Prima Pars
121. Summa I, Q. 34, Arts. 2–3: Word as the Son's Own Name, and the Word's Relation to Creatures
Class of 2008-02-28
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/121-summa-i-q-34-arts-2-3-word-as-the-sons-own-name-and-the-words/

[0:00] Whether word is the son's own name, right? Okay. To the second one proceeds thus: it seems that word is not the son's own name.

[0:20] For the son is a subsisting person in God, but word or thought does not signify a thing subsisting, as is clear enough, right? So my thought is not a what? Substance. It's not a hypostasis. It's not a person, right? Why the son of God is a person? So how can the word be his name, right? Therefore, word cannot be the son's own name.

[0:58] Moreover, the word, by a certain carrying forth, proceeds from the one speaking. If, therefore, the son is properly a word, he does not proceed from the father except by way of what? Speech. See "prolatio" means what? Being carried forward, right? How do you translate that in English, Text What? Pirates Okay, but "prolatio latio's got the word for what? Carrying, I think, and "pro" means forward, right? Brought forth, carried forward, right?

[1:38] Which is the heresy of Valentinus, right? Okay. As is clear from Augustine in his book about heresy, well, we've got to watch ourselves, there, right?

[1:53] Be very careful when you use the words. Okay. Moreover, every proper name of some person signifies something, what? Some property of it, huh? If, therefore, the word is the proper name of the son, it signifies some property of him, and thus there are more properties in God than those numbered above, right? In the five notions there.

[2:26] That's that's interesting objection. Moreover, whoever understands in understanding conceives a thought or word, but the son understands. Therefore, of the son, there is another word, and thus it is not private to the son to be the word, huh?

[2:49] Moreover, it is said in Hebrews one three about the son carrying all by the what? Word of his power, huh? From which Basil it takes that the Holy Spirit is the Word of the Son is not therefore a private to the Son to be the what Word,

[3:11] but now against all this nonsense is what Augustine says in the sixth book about the Trinity that the Word alone is taken for the Son, right? Of course, you could go to the Gospel St. John, right? Because there is clear that the Word of God is what the Son of God, right? You look at the chapter there, right?

[3:40] So, as far as your authority is concerned, you could be clear in the Gospel of St. John, right? But Thomas, I'll go to the reason for this.

[3:56] The answer should be said that Word properly said in God, as opposed to metaphorically, is taken what personally, the person, and is the what

[4:15] its own name, the proper name of the Son, of God. Right, By the person who is the Son. For it signifies a certain what emanation of the understanding, but the person who proceeds in God by the intellect, emanation of the intellect, is called the what Son, and this procession is called what generation. We're talking about the similarity there, the word concept, right? Okay. Hence it remains that the Son alone is properly called the Word in God.

[5:04] So Thomas talks about there being only three persons in God, right? He talks about they have to be distinguished by a proceeding that remains within the what God Himself, right? Therefore, within activity that remains within, there's only two kinds of activity remaining within God, right? And one is the act of the understanding, and the other is the act of the will, right? The loving, basically. And so the one proceeds by way of God understanding Himself, right?

[5:40] And that's where the Son is God understood, and the other one proceeds by way of God loving Himself. So if the Word proceeds by way of understanding in the Son, that same way, the same person.

[6:02] Now, the first objection says, "It's a good place to begin because you got to start the fundamental objections rather than get more subtle things." A thought in us is not a person, but

[6:19] so in Saint John says, "In the beginning was the logos." What does "logos" mean there? How would you translate that? You translate "word," right? But it's word in the sense of thought, right? So it could also be translated in that context by saying, "Beginning was the thought."

[6:38] But our thoughts are not persons. How can God's thought be a person? Thomas gives you something you have to understand from the treatise on the unity of God. Right. To the first, therefore, it should be said that in us, to be and to understand are not the same thing. I discovered in my life. I can be without understanding something, right? And I have to struggle to understand things.

[7:09] And so, for me to be is not by any means to understand. Whence that which has in us understandable being, right? That is to say, being in our understanding, understanding does not pertain to our what our nature, because it's not my being.

[7:33] But the to be of God is the same thing as his to understand. For God to be and to understand are the same thing. That's something. That's interesting position to be in. So you say, right? Huh? For me to be is to understand.

[7:58] That's that's that's it's something. Whence the word or thought of God is not some what? Accident. in him, right? Or some effect of him, right? Because an effect would have a different existence than the cause, right?

