Prima Pars
132. Meaning vs. Standing-For: Why the Essence Does Not Generate the Essence (Article 5)
Class of 2008-04-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/132-meaning-vs-standing-for-why-the-essence-does-not-generate/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels, give the lights of our minds, order and, illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:24] Let's come back a little bit upon this distinction we met in the last article, the distinction between the meaning of a word or words and what they stand for. At first sight, that might seem to be exactly the same what thing, right? And the word stands for whatever they mean, right? Okay.

[0:50] But let's imitate Augustine here, kind of approach the distinction from a little dialectic. When we look, sometimes you know, maybe in the future, at the reasons of the incarnation, Thomas Aquinas, following I think Saint Augustine, in a couple of the reasons, he starts them with kind of dialectic. Augustine says, for example, God should be followed, but he can't be seen. Man can be seen, but he's not a perfect model to follow.

[1:25] I got a problem there, right? Well, God solves it by becoming man, and so have both something to be seen and something perfect to be followed, huh? Okay. Or, you know, man sins, so man should make reparation, but he can't do it. God could, but he didn't commit the sin. How do you get out of this dilemma? Well, God became man, right? So you see how appropriate this was.

[1:56] Well, go back to this distinction here and see how you approach it in this way. Would you admit, if you didn't know I was going to get you into a little math, would you admit that no one, no son, is the one of whom he is a son?

[2:21] You're not your own son, are you? No. Okay, so no son is the one of whom he is a son. Okay. Okay. Now, I am the son of a man. True or false? True. Okay. So if I'm the son of a man, I'm obviously not a man, right? Because no one is the one of whom he is a son.

[2:48] I'm the son of a man. Therefore, I'm not a man. Now obviously I'm a man. But you got a problem here, right? You admit that no son is the one of whom he is a son. You admit that I'm the son of a man, and yet you admit that I am a man. You can't have your cake and eat it, right? You see.

[3:18] Now, one attempt to unravel this, which I would regard as a false solution, but one attempt to unravel this would be to say, "Well, when I said that I'm the son of a man, a man means my father." Okay.

[3:41] Well, of course, everyone in this room is the son of a man, right? And so, when I say you're the son of a man, a man means your father, and you, another man, right? Okay. But now, do the words "a man" really have all these meanings? You're talking one sense in the real singular, the other case in the plural. Yeah, yeah. But you say every one of us in this room is the son of a man, right?

[4:12] Okay. But I'm the son of my father, and you're the son of your father, and so on, right? So, do the words "a man" when I say that I'm the son of a man, do the words "a man" mean we know Victor Burklest who is my father? And when you say you're the son of a man, it has another meaning, and there's as many meanings of the two words "a man" as there are what fathers in the world, huh?

[4:42] Is that true? See. Or is it that because a man can be said of your father, my father, the next man's father, and a man means something that has human nature, and your father, my father, the next father has human nature, therefore a man can stand for your father in one context and my father in another context, right? Isn't that a better solution, right? Okay.

[5:18] Now, this distinction is a beginning of many things, huh? And a beginning in philosophy or theology is always a seed, huh? And a seed is something small in size but great in its power. And because it's small in size, it's hard to see. So it's kind of hard to see a distinction between the meaning of a word and what it stands for. They seem to be almost the same thing.

[5:54] And when you say a man is an animal, let's say, or a man is an animal that has reason. You wouldn't maybe see the importance of this distinction, right? But when you say that no son is the one of whom he is a son, and yet we all would say without hesitation that I am the son of a man, how we see the necessity of this distinction between the meaning of a word and what it might stand for, right?

[6:22] There is a connection between the two, right? If my father didn't have human nature and your father didn't have human nature, we couldn't say that a man is standing in one sentence for my father and another sentence for your father, and so on. Okay, but they're not exactly the same thing, right? The meaning of a word and what it is standing for, right? So when I say a man is an animal that has reason, a man is not standing for my father, your father, is it?

[6:53] Although it can be said that your father, my father, right? But it's not standing for either one of them. It's standing for man as he is what? His nature is right. Thinking of what man is by nature, okay? Not what man can stand for, right? Okay.

