Prima Pars
129. Summa I q.39 a.1 Replies and Article 2: Relations as Opposition, and 'Three Persons of One Essence'
Class of 2008-04-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/129-summa-i-q-39-a-1-replies-and-article-2-relations-as-opposition/

[0:00] Now the first objection was a very powerful one, if you know. But Plato began to see about immaterial substances, right? Plato, in his theory of the forms, although he was mistaken as to the nature of these immaterial substances, nevertheless he had this insight, right, that in immaterial substances there is only one of a kind of each kind, that no two immaterial substances have the same what? Exact nature.

[0:41] They differ like circle and square, and triangle, not like two circles or two points. Okay. And Aristotle saw this, huh? When Thomas, following Aristotle, talks about the angels and so on, he'll say the same thing, huh? That there can't be two angels of the same kind.

[1:11] Thomas sometimes raises the objection there, you know, of would the angels what? Love each other more if they are of the same kind. Because you know that's nothing to do with love, right? And Thomas answers no, and he gives a very good reason why they love themselves more because they're not the same kind. And he says that the the higher a creature is, and the better he is, the more he loves the common good, right?

[1:43] And the common good is served more by distinction of kinds than of what? Individuals of the same kind. What's that criticism they make of poor Vivaldi, You know, say he wrote the same concerto a hundred times. It's kind of you know exaggeration, you know, huh? You know, and even to some extent, you know even with Handel, you know? to some extent, you know, one piece sounds a little bit like the other one, you know.

[2:11] Sure. Why, somebody like Mozart, there is much more of a distinction between the pieces, right? You see a certain perfection there, right? Or you go to Shakespeare's play, you know, each play seems to be kind of what? Different, you know, sui generis almost, right? You see a kind of perfection of that. And as opposed, these guys used to, I go to these philosophical meetings. You know, some guy you see, you know, year after year, he's giving the talk of the same subject year.

[2:39] I'm repeating himself, you know, you know, with these things much new, you know, He just differs numerically from the talk last year. You know, he's not a new thought or kind. So the angels love each other more in their distinction, right? Because other love the common good, and you see how this contributes to the common good, to the whole universe. So

[3:09] it's like you know, talking about odd numbers and even numbers before, but different numbers, right? Rather than two twos and three twos and four twos and that.

[3:23] Now sometimes they talk about this this mere mental multiplicity, right? If I can say Socrates is Socrates, now Socrates appears twice in my statement, right? Then I can say the statement Socrates is Socrates is a statement Socrates is Socrates. I get four Socrates. I can go on multiplying these at infinitum you know. you know, that's the sense of this right

[3:54] So let's look at now the reply to the first objection here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that in creatures there cannot be a distinction of individual substances through what relations, because relations in creatures are what accidents, right? They can't be the substance of these things. But it's necessary that it be through essential principles, principles that belong in the genus of what substance, huh? Because relations are not subsisting in creatures.

[4:39] So my being a father or a teacher or a husband or a son, right? These are not what. Yeah, yeah. I was like, we need substances, okay?

[4:54] But in God, the relations are what Subsisting. subsisting. Just as the wisdom is subsisting, right? Why in me if I have any wisdom? It's an accident of me, very accidental.

[5:12] And therefore, according as they have opposition to each other, right? They are able to distinguish what. Yeah, yeah. I think it's kind of marvelous, huh? That when Thomas sees relation as one kind of opposition, right? He's going back to this pagan who knew nothing of the Christian faith, Aristotle, right? Who, in the categories and in the fifth book of wisdom, distinguishes relations as one of the four kinds of what opposites.

[5:46] And you can see the divine providence in that, huh? Because some might say, "Oh, he just invents this kind of opposition to get around this problem of his faith, right? " You know that the thing that the church fathers said that you know God brings good out of the bad, right? And one good thing he brought out of the fact that all the Jews were not converted, right?

[6:10] And that many of the Jews, as you see in the Acts, of, the apostles, and Saint Paul and so on, are violently opposed to the Christians, right? But these Jews were what

[6:24] witnesses to the antiquity of the books, huh? The prophetic books in the Old Testament, from which the Christians drew arguments for the prophecies about Christ and so on. Um. Why somebody might say, you know, if they just all the Jews have been converted, we just invented those books, or you created those books, right? You see, okay.

