Prima Pars
134. Summa I, Q.39 a.8 (1): Being Led by the Hand to God, the Order of Appropriations, and Eternity, Beauty and Enjoyment
Class of 2008-05-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/134-summa-i-q-39-a-8-1-being-led-by-the-hand-to-god-the-order/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father, the Son, and, the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels bring to the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and cause us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. Help us to understand all that you've written. The Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:27] You even have the Holy Grail, We claim to have the Holy Grail. Then one of the. Yeah, yeah. The Pope used it at mass. He was in Spain last year. Yeah, yeah. Except you see it there in above the altar. Interesting.

[0:41] I tried bringing some of my travel books, but I had all the other books to bring, so I was way down as I can.

[0:53] If you look now at the article eight there, question thirty-nine, the first four objections at least are going to come back in the body of the article, right? Because they are four what

[1:17] different appropriations, right? But Thomas will order those four different appropriations. One of whom comes from Hilary, right? And the other three, I guess, from Augustine, and he ordered them in a certain way, right? Okay. And I was looking at Augustine's text here back in the sixth book on the Trinity, and the tenth chapter in the sixth book, where he begins by Hilary's son. He quotes Hilary, and this is the same text he had here in Thomas, right?

[1:52] So Augustine begins that tenth chapter with that, but then after that, he goes into talking a little bit about the footprint, or not the footprint, maybe more the image, you know, the Trinity in us, and then he goes to this fourth one that Thomas has here, right? So you probably find maybe all of these four in Augustine, either in his own words or he's quoting Hilary, but they're not what ordered, right?

[2:25] Okay. So you have the first in this particular chapter, you have the first and the fourth one, but not the second and the third. But Thomas sees an order among those four different

[2:39] appropriations, right? Okay. But see, there's a beautiful text of Augustine. And Hillary must be a little bit before Augustine, then. He must must have the work on the Trinity, because he's quoting from Hillary's work on the Trinity, and the references to that. Contemporary of Bartholomew Tours, he ordained Bartholomew Tours. Yeah. So Augustine says he had somehow Hilary's book in the Trinity. So, so you go from Hilary to Augustine to Thomas, you get a fuller and fuller teaching.

[3:13] But as Gadgetan says in the premium, I guess, to his commentary on the Summa Theologiae, right? These to be printed in the Leiden edition. He says Thomas seems to inherited the mind of all the Church Fathers because he so what reverenced them, right? We'll come back to this and talk about glory, right? A little bit later on.

[3:39] So look at the objections first, and Thomas doesn't reply to them separately, but in the course of explaining each of these appropriations. You remember what appropriation is, right? Taking something that belongs, what, essentially to God, and you're what appropriating it to this or that person by reason of a certain likeness between this attribute and this what's proper to this person.

[4:09] And this is acceptable because you're what manifesting the less known by the more known. But you have to understand what you're doing. To the eighth one proceeds thus: It seems unsuitably, yeah. By the sacred doctrines are the essential things attributed to the what persons?

[4:37] They have the idea of attribution, right? Essentialia, says the Latin, to the persons attributed to them. For Hilary says in the second book about the Trinity that eternity is in the Father, species in the image, and that's capitalized, meaning the second name there we had, the last name we had of the Son, right? Son word, image, and usus, use. That's a little more difficult that use of the word there.

[5:09] In in the gift, right? Meaning the what Holy Spirit was called donum, right? In which words, huh, are laid down three names proper to the persons, to wit, the name of the Father, which is was very clear, the name of image, right, which is proper to the Son. We saw that in the particular consideration of the persons, as has been said above, in the name of muneris divinitatis, gift, which is proper to the what Holy Spirit, as when the names he took up in the Holy Spirit.

[5:55] And it lays down three things that are appropriated, for he appropriates eternity to the Father. Species to the what sun, and use to the what Holy Spirit, and it seems that it does so unreasonably, irrationally.

[6:17] For eternity implies the what duration of being. Species, however, is a beginning of being. And use, which seems to pertain to what operation. But essence and operation are found to be appropriated to no person. Therefore, unsuitably, I see that these are appropriated to the persons. Well, Thomas would be replying in the objection or in the body of the article that essence and operation are too general, right, to have any particular likeness to this or that persona.

[6:57] But these other names, as we'll see, do have, and we'll find out what that is when we get there. I'm struck by this, you know. Do you know Thomas's prayers there before and after communion? And there is where he addresses to the what the God the Father right, But he'll say omnipotens et aeterne Deus right. Well, who's he talking about? Because then you talk about your son.

[7:26] So, omnipotens et aeterne are what appropriate to the Father, right? This helps you to understand the the prayer, right, or vice versa. We'll see what that likeness is, huh? Because power and eternity are appropriated to the Father. Why? Well, it's because he's most of all what a beginning that has no beginning, right?

