoughts.

[22:44] Okay. And therefore, although God is said to be one on account of the unity of his essence or nature or substance, and three on account of the Trinity of persons, huh? Nevertheless, he is not said to be fivefold on account of what? Five notions, huh?

[23:08] So you want to confuse those two, right? So reduction from five to four to three is different than the one I was giving in terms of the soul, right? Because the genera of powers are different things, right? And the different grades of life are different kinds of things, and the three kinds of soul are different things here. But these five notions are not what five things in God, right?

[23:38] But they're five thoughts, you might say, rationes, huh? Five reasons to have in mind to distinguish these. Okay. Okay. Now the third objection. If there are three persons existing in God,

[24:11] if there are five notions for them, right, is necessary that in one of the persons there are what two or more notions, right? We want to talk about that, right? Okay. Now either these notions differ as things, right, in reality, or not. If they differ as things, it would follow that you have composition in God, right? They differ in thought only. It follows that one can be what said of the other, right?

[24:42] Okay. And therefore, the common breathing is the fatherhood, and okay, so the Holy Spirit can be the son again. All these horrible problems, right?

[24:56] Now Thomas says to the third, it should be said that only relative opposition makes a real plurality in God, right? But many properties of one person, since they are not opposed to each other relatively, don't what differ in reality, right?

[25:22] Nevertheless, they are not said of each other because they signify as diverse what thoughts about the persons, huh? And in that way, we could also say in the objection there, right? We could say that the attribute of power. We do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of what knowledge, huh? Although we say that what. Knowledge is power. Yeah, yeah. So in a sense, the attribute is bringing in, I suppose, a little bit our thought, right?

[25:59] So we have a thought about the power of God, and we have a thought about the wisdom of God, and we have a thought about the goodness. Of God, and are these thoughts the same? Not for us, no. No, no. Even though, what corresponds to them is the same thing in God.

[26:21] So these are really five different thoughts we have about the three persons, right? But there's real distinction only where you have things that are opposed, but relatively. So father and son are opposed relatively. I can't be my own father or my own son. Must be a real distinction between me and my father, and a real distinction between me and my what, son.

[27:03] But say I'm a husband, and are they opposed? Being a father, they belong to the same person, right? But those are really different relations for another reason. They're based upon different relations,

[27:24] I guess. Now, the last two are the objections on the other side, right? So let's look at those again. The first Sed contra says, just as the father is from no one, and according to this, one takes the notion of without birth, right? Which, as you say, it means more without origin, right? Some no one. So from the Holy Spirit, there is not another person, right? So you shouldn't want to have a sixth notion here, right?

[28:02] Thomas recalls the fact that people say person signifies dignity. So I fall the second saying all that. Okay, dignity of person. One cannot take some notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is what from him. For this does not pertain to his dignity. He has no one from him.

[28:27] Just as it pertains to the authority of the Father that he is from what no one, right? I've been trying to figure out why he uses the word authority

[28:39] here. Well, author has the idea of the origin of something, right? Yeah, doesn't have the sense of authority and thus, right? Okay. But part of the excellence of the Father is that he's from no one.

[29:01] Doesn't pretend though, or add subtility to the Holy Spirit. There's no one from him. That's why you don't have that as a sixth notion.

[29:16] Now the last objection is common to the Father and the Son, just as it is common to the Father and the Son that from them goes forth the Holy Spirit, right? So it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that they go forth from the Father. Therefore, just as there is one notion, one notion laid down common to the Father and the Son, this common breathing, so not to lay down one common notion to the Son and the Holy Spirit.

[29:50] That's the distinction that Thomas points out. The Father and the Holy Spirit do not come together in one special way of being from the Father, but the Father and the Son come together in one special way of what? Producing the Holy Spirit, they both breathe the Holy Spirit, right? It's one and the same breathing that they have, but the Father and the Son don't go forth from the Father in the same way.

[30:22] The one is generated from the Father, the other is not generated from the Father, but he is breathed by the Father, right? But that which is a beginning of making known ought to be something but special, and therefore it is not similar, right?

[30:46] So, so we settle with five now. See, there's five notions, Neither more nor less. huh You say, more or less than the truth, there are villains and the. Sons of darkness, as Faustus says. Is there a distinction between filiation and generation? But we'll talk about that in the comparative consideration.

[31:16] But you know, generation at this point we would say generation is the act underlying our way of thinking, anyway, right? The distinction between father and what son, right? Okay. But there'll be more subtleties that'll come up when you get into the comparative thing, right?

[31:43] Now, you heretics, whether it is licit to opine contrarily about the notions, right? To the fourth, one proceeds thus: it seems that it is not licit to think contrarily wise about the notions. For Augustine says in the first book of the Trinity that one is never mistaken. Nowhere is it more dangerous, you might say, right, to err than when you're talking about the what Trinity, huh?