[6:54] The same way, you know, people, you know, come and say, you know, you are opposed to abortion because you are a Christian or something, you are a Catholic or that's what your your boss hands down. Yeah. And and then when when the Athenian stranger in in the laws of Plato, you know, proposes a law against homosexuality, you know, because it's against nature, right? Huh? Say, well, here is a guy who was not influenced, as far as I know, by the Pope.

[7:22] But he sees this, right? Huh? You see, and so it's interesting, huh? You have people who are non-believers or even pagans, right? And they they see things, right? That they try to claim, you know, that you are saying, and they get away with a lot of this, you know, you know, pretending that you are saying it just because of religion and not because of your natural reason.

[7:46] And so, this is a good example, right? That Aristotle understood very well the kind of opposition that relatives have, right? And Thomas learned that from his master Aristotle, but it helps him to understand the what. Trinity. I think I mentioned before how if you look at the Greek of Saint Paul's text, right, it doesn't say with. Beginning was the word. The word was with God, but it says the word was toward God, right?

[8:29] It's exactly the word Aristotle uses in the Categories when he talks about relation. He doesn't use the abstract word relation, but he uses the term pros towards t towards something. And in the in the Greek, in even the Latin ones, he'll translate as ad aliquid right? Towards something, right? And that's right in the Gospel of Saint John. If you know Aristotle, you've got the Greek of Saint John.

[8:55] You see, there is a distinction between the word and what the word is toward, right? And that's a distinction of relativism. So. Daniel, can you smoke a fry?

[9:19] I don't know where that began. When Washington Irving went to Holland, everybody was smoking a pipe. Even the servants were pipe down the field.

[9:31] The Irish smoke as much as the Dutch. I don't know. Well, in the when I was there one time, well, that's out in the fields they pipe. Yeah. Out there in there, suit coat, sweater vest, tie, white shirt, working on the field. Well, Irving in his kind of satirical history of New York, you know, is kind of making fun of the Dutch a bit, you know, and they're always around.

[9:54] They're debating on smoking their pipe and so on, and that's all they do is smoke on up, and no decisions are reached. So he says, in creatures, then he says there cannot be a distinction of individual substances by relations, but it's necessary that be two essential principles, because relations are not subsisting in what creatures. In God, however, the relations are subsistent, and therefore, according as they have opposition to each other, they are able to what distinguished, Supposita, right?

[10:40] But they are not distinguished what by the essence, right? Because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other, according as they are really the same with the what essence. ad invicem towards each other, huh?

[11:01] Now the second objection seemed pretty. not a logician like me, you know, You know, it's the second figure of the syllogism. The second figure of the syllogism, the the predicate is the what? The middle term is the predicate in both premises, right? And you can only draw negative conclusions in the second figure. And so, basically, it's by one statement affirming something of one thing and the other one negating it of the other, right?

[11:29] Okay. And we use that kind of syllogism, that second figure syllogism, all the way through the negative treatment of the divine what essence, right? Huh? Okay. Ah.

[11:45] The composed is something before it. God is nothing before him. Therefore, God is not composed, right? You're always affirming something of one and not the other. Notice that Thomas answers here now. To the second, it should be said that in so far as the essence and the person in God differ in their what understanding, huh? It follows that something can be said of one that is denied of the other.

[12:16] That's in so far as they're not the same in what thought, huh? And consequently, that supposing one, the other is not what. Yeah. Now another place where I see Thomas take up the same objection, you know, he goes back to the third book of Natural Hearing of Aristotle. And Aristotle is talking about acting upon and undergoing. How they're really the same thing, and so take a simple example: it's my kicking you, and you're being kicked?

[12:57] Are they two things, different things? No. No, They're not the same because they're in the subject. Same subject. But the thing is in the subject. But there's a whole different definition, right? Yeah. It's called kicking. Insofar as it's from me to you, but the same thing that's going on, insofar as it's in you from me, is called being kicked.

[13:35] And so you're not kicking, and I'm not being kicked. So we can affirm of one which we would deny of the other, right? Yes The same reality: by kicking you. And you're being kicked, huh? Okay.

[13:53] Or as Heraclitus said, the way up and the way down is the same. So the same to go up and go down? The ladder is one.

[14:07] Something like that, right? You know, but Aristotle could see that two things could be. I mean, I mean, something could be one thing and yet be two in what definition, and therefore something could be affirmed of one that would be denied of the what? Other. Yeah.

[14:26] Yeah. Okay. So those are. You can see how those objections, though, can really paralyze people, right? Thomas speaks of you know giving the objections and not the answers, leaving the cistern open, right? So we can fall down there. Which is what they said. that Voltaire did, right? He'd just go through and assume we get some objections, and then you know embarrass Thomas Aquinas or embarrass some Catholic if he shows up.