[7:13] Now, it's a little passage here from a pope here from Providentissimus Deus, Leo the Great. This is the encyclical on Scripture, right? And in paragraph 97, he's talking about the.

[7:39] That was ninety-seven. Yeah. Yeah, in paragraph uh 96, excuse me, he's talking about the late Scholastics, including Thomas Aquinas, and their contributions to the study of Sacred Scripture. And I just read you this little paragraph ninety-six. With the age of the Scholastics, he says, came fresh and welcome progress in the study of the Bible. That the Scholastics were solicitous about the genuineness of the Latin version is evident from the Correctoria Biblica or lists of emendations which they have left.

[8:27] But they expended their labors and industry chiefly on interpretation and explanation. To them we owe the accurate and clear distinction, such as had not been given before, of the various senses of the sacred words. The assignment of the value of each sense in theology, the division of books into parts, Thomas always dividing, subdividing by two or three, and the summaries of the various parts. The investigation of the objects of the writers, the demonstration of the connection of sentence with sentence and clause with clause, all of which is calculated to throw much light on the more obscure passages of the sacred volume.

[9:20] Now, this last sentence is the one I want to make applicable to this distinction. The valuable work of the scholastics in Holy Scripture is seen in their theological treatises and in their Scripture commentaries. Notice he mentions both of them, right? Now, obviously, the Scripture commentaries is what he's, you know, emphasized here. But he also says in their theological treatises, of which the Summa is is one, right?

[9:51] And the last sentence is, and in this respect, the greatest name among them all is Saint Thomas Aquinas. So. Does this distinction here in theology is it useful and necessary for understanding sacred scripture? Well, when I left last night, I got to the last class. I think it was. I got thinking about this famous passage from our Lord in the third chapter of John.

[10:20] For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that those who believe in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. So you look at those words. For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son. Well, Son is not the one of whom He is the Son, right? So the Son of God is obviously not what. Yeah. You can see the importance of this distinction, right?

[10:52] You say, well, when you say God so loved the world, God is standing for what? Yeah. Now, does that mean that God the Father, for that matter, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, that these are three meanings of the word God? No. Not three meanings, are they? No. And yet, you've got to understand this text correctly. To say that God there is standing for the God the Father.

[11:33] Okay. Or take another text, huh? As Saint as Paul VI said, talking about Matthew chapter sixteen. As you know, he says the whole church is built upon the faith of Peter. So the profession of the faith of Peter at Caesarea Philippi, which is given completely in Matthew, not in Mark and Luke, is pretty important. If the whole church is built upon this profession of faith. Well, what is the profession of faith of Peter when Christ asks, "Who am I?"

[12:12] and you get all the false answers and so on, and then Christ says, "What do you say?" and Christ and Peter says, "Thou art the what? Christ, the Son of the Living God." Well, Son is not the one of whom He is the Son. You're meddling, adeptic again. So if he's the Son of the Living God, he's obviously not the Living God.

[12:36] This is radical to say the least. And you say, well, how can he be the Son of the Living God and still be the Living God? Well, obviously, Living God there is standing for what? The Father, right? So this is extremely important distinction in theology, but it helps to illuminate these what texts, huh? And even the beginning of the Gospel John, you say, and the word was towards God, right?

[13:11] In the beginning was the word, and the word was actually pros towards God, right? Well, you are not towards yourself, but towards another, right? So, if the word is towards God, then the word is what? It's not God, right? Well, that's a serious mistake, at least. And so,

[13:38] what's the solution to this? Right? Objection, right? Say, well, God there is standing for the what? The Father, right? Does that mean that the word God has a different meaning there than elsewhere in Scripture? No. Okay.

[14:08] One last thing, and a little further removed, but pardon. We say the rule of prayer is a rule of faith, right? And we're very accustomed to the Hail Mary, and we say in the second part, "There, Holy Mary, Mother of God," right? I don't know if you had this experience talking maybe to a Protestant, even, where they kind of find the unease with the expression "Mother of God."