[8:21] But it pertains to his very nature, and therefore it is necessary that be something subsisting, because whatever is in the nature of God subsists.

[8:37] And therefore Damascene says that the word of God is what Substantiale substantial, Any being in a what hypostasis. That's a person, individual substance, right? But the other words, the other thoughts, to wit, ours. are powers of the what, virtues of the what, soul, right? They're accidents, right?

[9:05] So my thoughts are in me, but they're not me. Even my thought of myself is not me, is it? Even reason's definition of reason, right, is not reason. It's a definition of what reason is, but it's not reason itself, right? So, my reason, conceives that it is a what ability for a large discourse, looking before and after. It has what formed a thought about itself, a definition, in fact, of itself, right? But is that definition of reason, reason itself?

[9:54] And the being of reason is not the understanding of what reason is, any more than the being of reason is the understanding of what a triangle is.

[10:08] So my thoughts are not me, right? Not not even my reason, let alone me. Now you know what God says. My thoughts are not your thoughts. So that's my little objection, but Thomas you know starts with that, right? Very very human, Thomas's.

[10:39] That's why when I was giving the little discourse there on antonomasia, right, that Saint John is speaking by antonomasia when he says, "In the beginning was the word. In the beginning was the thought. " Just like we call Aristotle the philosopher. So if you say Aristotle is a philosopher, are you speaking by antonomasia there? No. If you say he's the philosopher, then you seem to be what?

[11:09] Saying among all men he is the philosopher, right? Okay, Aristotle calls Homer the poet, right? Um, of course Thomas calls Saint Paul the apostle, right? Okay. But one reason why it is the thought is it's the only thought that is a what? Substance or that is a person.

[11:38] Part of why it's the thought, right? But that by itself is impressive, isn't it? I've got thoughts, but none of them is a person.

[12:02] I have a son who's a person. And you thought about it. Now the second objection there, not too clear to us about the heresy of Valentine, right? So Thomas explains a little.

[12:29] To the second, it should be said that not on account of this was the error of Valentine damned, because he said that the son, right, was born, right, being carried forth as the Arians what? Calls named him. Yeah, yeah. It's it's Hilary refers in the sixth book of the Trinity, an account of the what? Various mode, right? The other mode of bringing forth, which they laid down, is clear to Augustine in the book about heresies.

[13:04] We have to go to the to see exactly the problem was there. But maybe they what? Were understanding the way he went forward as being what? Yeah, yeah. Not to worry too much about the objection.

[13:23] And what about property? This wasn't wasn't one of the five notions before, right? So on. Now, Thomas says to the third, it should be said that in the name of the word or thought, the same property is implied, which is in the name what? Son. We saw a little bit of that with the word concept, right?

[13:48] Whence Augustine says, in the same way, he's said to be what? The word as son, right? For the nativity of the son, which is a what? Personal property of him is signified by diverse names, which are attributed to son to expressing in diverse ways his perfections. If we can't find a name that brings out all the perfection of the son in his birth, right? For that he might be shown to be of the same nature as the father.

[14:23] He is called what? Son. That he might be shown to be co-eternal, he's said to be splendor, because that seems to be simultaneous with the with the flame or with the with the light, huh? That he might be shown to be altogether similar, he's called the image, huh? That he might be shown to be generated in immaterial way, he's called the what? Word, yeah. I mean the objection to saying that God is generated because generation means something material, right?

[14:58] In our first use of the word, right? So he's not generated in that way, right? There cannot be found one name by which all these things are what? Designated, huh?

[15:24] So. So saying that he's the son does that bring out that he's the immaterial way of this? Like the word thought does. Interesting how Saint John begins the Gospel by talking about him as the what word it shows.

[15:59] He wants to bring out there. Now, what about the fourth objection here? The Son understands, doesn't he? Have a thought. To the fourth, it should be said: in that way belongs to the Son to be understanding, in which it belongs to him to be what God, because God understands. Since to understand is said essentially in God, right? To understand and to be are the same thing in God, and to be and what he is are the same thing, right?

[16:41] But the Son is what God generated, not God generating. Whence he is understanding, not as producing a word or thought, right? But he's understanding as the thought proceeding.

[17:05] In so far as in God the thought proceeding really does not differ from the divine what understanding, but by relation alone is distinguished from the what principle. I mean that word for the Holy Spirit, right? I mean for the Father, right? He's a principle, beginning of the Word, right? That's what we understand, Yeah beginning was the word That's the only understanding it, yeah. It was in the Father.

