Prima Pars
131. Trinity, Question 39, Article 4: Can 'God' Stand for a Person? (Meaning vs. Supposition, 'God from God', Metaphor and Irony)
Class of 2008-04-17
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/131-trinity-question-39-article-4-can-god-stand-for-a-person/

[0:00] Okay, Article Four here. Whether essential names, concrete essential names, can what stand for a person? To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that essential concrete names are not able to stand for a person. Thus, that this would be true. For example, God, what begets,

[0:32] generates God, right? Because, as the sophists say, the sophists are the guys who what started grammar, right? So they don't call sophists. So that they're

[0:48] lesser people. Because, as the sophists say, a singular term signifies the same thing that it stands for, right? But this name, God, seems to be a singular term, since it cannot be said plural, right? The plural. Therefore, since it signifies the essence, the nature of God, it seems that it stands for the nature and not for what a person, huh?

[1:26] Moreover, a term laid down in a subject is not restricted to a term placed in the predicate by reason of its signification, but only by reason of the time signified with, huh? Just as when I say, I don't know if he's saying that, right? That if you say something of the subject, right, in the sentence, that's not going to change the meaning of that, right?

[2:00] But it signifies something of time, like the verb does. As when I say God creates, this name God stands for the essence. Therefore, when it is said that God generates, this term God cannot, but by reason of the predicate, the notional predicate, the relative predicate, which is what the verb to engender, right, is something that pertains to a person. It cannot stand for a what person, right?

[2:34] It's like you're changing the meaning of it, right? Moreover, if this is true that God what generates because the father generates, right? For a like reason, this would be true that God does not generate because the son does not generate. Therefore, God is generating and not generating. So it seems to have the same God, right? And therefore, you have two gods. What's affirmed of one is denied the other.

[3:09] can have the same God. Moreover, if God engenders God, either what the same God himself, right, or another God, right, but not the God himself, because as Augustine says no thing generates itself. Nor another God, because then there would be what. Yeah, because there's not except one God. It's only one God. Therefore, this is false that God generates God, right? God from God, light from light, true God from true God.

[3:52] Moreover, if God engenders God, either the God who is God the Father or the God who is not God the Father. If the God who is God the Father, therefore God the Father is generated, right? If the God who is not God the Father, therefore the God who is not God the Father, which is false. Therefore, you cannot say that God generates God, right?

[4:22] Reminds me of studying, you know, the formal syllogism there, you know, in Christian college, and getting the formal syllogism down. I wanted to be a member myself. Was quiet. For I can't understand this. It gets a little bit complicated, right? Against all this is that in the symbol, meaning the creed, right? It is said God from God, light from light, true God from true God. So you say God from God.

[4:52] What does God stand for? Yeah, you say God from God. Well, the God who is from God is the Son, and yeah. So I mean, the creed didn't say that.

[5:18] To answer, it should be said that some say that this name God and like names properly, according to their very nature, stand for the what essence, right, the divine nature. But from the joining to them of something that's what notional, something relative, something in persons, they are drawn to what standing for a person, right?

[5:50] And this opinion would seem to proceed from a consideration of divine simplicity, which requires that in God, the same is the one having and what is had, right.

[6:07] And thus, the one having deity, which is signified by the name God, is the same thing as what? God, huh? Now, Thomas will come in here with a distinction, right?

[6:26] I told you this. This Dominican I knew, you know, his teacher had said, you know, never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish. Got exaggeration, but a little truth to this, right?

[6:43] But Thomas says, in what is proper to various kinds of speech, right? One ought to not only note the thing signified, right, but also the way of signifying, huh? And therefore, because this name God signifies the divine nature, as in the one having it, right?

[7:11] Just as this name man signifies what human nature in the what underlying subject? Others say better that this name God, from its way of signifying, right,

[7:31] has that it can properly stand for a person, just as this name what man, right? So sometimes this name God stands for the nature, as when it is said God creates, huh?

[7:53] Why? Because this predicate, which is creates, right, belongs to the subject by reason of the form signified, which is the divine nature. But sometimes it stands for the person, either one alone, as when it is said God what generates, or two, meaning the Father and the Son, when it is said God agrees, right? Or three, when it is said to the what? King of the ages, the immortal, invisible, the only God, huh?

[8:37] Okay. So, am I a man from a man? Yes. So the generated and generated are the same. A man generated a man. It's not the same thing, obviously, as God, but. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. the man stands

[9:03] for either your son or your father. So when a man generates a man, the first man in the sentence stands for the what father, right? And the second man in the sentence stands for a son, right? So you see, a man generates a man, right?