[14:39] You run into that in talking sometimes to them, because "Mother of God" might seem to imply that she is somehow the mother of the divine nature. She gave rise to divine nature, and we don't mean this at all, do we?

[14:58] Well, let me say, somebody would say, well, by God, do we mean Christ? Well, then why don't you say "Mother of Christ"? Why say "Mother of God"? But as you know, with the stories and so on, "Mother of God" is very important to insist upon, right? Well, what would you say about? it? Does the word "God" mean here?

[15:20] Yeah. And so, God here is standing for the second person, for the Son of God, and she's the mother of this person, right? According to his human nature, right?

[15:35] I think that's very striking. Example of how God can stand for one of the persons, right? Even when it's not what in his divine nature, right? But still, we speak of her as being the mother of God, right?

[15:57] Because this person who took human nature from her, right? This person. Is in fact one of those having in common that divine nature, and therefore you can say that she is the mother of God, right? So the uneasiness that they have with that, right, is partly because they don't see that distinction and the application of it to that sum.

[16:30] And notice even take you know further removed relations, like say if I say for example that two is half of a number, would you say that is that true that two is half of some number? But you're not half of yourself, right? So if two is half of a number, then two is obviously not a number.

[16:56] Well, again, here you got a different relation than Son and so on, but what is the number standing for there, right? Yeah, it's not as if it takes on the meaning of four, right? That would be kind of incorrectly saying it, right? So it's a very very subtle what distinction, huh?

[17:20] But, wait, did you hear any of the Pope's addresses in this area? No, I haven't. well, one thing that struck me just in terms of this subject matter, this course here, one of his sermons there talks. He was speaking of the triune God.

[17:42] I think that's interesting word, right? What does that mean, triune God? Yeah, three and one. I even looked up the dictionary to make sure, you know, wasn't a false etymology, right? But he wasn't elaborating on the mystery, but I mean, use that word. I think it's an interesting word to use. So you have three persons and and one God, huh? one nature, huh? Okay.

[18:10] So a little that distinction, right? Sometimes you know you don't see the power of a beginning until you see everything comes from it, right? You see all these texts in Scripture just to take those to be a case, and elsewhere besides Scripture, right? Depend upon that distinction, right?

[18:38] And something quite different from from metaphor, right? Okay. So we're up to the fifth article here. To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems that essential names signified in the abstract.

[19:09] Can stand for the person. Thus, that this would be true, that the essence generates what? Yeah. Then not only we could say God from God or God generated God, right? But we could say that the essence generated the essence. Huh?

[19:34] No. First objection is from Augustine, right? Got to be careful, reading this, Augustine? For Augustine says in the seventh book about the Trinity, the Father and the Son are one what? Wisdom, because they are one essence, huh? And each of them wisdom. Yeah. And not in particular, you might say. Wisdom from wisdom, right? As essence from what? Yeah. But there seems to be saying you can say that just like you say God from God, light from light, true God from true God.

[20:19] Moreover, we being generated or corrupted, there is generated or corrupted those things which are in us. But the Son is generated, huh? Therefore, since the divine essence, the divine nature, is in the Son, it seems that also the divine essence is generated.

[20:49] Moreover, as we said above, treatise on the substance of God, the same is God in the what? Divine nature. That was one of the articles in simplicity of God, huh? So if God and the divine nature are not identical, there would be something in God besides the divine nature, and then you'd be composed.

[21:12] Incidentally, I was reading the first book of Wisdom of Aristotle, and he's discussing the materialists, some those who say that some kind of matter is the beginning of all things and is the first cause. And Aristotle's a general criticism of all the materialists. It's very interesting. He says that in material things, what is simple is imperfect, and the composed is what more perfect? Yeah. So the simple and the and the perfect are not the same thing in in material world.

[21:58] But he says the first cause must be altogether simple and altogether perfect. So there's no way they can combine these being materialists, huh? It kind of struck struck me, huh? Because that's always central to Thomas when he talks about the divine substance that is both simple and what and perfect, huh? He sort of takes these two up together, right?