[17:45] Now the fifth objection: when it is said of the Son, carrying all things by the what word of his power, Thomas understands as what to be said figuratively, right? For the effect of the what word, right? Whence the gloss

[18:12] there says that word is taken for what command. In so far as it is an effect of the power of the word that things are what preserved in being, just as it is from the effect of the power of the word that things are produced in being.

[18:36] That Basil understands verbum for the Holy Spirit, right? Improperly and figuratively is said, right. As word is said of someone, everything that is what manifestive, manifests it in some way, and thus, for that reason, the Holy Spirit is called the Word of the Son, because He what manifests the Son, right? But it's kind of a what

[19:12] improper figurative use of the word, right? Gotta watch these guys, huh? Let's take a little break here before we do the third article here. Okay, third article here.

[19:33] To the third one proceeds thus. It seems that in the name of the word or thought is not implied a respect or relation to creatures.

[19:49] Thomas is going to take that as a side, right? For every name connoting an effect in the creature is said essentially in God, but the word is not said essentially, but personally, as has been said. Therefore, the word does not imply respect to the what creature?

[20:17] I'm interested in this article here because would you think of the word or the name "son" as implying a reference to the creature? No, because "son" seems to be reference to the father, right? But the word

[20:38] you're saying by the word everything you understand, and God, although chiefly understands himself, nevertheless, in understanding himself, he understands everything else, right? So, in some way, he says not only himself, but even creatures in his word, right? So then the question arises: Well, then, is this word in some way what? Yeah, yeah. Saint Bonaventure speaks of it as eternal art. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Again, the word "imago" is

[21:19] said towards what the Father, right? Huh? He's the image of the Father, likeness of the Father. In reference to the creatures, God is an exemplar, not an imago. Now, what's the difference between an imago or likeness and an exemplar? Because they both have the idea of likeness, right? But the image is towards something as beginning, right? But the exemplar is what it is itself is the beginning of.

[21:50] So I wouldn't think of of the image as being the image of the creature, right? Image of the Father. You could say he's the exemplar, but I mean that's not the name of the son. But but the word right comes in, so it's kind of interesting here.

[22:12] Moreover, those things that imply a relation to creatures are said of God in time, right? As Lord and what Creator, right? So God is not said to be the Creator until he's created. Okay.

[22:33] But word is said of God from eternity; therefore, it does not imply a what relation to the creature. Moreover, the word implies a a relation to that from which it proceeds. If, therefore, it implies a relation to the creature, it would follow that it proceeds from the creature.

[23:03] Moreover, those ideas we talked about back in the treatise on the knowledge of God, right, are many according to diverse relations to creatures, huh? If, therefore, word implies a relation to the creature, it would follow that God does not only one word, but what many. Now, probably these can all be solved in some way by saying, "Well, the word is what a word of God, right? Chiefly, right?

[23:35] " And but because God understands Himself, understands everything else, then it has a kind of secondary way in its relation to the to the creatures, right? But chiefly of God, and therefore it proceeds only from Him.

[23:51] Moreover, if the word implies a relation to the creature, this is not except in so far as the creatures are known by God, right? But God not only knows beings, but also what non-beings, right? Therefore, in the word there would be implied a relation, in a sense, to non-beings, which would seem to be what false.

[24:18] Now, against this is what Augustine says in the book on the Augustine says in the book of Eighty-three Questions It must be one of the Eighty-three questions that in the name of word or thought is signified not only relation to the Father, but also to those things which are what. made to the word. Yeah.

[24:40] By his operative power, right? Okay. Now, Thomas answers. I answer: It should be said that in the word or thought is implied a what relation to the creature? Why? Because God, in knowing Himself, knows what. Yeah. That's what I say in my little poem there. God the Father said it all in one word.

[25:09] Not only Himself, but creatures. For the word or thought conceived in the mind is representative or represents everything that is understood in act, as act understood. Whence in us there are diverse thoughts, right, according as diverse things are understood. But because God, by one act, both Himself and all other things understands, the unique Word, His unique Word, is expressive not only of the Father, but also of the what creatures.

[25:55] And just as the knowledge of God is a knowledge of God only, is only knowing God, it's not knowledge of how to make God, right? But of creatures, it is both knowing and what making. So the Word of God, of that which is in God the Father, is expressive only, right? But of creatures, it is both expressive and it operates them, right? And in account of this, it is said in Psalm 32, He said, and they were what made?