[9:26] That's exactly the same because the the human nature is multiplied there, right? Right. God, when when God generates God, you don't have the human nature and divine nature multiplied there; it's means one.

[9:47] Okay. Now, in regard to the first objection, there, right? Thomas points out that this name God, although it comes together with singular terms, in That the form signified is not what multiplied. It comes together nevertheless with common terms, right? In this regard, that the form signified, the divine nature, which is signified in there, is found in many what individual subjects, right? In many persons. Whence it is not necessary that it always stand for the what essence which it what signifies.

[10:37] What's he saying there? He's saying that the name God can stand for something that it doesn't what signify. It sounds a little strange, doesn't it? But because it signifies as what having the divine nature, and that's true of the person, right?

[10:55] So we can attribute to God or say God generates by reason of a person who has the divine nature generating, right? And we can say a God is generated, right? Or a God is born, right?

[11:18] Didn't they use on Christmas day to have you know a number of masses and one would be dealing with the divine birth of him and then you get down to human birth in the later mass? Wasn't that the way they was they were set up? You know, a number of masses.

[11:39] But notice that's because of the difference, huh? If if God signifies the divine nature, would you say the divine nature generates? No. No. But what has the divine nature can generate. One who has the divine nature can generate, right? And another who has the divine nature can be what generated. Okay. Because God signifies not just the divine nature, but what has the divine nature, and that can be said of the person, right?

[12:16] And that generating power of generating the Father has is from divine nature, but through him as one having the divine nature. I will get into that in another question, right? We said compare these things, okay? Now the second objection says, yeah, is not

[12:41] saying that the name God can stand for a person as well as for what. The divine nature, right? So he says, objection proceeds against those who say that this name God does not have a natural supposition for a what person, right?

[13:13] But Thomas is saying by reason of the fact that it signifies what has a divine nature, right? And because each of the three persons has a divine nature, right? Then the name that signifies what has a divine nature can stand sometimes for a person, and you know that from what the verb or something, right? That it is here standing for this person or that person, right? So if you say God is born, God is generated, then God here is standing for what the Son, right?

[13:48] But if I say God generates or God gives birth to, then God is standing for the what Father. Okay. Now the third objection. If this is true, he says that God engenders because the Father generates. For like reason, this will be true that God does not generate because the Son does not generate. Therefore, there is a God who generates and a God not generating, and so you are affirming of one God what you are denying of the other God.

[14:28] So they can't be the same God, right? They get one God, right? Okay. Thomas can have a long reply to this, right? I know this guy got got the stupid night time. To the

[14:46] third, it should be said in another way: the name God has itself to standing for a what person? How does your text translate that? By the way, that's probably the best way of putting it: to stand for, I think, in English. I don't know The word "God" stands for. They use the word "stands for." Yeah, I think that's the way it's translated. Often puzzled about supposition, you know.

[15:15] But you know, it's not like the supposition of a name is the same thing as the meaning of the name, right? Okay. So he said the name stands for something. It's not to say that's its meaning. Anyway,

[15:36] in another way, he says the name God stands for a person and the name Man. Because the form or the nature signified through the name Man, that is humanitas, or human nature, right? Really. Is divided in diverse individual subjects, right?

[16:00] Then, by itself, it stands for what? A person, right? Even though nothing is added that determines it to that person, right? Which is a distinct what? Individual.

[16:18] But the unity or the community of human nature is not in things, secundum rem, right? But only in the mind, only according to what consideration.

[16:33] So human nature is common only in our mind. Out here in the real world, it's all what individually, your human nature and my human nature.

[16:49] Whence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature, except when it is required by something added, right? As when we say "man" is a species, huh?

[17:08] That's only in the mind, but man is universal. It's one of the five predicables, that Porphyry talks about. Huh? Considering Porphyry is very anti-Christian, anti-Catholic, right? And I guess Thomas said somewhere that Augustine says was it pride or what that kept them out of the faith. I find it interesting thing in terms of reason and faith, right? That Porphyry's book is regarded as the beginning of philosophy.

[17:39] And as I mentioned, you know, Albert the Great has a whole paraphrase of it, right? Cardinal Cajetan has got a commentary on it, right? Thomas uses it all the time. So they all agree that this is excellent, fundamental, even though the the Mohammedans would regard it as the beginning of logic and so on. And so, despite those who are Mohammedans or Christians or pagans or wherever they are, they all accept the what Porphyry of Isagoge huh?