[15:01] Okay. Now the third objection is a different type of objection, right? That's going back to the the way we say what after our ways of speaking appropriate to creatures, we talk about God, right? But then we eventually negate these. The way of saying. To third, it should be said that we impose or place upon divine things names according to the way of creatures, right? And because the nature of creatures is individuated by matter, which is subject to the nature of the species, hence it is that the individuals are called subjects or supposita, right?

[15:46] Hypostasis Now I don't try to tell you anything. You should say what they're called the underlying or the standing under, right? And account to this, the divine persons are also called hypostasis, or supposita, standing under, right? Not that there is there some supposition or subjection secundum rem So you know, in philosophy when you're talking about the creature and so on, Aristotle's talking about the word in there in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, and he distinguishes about eight senses of in, right?

[16:26] And strictly speaking, nothing is in itself, right? So there's always a distinction between what is in something and that which it is. So if the water is in the glass, there's some distinction between the glass and the water. The genus is in the species there's some distinction, right? And so we say that the divine nature is in God, right? You might say, well, then there is some distinction between God and the divine nature, right?

[16:54] And you say, well, we can't avoid these concrete and abstract names because of our natural way of knowing. Aristotle says in the third book on the soul that our reason's own object is the what it is that's something you can sense or imagine,

[17:18] and so our language reflects what you can sense or imagine. That's why even our statements involve a noun and a what verb, and a verb signifies with time, right? So I am going to talk about something that isn't in time, like God. You see,

[17:43] but you know when Thomas makes that first consideration, he deals names a lot there. After he takes up the unity, I mean the simplicity and perfection of God, right?

[17:56] And so we say that God is wise, or that God is wisdom. Well, by reason of simplicity, we say God is wisdom itself. But then that seems to not be saying that he's wise,

[18:14] and that tracks with his perfection. So he sees wise, right? So he sees wise to bring out something of his perfection. Right, he's just, he's merciful, right? Here, bring out his perfection. We say he's justice itself. So we fear it. We fear justice itself, but he's mercy itself, right? He's wisdom itself, right?

[18:41] Then you bring out the what simplicity of God, right? But the form in creatures would be really distinct, right? And so we have the preposition in. We say wisdom is in God, right? But there is not a real distinction between wisdom and what it's in, right? Therefore, you have these two statements that we were mentioning earlier: that whatever God has is God, and whatever is in God is God.

[19:13] We use the word "has" and "in" because our way of knowing God, right, the creatures, but with him it's just the reverse. He knows that composed to himself was completely simple.

[19:40] Take a little break here. Second article here. It seems that it should not be said that the three persons are of one what essence or of one nature.

[19:57] For Hilary says in the book on the synods that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are in substance three. Through consonantium, through what harmony, right? He says it's a Latin word for harmony, huh? One, but the substance of God is His essence, huh?

[20:25] Therefore, the three persons are not of one essence; they're three substances. But you know, word substance can mean what? As Aristotle, Thomas is always quoting Aristotle. There, the two main meanings of substance is, what a thing is, and then the individual.

[20:42] In one sense, they're three substances. In another sense, they're not, right? Three angels would be three. What it is, as well as the persons. But

[20:58] moreover, one ought not to affirm something of God that is not expressed by the authority of sacred Scripture, huh? So, the thirteenth said that sacred Scripture, the study of sacred Scripture, is the soul of theology, as is clear through Dionysius in the first chapter of the Divine Names. But never in Scripture, sacred scripture is it expressed. express that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one what essence.

[21:28] Therefore, this should not be asserted. Moreover, the divine nature is the same thing as the essence. Therefore, it would be sufficient to say that the three persons are of one nature.

[21:50] Moreover, it is not customary to say that the person is of the essence, but more that the essence is of the what person. Say, Socrates is of his nature, or his nature is nature of Socrates. Therefore, neither suitably can it be said that the three persons are of one essence.

[22:16] Moreover, Augustine says that we do not say that the three persons are from one essence, from one nature, right? Lest we understand in God that the person and the essence are other, right?

[22:40] Of course, we couldn't say that what the table is from wood, but there's some distinction between the wood and the table, then, right? We can say my son is from me, but there's some distinction, anyway. So if we say that the three persons are from one essence, neither of those senses, you're going to be in deep trouble. But just as prepositions are what transitive to something other themselves, right?