[7:55] Moreover, Augustine says in the first book about the teaching of Christ, the Doctrina Christiana. Oh, that's where he says that. Not in the De Trinitate. I wonder, huh? So these things are scattered among different works of the of the fathers, and Thomas will bring them together and order them, right?

[8:19] Okay. Augustine says in the first book of the Doctrina Christiana that in the Father is unity, in the Son equality. And in the Holy Spirit, the agreement or concord of unity and equality. And it seems that this is unsuitably appropriated. Because one person is not denominated formally to what is appropriated to what another. For the Father is not wise by generated wisdom.

[9:05] But as is said there, or added to that, the three, these three, are all one on account of the Father. They are equal, all on account of the Son. They are connected, all on account of the Holy Spirit.

[9:24] But you can't say that they're all wise by the Son. You can't say they're all equal by the Son, right? Okay, how do you understand what Augustine is saying there?

[9:36] Moreover, according to Augustine, and incidentally, in my particular thing it is a reference to Hugo, which is my name, by the way. In the other one,

[9:49] Yeah, Hugo of St. Victor. Okay, so that's very interesting. See, my my baptismal name is Hugo. I was baptized. Hugo. My name is actually Hugo Duane Berquist named after a grand uncle who was lost at sea off the coast of Sweden. So, and then the names got switched around, right? So when I got to the Catholic grade school, you know, the old pastor said, "How'd you get baptized?

[10:18] Duane is not a saint's day. And I took it in my confirmation name, Victor, because my father's name was Victor Burquist. and so I always felt an affinity for Hugo of Saint Victor because two of my three names there come in, huh? Our bishop's last name is Mansour, and I think Mansour is Lebanese for or for Vincent, a related name. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Also, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed power, right?

[10:57] Potentia. To the Son, wisdom, right? To the Holy Spirit, goodness, huh? And this seems to be unsuitable for virtus, huh? Virtue pertains to power, huh? But virtue is found to be appropriate to the Son, according to that of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter one, verse twenty-four: Christ, the virtue of God, right?

[11:30] Of course, Thomas often used the word virtue too to mean power, right? And it's also attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to that of Luke chapter six. The virtus went out from them, right? And it healed all of them. Therefore, power ought not to be appropriated to the what? Father, huh?

[11:55] As you mentioned before, Thomas the Church says omnipotens, sempiterne Deus, right? So you have power there attributed to the Father, and he had that in the creed, too. I believe in God the Father Almighty. You know, so Almighty is said of the Father, not of the other persons, but aren't they Almighty too? What? How do you understand that? Well, it's appropriation, right? But why is it appropriated to the Father, right?

[12:22] And see the importance of that article where he said that Thomas said whether the Father is a principium, a beginning, right? Because in the definition of power, he said it's a beginning of what? Operation, right? So the idea of beginning, and because the Father is a beginning that has no beginning, right? Then he especially seems to what? Have the aspect of a beginning, and because power is fundamentally a beginning, then it's appropriated to the Father.

[12:57] Not because those are not a beginning, but because of the special connection between the beginning that has no beginning, huh? And we'll see the glory of that a little later today. Okay.

[13:16] Now the fourth objection, just dealing now with the fourth one that Thomas will have in the order of these, right? So Thomas has ordered the objections, right? Is he allowed to do that?

[13:30] There's a beautiful text there that you'll see in the third part of the Summa there, where Thomas is asking where the dialectic remains after you have demonstration,

[13:42] and he distinguishes between dialectic before you demonstrate the truth, and then after you demonstrate the truth and see it clearly, you can go back over the dialectic and what order it more carefully, right?

[13:59] So the order of these objections obviously is the same as what the order Thomas sees among these four appropriations. So the dialectic here is what much more useful to leading the student to the truth than kind of hit and miss dialectic that you would have before, right? And you see this, you know, if you compare the dialectic of Plato in the dialogues where it's kind of all over the place, you go from one thing to another, right, and so on, and then in Aristotle where it's all what ordered, right?

[14:34] And something from this dialogue maybe comes in, something from that dialogue comes in, and this one right before that, and it's right perfectly ordered. But you don't have in Plato, maybe Plato did more so in his lectures, but but the the dialogues are like a man who Socrates claims not to know, right? And so he's kind of wandering a bit, right? And the dialectic is not as well what ordered, right?

[15:01] Of course, you see what they say is that teaching ought to imitate the discovery, right? But there's a lot of false dead ends when you try to discover something, right? And then the master comes back after he sees the truth, and he takes those parts of dialectic that are most convenient to lead somebody towards the truth.

[15:25] So this is a very simple example of it, but you can see the order here, right? But if you go through you know article after article of Thomas, the the objections are actually ordered,

[15:37] and more so in the Summa say, than maybe even the questions disputate, where it's, you know a little more dependent upon what the student has heard, right, and the collected objections.