[22:28] So here going back to the idea though that God is altogether simple, therefore there can be no distinction between the divine essence and God himself.

[22:40] But we talked about that what difficulty of speaking about God, right? You say God is good, or do you say he's goodness itself? Do you say God is wise, or do you say he's wisdom itself, right? Well, if he had. Wisdom, which signifies as that by which you are wise, but he wasn't wise. What what good is there in in having wisdom? He didn't get wise by it, right?

[23:10] So you have to to bring out the divine perfection, say that he's wise. That's why we believe him. Okay, but then, wise we seem to by form of the word there signify what has wisdom, right? And therefore to imply a distinction between the haver and the had, and therefore composition. So we say, yeah, but God is His own wisdom, and there we bring out the simplicity of God, right?

[23:43] But nevertheless, there is a difference in the way you're signifying here, right? When you say God is wise, and when you're saying he's what, wisdom itself. There's a reason why you say both of those, but you realize there's a defect, and not by neither one of them, or even both together. You know, we know God as He is, but use both of them to bring out something about God.

[24:12] Moreover, of whoever is said something, right, it is able to stand for it, right? But the divine essence is the Father, right? Therefore, the essence can stand for the person of the Father, and thus the essence what generates him, just like in a way we were saying before. If a man can be said of my father, then a man can stand for my father.

[24:49] Moreover, the essence is a thing that is generating, because it is the Father who is generating. So he's saying, what's he got a syllogism there? It seems right. The essence is the Father. The Father is a generating thing, right? Therefore, the essence is a generating thing. If therefore the essence is not generating, the essence would be both a thing generating and not generating. That's impossible, once. And God can't have a contradiction, right?

[25:31] Moreover, the great Augustine says in the fourth book of the Trinity that the Father is the beginning of the whole what, Godhood. Godhood. But he is not a beginning, except by what, generating or by breathing, right? I see deitas there, and deitatis that refers to the divine essence, right? Therefore, the Father generates or breathes the divine what, nature, huh?

[26:04] But against all, this is what Augustine says. Give Augustine a chance to redeem himself. But against this is what Augustine says in the first book of the Trinity that no thing generates itself.

[26:22] But if the essence generated the essence, would not generate anything but itself? Since nothing is in God that is distinguished from the divine what essence? Therefore, the essence does not generate what in essence, right?

[26:47] Now Thomas begins by taking difference here. The abbess, abbot, Joachim. I answer: It should be said that about this erred the abbess Joachim, asserting that just as it is said that God generates God, right? So it can be said that the essence engenders the essence, huh?

[27:18] He said this considering that because of the divine simplicity, there is nothing nothing other God than the divine what essence of the same thing. So if they're the same thing, why can't you say the same about them, huh?

[27:37] But in this he was deceived. Again, Thomas is going to point out a little distinction, a little difference here, right? Which is important because for the truth of locutions of speeches, right, is not only necessary to consider the things signified, huh? But also what? the mode of signifying Yeah, the way of signifying. This has been said, huh?

[28:11] So although secundum in the thing itself, God is the same as the divine nature, the deitas. There is nevertheless not the same way a signifying for both.

[28:30] For this name Deus God, because it signifies the divine essence as in the one having it, huh? From the way of its signification, it naturally has that it can stand for what a person who has that divine nature.

[28:57] And thus, those things which are proper or private to the persons are able to be said of this name, God. As it is said that God is what begotten and or generating, huh? Okay. God gives birth. I'm going to be without, but I give others, right? You know, this. And He's also what? He's also born, right?

[29:32] But this name essence does not have, from its way, of signify that it stands for the person. Why? Because it signifies the essence or nature as a what abstract form rather than the concrete.

[29:51] And therefore, because those things which are private to the persons, by which they are distinguished from each other. Cannot be what attributed to the essence, huh? For it would signify that there was some distinction in the divine essence itself, just as there is a distinction in the what? Individual person. Yeah, standing.

