Prima Pars
122. Thinking, thought and image: is 'image' said personally in God? (Summa I, q.35, a.1)
Class of 2008-03-14
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/122-thinking-thought-and-image-is-image-said-personally-in-god/

[0:00] In the name of the Father, the Son, and the, Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Help us to understand all that you have written. In the Name of the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:29] Just a word here about the words, huh? In English, huh? We have the word "think" and thinking, of course, and then the word "thought."

[0:53] So when my reason thinks about something, right? Especially when I think it out, there proceeds from my mind a what thought? The thought is not the same thing as the thinking. It's like the the end of the thinking.

[1:19] Now, to some extent, you have something like that with to imagine, right? And then you have the image, right? So when I imagine a gold mountain, there proceeds from my imagination an image of a gold mountain, huh? And so these two are similar. So Thomas explains how the Arab philosophers, right, sometimes call this here imagining through the intellect, right?

[1:58] Now, of course, in English, to imagine is something other than to think, but they're very similar and they're sometimes used interchangeably. I think that's so. I imagine that's so. I'll say right. We've talked before here, I think, about how Aristotle, in the third book, about the soul, distinguishes between thinking and imagining. Okay. And there's many ways he distinguishes between those two. And one way that we mentioned was that you can what imagine something without having any reason to do so.

[2:37] Like I can imagine that gold mountain, right? But I can't think that something is so without having some reason for thinking something is so.

[2:49] But there are more subtle differences between thinking and imagining, and so on. Now, could we say that God thinks? And what does God think of? Why he thinks chiefly and first only of himself. That sounds selfish. He thinks chiefly and first only of himself.

[3:25] But in thinking of himself, he, in a way, thinks about everything, because he is the cause of everything else, and everything else, in so far as it is, is in some way like him who is being itself.

[3:54] Now, in Latin, in Thomas's Latin, there, do you have these two, where etymologically, you know, related to think and the thought, just like to imagine an image, etymologically related.

[4:15] So, what does Thomas call that thought? Verbum, yeah. Could have a verb for me to have to use to verbalize it. But they don't actually use to verbalize; they have more to say, right, teacher, right? And perhaps it's something like that in Greek too. You know, the word for Greek, the Greek word here is logos, that's related to the word to legein to speak, huh? More than to the word to what to think, huh?

[4:53] Now, I think we mentioned before how Augustine's definition of to believe, right? And in Latin would be cogitare, cum, assensu, something like that. And I think the way they translate cogitare here is what? Yeah, yeah. So it's to think, well, assensu right? With assent. And sometimes they turn around and say, "As sentire cum cogitatione to consent." But again, the word cogitare, if you take that as kind of a synonym for to think, cogitatum is more of that, which is thought of.

[5:42] It's not thought, right? Cogitatio, that's more the activity of thinking. I got to be a little careful because sometimes in English, especially the word thinking, we contrast thinking with what knowing. Do you know that so and so is winning the election? No, but I, I think he is right. Okay, and in that case, you wouldn't speak of God as thinking, right? Because thinking would imply something. What?

[6:14] Yeah, yeah. But again, going back though to what we've talked here about equivocal words, you could divide thinking into thinking in the sense I just spoke of, which is contrasted with knowing, right? But knowing could still be said to be thinking in the broad sense, right? Like I know that two is half of four.

[6:46] But do I think that two is half of four? More general. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So in some sense, you could say that God thinks, right? But Thomas will say, you know, you shouldn't use the word cogitari for God, right? Because that implies kind of emotion towards understanding, huh? And in English, especially the word thinking tends to imply, right? I'm thinking about this, but you understand it or no?

[7:15] But I'm thinking about it. So thinking is kind of emotion towards understanding, right? Yeah. It's kind of interesting. Perhaps I have to maybe think about it more. But in English, that we have this connection between to think and thought, and in Latin and in maybe Greek, the word for thought is what verbum or logos, huh? And maybe don't have a verb form corresponding to them, so it's a superiority of English in one respect, huh?

[7:51] Now, when Thomas contrasts the proceeding of the Holy Spirit with the proceeding of the Son, if the Son proceeds as the Word or thought of the Father, right, of Himself, then the Son proceeds as a what? Likeness, huh? This might be an English translation of imago, as a likeness of the Father, right? But a likeness that is so close that it is, in fact, God, right?