[15:54] Also Augustine in the book about the Trinity, the text I was referring to earlier, Book Six, Chapter Ten. He says, "Not in a confused way should one take what the apostle says. " Notice that's by antonomasia the apostle, capital A. From him, and through him, and in him, right. From him, saying an account of the Father. Through him, per ipsum, an account of the Son. In Ipso, in him, an account of the what?

[16:29] Holy Spirit. But this seems said unsuitably, because through this that is said in ipso, there seems to be implied the what relation of a final cause, which is the first of all causes. Therefore, this relation of cause ought to be appropriated to the Father, who is the beginning, not from the beginning,

[16:58] But notice, there's still a likeness there of the Father in respect to the Son of what cause, huh? You know, these times tricky speaking of cause, but we mentioned how Basil and the Greeks sometimes use the word cause there, and it's because they're using it kind of a loose sense, right, a large sense. But what cause, or like what cause most of all, is the Father a beginning of the Son?

[17:26] Efficient. Yeah. In no way as an end or purpose, right? But the Father is to a Son a little bit like the maker, mover, and in us, strictly speaking, he is a cause in the sense of mover or maker, right? But there's still a likeness, right, of God the Father and the human Father, right?

[17:56] Okay. Now the fifth objection. Moreover, truth is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to that of John sixteen sixteen. I am the way, the truth, and the what? Life.

[18:14] Now, I just take as an example of a text there where sometimes the church see more than one sense of the words, right? So when I grew up there, you know, in the catechisms, they would take these three for the three parts of the catechism. And the Veritas you'd teach the what creed and so on, what you believe, right? And then in via you you would teach the what commandments, right?

[18:50] And then Vita, you'd teach about prayer and the sacraments, huh? Life, huh? Okay. But in the context of the question, where one of the apostles asked Christ, "Well, where are you going? " and "And how can we get there? " right? And Christ answers both questions by saying, "I am the way," which in Greek is the word "odos, right? I am the road, the truth, and the life.

[19:13] And as Thomas explains, well, as man, he's the what? The road, the way to God, huh? But as God, he's what? Both truth itself and life itself, huh? So he's answering both of those questions, huh? And so Thomas gets down to the Tertia Pars, the third part, where he talks about incarnation and so on. He says he's going to talk about Christ, who, as man, right, is the via, the road, the way of what, tending to God, huh?

[19:49] So via, referring there to the human nature of Christ and truth and life to his divine nature, but truth and life. There are what would seem to be appropriations,

[20:06] and likewise the book of life, according to that of Psalm 39. In the head of the book, it is written about me. That is before the Father with my what head,

[20:20] and likewise this that is said, who is, who am, ah, because or on that verse of Isaiah, chapter 65, verse 1. Behold, I go to the Gentiles, says the glass. The Son speaks, who said to Moses, "I am who am."

[20:43] But it seems that this is proper to the what, yeah, and not appropriated for truth, according to Augustine in the book on true religion, is the what highest, greatest likeness of the beginning without any what unlikeness. What seems to be what the Son is, the image of the Father, right? Well, of course Thomas is going to be saying the reply here that he's talking about truth insofar as it's the Son, right?

[21:15] But truth, simply said, is is essential, not what proper to the Son. It's appropriate to the Son, and thus it seems that is properly belongs to the Son who has the beginning. And book of life also seems to be something proper because it signifies being from another, right? For every book is written by someone. Thomas will seem to deny that. It's so hard that text I find, and this word "who is who am" seems to be proper to the Son,

[21:59] because if when it is said to Moses, "I am who am," the whole Trinity is speaking. Therefore, Moses could say, "He who is the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit, sent me to you," and therefore further he'd be able to say, "He is who is the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit, sent me to you," demonstrating a certain person. But this is false, because no person is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

[22:27] Therefore, is not able to be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son. And those are more particular objections. The fifth, but the first four objections are what dealing with the four appropriations that Thomas takes from Hilary and Augustine, and maybe someone go back before Hilary and Augustine, right? Like Hugh. So, okay. Now

[22:56] Thomas gets to the body of the article. I answer: It should be said. That our understanding, which is led by the hand, from creatures to a knowledge of God. Monsignor Dionne is very fond of that word. there, manuducitur right? Lead by the hand. And he'd often, in talking about teaching, he'd go to this text of Thomas here on the teacher, which is in the same volume here.

[23:28] If you have it, there. I don't know if you have it. Question one seventeen, article one, right? Very kind of famous text. And in the last paragraph of the body of the article, there he's talking about the work of the teacher. He says the master, the teacher, leads the student from things already known to a knowledge of things what unknown. It's the last paragraph almost. At least in my text, the last paragraph in question one seventeen, article one, whether one man is able to teach another.

