Prima Pars
139. Aquinas on the Trinity: Does the Father Generate the Son by Will or by Nature? Nature, Will, and the Senses of 'Necessary'
Class of 2008-05-22
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/139-aquinas-on-the-trinity-does-the-father-generate-the-son-by/

[0:00] Now, whether the notional acts are what voluntary, right? The second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the actual, the notional acts are voluntary.

[0:17] For Hilary says in the book on the synods and councils that not by not led by natural necessity did the Father generate the Son. I see. If if Hilary had known Aristotle better, he would have been a little more careful, Saint Thomas.

[0:39] Because necessary is the one of the words in the first of the three parts of the fifth book of wisdom. And the first words are ones pertaining to cause in some ways. So Aristotle has beginning, cause, element, nature, and then he attaches that to the word necessary.

[1:01] Thomas will make use of that. of course, in here. Moreover, the apostle says in Colossians one verse thirteen, he trans carries us over right to the kingdom of the Son of His love right. But love is of the will. Therefore, the father is generated by the the son is generated by the father by the will right, beloved son.

[1:38] Moreover, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Spirit goes forward from the Father and the Son as love. Therefore, he proceeds voluntarily.

[1:53] Moreover, the Son goes forward by way of understanding as the word or thought. But every word or thought goes forward from the one speaking it to his will. Therefore, the Son proceeds from the Father through will and not by what nature.

[2:16] Moreover, what is not voluntary is necessary. If therefore the Father did not generate the Son bound by will, it would follow that he generated by necessity, which is against what Augustine, huh, in the book.

[2:39] I don't know if that's all good, authentic work or not. It says it's among the works of Augustine called sixty-five questions dialogue sixty-five questions. Yeah. Anyway. Okay.

[2:53] But again, this is what Augustine says in the same book that neither by will did the Father generate the Son, nor by you know, distinction of sense isn't necessary. I don't know.

[3:11] Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that when it is said that something is or comes to be by the will, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the adjective designates the going along with only right.

[3:35] Just as I am able to say that I am a man by my what will, according to my will, because I wish myself to be a man, right? But I am not a man as an effect of my will, right?

[3:51] And Thomas says, in this way, it can be said that the Father generated the Son by will, just as He is by will what God,

[4:03] because He wishes Himself to be God, He wishes Himself to what generate the Son. But is that wish the source of His being God? Is the source of His what generating the Son? He's going to deny that now. Another way that the adjective implies the relation of a what beginning or source. Just as it is said that the artist operates by his will, because his will is the beginning of the what, yeah.

[4:39] And in this way, it should be said that the Father, God the Father, does not generate the Son by will, but by His will He produces the what creature.

[4:56] Whence, in the book about the Synods, it is said, "If someone says that the Son was made by the what will of God, as if He is one something one of the creatures, right? " So, Thomas says he is accursed. Little phrase there, lost. So Thomas is beginning in this first paragraph to state his what position, right? And now he's going to give the reason for this, right?

[5:36] And the reason for this is because the will and nature differ in this way in causing, because the nature is determined what to one. But the will is not determined to what, what? This is a distinction that Aristotle brings out in the first part of the ninth book of Wisdom, right?

[6:04] Now, why is it that the nature determined to one, but the will not to one? The reason for this is that an effect is like the form of the agent in which the agent acts, but is manifest that of one thing there's only one natural form to which a thing has being. Whence such as that thing is, so does it make. So dogs naturally give rise to what, dogs, and cats to cats, right?

[6:41] Horses to horses, right? But the form by which the will acts is not one only, but there are what, many, same knowledge of opposites among other things, according as there are many reasons understood. Whence what is done by the will is not such as the agent is, but such as he wills and understands that to be when he acts.

[7:15] Of those things, therefore, the will is a beginning which are able to be thus or in another way. But those things which are not able to be except thus, the beginning is what, nature. Now something can be thus or another way is far distant, right, from the divine nature. But this pertains to the notion of the creature, because God, as we saw before, is necessary to be what, to himself.