[30:25] You see what Thomas is saying, right? He has to take into account not only what the words signify, right, in reality, but the way they signify, right? And the name God signifies that which has the divine nature, right? And so, since the three persons all have that divine nature, the name God can stand for them, right?

[30:50] But the essence, huh, signifies a divine nature in a kind of abstraction, right, from the persons, huh? And therefore, there can't be understood a distinction in regard to nature itself, right? The nature is altogether simple.

[31:11] Now he's got a little trouble there with Augustine, right? The first, therefore, it should be said that towards expressing the unity of the essence and of the person, the holy doctors, right, sometimes spoke more what expressly, right, than the suitability or propriety of speech allows, right?

[31:47] Whence these ways of speaking should not be what extended, but explained, yeah. As that abstract names should be expounded, huh, through what concrete names, huh, or even through personal names, huh? As when it is said essence of essence or wisdom, a wisdom, the sense is that the Son who is what the divine essence, the divine wisdom, is from the Father who is also the divine essence and wisdom, right?

[32:35] So is is that basically the same principle about standing for? In other words, essence stands. Well, it involves that, but I mean, he he's saying that that the one name that signifies concretely as having the divine nature can stand for the persons even in their what private differences, right? Why the name the abstract name. The name of essence or the divine nature, by the way of signifying, can't stand for the persons, and therefore can't stand for them in their distinctions.

[33:17] Okay, yeah, but then here, in the sublimum, isn't he saying something a little different though? He's making. We're saying sometimes the doctors spoke more explicitly. Sure. Yeah. They wanted to bring out the fact that the one who is the divine nature and is the divine wisdom, right, generated another one who is the divine nature, who is the divine what? It's almost like they want to emphasize the unity of the nature.

[33:51] Yeah, with the persons. With the persons. With both persons, yeah. Okay. Yeah. Yeah, speaking in a certain way. Sort of speaking more rhetorical. Yeah. So, so, but if you speak of the son and the divine nature, is any difference in them? No.

[34:07] But in these abstract names, a certain order should be noted, because those which pertain to action are closer to the persons, because acts are of the what? Individual substances, right, of the persons. Whence it is less improper to say nature of nature, right, because nature always has the idea of a beginning of motion and beginning of an operation, right, or wisdom of wisdom, because wisdom orders things, than to say what essence of essence, right.

[34:49] So notice how careful Thomas is there, right? Yeah. He says the way Augustine's speaking there can be understood in a way that is orthodox, right? But it's not a way that we should adopt the speaking, right? But then he also sees a distinction between a name like what nature and a name like what essence, yeah. And the name nature is more able to be used for the persons, right?

[35:16] Because persons are what acts, huh? You know the famous book of John Paul, the acting person, right? Okay. The idea that acts are persons, right? So a word that has some relation to activity, like the word wisdom, you know, always saying belong to the wise, wisdom orders things, wisdom orders all things sweetly from one end to the other, and the word nature, which is always beginning of some kind of operation, motion, could more, right?

[35:47] Yeah. And he doesn't say we should adopt those ways of speaking either, but he says minus impropria, less improper is this, right? Okay. So he's excluding really two

[36:02] categories, right? But one even more so than the other, right? And that's the one that's in the objection, right? In essence. So Thomas is correcting us not over there, in this language,

[36:26] okay. The second objection says that when we are generated or corrupted, what is in us is generated or corrupted, right? The second should be said that in creatures the generated does not receive the same nature in number which the one generating has. So my human nature is not the human nature of my father. Numerically the same in kind, right? But Swedish nature, half Swedish, but it's not what the same numerically.

[37:03] My humanity is not his humanity, right? It's numerically his number, though. You know, he's one, you're one. Yeah, well, that's expression going back. You say you say

[37:17] one in number is use expression one in number, right? Then they mean it's what individually the same, right? Okay, kind of a fun expression, but it goes back even to Aristotle, right? So we speak of things as being one in genus, one in species, one in number, right? Okay. So the man and the dog are one in genus, and two men are one in species, and I'm one in in number, I said, right?