[24:10] Sometimes it's doubtful. Okay. And I'm not going to look at the whole article, but just this last text here. Um. He says the teacher leads the student from things already known to a knowledge of the unknown. Do you find that text? But Thomas makes a distinction now, in two ways. First, by proposing to him some aids or tools, by which his understanding, or by which or which his understanding uses to acquiring knowledge.

[24:55] As when he proposes to him some statements less what universal, which nevertheless, from things foreknown, the student is able to judge. Right. Okay. I remember how those of you had me for the first reading there from the first book of the physics. Actual hearing, Aristotle is showing that we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly. And he gives a very difficult and profound universal reason for this.

[25:27] That what is more known to us is not is less known. But then he has three kinds of examples, right, to bring out that we know things in a confused way first. And he begins, you know, with you know you see sense of a whole, right? You don't distinguish all the parts at once. And then he gives example of we name a thing before we can define it.

[25:52] And then the child calls all men father and all men mother, right? The newborn distinguishes. And that's example of using less universal statements to manifest a what more universal statement. Okay.

[26:08] As when he proposes to him statements less universal, which nevertheless, from things already known, the student is able to judge, right? Or when he proposes to him some sensible what examples, right? Or some likenesses, huh? Or apposita, right? Or other things of this sort, from which the understanding of the learner is manuducitur in Latin. How do you translate if you're English? How do they translate manuducitur I didn't catch what question we're asked.

[26:47] Oh, one seventeen, article one. What word do they use? Yeah. Is able to judge. No, they don't really translate it. Yeah. The Latin word—it's a compound word—but it's manu, which is by the hand, right? Ducitur led by the hand. I suppose it comes back from the idea of taking a little child who's first learning to walk, right? And he can't walk by himself, so he's led by the hand, right?

[27:17] And he can walk when he's led by the hand. Something like that, where the teacher is leading the student by the hand. Thomas says, "It's a very common thing he uses." And they don't even translate it. Okay. By which the understanding of the one learning is led by the hand to a knowledge of the unknown truth. Now, in a sense, Augustine, when he looks for the image of the Trinity in creatures, right?

[27:48] And even he looks for the footprint, huh? He's manifesting the great mystery of the Trinity per what similia, as it says in the text here, right? Okay.

[28:05] In another way, when he strengthens the understanding of the one learning, not in the way this takes place in the angels by some active power of spirit nature, as has been said about the angels, where the higher angel illuminates the lower one, or our angel, guardian angel we pray to illumine you and, we study these things because all human understandings are one grade in the order of nature, right?

[28:31] But in so far as he proposes to the student the order of what principles or beginnings or premises to conclusions, right? Because perhaps to himself he does not have so great a what power of bringing things together, right? That from beginnings, premises, he is able to what deduce conclusions, and therefore is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, the demonstrations of syllogism, making us to know.

[29:02] In this way, the one who demonstrates. Makes the what here no idea. So in the easiest sciences, like like I've been referring to Euclid, right, all Euclid does is to what propose the order of premises to conclusions.

[29:24] When you come to new theorem in Euclid, right, all he does is use ones that you've already seen. But you don't have a sufficient qualitative power power to bring these together, right? So Euclid brings them together for you, right? You probably forgotten some of them already, you know. And usually, you have nice texts that give you the the number of the theorem that's being used, right? And you go back and oh, I remember that now, yeah, yeah.

[29:46] You see, but if you went back, you should be able to figure it out from the ones you've done before, right? But that's all you have to do in geometry. It's so easy. We all do other things, but you get into natural philosophy or or wisdom. Some of these more difficult sciences, theology, then you need this monadexio, right? So when Monsignor Dionne gave a course on the monadexio proper to what?

[30:10] Logic, right? It's a very difficult science. It has, as Thomas says, maximum difficultatum, the greatest difficulty, and wisdom even more so, right? And he gave a course on the monadexio proper to that, which is totally neglected you'd say. So Thomas, you'll find that term used in different senses, but similar senses, right? Okay.

[30:40] So going back now to the body of the article here, question 39, Article 8, I answer: it should be said that our understanding, which is led by the hand, right, from creatures to a knowledge of God,

[31:00] and sometimes properly, sometimes but metaphorically, and so on, right. Since it is necessary that it consider God according to the way that it takes from what creatures. Now this is nothing new to us, is it? That's why we have many names of God, right?

[31:24] Because perfection of God is altogether one and simple, right? But in a superior way, it contains perfections of creatures, right? But in creatures, where we start, they're all multiplied, and we work our way back, right? And so we have many what? Yeah, You've heard me comparing many times that to what? The radii of a circle, right? And there's one point at the end of all these radii.