[32:20] To which it is certain that the notions pertain, right, to this study. But contrary opinions cannot be without some kind of error, right? Therefore, it is not licit to think contrary wise about the notions, huh? So some of you guys are thinking there are six or seven or only four or something. Forty-six, actually. If I say there's five and you say there's four, then one of us must be mistaken, right?

[32:48] It's nowhere more dangerous than talking about the Trinity to make a mistake. So therefore, it's not licit, it seems, huh? Moreover, through the notions, the persons are known, right?

[33:03] But it's not licit to opine contrarywise about the persons. Therefore, neither about the what? But against this, is that the articles of faith are not about the notions.

[33:23] Therefore, it's licit to what? Think differently, right? Thus, otherwise about the notions, right? Okay. Now, Thomas is going to make a distinction, right? I answer: It should be said that something pertains to faith in two ways.

[33:49] In one way, directly, as those things which are what chiefly handed over to us or handed down to us divinely, as that God is three and what one. The Son of God is what incarnate, and things of this sort. And about these to opine the false, by that very fact brings in what heresy. And most of all, if what pertinacity, persistent persistence is joined, right? So you adhere to this, right?

[34:25] You might, you know, thinking kind of loosely, think falsely about these things. But I'm just pointing out to you you adhere, you know, with pride, you know, huh, to your false opinion. Then, then you're committing heresy.

[34:44] Indirectly, that pertains to faith, from which follows something that is contrary to faith. Just as if someone said that Samuel was not the son of what, yeah, from which it would follow this divine scripture is what false.

[35:06] Now, about things of this sort, without danger of heresy, someone can think something false. Before it is considered or has been determined that from this there follows something what contrary to faith, and most of all if he does not pertinacity with pertinacity, obstinately right adhere to it, huh? But after it has been made known, and especially if it has been determined by the Church, right, that from this there follows something contrary to faith, then to err in this matter is not without what heresy

[35:50] account of this, many things are now considered heretical, which before were not what. Yeah, On account of the fact that now it is more manifest what follows from them. So even in you know saints, right, you could have opinions, right, that we now would regard as what, yeah, yeah,

[36:16] you know, like the question of the immaculate conception, right? I think there are some saints who denied the immaculate conception, right? Okay, Now it would be clearly heresy if you denied it now, but before it would not be right because they get determined that this was connected with the incarnation.

[36:40] Thus, therefore, it should be said that about the notions, some without danger of heresy opine in a contrary way, not intending to sustain anything that is contrary to the faith. But if someone thinks falsely about the notions. Considering that from this there follows something contrary to faith, then he falls into what heresy, and by this is clear the response to the what objections.

[37:16] So this brings us to the end of the four questions about the persons in general, right? And we divide the four questions into what three, right? Subdividing the second part, there was a question about the meaning of person in general and in God in particular, right? And then there was two questions about the number of persons, right? The plurality of persons and what follows upon them, and then the notions whereby the persons are what known, huh?

[37:51] Okay. Thoughts we have, Making known the distinction of the persons. Now the next six questions are going to be about the persons in In particular, right. But you'll see, there's one question devoted to the Father, and two to the Son, and three to the what? Holy Spirit, right.

[38:16] So he says, "Consequently, we're not to consider about the persons in special, in particular, and first about the person of the what? Father. And about this, four things are what asked, right?

[38:37] First, whether it belongs to the Father to be a what? Beginning, right? Now I was mentioning that before. One meaning of in beginning was the word, right? Is that he's eternal, right? Beginning of time, always was. But another meaning of in the beginning was the Father's and I, and I and Father. So the Word is in the beginning. He's in the what? The Father, who is the beginning that has no beginning, right?

[39:10] Secondly, whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name what? Father. Third, whether the name Father, right, is said before, according as is taken personally, then it is taken what? Essentially, right. So, no. So you pray in the Our Father, you say, "Our Father who art in heaven, " is Father naming the first person of the Trinity, or is that naming God?

[39:50] Seems to me the first person because Jesus is praying to God. I don't know. Again, I assume Father's right, but God's just plain the opposite. Yeah. Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name. Yeah. The King of Kings. Is it just the first person? No, it's not. It just seems.

[40:15] That's why I have to read this. But since the Son taught it to us. If we define prayer as, you know, the ascent of the mind to God and asking God for suitable things, and this is the prayer of prayers, right? You know, Augustine says, contains everything that we we can write to the asked for, right? It would seem that Father means God, right? Okay.

[40:39] Although sometimes you know might be attributed to the Father because some reason, because we attribute power to him or something. So, but anyway, the Father can be taken therefore to mean God, and it can be taken. That means essentially, as he says, right? And then personally, where it signifies. the first person of the blessed trinity, right? And Thomas is saying, "Well, you got to name them that's equivocal, right?

[41:09] " And does it first mean God, or does it first mean the? Okay, that's the order thing. So, in a sense, you put second and the third article together, right? Because they're dealing with the what name, Father, right?

[41:39] Does it properly signify this name, the person of the Father, right? Or maybe complicated because it can signify something else, right? Okay. And then, whether it is proper to the Father to be what unborn, right? Now raises that question again that you are raising, right? About whether the Holy Spirit is ingenitum right? Or whether ingenitum should be understood in broader sense than the words themselves would seem to indicate, meaning without a beginning, right, without an origin.