[8:27] And if you use now speaking English here for a bit, if you say that God thinks of Himself, and therefore He has a thought of Himself, and that thought exists in His what? Thinking, right? But His thinking is His being. There's no difference between God's being and His doing. So if the thinking of God is the being of God, and the being of the thought of God is the being of God Himself.

[9:04] And therefore, the thought must be God Himself, huh? But he's a thought in that sense proceeds as a likeness of what you're thinking of. And likewise, we go back to nature, right? The other name where he's called Son, right? The Son proceeds as a what likeness of the Father, right? Okay. So, in a sense, this Imaginary is kind of almost a natural conclusion, right? If he's the Son of God, in that strict sense, right?

[9:39] then he's the imago of God, right? And if he's the thought of God that God has of Himself, then he's also the likeness of God, the image of God, right? That's why this comes last, right? But the Holy Spirit doesn't proceed as a likeness, right? He proceeds by way of what love, right? And again, he's he's like God, but not because he precedes as love, but because he proceeds as divine love.

[10:09] And the loving of God is like his thinking or understanding, his being, and therefore his God. So, let's look now at the first article here on the Imago. To the first, then, then we'll have to seek or ask about the image, the likeness, and about these two things are asked. First, whether likeness is said in God personally, as opposed to essentially, right? And then secondly, whether it's proper or private to the what son.

[10:59] Now, to the first one proceeds thus. It seems that Imago is not said personally, in God. For Augustine says, in the book on Faith to Peter,

[11:16] one is the what image. One is the divinity of the Holy Trinity, and the image to which man is what made. Therefore, the image is said essentially and not personally.

[11:37] In some way, we are what God, but because we're an imperfect image of Him, we're said to be made to the image. Right? Sometimes in scriptures. But we'll let Thomas answer his own objection.

[11:55] On the trip there, I was reading De Potentia. It's the Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia? And there's you know ten questions there with number articles under each question, and there's a question on the proceedings, right? And there's a question on the relations, and question on the persons, right? So the last three questions are really kind of the same material. But there you have, you know, sometimes as many as twenty five objections.

[12:29] So Thomas has cut this down for a beginner, right? I was sitting in the airport there waiting to for the last flight because this is a bumpy flight. We went from El Paso to Albuquerque to Albuquerque to to you know El Paso. I was sitting there with my book computer there and going through the twenty five objections. I never got to the body article that flight flight to.

[13:03] But that's too much for a beginner. say. Moreover, Hilary says in the book on the synods, and those I guess on the councils, right.

[13:20] That the image is to the thing to which it is imagined, a what species or form that in no way differs. But species or form in God is said essentially. See at the end of the epistle of St. Paul when he's in the form of God, right?

[13:41] I just saw that objection. Yeah. So what strikes me is the likeness, though said to be a likeness of something, right? By form is said more what? Absolutely right.

[14:13] Of course, the what said personally got the idea of relation. Moreover image is said from what imitando right? Aristotle says in the book on the Poetic Art that man is the most imitative of the what animals, and we naturally delight in imitations. And at first we are what we learn imitation.

[14:46] Imitation is a good word. So in the definition of tragedy and so on, the first word is imitation, right? Imitation of a course of action that is serious, et cetera, et cetera.

[15:02] In which is implied, he says, a before and after, right? Just like you know, my statue of me is a what a likeness of me, right? Something posterior to me. Statue of George Washington is a likeness of George Washington. But in the divine persons, there is nothing what. Yeah.

[15:28] That goes back to the Athanasian Creed, where it's an explicit, it doesn't say the Athanasian Creed, but it's an Athanasian Creed. There's no before and after. Therefore, images not cannot be a personal name in what God, and they have before and after there.

[15:51] But against all this is what Augustine says. This is in De Trinitate, Book Seven. What is more absurd than? To say that image is what said to itself, what I'd say is the opposite of what to another, right? It's one of those odd sayings, a little bit like what one of those misleading affirmative ways of saying something what negative, right? So to say I'd say is to say not to another, right?

[16:26] Or to be said absolutely in this other way of speaking. So Augustine was more absurd than to say that it's absolute rather than towards. another. Therefore, image is said in divine things relatively, and thus it is a personal name, right? Incidentally, when I was reading, I think it was in the Potentia, and now we've got to determine the thing as Augustine has done it, right? He's very explicit, you know, about referring to Augustine as his as his master, as his authority.

[17:06] Okay, Thomas says the answer should be said that of the notion of image is what likeness. They see in English how do you translate imago?