[31:52] That's God. And at the other end, there's many, and that's the what? Multiplication and diversification of these perfections as they are creatures, right? So if I say, you know, God's wisdom is the end of this line, and God's what? Love is the end of this line, and so on, right? It's really the same point I'm talking about. It's the end of all those lines, but I can name it by as many radii as I have, because I'm starting and being led by the hand.

[32:27] Should fathers speak the what? Stuttering, right? Our mind stutters. Yeah, Yeah beautiful. Yeah. But that's a very concrete way. You don't lose that. I know when we were reading, what was it?

[32:50] Job, I guess it was one of those books, the Old Testament. I was kind of looking at the text I had, and the translation would say, you know, I helped the blind man, you know, wouldn't see it like that. But the original text says, "I was an eye to the blind man. I was a foot to the lame man. You know, so concrete, right? And this is not quite that concrete, but it's something like that—to be led by the hand.

[33:20] And now we're going to go back to creatures for a while, if you permit the necessary what? Yeah, yeah. Return to the creatures, right? In the consideration, however, of some creature, there are four things that occur to us in a certain order.

[33:43] For first, we can consider the thing what? Absolutely, right. Insofar as it is a certain being, a certain thing, right? Secondly, is consideration of a thing insofar as it's one.

[34:01] And that reminds me a little bit of what Aristotle does at the beginning of the fourth book of wisdom, right? Where He talks about being as the subject of wisdom, and then he talks secondly about one as being a way the subject too. But being comes first, and then one, right? So in book seven, eight, and nine of wisdom, he takes being as being considers it. Book ten, the one, right?

[34:25] So it has the same order here. The third is a consideration of a thing according as there is in it a power, and there there are three features in the sense of power to what Operating to doing something and to causing things right

[34:48] And you see how those three are perfectly ordered right Because in a sense the meaning of one is undivided being right So being is more basic than one so that one adds to the idea of being or sense of power to what? Operating to doing something and to causing things, right? And you see how those three are perfectly ordered, right? Because in a sense, the meaning of one is undivided being, right?

[34:56] So being is more basic than one, so that one adds to the idea of being or a thing that it's undivided, and maybe sometimes indistinct from other things. but idea. and then those first two are kind of considering the thing in itself. Now the third thing is, according as there is a what power in the thing to do something or to to cause something, huh? And very close to the third thing is the fourth thing.

[35:25] The fourth is a consideration of a thing according to the relation which it has to the things caused, huh? Okay. So you can consider me as what a man, one man, right? Am a father, right? And then this relation with all these grandchildren, children, grandchildren running around, right? Okay. Now all this can all be applied to God.

[36:02] So these four appropriations that are objected against in the first four objections are going to be in this exact order that he's distinguished here. According, therefore, to the first consideration, by which is considered absolutely God, according to his what very being, is taken the appropriation of glory. According as eternity is appropriated to the Father, right, species to the Son, use to the what? Holy Spirit. Yeah. Now the is one that is static, of course, is the first one, right?

[36:50] Now what is a definition of eternity that goes back to the master there, Boethius? Tota simul et perfecta. Yeah. Yeah. So vita interminabilis means what? An ending. An ending has no beginning. No end, right? Okay. So what's the connection between eternity then and the Father?

[37:25] Eternity has no beginning. He's a beginning without a beginning. Yeah. Yeah. Father has no beginning. Well, the Son has a beginning, right? That he proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit has a beginning, as he proceeds from the Father and the son is one beginning in them. Tota simo. Okay. And notice one of the names of the Father was what? Eternal. No, I mean one of the properties of the Father, one of the one of the notions, you might say, of the Father.

[37:54] innascibilitas, right? Yeah, which in a sense is touching upon him having no what beginning, right? Okay. We'll touch upon this when we get to the glory of the Father. Okay.

[38:13] So eternity, in so far as signifies something to not have a beginning, right? To be not principled, Latin word, right? Signified esse non principiatum. And Monsignor Dionne you know, his native language, of course, is French, right? He made this proportion. He said English is to French as what? Greek is to Latin, right? He says Greek is better than Latin for both philosophy and for poetry. And likewise, English, he says, is better than French for both philosophy and for what poetry, right?

[38:54] And the French language, like the Latin, seems more abstract, you know, than the Greek or the English. I think I mentioned before I used to use the text of André Gide there, his introduction to the French edition of Shakespeare in the Pléiade Edition, and he talks in general about the the difficulty translating any poet from one language to another, but then the particular difficulty of translating Shakespeare into French, right?

[39:22] And he calls the French language Presque Antipoetic. that's a very strong man. He's a master of the French prose, right? I guess French is much better prose and poetry, but it became very abstract, you know. Descartes, people like that, helped it to become very abstract, and but then you also kind of cut off from your roots and the senses for philosophy.