[7:53] But the creature is made from nothing, and therefore the Arians, wishing to lead to this conclusion that the sun is a creature, said that the Father generated the sun by will. Also, a dangerous thing it is to say, according as will designates a what beginning.

[8:19] But to us it should be said that the Father generates the Son not by will, but by what nature. Whence Hilary, in the book about Synods, says to all creatures, the will of God brings substance. on being. But to the Son, but he gave the nature to the Son, right? From his impassible, right. And not born substance a perfect what birth? For all things created are such as God willed them to be.

[8:58] But the Son is born from God, and subsists such as God Himself is. That little thing from Shakespeare, Coriolanus, Act Four, Scene Seven of Coriolanus. And Aufidius is reflecting on the troubles Coriolanus and how he got into trouble, and what the cause might be. Right.

[9:43] First, he was a noble servant to them, the Romans, but he could not carry his honours even. Now he speculates as to the cause. Whither 'twas pride which. Out of daily fortune, ever taints the happy man. Now, pride would be the will, right? And the thing about pride is it can arise from good in somebody, right? In fact, some excellence that you have, right, could be the occasion for pride.

[10:20] Whether a defect of judgment to fail in the disposing of those chances which he was lord of, a defect now of the mind, reason, right?

[10:33] Or whether nature not to be other than one thing, not moving from the casque to the cushion. The cask is a soldier, right? But commanding peace, even with the same austerity and carb as he controlled the war. Well, custom is said to be a second what nature, right? But notice what he says there: nature not to be other than one thing. He's saying the same thing Aristotle said: that nature is determined to one.

[11:14] Right? Why the reason that you know from dialectic and rhetoric and look at the opposite side, and the will can choose to do or not to do something, or to do it this way or do it this other way. It's not his bookmark. It's Thomas's bookmark. Yeah. Somebody, we are out to Seville. Royal Palace of Seville. How did you get there?

[11:46] I'm reading a book on the Royal Palace. That's where the King of Spain stays when he comes to Seville. So you don't see the whole thing, you know. You see, you see the some of the rooms, but you don't see the grand portis. You buy the book, you can see the portis more than I'm bringing it.

[12:04] Yeah. Um. May I ask a question? Sure. Now, there was some Franciscans who tried to argue that the procession of the son is the procession of the will, which is similar to the cross. Obviously, it's not the same kind of position, but how is it that he was saying the Arians go wrong with saying the procession is procession of the will? How is it that it leads to a serious error to say that?

[12:29] Well, if you say that the will is the beginning or the source, right? Now, is it the Father chose out of love to to generate the son, right? You say about human generation, right? Maybe it comes out of love, right? It should, but

[12:49] and you can say God made creatures out of love, right? He chose, you know, to to to make a son. You know, you should thank God that He chose you to be. And but did the Father choose to generate the son? No. Now Thomas says, is is it agreeable to the will of the Father that the son be generated? Yes, yes, it's an harmony with His will, right?

[13:16] Okay. But His will is not the source of that. Okay. We'll come back because the subtle distinction will come out in the replies, right? Okay. Um.

[13:33] Now, if you know something about dialectic, dialectic is a way of reasoning from probable opinions, right? Even to contradictory conclusions. And so you see Aristotle, Socrates, just take Socrates, you know, in the Meno right? Meno wants to know whether virtue can be taught, and Socrates says, "Well, we don't know yet what virtue is, so how can I really answer your question? " But let's think about it, right?

[14:03] And then he he says, "Let's see what can be said for or against, right? " So Socrates, in the third part of the Meno, he brings out a probable argument that virtue can be taught. And then he brings out a probable argument that virtue cannot be taught, right? Okay. And then in rhetoric, right, you learn how to reason two opposites. And you know, I know if you know anything about debate clubs in high school, even, you know, usually they have a topic they're going to subject debate this year.