[17:22] Yeah, yeah, but the native English word would be more likeness, huh? So you know when you're trying to translate the book of the poetic arts, say you say the genus in tragedy or comedy is that to say what? Well, in the translations, I have imitation, right? It's imitation of, but the word imitation has been degraded, the word in English because of our commercial customs, I suppose, right?

[17:57] So what an imitation is is a cheap or inferior likeness, huh? Of course, Aristotle says that the poet can represent men as they are, or he can represent them as they are thought to be, or he can represent them as they should be, and so the imitation might be what actually improvement, right? So if you translate the definition of these things by saying it, say what imitation?

[18:29] Maybe that's not the best word to use in English at least today, right? So usually I translate it as a what likeness, huh? Now Thomas is using the word similitudo, right? But image is going to be more exact word in meaning than likeness, as he's going to go on to explain, right? But not just any likeness, he says, right? Suffices for the notion of image, okay? So you got to be careful when you use the word likeness as a translation of image, but that's the word that we have in English to translate it by, right?

[19:07] But a likeness, which is what, in the form of the thing, or at least in some sign of the what species. And then Thomas uses the standard example he uses to bring this out, right? So if you have a piece of paper that has the skin color of a man, you don't call that a likeness of man. But if it has, say, the shape of a man, then that's at least a what sign of the species, right?

[19:40] Or if it has the shape of a dog, then it's a likeness or image of a dog. Well, he says, the size of the species and body of things, most of all seems to be their what figure or shape. For we see that of diverse animals and species there are diverse figures. Not, however, diverse what colors, right? So a cat or a dog might have the same color or something, but you distinguish them really by their what shape, form, yeah.

[20:12] So you talk about the senses, huh? Now the one text there where, Boethius is talking about the road from, is talking about the road from the senses into reason, and he singles out what what two of the five senses. Is it uh hearing and sight. Well, in one text they do that, yeah, because the senses of learning from another or from yourself or by yourself. But in this other text, he uses touch and sight, right?

[20:44] Okay. Now, sometimes we point out a certain excellence of sight over the other senses due to its clarity, and the sense of touch because of certitude. But together, what such touch and sight have is that they're the only senses that know the shape of something. So I can know the shape of this glass with my eyes, and also I could feel the shape of it, right? And the shape or figure is so important in what identifying, right?

[21:15] How do I know this is a chair and not a bit? Was it by its color? No, it's by its shape, right? But only my touch and my sight know the shape of things. So it's interesting he singles out those two senses, huh? And sometimes they talk about the particular likeness of these or excellence of these individual senses, right? So doubting Thomas, he wants to put his hand to the sight of our Lord, right?

[21:44] And then he'll believe, right? He'll trust his touch more than his sight. This is the touch going to certitude, huh? Sense of touch. But then the the sight has the other excellence of being more sharp or clear than other senses. But together they both know what shape or form.

[22:08] Okay. So Thomas, this is a common example of Thomas using I seem using in different texts when he talks about this. For a sign of the species in bodily things, most of all seems to be their figure, their shape. For we see that of diverse animals and species there are diverse figures, but not diverse colors, right? Whence, if one depicts the color of a thing on the wall, is not said to be a what image or likeness of it, unless one depicts the what figure, the shape.

[22:45] But neither does the what likeness of the species suffice or the figure, but there is required for the notion of image the idea of origin, right?

[22:58] Because, as Augustine says in the book of the eighty-three questions. One egg is not a what image of another because it is not expressed from that. Okay, so when you buy a dozen of eggs, you look in and see they're not broken. That's what's going to do, and is one an image of the other? One a likeness of the other? Which you might say about somebody's son that he's an image of his father or his mother or something.

[23:32] And I think that's somewhat implied in the English word likeness, right? See that this is a likeness of that implies that somehow it's what not just like it, but it was that's original and this is what from it, yeah, yeah. Doesn't apply the English word likeness, yeah,

[23:55] just like the word imitation, right? It's implied likeness, maybe likeness in something specific to the thing, right? But also derived in some way from that, right? Okay, so the original Bailey's Irish Cream original is, and then they have this other cheaper, less expensive imitation, right, which may not be quite as good as the original, but that's the original, right?

[24:22] If you buy parts and it isn't original equipment, then they say, well, but this one's just like it. Sometimes they'll put the word "just" in there, just like, yeah, exact likeness.