[23:07] So the what oblique ways of speaking, the genitive. Because if you're got a real distinction there between the three persons and the essence, right? Yeah. But oblique does does he mean just the genitive or any other cases as well? Perhaps other cases, yeah. So it's just a way of referring to the. Yeah, what comes, you know. I see. Okay. Okay. Okay.

[23:46] Therefore, for a like reason, why not not to say that three persons are one essence? That implies a kind of distinction between them, right?

[23:54] Moreover, what is able to be an occasion of error ought not to be said in God. But when one says that the three persons are one essence or substance, there's given an occasion of error. Because as Hilary says in the book on the Synods,

[24:15] the one substance of the Father and the Son is predicated. What? Either as one that has two what? Yeah, subsisting. It signifies something subsisting. Or one what divided substance that makes two perfect substances, or a third, a prior substance which is what usurped, assumed by two. Okay, a little bit like the incarnation, right? When you assume a nature isn't exactly the same as you. Therefore, that we're not to say that three persons are of what one substance.

[25:07] But against all this is what Augustine says in the second book against Maximino. So many of these books of Augustine are contra. Very, very. That's the way theology developed, right? Kind of an ad hoc character, right? This man denies this article of faith, so against him we defend this article of faith, and that would be for the medievals like Thomas to, or you know, bring the whole together.

[25:35] Like the Second Vatican Council gives one of the reasons for studying Thomas. But again, this is what Augustine says in the second book against Maximinus that this name homoousion, which means what, of the same substance, homoousion

[25:57] is what, usia substance in Greek, right? Homo, same substance. Which in the Nicene Council was made firm against the Arians. It signifies the same thing as the three persons to be of one what? Essence.

[26:15] So what do we say in the creed, you know, they read "et cetera" instead of substance, but what was it? Original. What is it? What does the creed say? One being. One being. Yeah. Yeah. But the actual word is substance, right? Yeah.

[26:35] So, you convinced? It's dangerous way of speaking. I answer: It should be said that has been said above. Our understanding names divine things not in the way of them, because is not able to know them thus.

[27:02] You know, we name God not as He is, but as we know Him. And because in sensible things, from which our understanding gets its what? Knowledge, right? The nature of some species is made individual through matter, and thus the nature has itself as a form, the individual as a what?

[27:36] Yeah. Yeah. It's not the line before. On account of this, also in divine things, as far as the what way of signifying, the essence is signified as the form of the three what persons. I don't know if he's going to refer to the the epistle there. That reminds me, epistle though, right? But the Philippians, isn't it? When he was in the form of God, he did not consider it, you know, to be equal to God, right?

[28:11] And then he took on this form of a servant. Okay. So, speak of the nature there as being the form, right? Okay. Now we say in created things that any form is of that of which it is the form, just as health or the beauty of some man, right?

[28:40] You speak of the health of the man. That's a form, accidental form of the man, right? Huh? But the reverse: a thing having a form, we do not say to be other form, except with the addition of some what adjective, huh? Which designates that form, as when we say this woman is of what?

[29:15] No, of form is form. She's of an exquisite form. I'm thinking like being egregious, you know. So we're going to say, we wouldn't say a woman of beauty so much as a woman of exceptional beauty. You said it'd be an adjective in there, right? Okay. Or this. Man is of what? Of perfect what? Virtue, right? That's interesting that we do speak the way he says. I'm not sure I'm fully understand why we do speak the way, but we're bringing the adjective there, right?

[29:56] Okay. You see, he's a man of much knowledge, right? Not he's a man of knowledge. Okay. And likewise, because in God, the persons being multiplied, but the essence of the nature is not multiplied, right? We say that there is one essence of the three what persons,

[30:37] and the three persons are of what? One nature. One. Yeah, one essence. So that these are to be what constructed, as it were, in the designation of a what form, right? Okay.

[30:57] Now there's another place where Thomas takes up the same topic, and it's kind of interesting, huh? That he goes back to the distinction of four causes, right? It's going to be a chance to you know defend the debate the basil bit here, right, with the use of the cause. Okay. He says you've got four kinds of causes: matter, form,

[31:32] agent, mover, agent, and then the end or the purpose, right? Now he says in God is nothing like matter. So nothing in God is like the matter of something else. In no way. Okay. So even like that, is one person like the end or purpose of another person in God? No, because the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, and therefore, if one person was an end

[32:29] of another person, he would be better than the equal. And could you speak of even though he talks about this, but I'm thinking about it. Would you want to speak of the divine nature as being the end or purpose of the persons?