[26:34] This is Genesis 2, I guess, when the Gospel interprets it. Because in the Word of God is implied a thought that is that makes those things.

[26:49] That God makes, huh? That is He maker of those things that God makes. That's why it's translated factiva. I think from a rightly, you know, in the in the first one way of dividing the four books of the Sentences of the Lombard, the first two books are about

[27:12] God being the beginning of things, right? And the last two books about God being the end, right? The procession of things from God. But in the first of the first two books, right, he deals with these processions, right, in God Himself, and then the procession of creatures from God, right? But as Thomas explains, there the processions in God are before the procession of creatures from God, not only in time or in duration, as they're eternal, why the creatures are not eternal, right?

[27:46] But also they're a cause, right? So in sense, the procession of the of the Word from God, right, is in some way a cause of the procession of creatures from God. In sense, God it's like God's art to make them, or He makes these things. But I suppose it's also going to be said about the Holy Spirit, right, proceeding by way of love, right?

[28:08] So it's kind of interesting the way those things are tied up in the the sentences, huh? One way of dividing it, huh? You divide the first two books against the last two books, right? I suppose what Thomas does say the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? Where he has one book about God Himself, one book about God as the beginning of things, and one book about God as the end of things, right?

[28:34] Thomas kind of, I mean. In the sentences, God is the beginning of things of creatures. That is to say, it's put along with the processions in God Himself. Why? Because of that relation between the two, huh? That one is a cause of the other, right? And it's kind of anticipated here when you start to talk about the word being expressive and and productive of what creatures, right?

[29:04] Now the objection says, the first objection says, every name connoting an effect in creatures is said essentially, right? But word is said personally. That seems a good objection, right? Now Thomas says, well, let's go back to the definition of person, right? Okay? To the first, therefore, it should be said that in the name of person is also included the nature, but obliquely, right? Okay. What does that mean, obliquely, right?

[29:40] What? Because you don't say that a person is the rational nature, but it's a individual substance of a rational nature, right? So you say it's directly individual substance, so right? But you do put in the definition there, right? Obliquely, the rational nature, right?

[30:06] Just like if you if you define the point as the end of a line, well, end would be said directly. It's directly said to be an end. It's not said to be a line. But line is in the definition of point, right? If you use as a definition of it, but it's obliquely. That's that way of speaking, right?

[30:26] It's supposed to be directly. In the name, therefore, of a divine person, as far as what the personal relation, right? It does not imply respect to the creature,

[30:45] but it does imply it in that which pertains to what the nature, right? For nothing prevents, in so far as what his essence or nature is included in his meaning, right? That it implies respect to creatures,

[31:08] just as it is proper to the sun that it be the sun, so it is proper to him that he be God, the generated God, right? Then you have the nature there. You say God, right? Or he's the what generated creator, and in this way there is implied relation to creature in the name of what the word. So it's kind of a delicate thing that Thomas is doing there, right?

[31:39] Because he wants to admit the force of what the objection that says. If you're going to talk about relation to creatures, you're talking about what's essential of the divine nature, right? So unless you're bringing the divine nature in some way into the what definition of the person, you don't want to have any respect to that, right? But if you take the the what he says the personal relation as such, right?

[32:12] There's no relation to the creature, right? But just to the what one from whom one proceeds, huh? Okay. Now the second thing is saying here, hey, if you have a a relation to creatures in some way, that's going to be something what? In time, right? Like Lord and Creator, right? We can't be Creator without the creature. The creature is in time, right? Can't be the Lord of the things he's made without those things being, right?

[32:49] But Word is what something eternal. In the beginning was the Word, right? The first way you should interpret that is is the eternity of the Word, right? Say, in the beginning was the Word.

[33:03] So, to the second, it should be said that since relations, right, follow upon actions, right? Let's say the relations that are involved here, because there are the relations involved that follow upon quantity, right?

[33:29] Some names that imply a relation of God to creature, which follow upon an action that what goes into exterior matter, as to create and to what govern, right? And such are said of God extemporaneous in time, right?

[33:53] But some a relation which follows an action that does not go into exterior matter, but remains in the knower, as to what know and to will, right?

[34:11] Now the the grammar there, right? You can go back and say some names imply, right? Okay. A relation which follows upon action that is not what not a transitive action, as it's said in English, huh? Such as to know and to will, and such are not said of God from time, right? So when did God choose me to be?