[18:05] It's marvelous. But the form signified by this name God, to wit, the divine nature, is one in common secundum rem in things. Whence, by itself, it stands for the what common nature, right? But from an addition, something added to it, its supposition it's standing for is determined to some what person. Whence, when it is said God generates by reason of the notional act. The relative act. It stands this name God for the person of the Father.

[18:59] But when it is said that God does not generate, nothing is added that determines this name to the person of the Son. Whence it would be understood that generation is repugnant to what? Yeah. But if there is added something pertaining to the person of the Son,

[19:26] the speech would be true, as if it were said that the generated God does not what. Yeah. Whence also it does not follow that God is generating, and God is not generating unless there be placed something pertaining to the persons, as if we say that the Father is God generating, and the Son is God not generating. And thus it does not follow. That there are many gods, because the Father and the Son are one God, this has been said.

[20:04] But then you're probably smoking from that, right? Read that in the quiet of your cell. The letter is supposed to be of advice to Thomas to the students. You know, love yourself. You want to know.

[20:22] That's the ancient monastic saying. Ah, by Moses, the Ethiopian says, "Remain, stay in your cell, and your cell will teach you all things." Yeah. here On the fourth objection here. If God generates God, either himself God, right, or another God, right, but not himself God, because nothing generates itself. Therefore, another God.

[20:59] That can't be so, because there is what only one God. Therefore, it's false to say that God generates God, right? Now. To the fourth, he says it should be said that this is false, that God, that the Father generates himself, God, right?

[21:20] Because the pronouns say right, self since it's reciprocal refers to the same what individual subject, right? I generated myself. I'd be saying right. Nor is it contrary what Augustine says to Maximus, contra Maximinum, isn't it?

[21:45] That God, the Father, generates another what self. Because the word self is either of the ablative case that he generates someone other than himself, right? Or it makes a simple relation, and thus it what into nature. But it is an improper or emphatic speech, whose sense is that he generates another most like what himself.

[22:32] Likewise, this is false that he generates another God. Because although the Son is other in the masculine case, therefore the Father. Nevertheless, he should not be said to be another God.

[22:51] Because it would be understood that this adjective other. Would place its a thing around the substantial thing which is God, and thus would signify a distinction of the divine nature.

[23:07] Some, however, concede this that he generates another what God, thus that the word alius is substantive. and the word God is what construed with it. But this is a improper way of speaking, and should be avoided, lest there be given a occasion of what.

[23:31] I won't try to unfold it anymore. Now the fifth one here. If God generates God, either the God who is God the Father or a God who is not God the Father. If the God who is God the Father, therefore God the Father is generated. If the God who is not God the Father, therefore there is a God who is not God the Father, which is false.

[24:08] It cannot be said that God generates God, right? To the fifth, then it should be said that this is false: that God what generates a God who is God the Father. Because, since the word "father" is what

[24:28] construed with what the word "God," it would restrict it to standing for the person the Father. So that the sense would be that he generates a God who is the Father himself, right? And thus the Father would be generated, which of course is false. Whence the negative must is true, he generates a God who is not what God Father.

[25:01] If, however, this construction be understood to not be what a positive, how they translate that anyway? Grammarians usually call it a positive. Yeah, yeah, that's what they like to have a positive. I know there's a better word for it

[25:24] It doesn't have to explain it. But something should be what interjected, right, placed in between. Then the reverse, the affirmative is true; the negative, false. That the sense is, he generated a God who is God who is the Father, but this is a what stretched, extorted, huh, exposition. Whence it is better that. Simply the affirmative be denied, right, and the negative what conceded. Praepositinus nevertheless says that both the negative and the affirmative is what false, because this relative who in the affirmative can refer to the individual subject, but in the negative it refers to the signified and to the what subject.

[26:21] Subject, yeah. Whence the sense of the affirmative is that to be God the Father belongs to what the person of the Son. The negative sense is that God the Father is not only removed from the person of the Son, but even from his divinity. But this seems unreasonable, Thomas says, irrational, because according to the philosopher about the same of whom there's affirmation, there can be what. Falsi Yeah.

[27:02] So, done your pipe and smoke it for a while. Difficult, though. But notice what's the basic thing that Thomas is saying in the body of the article. He's saying that the name God can stand for what divine nature, Divine nature, right? So when you say God creates, right? God is good, right? You're saying this by reason of being what God by reason of having the divine nature, right?

[27:36] But when you say that God generates or God gives birth, then God is standing for the Father, right? And why can it stand for the Father? Because God signifies what has the divine nature, and not only does God have the divine nature, but you can truly say that since the Father is God, the Father also has the divine nature, right? So God can stand for the Father, and that it's standing for the Father is clear from the what predicate, right?

[28:14] So I mean, you get these two statements, and you say God is good, or God creates or something, and you say, well, by reason of the predicate, you can see that it's standing for what what belongs to God by reason of his divine nature to be good, right? But when you say God

[28:36] engenders or gives birth, right, then God is standing for the what Father, right? I mean, it's it's got kind of subtle distinction there between the meaning of a word and what it what stands for, right?

[28:57] And so it takes them more more known to us, and you say that is it true or can it be true that a man generates a man?

[29:10] Say well, if a man generates a man, then the then the the generator and the generator are the same because they're both a man. You say well, and if you can't say this right because nothing generates itself. You say well,

[29:27] can't you say that a man generates a man? It's not equivocation. No, no, it's not two different meanings of a man, right? So you say a man generates a man. Does a man mean the same thing? Well, well, yeah. You see, because yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But does a man stand for the same man? You say a man generates a man. see Then the first it stands for the father, and second it stands for the son, right? So I mean, that's kind of a subtle distinction, right?

[30:02] But isn't there a true distinction there between the the meaning of a word and what it stands for, right? So you say, well, what does that mean, you know?

[30:27] Now, if you say that that man is a species, right, or a man is universal, but man is a species, the particular kind universal it is. Now, one of the sophistical arguments is like this: you say, man is a species. Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is a what species, right?

[31:00] So you say man is a species, and you say Socrates is a man. Does man mean the same thing? Well, the universal species is one of the five universals. And when you say Socrates is a man, though man is something universal being said of Socrates, so isn't the meaning of a man the same in those two sentences? Not the thing signified. Well, I mean, when you say Socrates is a man, man is a species, right?

[31:41] Does man have a different meaning in those two sentences? No, not the thing. That's the way it's signified. Was a difference? If it's not difference in meaning, is it a difference in what they call supposition, what it's standing for, right? Yes. Is that is that the same as saying it's the way it's signified? No, I don't think it's the way it's signified. When

[32:09] you say man is a species, it's standing for something in our mind, right? Because it's in our mind that something is universal, a species, right?

[32:24] But when I say that Socrates is a man, is man standing for something in our mind? No. No, something in the real world, right? So it doesn't seem to me that you have two meanings of the word man there, but there seems to be some kind of difference in supposition, right?

[32:45] Just like in another example, there you say a man generates a man. Okay. Or a man teaches a man. Four feet here. Can a

[33:01] man teach a man? Well, if a man teaches a man, then wouldn't the same man be knowing and ignorant? Teach a class by himself. Yeah. See, that's like giving birth to yourself, right? So you have to both be and not be, right? So if a man teaches himself, he both knows and doesn't know the subject, right? So you say, well, therefore, it's impossible for a man to teach a man.

[33:40] But you know, when you say a man teaches a man, does a man have a different meaning in the subject and in the, you know, predicate there? Man as teacher teaches a man as student. Yeah. Just man teaches that man. Yeah, but but you have teacher and student in there, right? And that in the sentence, that the word teacher and student. So you say, is it false to say that sometimes, rarely, a man teaches a man, right?

[34:14] Is that, or is that, can that be true sometimes that a man teaches a man? Okay. There are two individual meanings for it. You say a man teaches a man. That's something different. Yeah. You say a man teaches a man, or a man teaches a man. Yeah. But you you could say that the first a man stands the teacher, right? And then in the second case, it stands for the what student, right?

[34:47] You see. I mean, that's the way to speak of it, rather than say that that a man has two meanings here, right? And first it means teacher, and then it means what student. See. Well, somebody might be tempted to say that, right? But does those really two different meanings of the word man? Does man sometimes mean teacher and sometimes mean student? No.

[35:24] A teacher and a student are both a man in the same sense of man, I think. You see. Now, sometimes you know students get confused, you know, even with you know genus and species, and you say, well, when you say a dog is an animal, you say a cat is an animal. You say both of them that's an animal, right? And then you ask the students, well, you say a dog is an animal, you say a cat is an animal.

[35:54] Does animal mean the same thing? And you you usually get some student who will be tempted to say that animal doesn't mean the same thing, right? Is that true? In other words, you'd be saying that dog and cat are two meanings of the word animal. See? It would be like saying, you know, that that square and and oblong, let's say, rhombus are two meanings of the word quadrilateral.