[37:46] Okay. Really, there's no there's no number there in me, okay. So it's not the same individual in the generated, the one generated in creatures, but another one in number which begins in him to be through generation newly, and would cease to be through what corruption, right? And therefore, in some sense, it is said to be generated and corrupted, namely what per accidens, right? But the God generated takes the same nature in number which the one generating has.

[38:33] So the father doesn't give the son a nature like the one he has, but it's not individually the same. No, gives him the same nature individually he has.

[38:47] And therefore, the divine nature, the son is not generated; it's the same nature because it's not what something what new, right? So when my father generated me, there was a new human nature, the one that's in me, not in him. You see. So my father didn't give me the human nature, the same individual human nature that was in him, and that I have, right? If he had, then the human nature would not have been what?

[39:15] Be nothing new about it. The same one, same old, same old. So that's important distinction he makes there, right? Okay. Okay, don't know how we disagree here.

[39:43] Why is it not the same human nature? The same in kind, but not the same individually. Not the same man. My nose is not my father's nose. I don't breathe through the same nose that my father did. But but the son, you know, understands through the same understanding that the father does,

[40:11] And he loves the same love that the father loves. Okay. But my love is not my father's love, right? Okay. You know we love the same thing.

[40:32] So the objection is trying to say, he's trying to reason mistakenly from what takes place in us when a father generates a son, right? And human nature has a new existence now, right? It's human nature that begins to be there wasn't before. When I am generated, my human nature, my individual human nature, right? But when the God, the son is generated, right? There's not a new divine nature there in the son, resembling the father, but a new one.

[41:10] No, it's the same, same nature. So we also try to say there's nothing new. Oh yeah, there's a relation there. Yeah. That's why we said before that the persons are what, the relations, are modum subsistendi, right? Subsisting relations, right? In other words, the relation that subsisting in the divine nature is the person, right? And by reason of the relation, there is a real distinction, because the son is not the one of whom he is a son, but the son is the son of the father.

[41:52] He's not the son of the what? Yeah. Aristotle talks about relations and the categories. You know, he says we don't always give the proper correlative. So it would be common if we used to speak about a man and his slave, right? Okay. The slave of a man, but is the man of a slave? No. And the proper correlative of slave would be what master, right? So the master is related to the slave, slave to the master.

[42:26] Sometimes in the wedding ceremony they say we now declare you man and wife. I don't know, wife, the length is about the what? Um, but strictly speaking, the correlative of wife is what Husband. husband, yeah.

[42:43] So if one is a wife, one is the wife of a husband, and a husband is a husband of a wife, right? See, but you can't say you know if you're a man, you're the man of a wife, right? You see, or if you're a man, you're the man of the slave, right? So sometimes you don't give the proper what relative, and.

[43:06] If you give the proper relative, that's it, right? So, I mean, is the God the Son the Son of the Divine Nature? If that was a proper relative, then he would not be the Divine Nature. Yeah, but he's the Son of the Father, so therefore he is not the what Father, right? And the Father is the Father of the Son, so he's not the Son.

[43:37] Again, when you go back to the to the standing standing in, so to speak, you're not giving the what proper relative, right? So you say that I'm the Son of a man, right? A man, it's not giving the proper relative, huh? You have to say I'm the Son of my my Father, right?

[44:07] Okay. So it's not exactly the same way this generation of divine things as in human things, huh? Call the sun there, chip off the old block.

[44:26] It's not the same individual substance there. A third objection is taken from what we learned: that God and the Divine Essence are the same thing, right? With the same thing, why can't you say the same about them? To the third, it should be said: this what was in the body of the article that although God and the Divine Essence are the same in things, secundum rem, nevertheless, by reason of a different way of signifying, is necessary to speak diversely about but both of them, right?

[45:13] Now the fourth objection is somewhat similar. Of whomer something is predicated is able to what stand for that, right? Okay. Actually, you know, kind of with objections, stating you think that "potter" is being said to "sensio divina," but in reply here, Thomas is understanding the the words, right? To the fourth, it should be said that the Divine Essence is said of the Father by way of what identity, on account of the Divine what simplicity.