[24:41] I know some of these products. You know, a lot of times original is the best one. You know, and then they make all these varieties so it tastes as good as original. Sometimes you can't find the original one. You got so many, you know, barbecue chips. Finding how

[25:01] to go to Dave's barbecue down there and all posse and the kids out and so on, and you know they they bring in a like a six pack with six different barbecue sauces. They can try them all. You know, how hot you want, number how you want. Of course, we taste good the first one you eat with the barbecue sauce, but after that you can't taste it.

[25:26] Your tongue is burned out. Okay, so Augustine says, and notice how good his example is there. Right, one egg is not the. They do look very much alike. Eggs do,

[25:47] but to this that something be truly an image, right, is required that is in what proceeds from another, right? We got the idea of proceeding from another, right? Like to it in species, or at least in a sign of the species, like the shape of the animals, a sign of that species of kind of animal.

[26:10] So once you understand what an image is, right, then you see that what it's going to pertain personally, right? Because those things which imply procession or origin in divine things are what personal, right? So I convince you then.

[26:30] Whence this name image is a what personal name? I'm really struck here by this this word proceeding. I just go back that for for a moment there. You know, in the tenth question of the De Potencia, right, Thomas takes up, and I think the first article, whether the word proceeding procession should be used in God, right? We can speak of proceeding in God, right? And again, going back to the language a bit,

[27:15] how should you translate that word, right? Proceeding, right? Well, sometimes we translate, we transliterate from the Latin to English, and it kind of strikes me, you know, in my work in graduate school, Monsignor Dionne was speaking of the three ways of proceeding, right? Distinction of the three ways of proceeding, and it was starting my text of Thomas where he speaks of the modus procedendi,

[27:52] right? And it's a particular text there in the second book of wisdom where Aristotle is talking about the modus procedendi in each science is somewhat different, huh? And it has to fit the matter, the subject of that science, and Aristotle says we shouldn't try to do two things at the same time. So we shouldn't try at the same time to acquire a science and to what learn the modus procedendi.

[28:28] Well, then, which should be learned first? Yeah, yeah. Okay. Now, how is modus procedendi translated in English, right? Well, you could do it very much just transliterate the word proceeding, but generally we tend to substitute the word modus, the word way, right, which. Etymology is not exactly the same modus as related to to measure, right? And the Greek has the word tropos.

[29:08] What we said is translate this halfway way of what proceeding. Well, then that text here, Thomas says, yeah, but says there's the mode of proceeding that is proper or private to this science, right? But then there's the common way of proceeding, which is studied in what logic, right? Okay. So in logic, we we study the common way of going forward and reasoned out knowledge. In the beginning of geometry, we learn the private way of proceeding in geometry.

[29:48] And Thomas says, well, just as Aristotle says, you have to know the way of proceeding in geometry before you can acquire geometry. So you got to acquire logic, which is about the common way. of proceeding before all the other sciences, so logic comes first in the order of what Of learning. huh?

[30:12] And then Manjindian came into class one day and says, Okay, and he was thinking of what then the natural way of going forward, right? Now, if you wanted to translate the proceeding more into a native English word, what would be the translation?

[30:39] Going forward, I think, is the way to translate. Way of going forward, the way of going forward. It's kind of strange now that this word here was very much in my mind in this context of Monsignor Dionne's distinction of the three ways of going forward, right? The three ways of proceeding. But in the text from the tenth question of the De Potentia, Thomas talks about this word some more, right?

[31:12] And he makes a very interesting point, and maybe a little more precise point, and that is the more general principle that he gives in the beginning of the fifth book of wisdom that we name things as we know them, right? And since our knowledge begins with our senses, right, then we name what can be sensed always first, right? And then we carry names over what can be sensed to things that are less able to be sensed, and then eventually things that cannot be sensed, right?

[31:45] You see this through all of our words, but in this particular text here in the tenth question, he points out something more precise there about what we sense, right? And he talks about the continuous

[32:06] and how all these words that carried over start from the continuous or something of the continuous, right? Okay. And so, this word going forward that goes back to the continuous, the first meaning of coming and going is what locomotion, which is the most continuous of the kinds of changes, more continuous than growth, and obviously more continuous than coming hot or something like that, huh? And so we carry this word over, right?

[32:52] But in the use of this word here in Monsignor Dionne's distinction there, and in Thomas's distinction, you're already moving the word to something that is what. Not bodily at all, right? Not something material at all. The way in which your mind goes forward, right? So it's kind of in between that first meaning of going forward, right? Where I'm going forward now, and then you apply it to my mind going forward, right?