[39:49] I mentioned the time you know when I was first teaching logic and assumption there, and I got thinking about this English phrase to think out. I knew the eight senses of in and out, and so the idea of Thinking out a definition, thinking out a what division, thinking out a conclusion. You could distinguish these different senses of thinking out if you knew the eight senses of it now.

[40:10] So that was a pretty great idea. So I went to Monsignor Dionne to see what he thought about it. That was good, he says. But then he added, "But you can't see that in French."

[40:22] And so Monsignor Dionne took it as a compliment to Saint Thomas that he could think so well in Latin. And so I said, you know, they said compliment to Monsignor Dionne He could think so well in French.

[40:38] That's kind of funny because a lot of people think that French is better for philosophy than English, right? Because they think you get the abstract right away. But Taine, you know, that great, you know, literary critic, and so on. What do they say about the Jupiter symphony of Mozart of Mozart? The music is so pure; you have only to breathe it to be happy. He has a beautiful book on the Victorians, right?

[41:01] And he makes a beautiful contrast between his French and the English, right? And how the French get the abstract, you know, right away, you know. And of course, I don't know what they're talking about, but it all sounds pretty good. Well, One of the inner jokes, you know, a philosopher uses that Kant is much more clear if you read him in French than in English.

[41:31] So beware of that French clarity, and you see how Descartes was deceived by clarity, right? He thought that clear and distinct was more certain for us, and just the opposite of what Aristotle says, huh? But doesn't recall that Aristotle said it and why he said it and give the refutation of it. But the great physicist there, Max Born, says, "Young man, I was deceived by the clarity of mathematics."

[42:11] Now the second name here is quite difficult, huh? And um, Species, huh? How do you translate that into English, huh? Species. Now you see, in in English,

[42:32] you know, if you have, say, a genus like animal, a genus of creatures, let's say, dog and cat and horse. These are called species, right? Which is one of these strange words, which I guess just spell the same way, singular or plural. But horse is a species of animals, right? Cat is a species of animal, right? Well, animal is a genus of dog and cat and horse and so on.

[43:00] A genus is a name said with one meaning, right? Of many things, other than kind, signifying what it is, right? But it can only signify what each of these is in general, and therefore you need differences to complete the species. The species is the name of a particular kind of thing placed under the genus in which the genus is said in answer to the question, "What is it?"

[43:27] Now, in Greek, you have similar words. You have genus, huh? okay? Which would be almost the same as genus, right? Very similar. But here you'd have what? Cat. Now, perhaps the nearest thing in English, see there, I guess. Can't be already. Would be the word form, right? Okay. And so sometimes we'll speak of democracy as what one form of government, right? Or was it Churchill said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the rest?

[44:14] So form is probably the way to translate it into English. When I'm in studying fiction, I have to speak of the forms of fiction, you know. As it illustrates, that's one reason why I like it. But but you're talking about the species of fiction, right?

[44:33] Um. But the word form is not exactly etymologically the same as these two ones because eidos and species have relation to the eye. So the eidos is a form in the sense that is seen, and the Greek word eidenai means to see, right? And or to understand, it can mean that also. And species is related to you know spectacles and so on. So here's a little more particular etymology, right?

[45:10] As opposed to maybe like the word form in Latin, to be more directly corresponded to form, right? But the sort of richness there in Greek and Latin. Now, peddle, you know, we speak

[45:28] sometimes of the ideas, but that's kind of a misleading way of translating it because idea means you know a thought or an image. But if you've got to translate the botanical forms, right? So sometimes you see people translating forms, okay? But maybe because of this reference to the eye, there's some idea here of what the beautiful, right? And.

[45:55] In English, say sometimes you take the word "say shape," right? Okay, I can say the girl is shapely. I don't mean, just shape any shape, you mean there is something beautiful about shape, right? Okay, so you can see that in the English word "shapely," a bit right? It has a connotation of beauty that the form doesn't have as much, right? But even the word "form" in some sense—if you say something is disformed, or you know, that it's uglier, distorted in some way, right?

[46:26] Okay, so but apparently the Greek and the Latin words are more the idea of beauty, right? Isn't the Latin word formosa Yeah, yeah, that's for the island, I guess. It means a beautiful island, right? The Chinese, get there. Speciosa Is there a word speciosa Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, now just read Augustine here because he's the master here. The same chapter ten in book six of the De Trinitate.

[47:05] He's quoted this same thing from Hilary, right? And then he's explaining the word. In qua he says imaginem speciem nominavit. Hilary does It's Augustine credo propter pulchritudinem Okay, he goes on to explain like Thomas Okay, so it's not just Thomas, you know. it's a guest already, right? But apparently, if you know Latin better, you you'd see that that that's reasonable, right? So you've got to see the idea that species here is being appropriated to the sun, second person, because of the idea of beauty, right?