[32:49] That would seem to kind of make them the divine nature better than the persons, right? So that would get them in, right? Or what these two causes, right? Well, Thomas is not in the strict sense is our cause, right? But there is something like this when we say the Father generates the what, Son. Now, creatures, are really the mover, the maker of my Son, in a sense, right?

[33:21] See, well, he says, largo modo, large, you know, speaking kind of. But there's something like that, right? When you say the the Father generates the Son, right? Something like this. And here you have something like the what, form. When you say that the three persons, right, are what?

[33:45] Yeah. And I think it's in the Epistle to the Philippians. I think the one when he was in the form of God, there is a reform, right? Not that there is a real what distinction between the what, person, right, and the nature, but the nature is, because our way of speaking, right, drawn from creatures, is like a form, right?

[34:14] Use that for species sometimes too. So it is unlikewise, because in God the persons being multiplied, the essence is not multiplied. We say that there is one essence of the three persons, and three persons of one essence. That one understands the genitive in this case to be what. Put together, constructed. What's the best way to translate? Construe, construed. In the manner of a what, form. Okay.

[34:54] Well, notice. I just tried to be a little more complete here. We could speak of the Son of the Father, couldn't we? And this kind of touches upon something like this, right? Okay. When we speak of what three persons of one nature, then one nature there is not like the mover or maker. And that's why Augustine said you can't say from, right? Because that would imply either like matter or like the mover in the strict sense.

[35:35] But you say it should be understood kind of like saying the form, right? Okay. Even though in God the form and what has the form are what, the same thing, right? Okay. So

[35:58] you said God has great wisdom, right? Like a form, right? By wisdom, God is wise. So I've been thinking about that word philosopher, right? It means a lover of wisdom.

[36:28] So if God is wisdom itself, and the lover of wisdom must be a lover of what God Yeah No wonder the modern philosophers stopped loving wisdom, huh?

[36:44] Okay, now the first objection we were touching upon already—the one from Hilary, where he says in God there are three what substances, right? Well, to the first, it should be said that substance is taken there for what? Yeah, and not for the essence, right? So these are the two main meanings of substance that Aristotle gives in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? It can stand for the hypostasis or for the what essence, right?

[37:19] And of course, some of the problems that are created by the word substantia, right? Because etymologically it's the same as hypostasis, right? But hypostasis, usually in Greek, maybe doesn't signify the nature of the thing, while substance can, and then that's why Jerome spoke of, you know, the nomen venenum in this word, right? Because people were translating the three hypostasis that the Greek are talking about as three substances, and understanding it though to mean not individual, yeah, but the nature, right?

[37:58] Three natures, and then they're getting into trouble, huh? So these problems arise with the words. Okay. The second objection is saying, "Well, there's nothing like this in Scripture. So what are you talking about for? "

[38:21] The second should be said that although the three persons are of one essence, is not found in Sacred Scripture through those very words. And those very words is found nevertheless in its what sense or meaning, as in John 10 verse 30, I and the Father are what one, and later on.

[38:52] Um. Yeah, I'm in the Father, and the Father is in me, and this can be had through many other things. That's objection we met before, you know, where something is not word for word in Scripture, but the meaning is there, right? Of course, you have to bring it out when the heretic is putting his words forth disorderly. Okay. Now, the third one is saying, why do you say essence instead of what nature?

[39:25] Right. To the third, it should be said because nature designates a beginning of an act, right? So Aristotle says that nature is a beginning. and cause of motion and the rest and so on. Why essence is taken from what? Essay from being.

[39:53] Those things can be said to be of one nature, which come together in some act, as all things what? Heating. Yeah. But those things are said to be of one essence only that are of one what? Being. Right. And therefore, more is expressed unity, the divine unity, than the fact that the three persons are said to be of one essence than if they were said to be of one what?

[40:24] Nature. Yeah. That doesn't mean you can't call them of one nature. You can call them that, right? Moreover, it is not customary that the person be of the essence, but more the essence is of the what? Person. Do you understand the nature of the dog? Get dogs around here, don't you? Nature of the cat. If we speak of the nature of the dog, the nature of the cat, the nature of man, what?

[41:02] Nature of the cat. Nature. Yeah. Yeah. Therefore, it is not suitably said that the three persons are of one what? Essence. Huh. And Thomas says to the fourth, then it should be said that form, absolutely taken, right, is customary signified as of that of which it is the form. As the virtue, let's say, of Peter, right? Huh. The wisdom of Aristotle. Wisdom of Thomas.