[14:36] If you're on the debate team, you have to learn how to maintain both sides, right? And then when you get into competition, you may be, you know, on the affirmative today, and tomorrow you're on the what? Negative, right? So you learn how to do this, right? And a good lawyer can maybe defend a man or prosecute him. And in a politician's, you know, can defend the nation.

[15:01] We have another name. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Flip flop, flip flop. See, but but reason can flip flop, right? Yeah. And and you can actually change your mind, right? As we say, right? And think, you know, the opposite of what you thought before, right? So both reason as reason and the will as will are capable of what opposites, right? So so I can choose to eat steak tonight or not eat steak, right?

[15:34] Okay. Or to eat too much or to eat too little, right? I can I can choose these things. And um, um, so is is will the source of the son, the beginning of the son, right? Does the Father choose, you know, to generate the son or not generate him, right? And He chooses to generate him, right? No. No, that's that's gonna that's going to put him in the class of the what creature right.

[16:05] You see, when we say the divine will, we see that that he doesn't have to necessarily will the creatures right, because the creatures are not necessary for his goodness, right?

[16:23] He wills it as suitable to his goodness, but not as necessary for it. Now, going back to the first objection here, Hilary says in the book of the Synods, "Not by natural necessity led did the Father generate the Son." And Thomas says to that first, therefore, it should be said that that authority is brought in against those who, from the generation of the Son, would remove also the what, or even the what, going along with of the divine will, the concomitants,

[17:13] saying that thus he generated the Son, that his will of generating him was not what present right. Just as we by natural necessity undergo many things against our what will, as death, old age, and defects of this sort, right? You know, working the package store, there, the old guy come in and say, you know, never grow old, he says. You don't do that. I'm much younger than I am now.

[17:47] I'm getting to see a little bit of what he meant. You know, the age of 72 here. And this is clear through the things before and after the text. For thus it is said there, for not nolente patre, not unwilling, right? Or coactus the father, right?

[18:16] Or by natural necessity induced when he did not want to, you see, you got to add that cum nollet, right? Did he generate the Son, right?

[18:28] But you know, if you just said natural necessity, you could say that the Father's generating the Son is naturally what necessary, right? So Hilary, you know, you got to say he doesn't express himself fully if you just leave out that what. Yeah. See. Vel naturali necessitate ductus cum nollet right, You gotta have that in there. See, if you leave out that nollet, then you could say he does generate the son by kind of what natural necessity.

[19:07] Okay. The second objection is from this text of Saint Paul there, the son of his love, right? Well, he understands that in the way that you'd expect. The apostle, by Antonomasia there, Saint Paul, names Christ the son of the love of God, in so far as he is what loved abundantly, right, overabundantly, by the by God. Not that the love is the beginning of the what generation of the son.

[19:44] Now, the third objection. Let's look at first, and I'll kind of expand a bit because. The third objection said nothing is more voluntary than love, but the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as love; therefore, he proceeds what by will, right? Okay. To the third, it should be said that the will also, in so far as is a certain nature, right, wills something naturally, just as the will of man naturally tends to beatitude, and likewise God naturally loves, wills, and loves Himself, but about things other than Himself, the will of God has itself to what opposites, right, to the side, in a way which has been said.

[20:44] But the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, in so far as God what loves Himself, whence he proceeds naturally, although he proceeds by way of will. Okay. Now you can misunderstand this, right? I gave a paper on this one, so I've opened this a little bit. Okay. But Aristotle is in the ninth book of wisdom,

[21:15] and the ninth book of wisdom is about ability and act. Latin is potencia, ability and act. In the ninth book of wisdom, as you might expect, is divided into three parts. When Thomas first divides the ninth book, he'll say, "Well, the first part is about potencia or ability, the second part is about act, and the third part is about the order of ability and act." Okay. And I say, "now if you're going to write a book about marriage."