[48:15] Now we accept that much. Now, what's the connection between beauty and the sun? Well, it's okay. No, saw Thomas in the text. It's species or pulchritudo Okay, must be much easier than it is to see that in English, right? With English word "species," you don't see that connection.

[48:44] Species or pulchritudo has a likeness with the things that are proper to the sun. Now he's going to tie it up with the three names you see in the sun. He's a sun in the full sense of the word, right? And he's an imago, and he's what? He's the verbal, right? Okay. And Saint Thomas says now, for beauty, three things are required. First is integrity, or wholeness, or perfection.

[49:14] Okay. Aristotle said whole and perfect mean almost the same. So when you get to the third group of words in the fifth book of wisdom, you have the word perfect as the first word, and the words attached to perfect, and then the word whole. Words tied with that. Because those which are what missing, you know, are diminished. By this very fact, are what? Yeah, if you're missing an arm or a leg, that's kind of ugly, right?

[49:42] Sorry for you, but the argument. You know, your body, not your soul. Okay. That's one of the requirements for beauty, right? And a suitable what? Proportion, or consonance, harmony, right? Consonancia, sounding well together, right? The third thing that we require is what clarity, right? I notice that third thing so much in the fall when you have the beautiful leaves, right? On a cloudy day, they're not that striking, but when you get a nice bright day, and they really look very beautiful.

[50:28] Whence, things that have a brilliant color are said to be what beautiful, right? So, when Romeo sees Juliet, right, she's brighter than the candles and so on, right? As regards the first thing, the idea of being whole, right, or perfect, it has a likeness with what is proper to the Son, insofar as he's a Son in the strict sense, having in himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father, right?

[51:00] Hence, to insinuating this, Augustine says his exposition, right? So Thomas doesn't hesitate to say he got it from Augustine, right? Every time he says that God is liberal, he always quotes what Of the Son, right?

[51:18] Okay, Where to it in the Son is there the highest and the first life, etc., right? Augustine goes on to explain this in terms of perfection of the Son, and he has all perfection of what God, because he is God. Okay. As regards the second one, the idea of being in harmony, right? It belongs with what is proper to the Son, in so far as he is the express what image of the Father, right?

[51:45] Whence, we see that some image is said to be beautiful if it perfectly represents a thing, even though the thing might be what ugly, right? Okay.

[51:59] And this is what Augustine touches upon. He says, where there is so great coming together and the first equality, right, he's anticipating the second thing we'll be talking about in the unity, the second group of appropriations. But as far as the third, it belongs with what is proper to the Son, insofar as he is the Word, right, that enlightens the whole world, right, which is light and the splendor of the understanding, as Damascene says, right?

[52:31] And this Augustine touches upon. He says, as the Word, the perfect Word of God, which does not lack anything, and the art of the omnipotent God. To go back to the beginning of John's Gospels, and they say that he's the Word. He calls him the Word there, right, more than the Son. and then he says, and this is the one who enlightens everyone who comes into this world.

[52:52] So that's beautiful what Thomas does there, right, and Augustine before him. Three things that pertain. To what? What beauty is? And these fit in with the three names of the Son, huh? And therefore, it seems appropriate that beauty should be what? Yeah, yeah.

[53:15] Doesn't it? You're in the in the passion death, right? Huh? Yeah, a little a little card from the Dominicans there around the Easter time, and I don't remember it's a little card. I don't know who it's by, the painting, but it's about the resurrection, right? Instead of you know going down into key, it's kind of like when this when this stands above the ground, you know. And there's two angels sitting there, one and I think two angels, and then there's three persons, and the first person's got like this, you know, like where is he?

[53:45] It's about to see. It's not that big, so I didn't read it too carefully, and I don't know if it's a woman because you know maybe you know it's kind of interesting. I've never seen one exactly like that, but it's it's you know what happened. Very nice little ones.

[54:06] You know, the other thing the Dominicans put out the benitot, you know, yeah. They have these nice pictures in their lot, you know, and there was they sell these really nice little pictures and they keep these for bookmarks and stuff, nice little things. Okay, so that's really beautiful explanation there. No pun intended. What? No pun intended. Okay, now the third one is a little more what stretched, right?

[54:40] Because use here sometimes Augustine would distinguish between uses and what? Yeah, yeah. To use something, enjoy, and the whole secret to life is to know what to enjoy and what to use, and don't use the things you should enjoy, and don't try to enjoy the things you should just use, right? Okay. Sometimes has to first of all clear up that little thing there, right? Use has a likeness with the properties of the Holy Spirit, largo modo, right?

[55:09] Taking in a large way, huh? The word use, right? According as uti comprehends under itself what? Frui, right? Okay. So notice, son, we've talked about this way of naming things, right? But use could be divided into use and what enjoyment, right? Okay.