[36:30] Are they? See? Or like saying that tragedy and comedy are two meanings of the word play or drama. Are they? Or like two and three are two meanings of the word number. Are they? No, they're one the same meaning, right? So when I say a man teaches a man, which happens occasionally, does a man in the two uses in that sentence have a different meaning? One case it means teacher the other case it means student.

[37:09] They may be tempted to say that, right? See? But still, there's some difference, right? Because it can't be the same man who is a teacher and taught.

[37:22] So when you say, but is it false to say that sometimes a man teaches a man? Sometimes God teaches. a man. But I mean, you could say that. Truly, I think that sometimes a man teaches a man. Then you've got to make some distinction then between meaning and what it what stands for, right?

[37:45] Because a man, in some ways, has human nature, and the teacher has human nature. Then a man can stand for the teacher, right? And since the student has human nature, he's a man too, so it can stand for him, right? In the same way, you say a man generates a man, right? Or a man kicks a man. That's pretty hard. As you can kick yourself in some sense, but it's kind of hard too.

[38:19] Man's inhumanity to man. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it takes a while to get thinking about this supposition, right? But there is something there, right? That has to be what understood and we understood. You know, not the same problems exactly, but somewhat similar problems. Even with things other than God, right? It's not the same thing to say that this is the meaning of a man and what it's standing for in this sentence, right?

[38:55] And perhaps this other example is getting there. You know, we say Socrates is a man, and man is a species. Right? Does man have different meaning in those two sentences?

[39:18] But in one case, man is standing for what is in reality, right? Other case, it's standing for what is in our mind. When I first started out in philosophy, you know, to ask you what a metaphor is, and the people would say, "Improper supposition." I know where they got this idea, you know. And is that really what it is? I don't think it is that. No In

[39:56] other words, what Thomas says when he Explains metaphor, and he begins in the general there, and says in a figure of speech that when the man speaks figuratively, the meaning of his words is not the meaning of the speaker.

[40:21] So is the word standing for something they shouldn't stand for? Is that what metaphor really is? They call it improper supposition, right? So when I say you're a pig, you know they're saying, well, pig is standing for what glutton or something, right? And that's not really what it stands for. It stands for the four footed animal with a you know, That's really the way to understand what a metaphor is?

[40:50] So when I call you a pig, do I really mean that you're a pig? Now what I really mean is you're glutton. So my word doesn't mean what I mean. And then Thomas says, well, that's kind of a strange thing to be doing, right? To not say what you mean. But

[41:10] there's a way in which what you mean can be understood from what you say. And the case of metaphor, it's by a certain what, distant likeness, huh?

[41:23] You rat, you know. He compares you to different animals, right? That Boethius talks about this, you know, how a man when he departs from reason, he becomes like a what? Like a beast, yeah, but different beasts going to what is fox, you know, a fox, you know, and.

[41:42] Yeah. Three years ago about the war. Yeah. Hawks. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Doves and so on. Where does Thomas talk about the metaphor? Don't worry about that. I'll turn that one. Yeah, I think some of those passages, but kind of the key passage for me was one in the commentary on the epistles of St. Paul, where Saint Paul uses irony, right? And Thomas has to defend Saint Paul from lying or saying something false, right?

[42:20] You see. And he explains the fact that Thomas is speaking figuratively here, right? He's talking. I think it's in Galatians. Somebody just talking about what wonderful people you are, you know. And well, then Thomas gives this general notion of what figurative speech is, right? That the when you speak figuratively, the meaning of your words, right, and the meaning of of you are not the same, right? And then he he just contrasts two of them, metaphor and irony, right?

[42:52] His metaphor is based, as we said, upon a likeness, right, although distant between what your word means, what you mean, right. The likeness in this case from the pig, let's say the glutton, right? And then in the case of irony, it's the reverse; it's the opposite, you know. So, example I always gave when I was teaching, I'd say, "Like, when you're on the weekend, I find you drunk under the table," and I say, "What a fine example of a, you know, some sort of college student, right?

[43:21] " Well, they know I don't mean that; I mean just the opposite of what I said, right? But a lot of times in daily life, when someone's kind of mean to us, to say, "Gee, you're nice," you know, you hear people say that all the time, right? And

[43:35] so, Saint Paul is using irony, right? Saying the opposite of what he means, huh? So you got to distinguish between figurative speech and and lying or making a mistake, right? See, those are all different things, right?