[21:59] You say, "Well, first part is about the man or the husband. Second part is about the the woman, the wife. The third part is about the relationship between the two." Right? Kind of good understanding. Now that's a bit of an oversimplification, because when Aristotle talks about ability in the first part, he doesn't talk about every ability. He talks about abilities regard to motion and so on, so he's talking about a little more particular.

[22:30] But then, when he gets to second part, he talks about act. He talks about it completely universally, and then you see other senses of ability, right? Okay. Then the third party shows the order of the two, and then you see the reason why God is going to be pure act. You find out that act is simply before ability. Now. In his first part, he's talking about ability.

[22:58] He begins by distinguishing between the ability to act upon something and ability to what undergo. And he makes a few other distinctions, but that's the most fundamental distinction. Or he sees that distinction, I should say.

[23:19] And he sees that the ability to act upon something is the first meaning of ability. I used to make that known by putting myself in the ring with Cassius Clay or some other famous boxer. And before they call this thing off, he

[23:39] might say, "Well, Burquist doesn't have any ability at all. He's being destroyed by some other guy, right? " But you can say that Burquist is what beatable, breakable, bustable, right? Impressionable.

[23:58] Very impressionable. So you do say the word able, Burquist, right? Able is by some ability, Burquist. So in a secondary way, you can say Burquist is able to be beaten, okay? And similarly, we say that the fire is able to burn the paper, right? But the paper is combustible, and so there's a second sense of ability to be acted upon. Then Aristotle goes on a little bit later on, and he distinguishes more the actual ability between the what the natural ability and the rational ability, which includes the will.

[24:45] And the distinction he makes now between the natural ability and the rational ability is the natural ability is like Shakespeare said, determined to what? Determined

[25:12] to one of two opposites. So the fire is naturally going to heat things, right? It's not going to cool things as such, no. So it can't do both, right? Now you get the rational ability, like for example, art, right? And the artist is capable of what Opposites, huh?

[25:49] So the Doctor can what cure you or make you sick. Not saying he should do both, but he can do both, right? He's not limited to one, okay?

[26:05] He knows how to make you thin. He knows how to make you fat, okay? So this is open to opposites, and there follows upon this all kinds of things, like when the natural, a thing having a natural ability, when it's present to it, but it can act upon it. naturally acts upon it. So you bring the paper to the what fire, and it's going to naturally burn up the paper, huh?

[26:42] But the rational ability, since it's capable of opposites, you can't, well, say what it's going to do, and therefore there's got to be a what choice there, right? There's got to be some kind of appetite there to do one rather than the other, right?

[27:02] So this is a very fundamental what distinction, huh? Which in a sense Shakespeare is touching upon there too in that passage. Now that interesting word for mistake, which is mistake, and mistake is very close to mixed up, right?

[27:29] When you mistake, you what take one thing in place of another, take the good in place of the bad, or the bad in place of the good, maybe.

[27:43] So kind of the beginning of our troubles is not seeing some what distinction, not understanding some distinction. We've seen it all along, right? All kinds of distinctions you have to understand to understand these things. If you don't understand those distinctions, you're going to make mistakes, right? Or if you misunderstand a distinction, right? You're going to. No, here's

[28:17] a distinction, right? And I think the modern philosophers misunderstand this distinction. What kind of a distinction exactly is that? Is it like the distinction between virtue and vice, or is it like the distinction between two and three?

[29:13] See, is there really a virtue and vice, and a vice and virtue? No. Or like hot and cold. But in a way, there is a two and three, right?

[29:32] So going back to the old way of naming things, right? You might say, call the number that is just two, two, and the one that is what two plus one. Give that a name, right? Remember that way of naming things. So is the distinction between the natural ability and the rational ability

[30:04] like this first distinction, like this second one? Yeah. Now Thomas, in some texts, he talks about this. He says, well, in the rational ability, it presupposes the nature of the thing, right? And the nature of the thing enters into its abilities, right? So if the rational ability partakes, he'll say, right? Okay. But sometimes he'll say directly, the reason itself is a kind of nature, or the will itself is a kind of.