[42:26] Notice in this question, there is nothing here about the common breathing at this point, is there? Okay. He's taking these two ones that seem to be what private to the Father, right? Little problem there about the word Father. Okay, certainly one of its meanings it is private to the Father, right?

[42:52] You find out in the second article and then the third one raises the question of of the order of the words, right? Now, whether it belongs to the Father to be a beginning, right?

[43:11] That's interesting. She begin with that. Also interesting, one of his references here, the parallel passages against the errors of the Greeks. They just saw that. i printed that out with him right right at the beginning of the errors of the greeks. yeah, yeah. Now here, Thomas is going to

[43:37] kind of correct Aristotle, we could say, right? Okay. Because Aristotle will will say, you know, in the first reading there in the fifth book of wisdom, right? The fifth book of wisdom is about the names used in wisdom, right? Which are also the names used in the axioms, and because of their community, are used to some extent everywhere, right? And the first name that Aristotle begins with is the word beginning, or principium right?

[44:13] In Greek, could be arche, right? Aristotle goes through about six different meanings of the word beginning, right? Beginning with the beginning of the table here, right? Beginning of the line, and so on. The way it's most appropriate to begin, right? So when I go to Boston, I don't begin the beginning of the road, but the beginning for me is where I come onto the line, or it is.

[44:42] And then you have the fundamental part of a thing. The foundation of a house is the beginning of the house, right? And then you come to the mover or the what maker, right? The artist is the beginning. michael angelo is the beginning of the pietà, right? But that's the fourth sense. Third sense is the foundation of a house is the beginning of a house. The keel is the foundation of a beginning of a ship, and so on.

[45:07] And the first sense is what the beginning of knowing, right? Principles of science. Latin word for beginning. And then the sixth sense is what any cause, right? So even the end can be beginning, right? So you see the word we moved a long way, right? And the end is the beginning. but then when our star gets to those six senses, he gives a kind of a common notion of beginning, right?

[45:36] And he says the beginning is what is first in being or becoming or knowing. So he defines in the kind of common notion of beginning that it's first, right? Okay. Now, what does first mean?

[45:54] It means before all the what rest, right? So if you take Aristotle's common notion of beginning, and you say the father is the beginning, right? Then you'd say he's first, therefore he's before the rest, right? And this contradicts the Athanasian Creed, for example, right? And we have later on Article that says there's no before and after in the Trinity. The Father is not before the Son in any sense of the word before, right?

[46:29] And Thomas will touch upon Aristotle's chapter there before, right? Before in time, you know, before in being, before in knowledge, right? Before in goodness, right? In no sense of before is the Father before the Son. And in no sense of before is the Father the Son before the Holy Spirit, right? So

[46:52] is Aristotle mistaken about what a beginning is, right? Well. Aristotle was a pagan, right? He had no knowledge of the Trinity, right? Okay. But is every beginning

[47:15] that's known to natural reason, right? Is every beginning before that which is a beginning? No. Ask the question again. Is every beginning known to natural reason? No, no. See, before that which is a beginning. What do you think? Is every beginning known to us first? So, first and beginning are almost synonyms, right? What do you think?

[47:58] See, it is the beginning of the line. The point before the rest of the line, beginning of the day before the rest of the day,

[48:11] beginning of the motion before the rest of the motion, right? Is the foundation of the house before the rest of the house? The definitions of Euclid before the rest of the science? Yeah, it's a go before the categories and the. See, now Thomas will see when he applies to the third objection. Let's look at that for a second before we get into this. That although this name beginning, as regards that from which it was placed to signify something, seems to be taken from priority, right?

[49:05] From beforeness, right? Nevertheless, it does not signify beforeness, but what origin, right? So he seems to be in a sense here, looking at the word beginning and say it's it's got a meaning that Aristotle, he would see, you know. But he thought this other thing was part of it too, right?

[49:36] So it's a little bit of a thing there, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? Because every beginning known by natural reason would be first, before that which is the beginning. It seems to me.

[49:53] But in the Trinity, there's no before. So, does it mean to say that the Father is the beginning of the Son, right? Or he's the origin of the Son, right? As he'll explain later on, his being the origin of the Son doesn't mean he's before him.

[50:16] We'll see the reason for that when we get there. So Augustine's example of that, when you see your image in the mirror, it's the same as when you're there. That doesn't come a few minutes later when you're clear. Yeah. Yeah. You see, the Son proceeds as the thought of the Father, right? But God is always actually thinking of Himself, right? Always has the thought there. So the thinker is not before the thought in time, okay?

[50:48] Nor can one be without the other. And their goodness consists in the divine nature, which is goodness itself, and they have the same divine nature. So one is not before the other in the sense of being better. And Aristotle said the same. Now it's opposites. Plato had said it before him, right? So, in no way is the Father before the Son, right?