[34:44] Yeah, yeah. What's that text there? You know, I've loved you with an eternal love. Is that what's a little bit important Yeah, yeah. See, so to choose is an action that remains within the what one choosing, right? See, and so God did not choose me in time.

[35:07] After my mother and father met, then he chose me to be. No, he chose me eternally, right? But did he eternally create my soul? No, after my mother and father prepared the body, he says, "Well, we need a soul for this body here." So he created my soul, poured it into that body, right? So I'm stuck with this body. That's what that blessed Columba Marmion, who used to quote, "the passage from Hebrews A body thou hast prepared for me.

[36:00] And such are not said of God in time, right? And this sort of relation to the creature is implied in the name of what? Thought, right? Okay. Because to understand, that's right, or to know, is an activity remains in the one understanding, the one what? Knowing, right?

[36:23] Nor is it true that the names implying a relation of God to creature that all of them are said what? In time. But only those names which imply relation falling upon an action that goes out to exterior effects, huh? This transitive, right? Those are said in time. I think it's in English in time, rather than from time. Okay. Swell that. Yeah. So you have to see the distinction between an action that remains within the one doing, right?

[37:12] And when there's an exterior what? Effect, right? Okay. Now, you know, in English, we can use the word "doing" to name both acts, right? But the action that has an exterior effect, we call making, right? And then one we call what?

[37:38] Yeah. Okay. Now, the reason why this keeps the common name and this gets a new name is because here there's nothing apart from the doing, the understanding or loving or choosing. But here, there's something apart from the doing, namely this this product. Okay. Okay. So understanding a theorem of Euclid, right? Apart from the understanding theorem of Euclid, what is it? Nothing. So they say you're doing nothing.

[38:20] I'm doing something. Understanding what a triangle is, right? But in making a chair, right? Then apart from the making, there is a what? So this has something in addition to the doing, and therefore gets its name, right? But not something that makes it better than this, right? Because Aristotle argues, doing, as opposed to making, now doing in that sense, is a perfection of the doer. Yes. Okay.

[38:58] It's a perfection or perfecting of the doer. But making is a perfecting of the what? Doing. Of the made. Okay. Aristotle talks about this in the ninth book of Wisdom, and he makes kind of application. there to ethics, where ethics is about the end of man, and is the end of man consist in this kind of activity or this kind of activity?

[39:43] I mean, first, right? Because that's a perfection of the doer, and the other perfection of the thing made, right? Now, that's why, in a sense, we criticize Marx, right? Because Marx is seeing man's ultimate perfection in his making, huh? Okay. And now, in a sense, Marx tries to overcome that, even though may not be thinking so explicit the objection. But he says that man, in transforming the world around him, also what transforms himself, right?

[40:25] And there is some truth to that, right? Okay. So I heard the carpenter saying, you know, he likes this job because he's learning something, right? You see. But still, this is the fallacy of the accidental, because it's accidental that the maker is perfected by his making. Just as I often said about teaching, right? It's accidental that the teacher is perfected by what teaching, even though it might happen all the time that the teacher understands the matter better after he makes a effort of trying to explain to others, right?

[41:01] And most teachers would say that, right? If you're teaching something that's extremely elementary, right? You know, we're just getting you know repeating yourself ad nauseum. But if you have something profound like this, you're always seeing a little bit better each time, right? But still, it's accidental to teaching that you don't understand what you're teaching.

[41:21] Is it? And insofar, and you're really, you know, it's not you're not a teacher insofar as you don't understand. what you're talking about, right? You see. So

[41:36] it's still by happening that the teacher is perfected by his teaching, in the same way that the maker is perfected by his making, right? The cook, you know, if he knows how to make the meal, he doesn't learn how to make the meal by making it. That's you.

[41:51] So that's why I talk about politics now. You know, who's ready? You know, on day one, Hillary's saying, you know, she's gonna be ready on day one. But probably nobody's gonna be ready on day one. Ready on day one, you really don't elect her. Okay. So there's a real distinction in between these two acts here, right? Huh? And so.

[42:24] Is God understanding creatures right or loving them right? Which of these two kinds of acts is that? Well, we do this first kind of act,

[42:36] and so it's the second kind of act that's implied when we say that God what made the universe right, or He made my soul. He created my soul. He created the universe, right? And that is said of God in relation that comes upon this kind of activity in time, right? God is not a creator before there's a creature, and if the creature is in time, didn't always exist.