[30:41] nature. So there's something that we what naturally understand, and something that we what naturally will. So we don't choose to be happy rather than miserable, but we naturally want to be what happy, right? And we choose among what we think are the means to happiness, right?

[31:08] And there we're not determined, right? But as far as happiness and misery, no, we naturally what want to be happy, right? And likewise, in the reason, there are some things that we naturally what understand, right? So

[31:31] sometimes we speak of reason as reason, right? And reason as a what nature. And likewise, we speak of the will as will. Then we're thinking of this difference here, right? And then we're thinking of the reason as the will as what a nature, right? Okay. Just like I can consider the number three, the two that's in there, right?

[32:04] In a way, there's a two in three. But three as three is not half a four, is it? But the two that is in three is half a four.

[32:24] Is that a contradiction? No. The three which is not half a four has in itself something which is half a four. It's not being said of three in the same way to be half a four and not half a four, is it?

[32:48] So this distinction Aristotle's making here, right, can be misunderstood. And you get to see Jean Paul Sartre, for example, right? And for Jean Paul Sartre,

[33:05] there's nothing that our will naturally wills. There's nothing that our will must will. Our will is as free in regard to the end as it is in regard to the means. So he's understanding, right,

[33:30] this distinction in a false way, right? Now, likewise, you find in in John Stuart Mill, for example, there's nothing that our reason actually understands. There's nothing that it necessarily assents to it.

[33:56] This arises partly from the being accustomed to the experimental method, right? If you're immersed in experimental method, every thought is a what hypothesis, right? And so, if you if you read, you know, some of the scientists and they talk about their method and talk about human thinking, they actually seem to be saying that every thought is an hypothesis.

[34:24] And therefore, there's nothing that we actually understand. Now, maybe they're in a little difficulty because when you test an hypothesis, you test it by seeing whether its consequences agree with observation or experiment. And if the consequences are contradicted by experiment or by observation, what you find there, then you sort of have to reject or modify your hypothesis. But is that not acceptance of a contradiction? Is that a hypothesis?

[35:00] You know, you take the axioms about contradiction that something can't both be and not be, and go out to test that to see whether it's true or not. Because then you'd be testing it by itself, right? You'd be seeing whether it's contradicted, right? And therefore, you'd be saying, "well, it's contradicted by something that seems to be. Therefore, it is not so because it is so. So you got a real problem there, right?

[35:30] But nevertheless, this is their their idea, right? That every thought is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences. Well, as you know from elementary logic,

[35:45] the confirmation of an hypothesis by the by its consequence is not a syllogism. So you're never. Are what certain of the hypothesis, even after it's been confirmed. And so Claude Bernard says the doubt is intrinsic to experimental method. So therefore, he sees all of our mental life as one that's open to what opposites, right? You can always call into question anything that, no matter how many times it's been confirmed or tested, right, with success.

[36:25] So what you have in Sartre and in the modern scientists is denial of anything being what naturally understood, or anything naturally what willed. everything's up for grabs in a sense, huh?

[36:45] But this is not the position of Aristotle. His position was that there are some things that we what naturally understand, and other things that we naturally will, and therefore the distinction between nature and reason and will is like distinction between two and three, between nature that is just nature, right, and reason and will which are nature but not just nature.

[37:18] There's something in addition to that, right? So that beyond what they naturally understand or what they naturally will, they're open to some extent to multiplicity and opposites, right?

[37:38] So you could say, in a way, the sun proceeds by way of understanding, but by way of what God naturally understands himself, and so he naturally has this what thought of himself, and he naturally what loves himself, right? And therefore he has his natural love, right? Naturally, breathes this love.

[38:06] So look at the reply then to the third objection, the fourth objection with this in mind a little bit. To the third, therefore, it should be said that also the will, in so far as it is a certain nature, wishes something what naturally, right?