[45:54] But does not, however, follow that it can stand for the Father on account of the diverse way of what signifying. And the argument proceeds in those things which one is said of the other as universal of the what particular. So my father is a man, and your father is a man. So a man can stand for my father in some context, right? Or for your father in some other context.

[46:27] Now the fifth objection here starts with kind of like a syllogism, right? The essence is the father, and the father is a thing generating. Therefore, the essence is a thing generating. And then from it, this you are going to end up saying it is and is not so, right?

[46:47] And Thomas says to the fifth, then it should be said that this is the difference between substantial names and what adjectives, huh? Adjective names. No, so a name there or noun is what broader than we use it sometimes, huh? You don't call an adjective a noun, right?

[47:11] But incidentally, in Greek, I think, in Latin, I don't know if they have a different word for name and for noun. And you come into that question in the Peri Hermeneias of Aristotle, where he's talking about the statement is composed of a noun and a verb, right? Well, in Greek,

[47:36] both a noun and a verb can be called a name, right? But they don't have a separate name for name and for what noun. So I've explained that before, but just continue to parrot it here. Let's take Latin, which is the same as the Greek. you have nomen and verbum, huh? And then in Greek, you have like onoma, and then you have onoma and rhema, okay? Noun and verb, right?

[48:17] So you have the same word for a name and what? Noun. It's like in Latin for name and noun, right? Now in English, we could translate this though as name, and this down here is noun. So we have a separate name, right? And

[48:38] this is the least equivocal, but yet you'd say the word nomen here has two different meanings. And why does this name keep the common name, and the other one get a new name?

[49:01] Yeah. So Aristotle will first define the name and he'll say, well, it's a vocal sound. It signifies the human agreement. No part of it signifies a thing by itself. If it signifies with time, it's a verb. a rhema, Without, it's a what? Noun. So a verb adds something positive to the idea of name in general, right? That is, that it signifies with time. Okay. So it gets the new what?

[49:40] Name. And that's a common way that happens, right? That when the same thing is said of two things, more or less with the same meaning, right? But then one of them adds something that stands out to that common meaning. It gets a new name, right? So animal is said of. The beast and man, but sometimes you keep the name animal for the beast and distinguish animal against man.

[50:09] So if I call you an animal in biology class, I'm perhaps not insulting you. But if your girlfriend, as I always see the students, calls you an animal, she probably is insulting you or putting you in your place, I suppose.

[50:27] You see the idea? I noticed in English there's a tendency, you know, to use name for a noun too, isn't there? We're apt to call a man or a dog a noun, a name, then walks or runs, right? But Aristotle's definition of name in general would cover walks and runs too, right?

[50:51] You see with this other difference we have here with man and woman, right? In Greek and Latin you might have say homo, and then you can divide it into vir and femina, right? The same thing in Greek you have different word for the male and the female human being, right? But in English we divide man into man and what? Woman. And so one keeps the common name for different reasons, whether or not.

[51:25] But this is like what you have with what? Mouna, man, ran in Greek, right? So one language will have, a word but the other language, doesn't? It's just the way the language developed. I don't know why exactly, but it's a very common thing, right?

[51:55] Now one difference between these two kind of names, the nomina substantiva and the adjectiva, is that the substantive names bring along their own what? Subject, you might say.

[52:12] But the adjective ones not, but they place the thing they signify about the what? Substantive. Hence the sophists who began grammar. and you do point back to the Greeks, huh? Shows you the the lower mindset of the sophists, right? That they sort of developed grammar, way the Greeks, the philosophers developed logic, right? The sophists also developed what, rhetoric, huh? Which fits them, right? Because they.

[52:57] Yeah. Once the sophists say that the substantial names stand, right? You might say the adjectives do not stand, but they join something. So the substantive personal names can be said of the essence on account of the identity of the thing, right? Nevertheless, nor does it follow that the what personal property determines a what distinct essence, but they are placed around the what subject implied by the what substantive name.