[33:26] I mean, I learned the the definitions in Euclid there, right? And the postulates, right? And the axioms, and then I go forward from that to some conclusions, and I go forward from those conclusions to something further, right? Okay. And this is more like my walking forward, right? But eventually, this word is carried all the way over and applied to God, right? And that's in Scripture, right? Because we do speak, you know, in the Gospel Saint John as the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and so on, right?

[34:03] Okay. But um once you go back, to something continuous to start, right? Notice in the in the text there, the talking about the word form there, right? The first meaning of form is shape, right? And shape is the limit of the what, or limits of the continuance, right? So that's the way these things are what named.

[34:32] Okay, that's just kind of you know coming back to what he's saying here at the end of the body of the article. Those things which imply a what going forth, right? Or origin in God are personal, right? That's the way the relations, right, are distinguished. The persons are distinguished by the relations, and the relations are based upon this one going forward from that one, right?

[35:04] once, the name image is a personal name, because it implies not only a likeness, but a likeness and something specific, right? And a likeness to an original. If I forget, say, the Father is the original God, gotta kind of careful about that because the Son is the same God as the Father, right?

[35:31] But the Son is like the Father in having the very same nature individually that the Father has, right? But he has it from the Father. I see a text there. I think it was in the might have been there. I was reading some things on the Trinity and the sentences too. Thomas says the divine nature is not in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit in the same way.

[36:00] That's kind of interesting thing to say. He says the divine nature is in the Father, not from another. The divine nature is in the Son from the Father, and the divine nature is in the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. So, in one way, you could say, huh, that the divine nature is not in the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. In the same way, got to be careful about that way of speaking, but it struck me very much.

[36:29] Though he says these things, you read, you know, the different places it's taken up. You know, like in the Marquette edition, they give you cross references, but sometimes he'll say a little different in one place than another.

[36:47] At least, huh? Interesting. Now let's look at the first objection. This goes back to the fact that man is said to be made to the image and likeness of God, and so on. To the first, therefore, it should be said that image is properly said what goes forward to the likeness of another. Now that to whose likeness something proceeds properly is called a what exemplar, improperly a what image.

[37:22] Thus, however, Augustine uses the name of image when he says that the divinity of the Holy Trinity is the image to which God is what, or to which man is made.

[37:37] The text is saying that you are made to the what image of God, meaning that you are made like God, right? But Thomas says that's not really the proper way of using the word. He's correcting Augustine here a little bit, right? But we call that the exemplar, right? Aristotle talks about when he talks about the second kind of cause, right? He says it's the form and the exemplar, right?

[38:01] Well, the exemplar is an extrinsic form, right? That you imitate in making something, right? We see sometimes a famous painting, and someone what makes a copy of that painting, right? So that's kind of a exemplar, right? So God is more the exemplar according to which we are what fashioned, yeah, But isn't it, rather than the likeness, because likeness implies that that we do exist, all right? Yeah.

[38:33] Isn't St. Gustin um using the the words of Scripture that let us make man in our image? Yeah, yeah. So Saint Augustine's using the words of Scripture. Yeah. Is Saint Thomas saying that the sacred writers have let us make man as our image? I don't know Well, it might be that the Scripture is saying, you know, this is the image in the sense of of likeness, right?

[38:58] But even the word likeness might be kind of careful, because even in English, the word likeness kind of implies that, but. You're like something that originally had this, right? Okay. But maybe Scripture merely means to say that we are being made what like God, right? We're being made to as like this. That's to say, we're being made like God, right? Okay. So maybe it's a weaker word.

[39:27] I don't know what the Hebrew word is there, but it is there, you know. Yeah. Maybe that's what you mean. That's what. Now, we just said the divine nature is a. Likeness of of our soul, so that would seem to be improper, right? Yeah. Because now when implied that almost that our soul was original,

[40:14] but you say our soul is made in the likeness of God, right? It's interesting. One of the Eastern Fathers, Aphrahat, uses that. Kind of extends that comparison. If we say we're the image of God or likeness of God, then he says, "So God had man in His thought, and then He made him, and then man had God in His thought. So we became like God, because now we have God sort of in us, in a way that's comparable to.

[40:48] But obviously, it's there's a big difference. It's interesting because I was thinking, you know, I was teaching the love friendship course here in my house to these people come Wednesday night, and you know the two main causes of love are the good is known, and then likeness, right? Now,

[41:14] when we see God as He is, right, we will love Him more than we did in this life, for both of these reasons, right? Because in seeing God as He is, we'll see that He's goodness itself,

[41:33] and therefore the goodness of God will be known in a way it wasn't known in this life, and that will cause us to love Him more than we could love Him in this life. But in the text where Saint John there where it's 1, 3, 2, something like that, first epistle, third chapter, second verse, something like that, that when He appears, we shall what? We shall be like Him, He says, because we shall know Him as He is.

[42:03] But interesting that Saint John there says we shall be like Him, and he gives you this reason for that, or that we will know Him as He is. But when you study, how is it you can see God and know Him as He is?

[42:20] Well, only by having your mind joined to God, as that by which you see Him as He is, right? So you'd be more like God when you see Him as He is, and two for two reasons, right? Because God sees Himself as He is, and while in this life we don't see God as He is, but God sees Himself as He is to Himself as the understandable form by which He sees Himself.

[42:56] And we're going to see him as he is, through God Himself as the understandable form which our mind sees him. So that's the second way in which we will be what like him. So if likeness is the second cause of love, the first being the good is known, then we're going to be more like God than we could be in this life, right? In those two ways, and therefore, be more like him in those two ways.

[43:27] We will love him more than we could have loved him in this life. Saint Paul says something similar. then we shall see God, we shall know, as we are known. Yeah, yeah. It's a compliment. Yeah. Going in last night, I was reading a little bit of a note there in Kittredge on Hamlet. you know, as a reference to Leith, to the river that you bathe in. You know, in the Greek mythology, and then you forget about this world.

[44:09] I said, "What's not so far away from it. It's going to take place, right? " I don't think we're going to remember all these silly things in this this life much. Once we see God, we're going to be, to say, distracted. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. We're completely occupied. We won't think about this life anymore. I don't think. Mention your dog. Yeah, yeah. Or election two thousand eight.

[44:33] 2008 Yeah, Some things are more forgettable than others. Yeah was it the minister of Obama saying that Christ was a poor black man? Oh that we heard. we heard about him degrading the United States. Yeah, But yes, I heard some of the speech being, you know, recorded or poor black men being persecuted by rich white men, the Romans. Yeah, the rich white men were prosecuting the poor black.

[45:05] men So anyway, let's get off that. Okay, But it may be a little problem with the grammar going back to the question there. You know, we're said to be made to the image and likeness of God, right? Are you calling him the image or likeness that we are being modeled after? You say, and it seems kind of improper to say he's. Or you try to talk about what's the result of our assimilation here, right?

[45:41] We're being made like him, right? But you know, in my father's factory, they used to make farm wagons and. They come down and order from the office for a number five hundred wagon. Well, there are patterns on the wall there, and they would cut the wood according to those patterns, right? So those are like kind of the exemplars, and you you imitated them down here, right? But we might use the word, you know, that's that's a likeness for what you're going to make, right?

[46:16] Kind of kind of careful about the word likeness, right? Because more indicates what that you're not the original, right? Obviously, God is original comparison to man.

[46:40] Now, to the second, it should be said: this is the objection from Hilary, right? That the species, insofar as is placed by Hilary, the definition of image,

[46:55] implies a form deduced in another from another, right? And in this way, image is said to be the what species of another, just as that. which is likened to another

[47:14] Yeah. Just as that which is likened to another is said to be its what form, insofar as is a form like to that. But it's kind of implied when Hilary says there. He says, "ad quam, right? To which, huh? "

[47:38] That's original. It's not just species indifference, right? But you might say, you know, that the a statue is that which has the form of of another, right? Was it just a form? No, you're kind of implying that it's the form of what of another, right? It's been derived in some way from that.

[48:13] Now, the third objection, Thomas says, simply that imitation in God in divine persons does not signify afterwards being after, but only what likeness, huh? Okay. Now, sometimes Thomas will solve those by saying that you don't really have one before another, but you do have one from another, right? Okay. So you can say that you know God from God, light from light, true God from true God. You don't say God after God, light after light, you know.

[48:50] Use the word from. And Augustine, you know, you'll meet this later on. I think, you know, Augustine speak of the ordo natura, right? And Thomas will say, what does ordo natura mean? He means one from another, right? Not one after another, right?

[49:09] So when you're looking before and after, right? In God, you have to what? Proceed negatively. When Thomas will show that there's no before and after in God, he usually show that

[49:25] the four central senses of before that Aristotle gives in the categories, and no one of those senses is the father before the son, or the father and the son before the Holy Spirit.

[49:40] Okay.