[38:24] Just as the will of man naturally tends toward beatitude, and that's why those who are in hell are what naturally frustrated because they're frustrated of what they naturally want. And likewise, God naturally wills and what loves himself, but about other things from himself, the will of God has itself to both in some way.

[38:58] Because he wills other things for himself, right? And his goodness in no way depends upon other things. So he doesn't necessarily will them. Now the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, in so far as God what loves Himself. Whence he is said to proceed what naturally, right? Even though he proceeds by way of the will, right? But of the will, in so far as it's a certain what nature.

[39:32] Do you see the idea? And he makes the same point about the sun, right? The sun is not like a thought that God spontaneously thought up, right? I mean, he could have thought differently, had other thoughts. He says, "To the fourth, it should be said that also."So in the conceptions, of the understanding, there is a reducing to the first, which are naturally what understood. For God naturally understands Himself, and according to this, the conception of the what word, divine word, is something what natural.

[40:23] Okay. So, what you find in a lot of philosophers then is a what This understanding, this distinction in the ninth book of wisdom. Yeah, I mean that's a very fundamental

[40:45] mistake. It's going to affect the whole of your thinking. So when you get to to to ethics, the most fundamental thing to be considered in ethics is the the end of man, right? And man has a natural end, and he naturally wills that.

[41:06] And so you take Aristotle as a teacher, you're going to learn more distinctly what that natural end is, and how that natural end is to be what achieved.

[41:27] Shakespeare says that, right. Part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved. Reading Robert E. Lee's his sons' recollections of his father, as very much you know in his more private life than his military life, you know, but he's a very religious man, very strong, and very much resigned to the will of God, right? And you know, writing to his sons and daughters and nieces to everybody, and always this state of mind.

[42:12] He's very, very impressive. Very impressive. I don't know. I mean, he's talking about Virginia and how Virginia, he says, was on the way to getting rid of slavery, and then these Northerners started butting in and irritating the Southerners, right? I mean, that's a bit of exaggeration, you know, but it's like at least as far as Virginia is concerned, you know, he himself had been in favor of getting rid of slavery, and that's the way the the sentiment was going, you know, until these Northerners got in and said that you got to do this, you know.

[42:44] So I don't know if the if the abolitionists, you know, were you know in some way responsible for the Civil War, right? You know that you've got to have it now, you know, or you got to.

[42:59] Anyway, now in the fifth objection, right, Thomas will get into discussing a bit the senses of the word necessary, right? Okay. Now to the fifth, it should be said that something is said to be necessary per se and per alia, right? Now, as I mentioned before, Aristotle in the fourth book of what? Excuse me, in the fifth book of wisdom, right? He distinguishes the basic meanings of the word necessary, and he distinguishes there four different senses of.

[43:41] But of course, nobody could understand the distinction into four, right? So Thomas is taking those senses and distinguishing them into two, right? And then one of them is going to subdivide into what three, and then gets the four that Aristotle talked about. That wasn't as difficult as eight to ten categories, right? Because there you had to divide by two or three to get the ten, remember? He divides the ten into three, then he divides two of those further, right?

[44:19] So he always divides by two or by three, huh? Very limited his thinking. Ah, much bigger. I I think there's something on the side of things why you should divide into two or three,

[44:36] and something on the side of our own mind, right? On the side of things, you know, Plato always divided into two, but there's something about that that you should divide by what opposites, and opposites are what two, so it makes sense to divide by two, right? But then there seems to be some completeness about three, beginning, middle, and end, huh? And three is therefore in many languages is the first number by which we say all.

[45:13] So if I had just two children, I'd say both of my children, right? But since I have three, I'd say all my children. So there seems to be some connection between three and all. So there's some basis and things that three is enough, as Aristotle says in the first book of Natural Hearing. But it seems that our mind goes beyond two or three. That it seems to be enumerating rather than really what dividing, right?

[45:43] And okay, now sometimes Aristotle divides into more than two or three, but it's because he's aiming at brevity, right? So he combines a division with subdivisions and so on. But the master Thomas does it. So he says, "Necessary said something per se and per alia, right? So per se would be what to itself, meaning intrinsic, right? Do they translate that to itself, or do they leave it in per se?

[46:19] Of itself. Yeah. No, but per is through, through itself, right? Okay. Or through another, right? Okay. Now he subdivides through another in two ways. Now, notice, if you want to stop them before he gets to the subdivision of per alia. See, what's per se, right? Was it necessary that two be half of four? Yeah, is that per se or per alia that two is half of four necessarily?

[46:56] Yeah. Nothing other, other than two that's forcing two to be half of four, is it? There's nothing extrinsic to two, right? You'd say two through being two is half of four, right? That's necessary per se, right? Or a triangle has its interior angles good through right angles. Is that necessary? Yeah. It's necessary what? Through itself, right? Okay. But now there are two kinds of extrinsic causes: the mover or maker and the end, right?

[47:36] And so per alia is going to refer now to the extrinsic causes. That's where Aristotle takes up the word necessary, right after he takes up cause, cause and element.

[47:49] Okay. But per alia is said in two ways: in one way through the agent cause and the one who is kind of what forcing you, right? And thus necessary is said what is violent, right? Well, that can't be found in God because no violence in God, right? Okay. Another way through the final cause, right?

[48:13] As something is said to be necessary in those things which are towards the end, in so far as without them the end cannot be, or it cannot be what? Well, and those are two different senses that Aristotle distinguishes. So Aristotle distinguishes the necessity which is due to something intrinsic, per se, and then the what? One that comes from the the the mover cause, right? So if you know five guys come in and grabbed you, you know one got your arm, one got your other arm, one got your leg, one got your leg, and they took you out of the room, you would have to go out the room, right?

[48:54] But that necessity is through another, right? Okay. But this is force, right? That's one sense of necessary. Yeah. When I say food is necessary, right? Well, you can't what live, but do necessarily get food. It's not necessary in the way that it's necessary that two is half a four. It's necessary for me to have food,

[49:28] but is it necessary for me to have food in the way it's necessary for two to be half a four? No. It's kind of an absolute necessity of two being half a four, right? Why the kind of necessity that there is of my having food is kind of from the supposition: if I'm going to live, then I must have food, right? Okay.

[49:52] Other things are necessary. For achieving the end well, right? Thomas's example is a horse is necessary for a journey. Okay. So can I go to the Cape without a car? I can walk down there, but it wouldn't be very convenient. Something might be over by the time you get there. Yeah, yeah.

[50:24] Thomas says, "I say, you know, is logic necessary for philosophy? " A lot of people don't want to study logic. They think it's kind of dull or something, you know. Um.

[50:36] It's dull and difficult. Okay. And so there are other studies that are more interesting, right? But is logic necessary for philosophy? Well, as as Albert the Great points out, you know, the first philosophers made a lot of mistakes because they didn't know what logic, right? So can you philosophize without logic? Yeah. In fact, logic was one of the last parts of philosophy to be what investigated, right?

[51:12] So I often point out how in the great dialogue, the Phaedo, right? The dialogue called the Phaedo takes place in the last day of Socrates' life. He's going to die that day by sentence of the city of Athens. And again, to a discussion of whether the human soul is immortal. And Socrates makes a joke. He says, "They're always saying we're talking about something irrelevant for philosophers. " You can hardly say it's irrelevant this question on the day I'm going to die.

[51:42] But strictly speaking, it's it's relevant to your whole life, right? Because you're not going to live life the same way because you think your soul's gonna go on. If you think this life is all there is, you know, you might live a little bit differently, huh? And

[51:57] and Socrates starts to develop arguments that seem to indicate that the soul is going to be immortal, right? Or is immortal. And then Simmias and Cebes comes in with some objections, and all of a sudden Socrates' argument seems to collapse, right? And as around this time, Socrates says, "We need an art about arguments. " An art that would help us distinguish between a good argument and a what?