[41:45] The reverse: a thing having some form is not customary signified to be of that form, right? Except when we wish to determine or designate that form in some way, huh? And then there is required two genitives, huh? One of which signifies the form, and the other the what? Determination of the form. As when it is said that Peter is of great virtue, huh?

[42:23] Or also there is required one genitive having the strength of two genitives, as when we say he's a man of blood huh? Meaning he's a what? One who's spilled much blood, right?

[42:41] Because therefore the divine essence is signified as the form with respect to a person, by way of understanding it. Suitably, the essence is said to be of the person, right? But not the what reverse, right? Except when something is added to the what particular designation of the essence,

[43:09] as if one were to say that the Father is a person of the divine what essence, yeah. And likewise in the present one that the three persons are what of one nature, right? But that's one in number, not just one in kind.

[43:32] You see, you and I are one kind. That wasn't very good. We say to me sometimes, you know, you and I are one mind in this matter. You and I have one mind in these. I have the Trinity, hope. So, I

[43:50] wouldn't say you and I are of a mind. For one mind, right? Now the fifth objection was arguing from other what prepositions that you shouldn't use other preposition like Augustine says explicitly you shouldn't say that the three persons are from one nature, right? Then Thomas gets a little bit of this thing that we're talking about earlier, right? That I was giving earlier the four causes, right? To the first, then it should be said that this preposition X, right, or de in Latin, right, and how does that X is from, right, does not designate the relation of a formal cause, but more the relation of an efficient cause or a material cause.

[44:55] And Aristotle defines material cause as what that from which something comes to be existing in it, right? Okay. So he uses the word from actually the definition of the material cause. The mover cause, he will speak of whence first, right? There's the beginning of motion. But whence has almost got the sense of from which, right?

[45:22] And so sometimes you have texts of Thomas where he'll distinguish between different meanings of the word from, right? Something is said to be from the opposite, from the matter and from the what mover or maker, right? Okay.

[45:43] Now, which causes in all things, he says, which causes he means the efficient and the material, right? Which causes in all things are distinguished from those of which they are what causes? For nothing is its own matter.

[46:05] So is the chair its own matter? The wood? No. Some distinction in the wood and the. Nor is something its own what active beginning or cause, so mover maker. But something is its own form, as is clear in all immaterial things. So the great Plato spoke of the forms, the world of forms, right? And each of these things in the world of forms is what its own form.

[46:41] And therefore, through the fact that we say three persons. persons of one essence, signifying the essence in relation to form, one does not show that what the essence is something other than the person. If you use the word from, if you said that the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit are from one nature,

[47:07] like saying the table and the chair and so on are from same wood, and there'd be some distinction then between the two, right? And therefore, from the fact that we say three persons of one essence, signifying the essence in relation to form, we do not show that there's something other, the essence than the person, right? Which would be shown if we said that three persons were from X, the same what essence, huh?

[47:47] And now it's coming back to this thing here. Remember how I mentioned how Boethius uses the word cause, right? See. But even this large sense of the mover or the maker, you say the Father generates the Son, then there is a real what distinction, huh?

[48:07] Just like there is when you talk about the efficient cause in the strict sense, huh? Okay. Now. Now, what about this occasion of error, right? This question come up again with appropriation, right? You know, this question here. To the sixth, it should be said, as Hilary says in the book on Synods, huh? That badly is it what prejudicial to sacred things, if those things are not had in a holy way by some, right?

[49:00] This ought not to be, huh? For if someone badly understands homoousian, what is it to me understanding well? There is therefore one substance from the property of the nature generated, not from what proportion from a cutting up of the divine nature, right? Or from the union of the two, or from their communion, huh?

[49:39] Okay, so how he says, heck with you guys, huh? I don't know how to understand these things. huh? If you misunderstand, that's your problem. Yeah, yeah. But you know, you know how the Muslims uh, um, say that we're not monotheistic because we have three. That's why they understand the three persons, right? But then you have to read the third article here to see whether, whether because the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, just like Socrates is a man and Plato's a man, Aristotle's a man, therefore they're three men.

[50:18] So if the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, then three gods, right? But it's obviously a mistake. But but but why that difference? You know. So...

[50:39] We got time to go on? Stop. We kind of overloaded restarting. Yeah, yeah. we better stop right there. Yeah. Wires start burning. Think about that.