[43:59] And as I, you know, my my example in class was, you know, if Romeo calls Juliet Rosalind, which is the name of the girl he was in love with before he knew Juliet, that would be a mistake. It's always a mistake to call. Well, if he calls her honey, you know, she'd be pretty disgusted. That's not my name. Then he'd be speaking figuratively, right? He says, "Rosalind,

[44:34] who's that?" Yeah. And I suppose you know another thing would be to be lying, right? When you speak figuratively, you're not lying, right? I've told you a million times that's hyperbole, right? Well, is your mother lying when she says that? I told you a million times, you know, to pick up your room or whatever it is. She probably has. Yeah. That's what

[45:02] we used to say as kids. I told you once. I told you a million times. Don't exaggerate. The thing is, you know, we want to

[45:13] speak metaphorically in daily life and in fiction, you know, more to what express our emotions, right? But there are other reasons why sacred scripture uses metaphors, huh? Not to express emotions, right? But for the reasons Thomas gives in the beginning of the book, right? Because of the great what distance between these things, right? But also to somewhat hide the truth, right? But also, you know, Thomas gives as a reason that the whole of us should be subject to God, right?

[45:53] And so, when I genuflect, my legs become subject to God, right? And when I use metaphors, or scripture uses metaphors, even my imagination becomes subject to God, right? It's more important to me that your imagination be subject to God than your your feet. Although that's important too, right? But the imagination is always leading us what, astray, as Jane Austen would say. You know, it's always we're always imagining people to be other than they are, and we rarely, you know,

[46:30] the the in politics is it too? You know, the image of the speaker and the the politicians is usually the opposite of what he is, right?

[46:40] Yeah, yeah. Being inclusive now, I don't want to exclude anyone. My politician friend coming back there, coming back from the Democratic Convention that nominated Kennedy, and they said, "What is Kennedy really like? Cold as ice." So every time,

[47:00] but I know I saw that we had two guys, Humphrey, you know, ran national and Freeman, and Freeman didn't really like people, you know. Humphrey's really a funny guy. Even in private life he was really a nice guy, you know. So one the image, you know, was quite false. The other image was true He really was kind of a nice guy. It sounded like Regan was right.

[47:24] Because in private life he was a nice guy, you know. Some of these guys. Not really what they pretend to be. So in Jane Austen's novels, you often have you know a man who pretends to be something other than he is, right? Then you have the the moment of truth. Shakespeare has that in All's Well That Ends Well*, I guess it is, yeah. Where the guy is always bragging about what great soldier he is, right?

[48:02] And so they just they dress themselves up like enemy soldiers, and they capture him when he's out on patrol, and then they pretend, you know, and demand, you know, and he reveals the thing and so on. And then after he reveals the thing, then they pull off their masks, you know, and he's completely disgraced. He says, "who cannot be betrayed by the plot?"

[48:23] Well, it's the idea, you know, that you know if you arrange the plot, you can find out maybe things about people, right? You know, I think I told you to saw this. I guess they made a movie out of one time where people are going to be interviewed for a what position with the Secret Service, you know, for the CIA it was. And they were all being invited to this mansion in Virginia, someplace, right?

[48:51] And then they're going to be examined, you know, thing. And after they arrive, of course, they're informed that the people who investigate them are delayed, you know, and they're going to be staying at the mansion for a couple weeks before the thing begins. What they don't realize is that during those two weeks, they're really being examined, right? And some guys are falling in love with the woman there, you know, and this is a bad thing for a spy, you know, because that's how secrets get out, usually.

[49:19] And other things are testing them, you know, and that way they find out, right? There's other other guy kind of vulgar joke, but it's kind of funny, yeah. They're at a party there, and he's got discussing with the woman there. Would Would you sleep with a man for a million dollars, just one night? Well, for a million dollars, yeah, you know. And then later on, the guy comes by and offers the woman twenty dollars.

[49:48] Says, "Who do you think I am?" And the guy says, "well, we already know what you are. Just haggling about the price." But you know, old saying: every man has his price, right? You see, and you know, I hear this sometimes too. You know, an offer you couldn't resist. You know, I mean, you know, good people go some place and go another place because they got an offer they couldn't see.

[50:10] You know, couldn't refuse, right? So, I mean, you could arrange, you know, plot, you know, get the moment of truth about somebody, right? That's terrible thing, right? So this guy's name is Paroles, which means in French, I guess, words, right? So who cannot be betrayed with the plot, right? But he didn't have much he doesn't have much dignity, so he can still come back to society and make a living, you know, somehow.