[52:28] Bad argument. And among good arguments, between one that is necessary and one that is only what? Probable, right? And here he's anticipating what the father of logic, as we usually call Aristotle, does do, right? Because he has the prior and the posterior analytics about the arguments that are necessary. The book about places, the so-called topics, and the rhetoric about arguments that are only probable or likely, and the book called On Sophistical Refutations refutations about the arguments that are what bad, right?

[53:07] But notice Socrates is saying, you know, that we need such an art, but we don't what have it, right? So you need the art about arguments, you need the art of logic, um, to do philosophy what well, yeah, you can philosophize badly without it. So see, why food is absolutely necessary for my life, I can't live without my life, right? See, but is steak necessary for a living?

[53:39] Maybe to live well, or is wine necessary? Maybe to live well, but eat well, but you don't have to have these things, right? See, so Aristotle distinguished those two senses of what is that without which end cannot be had, period, right? And that without which it cannot be had what well,

[54:06] well do you have that kind of necessity in God? Does God is this some end that God has? No, okay, but he is the end of all things, right?

[54:21] And neither of these ways, neither of these ways, is a divine generation necessary, because God is not an account of an end, nor does what coercion fall on him. So you don't have the necessity from the mover or agent, right? Where somebody forces you right to do something, right? Nor do you have necessity from what

[54:47] the end, right? But that is said to be per se necessary, which is not able not to be, right? Okay. See, well, somebody might not force you to do something, right? And we don't always have the means to achieve an end, right? But what is per se necessary is not able not to be, right? And this and in this way is necessary for God to what be.

[55:22] And in this same way, the Father generates the Son is what necessary, right? Because God what naturally and necessarily right understands himself, right? It's got to be kind of careful that text from Hilary, right? Because it might seem like he's denying that the Father generates the Son by a natural necessity, but that's true that he does, right? But not by natural necessity when he doesn't wish it.

[55:54] If you take that that larger quote that Thomas says, "Huh? " No, naturaliter, sed non necessitate inductus cum nolit. He doesn't know it. He wants to separate from him what you find in us miserable creatures, where some things happen by natural necessity. That guy, by natural necessity, I grow old, right?

[56:21] And might be unwilling, you know, that can enjoy the things I enjoyed when I was younger, or something like that. See, okay. Shakespeare represents the woman there in

[56:39] Twelfth Night. There, you know that the woman, as she grows older, she loses her what beauty, right? Well, but by natural necessity, the older woman loses the beauty she had when she was younger, right? It's against the will, though. Okay, okay. So he doesn't want to posit in God some unwillingness to what takes place by natural necessity. But that shouldn't be understood to mean that there is not natural necessity in God, because God naturally what understands Himself, and the Word of God proceeds from God's what naturally understanding Himself, and God naturally loves Himself, and therefore the Holy Spirit naturally proceeds from God.

[57:30] Okay. You see how important that chapter on necessity is in Aristotle. It's necessary to have it, yeah. What sense is necessary? Yeah, yeah. I sometimes would ask that. I'd say, you know, is it necessary to understand the senses of necessary? And the answer is yes. Then I said, "What sense is it necessary to understand the senses of necessary? "

[58:02] And to think, well, right, it's necessary to understand the senses necessary. It's like my question about when he stimulates the four senses of before, and I say, "In what sense of before does one sense of before come before another sense of before? "

[58:22] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I told you what this this this guy was teaching philosophy. He was in Colorado, I guess it was, and describing the looks on the faces of the students. You know, why are you doing this to me? Because your

[58:41] parents pay me. The. Probably Lee. He was after the war. He became the president of Washington College, which became Washington and Lee there in Lexington, Virginia. Right. So it's kind of interesting to see what he's doing, but he really built the place up. So

[59:12] interesting man. So I guess we have to stop now and go on to another article. Did three articles. That's all. That's enough.