Prima Pars
140. Summa I q.41 a.3–4: The Son Begotten from the Father's Substance, Not from Nothing; Does God Have Power to Generate?
Class of 2008-05-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/140-summa-i-q-41-a-3-4-the-son-begotten-from-the-fathers-substance/

[0:00] Holy Trinity, God our Light and Life. Heard the angels strengthen the lights of our minds, toward the luminar images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Help us to understand all eternity. I was thinking the other day, you know, I wonder how I'm going to greet my guardian angel. You can't hug him, you know. you can't just about that, You know, in

[0:32] Dante's Divine Comedy, right, when he's seeing people in purgatory and so on that he knew in real life, he recognizes them by the shape of their their airy soul, but then he tries to embrace them and of course it's air and he can't embrace them. So I mean, you can't embrace here. How do you show your affection for your guardian angel? huh? In fact, how do they show their affection for each other, right?

[0:53] They don't have that. So knowledge of the soul is better than knowledge of the body, because the soul is better than the body. But knowledge of the angels is better than knowledge of the soul, because the angels are better than the soul. But knowledge of God is better than knowledge of the angels, because God is what only better than the angels. So we're in the best knowledge, right?

[1:25] And then after this will be step down, right? If we go down to the humanity of Christ, I mean, Christ says you know the Father is greater than me, and they explain those things according to his human nature, right? Because we'll find out an equality there in the divine persons. But as man, he's less than himself as God.

[1:48] Okay, to the third. We're in the third article of question forty-one. The notional acts are from something, right? Did the Father generate the Son from nothing, or did He generate Him from something? What do you think? Well, if He had generated Him from nothing, He'd be like a what? Creator. Creator, yeah, creation. But if He generated from something, what was that something He generated Him from? To the third one proceeds thus: It seems that the notional acts are not from something, because if the Father generated the Son from something, either from Himself or from something other than Himself.

[2:35] If from something other than Himself, since that from which something is generated is in that which is generated, we follow that something alien from the Father is in the Son,

[2:50] which is against what the great Hilary says in the seventh book of the Trinity, where he says there's nothing in them but that is diverse or alien.

[3:02] If, however, the son, if the father generated the son from himself, that, however, all which or from which something is generated, if it is remaining, we seize what its predication.

[3:19] Ah, what is generated, right? Just as we say that man is what white, because man remains when from none white he becomes white. It would follow either that the father either does not remain when the son is generated, or that the father is the what son, which is false. Therefore, the father does not generate the son from something but from nothing. Put that in the pipe and smoke it for a while.

[3:55] Okay. Moreover, that from which something is generated is the beginning of that which is generated. If, therefore, the father generated the son from his essence or his nature, it would follow that the essence or the nature of the father was the beginning of the son. But it can't be a material beginning, because matter has no place in God. It would therefore be a beginning that was active, as the one generating is a beginning of the one generated.

[4:32] And thus it would follow that the what essence generates, which above or before was what disproven, huh? Because then there'd be a real what distinction between the son and the what nature and the nature, yeah. Well, we see they're the same.

[4:54] Moreover, Augustine says that the three persons are not from the same what. Yeah. Because they are not other the essence and the what person,

[5:09] but the person of the son is not other from the what essence of the father. Therefore, the son is not of the what. Essence of the Father. Yeah. This gets me really tied up in a knot, doesn't it? Yeah. I hope the yokee can untie this. You know, I you see that comparison I make now, because Aristotle, two places I can think of, uses the word knots, right?

[5:39] And in the book on the Poetic Art, he says that a good plot has two parts: tying the knots and then what, untying them, right? And then when he's in the third book of Wisdom, there, which is all dialectical, he speaks of dialectical arguments on opposite sides as tying the mind in a kind of knot, huh? But then he says in the book of the poetic art, he says that the inferior poets are better at tying the knots than what, untying them.

[6:09] You all have that experience where you even see a movie and know that it got kind of interesting and then they get to know how to untie it in a way that was appropriate. Well, I think the same thing can be said about philosophers, right? They're better in tying their own mind and maybe the minds of other people too, in a knot than they are to untie the knots that they tied.

[6:27] And like a kid, you're trying to untie a knot in his lace or something, and you've got to bring it to mom or dad to to untie it because they can tie the knot better than they can what, untie it. You can see here, right, how much easier it would be to tie yourself or someone else into a knot than it would be to untie these knots.

[6:47] So I say, I hope he can do it. I hope he can do it. Further, every creature is from nothing. But for some strange reason, the Son in scriptures is called a what, A creature? This is a hard way of speaking, right? You know, when they heard the words about the Eucharist, they found this a hard teaching, right? Well, this is a hard way of speaking, right, to say that the Son is a creature.

[7:16] For it is said in Ecclesiasticus 24, from the mouth of wisdom generated, right, that I went forth from the mouth of the Most High, right, the firstborn before every creature. And afterwards, from the mouth of the same wisdom, it is said, from the beginning and before the ages, I was created.

[7:40] I don't know. Therefore, the Son is not generated from something, but like any other creature, like the creatures, I should say, from nothing, yeah. And likewise, it can be objected about the Holy Spirit. On account of, what is said in Zacharias chapter 12, the Lord said, extending the heavens and founding the earth, and creating the spirit of man in him. Well, of course, that's pretty easy. The spirit of man, is, not the Holy Spirit.

[8:12] And Amos says, forming, I was forming forming the mountains and creating the spirit. Well, suppose one way to interpret that. Not quite so worried about that, but still worried about that first being called creature.

[8:29] But against all this nonsense is what Augustine says in the book about faith to Peter, that God, the Father, from His own what, nature, without a beginning, generated a Son equal to Himself. That's quite a generation.

[8:54] So Thomas begins by giving his answer, right? What he thinks. I answer: It should be said that the sun is not generated from nothing, but from the substance of the Father.

[9:11] For it has been shown above that fatherhood, and sonship, and birth, are truly and properly speaking in God. But there is this difference between true generation, through which or by which someone proceeds as a son, and making, that the one making makes something out of an exterior, outside matter, as the what?

[9:44] Stool, as the artist makes a stool, stool from wood. But man generates a son from himself, from his own substance. Now, just as the created artist makes something from matter, so God makes something from nothing, as will be shown what below. Not that nothing what becomes part of the substance of the thing, but because by Him the whole substance of the thing is produced.

[10:28] not just the what form, that we do, right? Nothing other being what presupposed. If therefore the Son proceeds from the Father as existing from nothing, in this way he would have himself to the Father as an artificial thing has itself to the artist,

[10:53] which manifestly cannot have properly the name of what sonship, but only according to some what likeness. Like Dickens says, you know, every father's got his favorite child. I got my favorite novel I wrote, you know, and it's David Copperfield, you know, and so on. Um.

[11:19] But you can't, do I say? You know, you can't regard your opinions as your children and defend them, you know, no matter what. Must be prepared to give up your opinion when it shows not being very reasonable. Whence it remains that if the Son of God proceeded from the Father as were existing from nothing, he would not be truly and properly His Son.

[11:50] The contrary, which is said in the first Epistle, it said John, right, the end there, that we might be in His true Son, Jesus Christ. The Son, therefore, God, the true Son of God, therefore, is not from nothing, nor is He made, but He's only what generated. It's almost a quote from the what creed, huh? Genitum non factum in Latin.

[12:28] Now, if some are made by God from nothing are called sons of God, right? Every son is called sons of God, this will be what metaphorically, right? According to some likeness, right, to the one who truly is the Son, right. Whence, in so far as He alone is the true and natural Son of God, He is said to be unigenitus, only begotten.

[13:00] According to that of the Gospel of John, chapter one, verse eighteen, the only begotten one, the Unigenitus, was in the bosom, I guess, of the Father. He will what announce these things and everything.

[13:18] Um, in so far as through assimilation or likeness to him, others are called adoptive sons or adopted sons, as it were, metaphorically, right? Is said to be what firstborn, right? According to that of the Epistle to the Romans, chapter eight, whom he what foreknew and predestined to become conformed to the image of his what son, that he might be the firstborn among many what many brothers.

[13:55] It remains, therefore, that the Son of God is generated from the substance of the what Father, but in a different way than the Son of a man, you son. For a part of the substance of a man generating makes a transition right into the substance the one generated. So we have an expression in English to chip off the old block. Okay, that's what he's saying. Part of the substance, but the divine nature is what.

[14:35] Not divisible into parts, right? Impartibleness, impartible. I don't know if that's a word in English. Hence, it is necessary that the Father, in generating the Son, transfers not a part of the nature to him, right, but the whole nature he communicates to him, right. There remaining a distinction only according to what origin, right? So it's exactly the same nature and the whole of that nature that the Son receives.

[15:09] He receives it from the Father, somehow, still the basis for a distinction, right? Because the Son has the divine nature from the Father, and the Father is the one from whom the Son has the whole divine nature. So they remain what distinct by their origin, but they have one and the same number, nature.

[15:35] So let's look now at these terrible objections. The first objection to which you caught over here: the Father generated the Son from something, either from Himself or from something other, right? If from something other, since that from which something is generated is in that which is generated, it would follow that something alien, huh? From the Father is in the Son, and this is contrary to what the great Hilary says.

[16:07] If, however, the Son, if the Father generates the Son from Himself, and that from which something generated, if it is what, permanent, receives its predication, right? Receives the predication of what is what generated, huh? And also he says it remains, right? If you say that the cold becomes hot, then you don't say the cold is hot. But if you say that the water becomes hot, water remains, then the water is hot, right?

[16:43] Okay. As we say that man is white because man remains when he becomes white from not white, it follow either that the Father either does not remain the Son being generated, right?

[16:58] Like cold doesn't remain when the hot is generated, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Okay. So Thomas says to the first, therefore it should be said that when the Son is said to be born of the Father, this preposition de, huh? It's not ex, it's de in Latin, signifies the what? Generating, yeah, the beginning, generating, consubstantial, right? The same substance, not, however, a what, material principle, right?

[17:36] For what is produced from matter comes about through the transformation, right, of that for which it is produced, right, into another form. But the divine essence is not what,

[17:53] changeable, nor is it susceptible of a what, another form, right? So a principle generating that's of the same what, substance, huh? And the same substance and number, huh? Okay.

[18:21] Now look at the second objection here. That from which something is generated is the beginning of that which is generated. If, therefore, the Father generates the Son from His essence or nature, it would follow that the essence or nature of the Father is the beginning of the Son. But not a material principle, because there is no matter in God. Therefore, it says we are an active principle, as the one generating is said to be the beginning of the one generated, and thus it would follow that the essence generates, right?

[18:53] This is disproven before, because then there would be real distinction between the essence and what. Thomas says the second should be said that when it is said that the son is generated from the essence or the nature or the substance of the father, according to the exposition of the teacher, Thomasius that is Saint Peter Lombard Lombard, it designates the relation of a what beginning or source as the word that is active,

[19:28] where it is expounded thus: the son is generated from the essence of the father, that is from the father what? Yeah In essence From the Father in essence Yeah. On account of this, that Augustine says in the fifteenth book about the Trinity,

[19:52] such it is that I say from the de patre essentia, from the father of the essence, huh? As if more expressly, I was to say, from the essence of the Father, right? But Thomas says this does not seem to be sufficient for the sense of this way of speaking, huh? For we are able to say that the creature is also from God, right? The essence, huh? Not are or from the essence of God.

[20:27] He said to be from nothing, right? Whence, in another way, should be said that this preposition "de" and ex some kind of subtle distinction between "de" in Latin and "ex," right? That the preposition "de" always denotes what consubstantiality, something of the same substance. Whence we do not say in Latin that the house is de aedificatore, right? Because it is not from a cause of the same what substance.

[21:06] We are able, however, to say that something is de aliquo in whatever way that is signified as a principle that is what Consubstantiale. Whether it be an active principle, as the sun is said to be de patre? Or whether it is a material principle, as the knife is said to be of iron, right? Or if it be a what formal principle in those things in which the forms themselves are subsistent and not coming to another thing.

[21:43] For we are able to say that the angel, some angel, is of a what intellectual nature. And in this way, we can say that the Son is generated from the essence of the Father, in so far as the essence of the Father is communicated to the Son by generation.

[22:07] Excuse me. In so far as the essence of the Father communicated to the Son by generation subsists what in him, right? So, what's the meaning of that, right?

[22:38] Is it is it the "de" there can signify always signify something consubstantial, right? The one thing it can signify is the matter, right? And that's not the meaning here, right? Another one could be something like the efficient cause, but an active principle, right? And when that is said of the essence of the Father, is either one of those true? There's no matter in God, right? And can the essence be said to be the father of the son?

[23:10] No. So it's got to be in this third way, right? According as it is a what formal principle, right? And he gives example there that the angel is of a what intellectual nature. Does intellectual nature mean the matter which the angel is made? No. Does it signify kind of like the active principle of the angel? No. But it signifies what the formal thing. So this is what the meaning of it is when it's said of the what that the Son is what De essentia patris essentia patris, right?

[23:59] Hard to see, but you have to see the distinction of those three meanings or three uses of the word de right? It always refers to a beginning in that sense. Yeah, but but not a material beginning and not an active beginning, which is like an efficient cause, but more.

[24:26] I wonder now if you know going back to geometry. If I say that a cube is is is from six sides, right? From six squares.

[24:44] What would be the meaning of that? It's constructed by. Well, is it a maker though? The six. And maybe maybe it's not even the matter though. There's some like it's the matter, you know. But seems to be something more in terms of the what the form, you know. I don't know if that's a good comparison if it's going to help. Yeah, a cube is in

[25:16] matter. Yeah. Well, it wouldn't constitute with that. Could you still call it parts? Yeah, you can. You know, the more aspect of parts there, but like the matter. Well,

[25:55] if you said you know, another example like this, we say that something is healthy. From medicine, right? Well, that would be like an active cause, right? But see, you're healthy from health.

[26:14] Yeah, be more formal, right? Yeah. And the the sun is is what. God from the the nature of the Father, right? But in the formal sense. Yeah, we we we do think it would be necessary to say from the nature of the Father, because you just say from the Father and not understood. Well, in English, you see, we don't seem to have two words there, X and D.

[26:46] I don't see. So we gotta kind of get the distinction here with our words, right? But I think we can use the word from. We could say, "I'm healthy from health," right? It means that would be very common, isn't it? That's certainly a different way than saying I'm healthy from medicine, right? Because medicine is like a a fission cause or a maker made me healthy, right? But it's an active active source.

[27:17] Why health is more the the form of the healthy. And so the divine nature is like the the the form of the what. Yeah, yeah, like like Saint Paul says there in the epistle, right? When he was in the form of God, right? He didn't think it was inequality, you know, and then he took on the form of a slave, right? So. Yeah yeah that's what's communicated in the generation Yeah, yeah.

[27:53] See, why if if you were to say that the the divine nature generated the son, then there'd be a real distinction between the son and the divine nature. There's a real distinction between the Father and the Son, and there's no real distinction between the Son and the divine nature. We saw that before.

[28:16] Each of the divine persons has no real distinction from the divine nature. Divine nature is all three of them. Each of them is the divine nature.

[28:32] So there's difference in our our thoughts, right? Because something expressed by Father does not expressed by the thoughts he had about the divine nature, right? But realize that the Father and the divine nature are the same thing, and the Son and the divine nature the same thing. So when you see it, the sun is generated from one of the word, adjective or preposition, rather in English, from the divine nature.

[28:59] You've got to say, "What do you mean by 'from' there, right? " It doesn't mean, you know, there's material which made the three persons. It doesn't mean that the divine nature is the the father of the son. Because then there'd be a distinction between them, a reason of relative opposition. So it's from the nature of the father as a what the form is now the form the nature of the what son.

[29:35] It's hard to see, right? You can see a little distinction there. If you don't see distinction, you're going to stumble, right? This might be heretical, but

[29:50] can you say that the divine nature is the formal cause of the son? Is that what we're saying, or is it? No, no, no, no. Um Trying to understand. But but but we understand it as um the f the nature or form of the what Sun right. Mm hmm

[30:11] I mean, there's in other words, it signifies the abstractor signifies as a form of something, right? Yes. But in God, there is no distinction, real distinction, between what is signified as a form and what has the form, right? Yes. Okay. Because they say even Saint Paul uses that word form, right? Is in the form of what God, right? Let's op sir. Okay. Now the third objection, right?

[31:03] Augustine says that the three persons are not from the same what essence or nature, because they are not other the essence of the person, right?

[31:17] But the person of the son is not other from the what essence of the father. Therefore, the son is not of the essence of the father, right? Okay. To third should be said that when it is said that the son is generated from the essence of the father, there is added something with regard to which there can be saved a what distinction, right?

[31:48] Because you are saying it's from the essence of the father, right? Okay. Or it sounds like saying he generated from the essence insofar as it's what the same thing as the father.

[32:06] Insofar as the essence is the father's distinct from the son, but not insofar as its essence is essence. Okay. But when it is said that the three persons are from the divine essence, right? There is not placed something with regard to which there can be what. A

[32:28] distinction. Yeah. Through the preposition signified, right? And therefore, it is not what. Yeah. There is a difference there, right? Could you say the son is generated from the essence of the father? The father is used in that description, right? And therefore, there is something by reason of which you can speak of a distinction there. But you say the three persons are generated from the divine essence, not generated, but they are from the divine essence.

[33:00] There is nothing on the side of divine essence that led what. Yeah. And therefore, the Gaya end up being really distinct. Yeah, you wouldn't say the Son is from the divine essence Yeah Let alone the three persons, right?

[33:29] See, I mean, in English, if you say this is from that, doesn't that imply some distinction between this and that? So, if you said the three persons were from the divine nature, then that implies some distinction between the three persons and the divine nature, and that would be false or heretical, right?

[34:02] You see a good quote that Thomas has familiar, right? Ex verbis, inordinate prolatis heresis oritur from words disorderly put forth, heresy arises. How easy it would be to stumble over these things, huh?

[34:19] I proved that already. Because that guy got in the church and said she should be called the Mother of Christ, not the Mother of God. You know. But I see, you know, you know, Protestants, you know, who are uneasy by our calling Mary Mother of God, right?

[34:45] You can't see why they would be uneasy about this, right? He doesn't have a mother. By the way, isn't there also because doesn't the church always use is it ex virginae instead of they or to make a distinction or just sometimes does the church use ex? I think doesn't it? In the creed. Probably because I see humanity here. This is very fleshly. Yeah. Yeah.

[35:23] Incidentally, they're talking about Mary. I happened to run across an article on the church. I guess it's dedicated now to Catherine of Alexandria, the one that's down there on Sinai, and they claim to have the the

[35:42] burning bush, the bush that. Oh yeah. You heard that, or? I didn't hear this part. And the I guess the way it got named to Catherine was I think her remains were transported there or something, but anyway. But anyway, they're talking about the burning bush, and the church is dedicated also to the Blessed Virgin Saint. And the way they understand the burning bush is that the bush represents Mary, and the flames, Christ in his divine nature, and in taking flesh from her, he didn't consume her or destroy her, right?

[36:26] The explanation I'd always heard from the church fathers was that the bush represents the human nature of Christ, and the flames, the divine nature of Christ, and the two natures remain distinct, and one does not swallow up the other, so to speak, right? This is also, I think, a meaning you could see in it, and so they see that as pointing the way to to the incarnation, right?

[36:54] And specifically to Mary, right? And I think you find both both of those quotations in the fathers. Yeah, that's kind of interesting. I thought. Yeah, yeah. Our liturgy specifically mentions that for the Annunciation. Mary says, "God's all-consuming fire. How will I not be consumed? if He's going to come into me? " Oh, I see. Okay, okay, yeah. That's just sort of puts those words in her mouth.

[37:21] Yeah. Okay. Now we're down to the what fourth objection, right? Tom's going to give a couple explanations here. To the fourth, then it should be said that wouldn't it said that wisdom is created, right?

[37:42] This can be understood not about the wisdom which is the Son of God, right, but about the created wisdom which God has put into what His creatures, right? For it is said in Ecclesiasticus one chapters nine ten or verses nine ten that He created it that is wisdom by the Holy Spirit, and He poured it forth upon all His what works. Reminds me the second definition of nature, right?

[38:14] The Cassiodorus or the canonists used to speak of there, or it's something of an art, maybe the divine art, right, in things, right, whereby they are what moved to their end, right? And you know, Aristotle says if you could put the the artist could put the art of building a ship into the wood so it built itself into a ship, then you'd have something like nature. It shows it shows the excellence of the divine art, right?

[38:44] You put something of his art into things. I suppose trying to do that with a computer, right? You know. But it doesn't serve our needs very much. Yeah, but it has a mind of its own, as they say, right? So that.

[39:02] Nor he says, is it unsuitable that in one context of speech, scripture should speak both of what the generated wisdom and the created wisdom? Right? Why? Because the created wisdom is a partaking, a certain partaking of the what uncreated wisdom, or it is able to refer to the what nature created of the sun, assumed by the sun, that the sense would be from the beginning and before the ages, I was what created.

[39:39] That is, I was foreseen that I would be joined to what creatures to human nature, or this is now the one is going to be applied to even as divinit, as divine generation, or through this that the divine wisdom is said to be what created and generated. The way of the divine generation is insinuated for us, or indicated for us. For in generation, what is generated takes on the nature of the one generating, which pertains to its what perfection.

[40:19] But in creation, the one creating is not what changed, right? But the one created does not receive the nature of the one what. Yeah. Therefore, the son is said both created and generated, so that from the word creation we take the what unchangeableness of the Father, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. And thus is explained the understanding of this scripture by Hilary in the book about what the Synods.

[41:01] Now, like we saw, you know, before, you know, we have to use, we have to say God is what good to indicate His what perfection, right? We have to say God is goodness itself to indicate His what simplicity, right? And neither way is what adequate, so we have to use these two to express Him, and

[41:29] something like that, right? That you use one word to indicate the fact that He comes from the Father without any change of the Father, that there isn't human generation, right? Or in the animals, you know, because you don't really have maybe, you know, in the angels you don't have generations, to be speaking. So one angel doesn't generate another angel. So you have

[41:55] true offspring, you might say, in animals, right? So the dog produces a dog of the same nature, and a cat produces a cat, and a man produces a man. But there's a change going on, right, in the in the parents, huh? And so in God there's a real communication of nature, right? But no change. How do you express this? Well, you say there's birth to indicate there's a real a real birth, right?

[42:26] A true birth, because you truly have the one who generates also God, huh? Okay. But unlike the generations we know, there's no change in the one generating, and therefore we use the word create, huh? Because in creation, God is in no way what changed, you know. Some people think God created to get bored or something, you know. And you know, maybe we have a hobby or something, you know.

[42:58] Yeah. And uh, yeah. Now he says the authorities induced about the Holy Spirit. They're not speaking about Him, but about the what created spirit, right? Which sometimes is called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes even the soul, right? Or any what substance, yeah. So the word a breath or air first names a what material substance that has no color and can't be seen really, right?

[43:50] And then we carry the word over to a substance, that is what immaterial, and so we call the soul spirit sometimes, and the fortiori the angel's spirit, right? God's spirit. Those texts are not as difficult. The other one was the other one, right? So he gives three different explanations, right?

[44:16] Sometimes Christ is said to be predestined God. You know, it means what you're thinking, looking forward to incarnation, right? Huh? That there's a man predestined to be God.

[44:34] A little bit like this way of speaking, you know. One explanation there, right? Refers to the created nature. Okay, well, case you get out of that one, huh? Talked about the student I have as first teacher at St. Mary's, and I think about that kind of bright guy, but he always coming every day with an objection, you know. I had heard all these ones because you've read Thomas, you've heard these and ones that even they haven't thought of.

[45:07] And and I know how to answer them, and I could see him. You know, he knew I was answering the objection, you know, so he kind of you know go back. He's foreign until I try to answer just, then he relaxes and things like that. He told me after the course, he said, "I always thought I was going to get you this day, you know."At least he's involved in the class.

[45:33] Yeah, yeah. Okay, now we get to the two questions, the two articles here, four and five, which are about the power, right? And Thomas is going to be talking especially about the power of generating, but you could also talk about the power of what breathing, right?

[46:01] So if there's really what generation in God, right? And there's also what the breathing of the Holy Spirit, must you also speak of the power to generate, the ability to generate, and the power to breathe or the ability to breathe?

[46:24] To the fourth one proceeds thus: It seems that in God there is no power or ability with respect to the notional acts. For every ability or power is either active or passive. This is the first distinction Aristotle gives in the ninth book of Wisdom when he takes up power or ability. But neither of these seems to be fitting or to fit. For there's no passive power in God because he's what pure act, right?

[47:02] Nor is there an active power, for it doesn't belong to one person with respect to another, since the divine persons are not what made. As has been shown, therefore in God there is no power for the notional acts.

[47:22] Of course, the first meaning of the active power is the power to make something, right? The power to act upon something. Well, did God the Father make the Son? Then the two of them got together and made the Holy Spirit.

[47:42] Moreover, power or ability is said with respect to what is what possible, right? But the divine persons are not of the number of possible things, but of the number of necessary things. So we saw before that God is necessary to be through himself.

[48:03] Therefore, with respect to the notional acts by which the divine persons proceed, one ought not to lay down what in God Or if I use the word "ability" in English, right? Then you say, well, something had to be able to be, right? And God's not able to be. He necessarily is right. Okay, I am that one who's able to be. He says, "I am who am Okay,

[48:40] Be all you can be. Moreover, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the what concept, conception of the understanding. But the Holy Spirit proceeds as a love, which pertains to the will. But power, God, is said in comparison to what effects,

[49:08] not, however, in comparison to what understanding and willing, right? Now, why why did they say that, right? When God, there isn't any real what difference between God and his operation of understanding his operation of willing, right? Why power seems to be the source of something, beginning of something, right? And so that

[49:40] if God had a power to understand, then would seem to imply that God and his understanding are something different, right? Okay, so power seems to be said more with respect to creatures because there's a real distinction between God and the creature, right?

[50:01] Therefore, in God, we're not not to speak of power in comparison to the notion of what acts. Against this is what Augustine says that troublemaker against Maximus the heretic, right? If God the Father is not able to generate a son equal to himself, where is omnipotence of God the Father? Therefore, in God there is power with respect to the notional acts.

[50:39] It just comes up in the Greek question is disputata de potentia right? I think they're my favorite disputed questions, you know. You know, several questions on the Trinity eventually, but you know, the power of generating coming up again.

[51:00] Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that just as there are laid down to be actual notional acts in God, like to generate and to breathe, so it is necessary that there be placed a power or ability with respect to these acts, for power signifies nothing other than the beginning of some what act."

[51:28] When, since the Father is understand as the what beginning or source of generation, and the Father and the Son as the beginning of what breathing, it is necessary that to the Father we attribute the power of generating, and to the Father and the Son the power of breathing,

[51:57] because the power of generating signifies that by which the one generating generates. But every one generating generates by something. Once in every one generating, it is necessary to place a power of generating, and likewise in the one breathing, right? There must be that by which he breathes, right? And therefore, in the one breathing, which is the Father and the Son, we've got to place the ability or the power to breathe, right?

[52:35] So you're convinced that God has the power to, for the Father at least, has the power to generate. So the first objection says that every power is either active or passive. Neither can belong here, right? Because God is pure active, can't be the passive power, and if you give an active power, then it seems that God, the Father, made the Son, right? And the Holy, Father, the Father and the Son made the Holy Spirit.

[53:22] Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that just as according to the notional acts, there does not proceed some person as what made,

[53:50] so neither is there power for notional acts. So neither is power for notional acts said in God by what respect to some person made, huh? Okay. But only what with respect to some person what proceeding? So what is he saying there? He's saying the Father has no power to make the Son, but he does have the power to what generate the Son, right? And the Father and the Son have no power to make the Holy Spirit, but they do have the power to what breathe the Holy Spirit, right?

[54:32] But the generating of the Son or the breathing of the Holy Spirit, neither one should be strictly speaking called a making, right? Certainly, making in the first sense is where you transform matter, right? Okay, and where the thing made is. But if you speak of what creation is a kind of making, right? And there you're not making, the, transforming matter, right? But the making is going to be kind of an act. To the divine art, right, and therefore we are kind of like the artifacts of God, right?

[55:06] But the Son is not the artifact of God; He is God. Okay. So the artifacts of the artist are not the artist, not equal to God. That's where he defines it here. Yeah. Power is nothing other than the beginning of some act, so that's like it's not the cause of some act; it's just the beginning of some more general. Yeah. That's the same. I think that's where he's reasoning from there.

[55:35] Yeah. It's not just not the immediate cause, but it's something with God. So Aristotle begins the ninth book of wisdom. He talks about ability with respect to motion, right? And then later on, he shows that ability is not only found in regard to motion, but in regard to other things, right? And so,

[56:02] so we even speak of say the ability to understand, right, or the ability to love, right? And understanding or loving, are not strictly speaking, motion. And so you have to kind of move the word, right? But Aristotle, you know, one of the central questions of the third book of wisdom, there, where Aristotle was proceeding dialectically with the questions of philosophy, is whether anything, you know, comes to be without a motion, right?

[56:33] Whether there is, there is creation. He's having to get that right, and he wouldn't raise the question unless he he thought eventually there's going to be what something, you know, coming into existence not through motion, right? So if you go back to the to the definitions of the causes, you see the third kind of cause Aristotle speaks. of, whence first there is a beginning of motion. So he's really defined the mover, right?

[57:01] And then he kind of attaches to that the maker, the man who forms something, right? And then that's not exactly the same thing to move something and to form it. And then the creator would be what a cause in that kind of cause, but it'd be different from the mover and the maker, because strictly speaking, there the maker there is the one who what forms the matter, right?

[57:26] And God doesn't form the matter, but rather produces the whole matter and form. So got to move the word, as Monsignor Dionne said. Can't move the word, he says. That's a typical problem with the the modern philosophers, right?

[57:55] So you'd see them when they're talking about infused virtues. We speak of right. Of course, infused means pour it in, right? Of course, first you pour it in, you pour water in my glass, but they can't move the word, you know, because it doesn't absolutely mean that, you know.

[58:12] One guy used to say, you know, what do you think the soul is? A bucket for grace? But they're stuck with the first meaning of infused, right? You know.

[58:28] Pour wine in your glass. Yeah. Okay. Now the second question was saying, "Hey, ability is as respects to what is possible, right? What is able to be?

[58:48] But God is what altogether necessary. To the second, then it should be said that possible, according as it is opposed to necessary, follows upon the what passive power which is not in God, right? Whence neither in God is something possible in this way, but only according as the possible is contained under the what necessary. And thus it is able to be said that just as what is possible for God to be, so also is possible for the Son to be generated, right?

[59:29] Aristotle already distinguished those senses of possible, right? Because if you say in one sense possible means something what is able to be and not be, right? And but if you say that no way is necessary possible, then it's not able to be, right? And then it's impossible, and you got a real problem there, right? Okay.

[59:58] Now it reminds me that argument comes up when you're talking about creation and possibility of creation, right? And you say, well, before God created things, were they able to be?

[1:00:20] You say, well, if they weren't able to be, he could not have created them, right? If they were able to be, there had to be some ability there before he

[1:00:34] must have been something out there that was able to be them, right? So he could have made them to be. And how do you solve that kind of objection, right? Well, two ways you can solve it, right? You can say, well, yeah, they're able to be by the ability of God, right? Not by a matter of some sort out there which is able to be them, right?

[1:01:01] Okay. But the other way is to say, well, when we say that they are able to be, we mean that there's no contradiction in saying that they are.

[1:01:17] Now, Aristotle would take a simple example of this problem, but Aristotle would say, "Is two able to be half of four? Well, it's not able to be half of four in the sense in which wood is able to be a chair or a table.

[1:01:43] Because wood has its passive ability whereby it can be, and it isn't necessary that wood be a chair or a table, right? It's able to be one or the other, right? Well, that's not the sense in which

[1:01:57] two is half of four is able to be. But some might say, well, if it's not able to be, then it's impossible to be, and therefore two is never will be half of four. See, when it's actually necessary, right? So, what does "able to be" mean there, right? It means that there's no contradiction in saying that two is what half of four, right? That's a different meaning of it, right?

[1:02:29] And people are most often deceived by mixing up the senses of a word, and most often by these most common words like "able," right? "Able" is a very common word. It's able to show up in a lot of places, and so if you can't distinguish the sense in which two is able to be half of four,

[1:02:57] which is not opposed to being what necessarily half of four, is it? See, because able there is opposed to unable or impossible, right? And if something is necessary, then it's to be, then it's impossible for it not to be, right? Okay.

[1:03:22] So if you can't distinguish the sense in which two is able to be half of four from the sense in which wood is able to be a chair, you're already in deep what trouble, right? Okay. So this is the same distinction the way that Thomas is bringing out it, right?

[1:03:45] So there's one able possible that is opposed to necessary, and that is what is able to be and not be, right? And that's opposed both to the necessary and the impossible, right?

[1:04:02] For the impossible is not able to be. And the necessary is not able to not be, and so between those two, so to speak, is what is able to be and not be. Of course Aristotle points out that book of wisdom. Some people would deny it there is such a thing,

[1:04:26] and he shows that you know the obvious difficulties they're in in saying that, right? So can it happen that two is half of four, or can that not happen? It has to happen. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But there's another sense of happens where what it could be and not be, right? So you've got to be aware of the fact that it has that consensus. I don't know. You know, think a little bit of the of the equivocation that word, right?

[1:05:15] If you use the expression "able to be," you say it of both of these, and you say you say it of what is able to be and not be, and you say it of what is necessary, right?

[1:05:41] Maybe this gets the new name because it adds something, right? It's not just able to be, but it must be, right? But this is just able to be.

[1:05:59] Maybe it's a little bit like that. I don't know. Seems a little bit like that. In the same way that he's the word, you know, possible, right? Which is kind of similar to the word that's where he's using "might" now, possible. In one sense, the possible is opposed to the what necessary, right? And in another sense, the necessary is possible.

[1:06:29] So you can't confuse those those two meanings, right? But "possible" here means, in a sense, that there's no contradiction in its being, right? So no contradiction in wood being a chair, even though it doesn't have to be a chair, and there's no contradiction in two being half of four, but it must be, right?

[1:07:03] So again, that's that's one of those words that you will find in the fifth book of wisdom, right? Now I still anticipate at all the difficulties you're going to have here in in theology, huh? In a way, huh?