[43:03] Then that is said in time to be a creator. See how this can be done, but in the case of these others, God could what love the creature right before the creature is.

[43:20] He could choose us before we were right, and so if there's a relation following upon that, that's not going to be said of God in time, right? He didn't choose me to be when my parents met, that's what I was saying, right? But he created my soul after my parents met, huh?

[43:42] So he's a creator of my soul in time, but he's not the chooser of my soul, He's the chooser of me in time. But still, he said he chose me. That seems to be in some way saying he's what related to me, right? Okay. Let's see whether that's a relation of relation of reason, but but there is some relation of some kind to me, right?

[44:12] But differing from his relation that he has to me, because I'm related to him really from the fact that he created me, right? It's a kind of relation Aristotle says you know that you have when you say that the knowable is relative to the knower, right? It's a relation of reason, right? The knower is really related to knowable, but knowable is not. Is said to be knowable by the knower because of the relation between them.

[44:41] So subtle thing. Now the third objection here says, however, the word implies a what relation to the one from whom it proceeds. If therefore it implies respect to the creature, it follows that he proceeds from the creature, right? Thomas says that the creatures are not known by God by knowledge taken from the creatures. If it were, then they would be like his father, right? But to his very what essence, yeah.

[45:21] Hence, it is not necessary that the word proceed from creatures. Although the word is expressive of the creatures, right? Okay. So you could say, you know, that the exterior object, in a sense, is the father of my what sensing, right? You know, that my knowledge in some way proceeds from the exterior thing, but God's knowledge in no way proceeds from the exterior things, but the exterior things proceed from Him.

[45:55] But the son really does proceed from the father. That's why I guess you can compare it to art, because the artist has his idea and saying before

[46:11] it's executed in matter. Yeah. The fourth objection. Is relating the word to the what ideas, right? Huh? Okay. There are many ideas, as Augustine says, right? Thomas says, to the fourth, it should be said that the name of ideas applied to God, as Augustine does, chiefly it's placed upon things to signify what respect to creatures. Now there aren't many ideas really in God, right? Huh? But God understands what how this creature would be like Him, and how that creature would be like Him in another way, and so on, right?

[46:56] So these are more understood these relations by God, right? Huh? And because the way in which the dog could be like God, and the way in which the tree could be like God, and the way in which the angel could be like God, is all different, right? Then there are said to be many what ideas of God, right? Huh?

[47:14] And therefore plurally. They are said in God, right? Nor is it personal, right? Okay. But the name of word or thought is chiefly imposed to signify the relation to the one saying it, right? And consequently to creatures, in so far as God, in understanding Himself, understands every creature, right? And account to this in God, there is uniquely only one word. Because only one understanding, right? And it is said personally.

[47:57] You see the difference there between the ideas, right, and why there are said to be many ideas in God, right? Because He understands the way in which each creature could be like Him, right? And the way in which the angels like God is different from the way in which man is like God, and the soul is like God, right? And the way in which this angel and this angel, the seraphim and the lower angels are like God is different, right?

[48:26] Huh? And so He understands these many ways, right? And those are said therefore to be many ideas. But the word is what refers not to the thing, but to one saying, to one saying it. Yeah,

[48:47] it's only one saying it, right? Because he said it all, in one word. Now, what about non-beings, right? In the way in which the knowledge, what of God is of non-beings, so the word of God is of what non-beings, right?

[49:24] Because there is nothing less in the word or thought of God than in the what knowledge of God. So we go back to the knowledge of God. Does he know things that he never makes? Yeah, but he could make, right? Okay. So does his word then express those things too? Yeah, but it's not factiva; it's not productive of those things that he chooses not to make, right?

[49:55] But nevertheless, the word is of beings, right? Things that are at some time, rather, both expressive and productive of them, right? But of non-beings, it is only what expressive and manifesting them, right? But it's not productive of them.

[50:28] So now the next word will be imago right? We'd better stop now, but notice how there's connection there between the Son is the image of the Father, right? And the word is kind of a likeness of what's the word of that kind of follows naturally upon those two, right?

[50:51] But in particular, it goes back to this what text? Saint Paul there, huh? Did he quote it? You quoted somewhere. Which one? Now here it is, Colossians. Yeah, quoted in the next one by the article, Colossians one fifteen. Qui est imago Dei invisibilis, right? Okay.

[51:21] He's arguing that it's part of the human.