[55:36] And of course, when you enjoy something, you use it, don't you? Okay. But if you use something that don't enjoy it, you might just keep the word use for that, and then you enjoy it, you add something, right?

[55:53] Insofar as to use something is to take something in the what faculty, the power of the will. And to enjoy is to use with joy, okay? Cum gaudio uti. They were very generous with the wine when I was in Spain, you know. Actually, had some days we had to go out and get our own, but you know, four or five that we had, you know, in the hotels and so on.

[56:20] And they were very generous wine. I remember one of the wines was gaudium. No, no, the name of the wine, joy. So, yeah, so it's not

[56:34] Latin, but it's cum gaudio uti if you have the Latin in front of you, you know, to use with joy. That's what this bottle gaudium is for.

[56:47] I guess Spain is now produces more wine than either France or Italy. Used to be French, it used to be the. I first was reading about it, but but quantity doesn't necessarily mean quality, as they say, you know. But yeah, they're getting better too. They give you a free pig for having all the grandchildren.

[57:11] Actually, I found that the Spanish do know a couple of children that come. They're very handsome, you know, good-looking, you know. You know, that's about it.

[57:23] Yeah, we're all seeing. We're seeing all the time. Baby, Spain, I adore you. You know, they're really cute. These little little girls and boys too. Sometimes you see them in the museums, you know, coming in with their little. They have uniforms. They're very sweet little children.

[57:44] Okay, so using use is kind of there for to what? Frui, right? To enjoy, which is cum gaudio uti, huh? To use the joy, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the Trinity.

[58:03] So the use, therefore, by which the Father and the Son enjoy each other belongs to what is proper to the Holy Spirit, in so far as He is what love. And this is what Augustine says:

[58:19] that illa dilectio that love, directatio, pleasure. Augustine's word, felicitas, right? Which is the what? Latin word for happiness, but it's a more perfect word, huh? Felicitas comes from what? Fruitful, okay. See, I know it's that when I was first reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, they translate the Greek word eudaimonia in the English text, like in the Oxford, as happiness, right? And but in Latin you get the Latin commentary of Thomas to be translated as felicitas, But happiness comes from half.

[59:01] as if it's something happens, right? Good luck in life. Good luck. But felicitas has got the idea of what fruit, huh? And fruit is the what a natural result of a good tree, right? That produces fruit, and that's closer to what Aristotle's talking about because he's talking about what as Shakespeare says. it's part of philosophy that deals with happiness by virtue, especially to be achieved, right? So you could say that that happiness is a natural fruit of good deeds, and misery is a natural fruit of bad ones, huh?

[59:40] See, um, Shakespeare has in Macbeth unnatural deeds do breed unnatural troubles, right? Yeah. See, but breed that is, you know, that idea nature. Aristotle uses the word eudaimonia, which has the idea of the influence of a higher being, right? And so there's a discussion there in the first book, you know. if. It's anything that God sends to us, we expect it to be happiness, right? Then he'll be responsible for that.

[1:00:06] That's interesting what the philosopher says there. So, and this is what Augustine says that that love, pleasure, happiness, felicitas, or fruitfulness, or beatitude, right, which is the the end of the rational creature, is called by him what useless, right? Augustine's explaining the words of Hilary, right? Because Thomas, saw Bonaventure there, you know, writing the life of Francis, right? Let us leave a saint to write the life of a saint.

[1:00:39] Let us leave a doctor of the church. Augustine explaining the doctrine of the church, right? Okay. And this is what Augustine shows when he says that the Holy Spirit, right, in the Trinity, is the what suavitas, the sweetness, of the generator and the one generated, huh?

[1:01:08] And then pouring down upon us, right, with a marvelous largeness and what abundance, right? And thus it is clear. And now in the next paragraph, Thomas is completing the explanation of the first appropriation, but also answering the objection that was there, right? And thus it is clear wherefore eternity, species, or beauty, and use or enjoyment, are attributed to persons, or appropriate to them, right? But not, however, the words essence or what operation as they're too general, because in the notion or definition of these, on account of their community, their commonness, there is not found some likeness what is proper to the persons, right?

[1:02:00] So you all agreed about that first. You're going to follow Hilary. I mean Augustine does. Thomas does right. It's good enough for these guys. It's good enough. Good enough for me. Can't much improve upon these guys. I've called

[1:02:22] you many times, you know. The conics said, you know, somebody says to me one day, "you faut dépasser Saint Thomas. fine if you can do it. It's good. This has to go beyond Thomas. Fine if you can do it.

[1:02:38] I mean, the present Pope there makes no bones about the fact that he's getting his thoughts from Augustine, right? up there. He hasn't even got to thank Thomas yet.