[53:54] But the notional and personal adjectives are not able to be said the essence unless there be added some what substantive name. Hence, we are not able to say that the essence is generating, although we are able to say that the essence is a res, a thing that's a noun, right? Generating or God generating, if God and thing stand for a what persona. Not ever if they stand for the what essence.

[54:29] Hence, it is not a contradiction if it is said that the essence is a thing generating and a thing not generating, because the first thing stands for person, the second for the essence. That's just more subtle than the thing I was talking about. You know, when I say the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit are the one thing or three things, right? And if they're one, then they're not three.

[54:58] If they're three, they're not one. Well, you can say if thing stands for what substance, right? What it is, then they're one thing, the divine, the one God. But if by thing stands for relation, then they are what three things, right? So it's not a contradiction. No, even Aristotle distinguished those meanings of thing between what it is and relation, right, And the categories. huh? So you go back to the categories,

[55:38] put that in your pipe and smoke it. But notice again, a very subtle distinction, but a distinction that you're kind of forced towards because without seeing that distinction, you end up in a contradiction, right? Just like you would with. You know, saying the Father, Son, Holy Spirit are one thing, and saying they're three things. If you don't distinguish between thing in the sense of what it is, and thing in the sense of relation, then you have a what contradiction, right?

[56:25] Now the last one is from this way of speaking of Augustine that the Father is the beginning of the whole what Godhood. To the sixth, it should be said that Deitas, insofar as it is one in many subjects, has a certain what agreement with the name of a collective name, right? Not that it's that, but has much of that. Whence, when it is said that the Father is the beginning of the whole Deity, it can be taken for the universe of the what three persons.

[57:04] In so far as in all the divine persons he is the what beginning, nor is necessary that he be beginning of himself, huh? Just as someone, the people is called the ruler of the whole people, not however of himself, right? Of course, that's like things we get into all the time when we talk about God is the first cause, the first cause of all things. Well, For all things but himself, you know.

[57:42] But we do say all things, don't we? Right? It'd be kind of annoying to always be adding that, you know. But you have to understand that way, right? Take it from logicians, man. We say God is beginning or the first cause of all things, and God is among all things. Therefore, you get a problem, right?

[58:03] Or can be said that he is the beginning of the whole Godhood, not because he generates or breathes the Godhood, but because by generating and breathing he what communicates the divine nature to the Father and the Son.

[58:24] Thomas is saying in the sentences there later on when you get to talk about the missions there, you know, about three of the sentences that the the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit it leads us back to God, and ultimately it leads back to the Father. So if you're going back to the principium diitakis, as a result of the mission of the Son to you, and the mission of the Holy Spirit, but it's getting ahead a little bit.

[58:54] I'm reminded of it when he talks about him being the beginning, huh? Good, this is somewhere, huh? Happy man is a man enjoying the end of his life to the beginning of it.

[59:06] I'm not sure exactly what that means. Not only is true, you know, but there's some there's some truth about it, you know. You know, like our our soul came what immediately from God, didn't come immediately from our parents. Our body came from God, but through our parents, right? But our soul came immediately from God, and our end is to return to that from whom we came, right?

[59:34] So this will come out sometimes in talking about the mission of the Father and the Son. I mean, the Son and the Holy Spirit rather. Father doesn't isn't sent anywhere, but we'll see what that means to be sent, huh? But they are sent, you know, as a result of their divine proceeding, and then they, because of the certain effect that they have upon us, they are sent to be sent to us, right?

[1:00:01] But then to bring us back. Okay, so yes, did I go straight? But there's a contrast right now between five and four, because four was saying that

[1:00:16] God can stand for God the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit in a way that the abstract, the divine essence, the divine nature, the divine substance is not appropriately right to stand for them, and that's because the different way in which the two what signify. We have those two ways of signifying because we can't get rid of our natural way of thinking about things, which is about material things, where the nature or the form of a thing is not identical to the thing, but the thing has its nature or.

[1:00:51] form. Form, so we have these two kinds of words, and we have to use both of them because of God being both simple and what perfect.

[1:01:05] So the sixth article here: