Prima Pars
141. Summa I q.41 a.4–5: Power as a Beginning, and Whether the Power of Generating Signifies the Divine Essence or the Relation
Class of 2008-05-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/141-summa-i-q-41-a-4-5-power-as-a-beginning-and-whether-the-power/

[0:00] Okay. Now we got to come to the third objection, right? It takes longer to answer the third objection. Moreover, the Son proceeds as the Word, which is a conception, the understanding, the Holy Spirit as love, which pertains to the will. But power in God is said in comparison to effects, right? Not in comparison to understanding the willing, as was had above.

[0:33] So therefore in God we're not to speak of power in comparison to notional acts speak of power in comparison to emotional acts, right? Well,

[0:48] maybe let's see what Thomas before Thomas. We look at what Thomas says. there. Power, as I said, could be more said in reference to creatures than reference to notional acts, because there's a real distinction between God and the creature, right? But is there a real distinction between

[1:08] the Father and the breathing and the and the generating and the power? See, oh, see, It might be more according to, our way of understanding, right? But why doesn't he listen to Thomas, here, right? Okay. To the third, it should be said that power signifies a what? Beginning. Okay. So when Aristotle defines power in the beginning of the ninth book, right? And he say he starts with the powers that are most known to us, the powers of motion.

[1:46] So the active power is a beginning or source of change in another as other, right? And then the passive one of being changed by another, right? Okay. But in the definition there of power is beginning, right? Okay.

[2:06] Now there's an axiom about beginning, right? What is the axiom of of beginning? Nothing that begins itself. Yeah, yeah. Aristotle states this axiom in the first book of Natural Hearing, first book of the Physics, because he says Parmenides and Melissus say that everything is one. So therefore, they're really doing away with beginnings, he says, because nothing is the beginning of itself, and so if you have no multiplicity in the world, stay in position, right?

[2:45] Then how can there be beginning, right? Okay. So it's a little bit like the beginning. I mean, the axiom of before and after, nothing is before after itself. So there's always a distinction between what is before and what is after. So today cannot be before today or after today, but it's before tomorrow and after yesterday, right? So a beginning implies a distinction from that of which it is a what?

[3:18] Beginning, right? Now there's considered a twofold distinction, right? In those things which are said about God. So this is a distinction of distinction, right? Okay. One secundum rem in the things, right? The other secundum rationem, reason or thought only, right? Okay. That's why he says only there, right? Because you can have, you know, a real distinction, a distinction thought about things that are really distinct, but then you can have a distinction of thoughts that is only.

[4:04] Of course, Aristotle had already seen this, huh? I was looking at the the Parmenides which is a terrible dialogue of Plato, and I really think, he's talking about being and one, right? And how one partakes of the other, and so on, as if they were different what things, right? And Aristotle says, well, being and one in the fourth book of wisdom, there, they're really the same thing, but they're not synonyms, the words, because one adds the idea of indivision, so one means undivided being, so a difference in meaning from being, but this undivided is just a negation, which is a being of what reason adds nothing to being, right?

[4:52] So they're one the same thing. They differ secundum rationem. It's the Latin here, right? Are different thoughts. The words are what are not synonyms. And we had an article earlier, you know, about God. You know, these words synonyms, because even though you're signifying the same thing, it's not the same thought. So Aristotle already seen this distinction, huh? But Thomas is using it there.

[5:21] Why would Aristotle distinguishes between, say, substance and quantity, quality, being, according to future predication? Well, then substance and quantity really are what are distinct, right? What you are and your size,

[5:39] not the same thing. And and my substance and and my my knowledge of geometry are not the same thing. So they have a distinction in things, right? A distinction between act and ability, right? That's a distinction in things between matter and form. But the distinction between being and one, they say the one that's convertible with being, right, is a distinction in our thoughts, but not in things.

[6:19] But the being unity of the thing are the same thing, right? So he says it should be considered, however, a twofold distinction. in those things which are said about God, one secundum rem in the thing, the other secundum rationem, reason only, tantum only, right?

[6:41] Now, secundum rem, in reality, God is distinguished by His essence from things of which He is the beginning through what creation. Just as what one person is distinguished from another of which He is the what beginning, according to what some notional act is the beginning of them. But action from the agent is not distinguished in God except by reason what only. Otherwise, action would be an accident in God, and there'd be that composition in God, right?

[7:31] And therefore, with respect to those actions by which some things go Forward, distinct from God, either essentially or what personally, one can attribute to God in some way power, right? According to the what proper notion of a beginning, right? Remember we had an article in there about is God the Father a principio, right? The principium right beginning, remember that? Because what a beginning is always distinct from that which is the beginning, right?

[8:12] So the Father can be said to be the beginning of the Son, and the Father and the Son the beginning of the Holy Spirit, because there's a real distinction between the Father and the Son, and God can truly be said to be the beginning of creatures, right? So that book I think is mainly the Apocalypse, right? That he said, "I am the the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, but the beginning and the end, right?

[8:39] The Arche, right? And and the Telos, right? Beginning and the end, but you know the proper notion of beginning, right? Which requires a real what distinction?

[8:56] And therefore, just as we place the power of creating in God, right? So we what able to place the power of generating or of what breathing in God, right? But to understand and to will

[9:17] are not such acts which designate the procession of one thing from another, you know, from God as distinct, right? Either essentially, like the creature is, or distinct really personally, as the other person is, right?

[9:37] Whence, with regard to acts of this sort, one cannot save the notion of ability or power in God, except according to the way of understanding and signifying only,

[9:56] as are diversely signified in God, what the understanding in the power of understanding and to understand, right? Since when although the understanding of God is His essence and has no what beginning, right? Okay.

[10:18] So we've met some of these things before, right? See, is God's understanding a beginning of His loving? No. And we have to try to understand God's understanding and loving from creatures, right? And could I love wisdom? Say, I'm a lover of wisdom. Could I love wisdom if I didn't understand what wisdom is? See.

[11:07] And. Is that because there's a real distinction between your understanding and loving? Yeah, yeah. So my understanding what wisdom is is a beginning of my loving wisdom, right?

[11:21] Um, that's why you know the God too, right? Um, faith is before what charity, right? Huh? Um, have to in some way know God, know who God is, uh, before I can what love Him, right? And so you know, in the Vatican Council, they quote Augustine, right? Um, in the De Verbo, right? Um, so the whole world might believing might come to hope, and by hoping come to what love, right?

[11:55] Huh? But is God understanding what He is a beginning and source of His loving Himself? Yeah, yeah. But according to the way of understanding, right? Huh? We say, well, if God didn't understand Himself, could He love Himself? See? Can you love something you don't know? See? But it's got to be kind of careful there, right? Huh? Because is God's understanding Himself something different from His loving Himself?

[12:36] What? In our reason. Yeah. See. Because in in us, our understanding and our loving are not the same thing. And even our understanding God, our loving God, not the same thing, huh? We can love Him more than we understand Him, right? See. So, but so because we start from creatures, we have a different thought of understanding, different thought of loving, right? And then we apply both these to God, but then we say in God the the what same.

[13:10] Like my example there, I'm using always a circle, right? Okay. So the the center of the circle is one point, but it can be defined as the beginning of this line and the beginning of that line. But the two points in circumference, my understanding and my loving, are really. Distinct points, right?

[13:36] But my thinking of the center as being the beginning of this line of ends in my understanding, and the beginning of this line that ends in my loving. is really one and the same point, right? But it's defined differently, right?

[13:59] See, but you know Thomas would kind of reason from God understanding Himself to His what, loving Himself, right? Because the good as known, the good as understood, is the object of what love, right? You couldn't understand God's love without understanding His understanding. It's interesting; it's in order, right? So, there's a distinction in order,

[14:25] which is in our thoughts, right? But realize there's not a real distinction in God, and a real order in God corresponding to to this, right?

[14:45] But in terms of the Father and the Son, then there's a real distinction God between the Father and the Son, and a real proceeding of one from the other, right?

[15:00] So that's kind of interesting. You can see this a lot in the Disputed Questions On the Power of God (De Potentia) right? One question is dealing more with the power of God with respect to creatures, right, and creating the power of creating and so on, and then then this power of generating, right? And the power of breathing is similar to the power of generating, right? But the basic, what's the key thing that Thomas is saying there, right?

[15:27] Well, he's saying that power, in its definition, is a beginning of something, right? And beginning is always distinct from that which is a beginning. So, if there's a real distinction between the beginning and that of which it is a beginning, you're really using the word power in its what Proper notion. There's a real distinction between the Father and the Son, and between God and the creature. So there, you have more the proper notion of power, right?

[15:56] But in regard to understanding the will of God, then power seems to what be only in our what. Yeah, he says there the secundum modum intelligendi, right, et significandi tantum, right. But there can't be any real distinction there between God's ability to understand His understanding. What I mean is a great distinction between my ability to understand and I actually understand it. And I had the ability to understand many things before I understood them.

[16:38] I guess I have the ability to understand even more things than I understand now. At least there's not a contradiction. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So my ability to understand is the real beginning of my understanding.

[16:55] Was God's ability to understand the real beginning of His understanding? So that's beautiful, huh? So we take a little break before we go on to the fifth article here. Okay, this is the fifth article now, right? Whether the power or ability of generating signifies a relation and not an essence, huh?

[17:38] To the fifth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the power of generating or breathing signifies relation and not the very essence of God, huh? So, is the ability to generate the Son in the father? Is that his fatherhood? See, or is it his what? Is the divine nature itself?

[18:04] Well, there's some distinction here, I'm sure. Well, potency or power, right, signifies a beginning, right? As is clear from its definition, for the active power ability is a beginning of acting upon something, as is clear in the fifth book of wisdom, the fifth book of the Physics books in natural philosophy, right? But a beginning in God is said with respect to a person, right, notion.

[18:43] Therefore, the power in God does not signify the essence, but the relation, right? So he's saying that the divine nature is not the beginning of the sun, because then it would be something different than the sun, right? So it must be then. Must be like

[19:04] divine nature as is in the father. Well, there may be some distinction coming. We'll see. Yeah, sure. Yeah, something like something up his sleeve. Yeah. This is very frustrating, you know, to somebody who's opposed to these things. You know, see, he's always got a way out. He never,

[19:28] he never accepts something against the faith, you know, as being unsolvable, right? I have heard people say he's always making these distinctions. Yeah, he's seeing these distinctions. That's better to say, seeing the distinctions and using them. Yeah.

[19:48] Moreover, in God, posse to be able and to do don't differ, right? But generation in God signifies what relation, right? Therefore, also the what power of generating signifies relation. So he's saying the power of generating is the same thing as the act, and the act is the same as relation. So I'm convinced. For the time being. Moreover, those things which signify the essence in God are common to the three persons, but the power of generating is not common to three persons, but proper what to the Father.

[20:36] Therefore, it does not signify the essence, right? As you probably suspect, it's going to involve somehow the essence and the relation, but exactly how we have to see.

[20:54] But against this is that just as God is able to generate the Son, so also He what? Wills it right? But the will of generating signifies the essence. Therefore, the power of generating is kind of strange argument. Okay.

[21:18] Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that some say that the power of generating signifies relation in God, but this is not able to be.

[21:36] For that property is said to be power in some agent by which the agent acts, right? So the agent is the one who does something, but that by which he does it, right, is the power. But everything producing something through its action, right, produces something like itself as regards the form by which it what acts. Just as the man generated is like the one generating him in human nature,

[22:20] by virtue of which the Father is able to generate a man, right? So I didn't generate a son by my what knowledge of geometry, and so I didn't say that my son knows geometry geometry. But I generated him by my human nature, right? And therefore, he's like that which I generated him, right? His human nature.

[22:53] That therefore is the generating power in someone generating, in which the thing generated is like the one what generating. But the Son of God is like the Father generating him in the divine nature, not in his fatherhood, right? If he generated him by his fatherhood, then he would be what another father. Okay, and the Holy Spirit would be another son and father.

[23:31] Whence the divine nature in the Father is the power of generating in him. But it's in the Father. That's kind of bringing it in over here.

[23:46] Whence Hilary says in the fifth book about the Trinity that the birth of God is not able. Not to possess the nature. Yeah. For that does not subsist as God other than that is from something other than from God subsisted right.

[24:18] Thus, therefore, it should be said that the power of generating chiefly signifies what the divine essence. He didn't say only right. He says chiefly right. Principally principally, as the teacher says right in the seventh distinction of the first book of sentences. Not, however, only what The relation, right.

[24:56] Nor does it signify the essence in so far as it is the same as relation. right. In the sense, therefore, that would signify equally what both right.

[25:16] For although fatherhood signifies as the form of the father right, it is nevertheless a personal what property. Having itself to the person of the father as an individual form to some created individual.

[25:43] But the individual form in created things constitutes the person generating, not however that by which the one generating generates. Otherwise, Socrates would engender what Socrates.

[26:08] Whence neither fatherhood is able to be understood as that by which the father what generates. But as constituting the person of the one what generating. Otherwise, the father would generate a father.

[26:32] But that by which the father generates is the divine nature, in which the son is like him. which is similar to Him. And according to this, Damascene says, the generation is a work of nature,

[26:53] not as of the one generating, but as of that by which the one generating generates. So if I teach you geometry, am I that by which I teach you geometry?

[27:17] No It's it's the science of geometry. in. me Whatever there is in me of the science of geometry, by which I teach you geometry, right? But who's the teacher of you?

[27:33] Yeah, not the art of geometry, right? What is the art of geometry then? That by which I teach you, right? Not the same thing, right?

[27:48] So the father, who's a father by his fatherhood, right, is the one who generates the son. But is he? Is it by his fatherhood that he generates the son?

[28:06] Because then the son would be assimilated to the fatherhood, and then he'd be another father. So, by what then does the father generate the son? It is not by his fatherhood. It's by the divine nature, right? Okay.

[28:29] And therefore, the power of the one generating signifies, and the Latin phrase you know that, in recto, right, the divine nature, but obliquely the relation, right.

[28:47] So what does that mean? How do you translate obliquely there? Relation indirectly. Yeah, not indirectly is the right way of saying exactly, but it's you might say it's the what, um,

[29:04] the divine nature of the father, right? Okay. Or the divine nature, maybe insofar as in the father, right? Yeah. So signifies chiefly the divine nature, but insofar as it's in the the father, right, or as of the father.

[29:29] Now, the first objection is saying that power or ability signifies a beginning, right? This is clear from its definition. But a beginning in God is said with respect to what a person. is said notionally. Therefore, power in God does not signify the essence, but a what relation, right? Now, I go back to the chapter on relation and categories.

[30:04] To the first, therefore, it should be said that power does not signify the relation of beginning. Otherwise, it would be in the genus of what? Yeah. And it's acting the genus of what? Quality, yeah. Okay, it's the second species of quality in the categories of Aristotle, right?

[30:31] But it signifies that which is a beginning, right? Okay. Now, what does Aristotle do? Huh? You know. Well, when when he first enumerates the categories,

[30:49] he says he says substance, and then how much? He's a concrete word for quantity. Quality, And then he says quality, how? And then he says relation, meaning towards what, right? Okay. Then he gives you the six. Okay. Now, after he does that, next chapter is on substance. Next chapter is on quantity. Then you expect quality to be next, right? It's quantity and relation. Exactly

[31:41] Now the great Porphyry, the Isagoge, does something like that, huh? Because in the beginning he says, Chrysarius, he says, "It's necessary to understand what is genus, what is difference, what is species, what is property, what is accident, right? " To know Aristotle's categories, but also to understand definition and division and demonstration. Can understand this, okay? So that's what he says. What is genus?

[32:14] What is difference? What is species? What is property? What is accident, right? And he takes up genus, and he takes up species, and he takes up difference, property, accident. So it's something similar to what these two guys do, right? Porphyry and Aristotle. Aristotle did it first, right? And what's the reason for this, right?

[32:55] Well, this order here is the order of things themselves, right? The substance stands under everything else, right? And substance receives accidents in a certain order, right? And quantity is presupposed to some qualities, especially the sense qualities and shape and so on, right? So quantity is put before quality. Then relations are based some on quantity and some on quality. So relation is put forth right now. Okay. The same way down here, because genus is the beginning, right?

[33:39] Then you add the differences and you get the species, right? And the property falls in the species, and the accident just came in there from the outside, right? So the order, in some way, similar to these, right? But now, why does Porphyry take up these two before difference, right? He has a good reason for doing that, and that is that genus and species are defined with reference to each other.

[34:10] So genus is what is said of many differing in species, in answer to the question, "What is it?" Right? But the species is what is placed under genus, and which the genus is said to answer the question, "What is it?" So because they're defined in a way with reference to each other, it's good to take them up together first, right? And then we come to the difference, huh?

[34:34] Well, the difference is defined as what the species has in addition to the genus, or the difference is said to be that by which

[34:47] species under the same genus are what separated, right? Okay. We can see that in a way, you know, genus and species then first together because they're kind of relative to each other, and then difference is made known by the fact that it is that by which the species, well, that's what species has in addition to the genus, right? Okay.

[35:13] So animal is a genus, and man is a species, and rational is what man has in addition to being an animal, right? Okay. Or it's that by which man differs from other species of animal, right? The two footed Aristotle says here, says rational. He says two footed. Okay. Now property is like the effect of the species, so that's just you know, some work So there's one shape right?

[35:44] Now, Aristotle has a different reason why he takes up relation before quality, and that is because his master Plato, right, said that a relation is what is what said to be of another in some way or other, right? Okay.

[36:03] And there are some qualities, right, that are said to be of another, like knowledge, right, which is in the first species of quality, but there falls a certain relation upon knowledge, right? So knowledge is knowledge of something, right?

[36:24] But Knowledge is fundamentally a quality, not a relation. When Aristotle begins the chapter on relation, he gives definition, and he proceeds for some time, and then he runs into these problems, right? And then he realizes he has to distinguish between something whose whole nature is to be towards something, like double, right? What is double? Well, it could be four, it could be six, you know. Absolutely, you can't say what it is, right?

[36:56] It's nothing, you see. So the whole being, Aristotle says, the whole nature of double is to be towards something, right? Nothing is double in itself, is it? Only towards another, right? See, why knowledge is something in itself, right? Geometry and so on, ah. And uh others in relation following upon right? So he has to distinguish between, you know, those two relatives, right? Because the one is going to be in this category, and the other will be in this, right?

[37:29] And then he goes on to quality, right? So it's kind of because of a subtle thing there, right? Well, it's like the power, right? Is power its whole nature to be relation? No, no.

[37:49] Because power is basically a quality, right? Okay. But there follows upon this quality a certain relation to be a beginning of what? Another, right? See, that's not its whole nature, right? So since Thomas knows this distinction, right? And

[38:12] that part of Cajetan's commentary on Categories is good because he sees what Aristotle is doing in the chapter on relation. It's kind of striking, you know, when you see this Aristotle and you see for a different reason, right? But the difference between the order in what in the things and the things there, which is given first, and then the order in our knowledge, right? And because there's difficulty with the word relation, right?

[38:39] And the fact that you know not only is a double said to be double of something, right? But knowledge said to be knowledge of something, and you kind of put these in the same bag and they don't belong in the same bag or in the same genus, right? The same predicament. Okay. So he's touching a little bit upon this here.

[39:05] Power does does not signify that relation of principle, right? Of beginning. Otherwise, it would be in the genus of what? Relation. You can say the same thing about knowledge. in. Aristotle's example and so on. But it signifies something nevertheless that is a beginning, right? And he makes another distinction, or excuse me, he sees another distinction.

[39:29] See, see, but Plato had not seen this distinction between these two, right? Okay, kind of lump them together, right? Not as the agent himself is said to be beginning, right? But the beginning as that by which the agent acts, right? Okay.

[39:50] So my teaching of geometry proceeds from me. See, it also proceeds from my knowledge of geometry. But does it proceed from me and my knowledge of geometry the same way? No. Proceeds from me as as your teacher. And proceeds from my knowledge of geometry as that by which I what teach you, okay?

[40:15] And he says the agent, however, is distinguished from the thing made, and the generating generator, the one generating from the one generated. But that by which the one generating generates is common to the one generated and the one generating. In sense that they what?

[40:39] Well, I know. In sense that they they they have the same what? Nature. Yeah, one is like the other. And more so perfectly, the more perfect is the generation, right? Now, when I generate a man, he's like me in species, right? But doesn't have the same individual human nature that I have, right?

[41:07] But in God, it's the same individual nature, right? So it's even more like than we are, right? Our parents That's like that axiom, the more. the uh the more the thing is one the more its power is infinite Well, that's true. Just call it mine Yes yeah Since the divine generation is most perfect, right? That by which the one generating generates is common, right, to the one generated and the one generating, and the same in number, and not only in what species, as is in the case of what created things, right?

[41:54] So the cat nature, the mother cat and the kitten, is the same in species and you know, in kind, but not the same in what number, right? Okay.

[42:12] So my son might have, no, so you say the son has my nose. Well, not in the strictest sense, yeah, We don't breathe through the same nose.

[42:25] But God the Father, God the Son, breathe through the same nose, right? You understand what I'm saying. Okay. To this, therefore, that we say that the divine essence is the beginning by which the one generating generates? It does not follow that the divine essence is what distinguished, as it would follow if we said that the divine essence what generates, right? Okay.

[43:02] Okay, you see the distinctions there. It reminds me. I was thinking there a little bit of Mozart there. You know, the remark of Einstein. You know about Mozart and Beethoven.

[43:23] He said Beethoven seems to have made his music right. Mozart seems to have found it. Mozart's music seemed to have been what always a part of the universe, right? It's kind of interesting. Yeah. And so, but like we're saying, you know, do you make these distinctions or make them up to get out of difficulty, right? Or do you what see them? Yeah, that they're already in some sense there, right?

[43:52] But you hadn't seen them. Yeah. See, or if you made something up, well, then it wasn't really there, you know, before, right? And then uh Einstein didn't believe in God and he saw that. kind of you can see that there's order in um Mozart's music. that's not his own. Yeah. Yeah Interesting. you marked that thing about Mozart. Was that Albert Einstein? Albert Einstein. Yeah. He liked Mozart the most, right?

[44:28] So. Didn't get his cousin or whoever it was Alfred write that Yeah, yeah, yeah. I have a book and yeah It's kind of classical. You know, with Mozart, but Einstein played Mozart, you know, the violin, right? You heard the time he was at one of these kind of public talks. All these stupid questions you get afterwards. You know, and finally, some woman asked, You know, what do you feel about all this?

[44:55] " You know, you know they want to kind of quick And so rather than answer he took out his violin and played You see, people, like, you know, Heisenberg was known as a very good pianist, right? And you know, in his hometown, he was more known as a pianist than a physicist, right? All right. And his wife, you know, was first kind of attracted to him because he was playing the piano and so on.

[45:17] And of course, he had all his whole family, you know, you know, playing instruments too, you know. So I mean, they would play together and so on. And but and it kind of runs through these guys, huh? Because it's mathematical character. And you know, you see the reason why Mozart—you can be a kind of a child prodigy in music, like Mozart was. Just like you have kind of child prodigies in mathematics.

[45:40] Don't we have child prodigies in in the drama or something like that? I think it rises to the you know maturity, but because of the imagination, there, right? Yeah, I think when I'm going to Euclid, but Mozart was actually quicker than I do. Faster, understand? Euclid, you know, faster than I would, huh?

[46:02] Yeah, a lot of scientists do like Bach a lot, but Einstein—you recognize Mozart. as the one and Benedict XVI does too. I just tell you, I got to kind of prod Benedict to make some ex cathedra statements, you know, Finish off my enemies, you know.

[46:26] Mozart is a doctor. of something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Something to proclaim, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of amazing when you see you know how people like Haydn and and Bach, I suppose, and you know people lived much longer than Mozart did, you know, that he could have done so much, you know, by the time he died, it was his 36th year, 35 years old. Yeah.

[46:48] If he'd lived another twenty, thirty years, if he had that, you know, you know, would have been all over for the rest of them. It would have been swallowed up, you know. He had got the right position and so on.

[47:04] Okay, but that was the answer to the first one, right? Okay. Second objection says, in God posse and agere right to be able. And to do don't differ, right? But generation God signifies relation, right? Therefore, the power of generating is going to be the same as the generation, and the same therefore as relation.

[47:38] The second should be said that thus in God the power of generating is the same as generation, as the divine essence with what generation and fatherhood is the same in the thing, but not in the what definition.

[48:05] How simple Thomas sees these things, son. Yeah. Tell again, Thomas. I mean that distinction he had before, where he said that although the fatherhood is not something different from the divine essence, right? The fatherhood is in the divine what nature and in the father in a different way, right? It's in the father as what constituting the father and distinguishing him from the son. It's not in the divine nature as constituting it and distinguishing it, right?

[48:47] But something like that here, right? A similar distinction that he's seeing here. You see, when Shakespeare defines reason as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after,

[49:08] he's including distinction, right? Because before and after presuppose a distinction. So, in the sense, what reason is chiefly trying to see is what before and after. But in order to see before and after, he has to see distinction, right? So, he's chiefly trying to see distinction and order.

[49:28] You can see as Thomas goes through here, right? There's an order, but there's also before that you have to see these what distinctions, huh? If you say trying to see distinction with order, distinction with order.

[49:45] Yeah, I mean distinction is kind of before order, and there can be all right. Soon you can see a distinction before you can see the order, right? But you can't see the order unless you see the distinction. If you can't distinguish between Mozart and Haydn, you can't say that Mozart is better than Haydn, right? But a man might see some distinction and not realize who's better, right?

[50:15] What's his name? The poet Lord Byron there said, you know, when he was a young man, right? There's as many plays of Beaumont and Fletcher, or more plays, performed than by Shakespeare, right? So in some sense, he distinguishes between the two, but it took him some time before he realized that Shakespeare was better than Fletcher, which he summed up by saying Fletcher was just a limb of Shakespeare, an arm or a leg, right?

[50:40] You know, only part of the excellence that Shakespeare had. Of course, most people are like who's Fletcher? Most of us are like who's Fletcher? No, I read a little bit of Fletcher, you know, but I told you one of my colleagues did his doctoral thesis on Fletcher, you know, because you can't do doctoral thesis in Shakespeare because there's too much, realm, You know, and someone asked him one time, you know, how come we don't see Fletcher plays, you know, performed nowadays?

[51:09] Well, he's not really that good. He's been your doctoral thesis on some. Listen. I mean, He was very popular for a while there, right? Yeah. You know what's his name? Samuel Johnson. The rule was it takes a hundred years to tell a poet. People are still reading him and so on a hundred years after he's been dead. That's prima facie evidence that maybe there's something to him, right?

[51:38] Because even for it's very famous, still being read, you know, thousand years later. I was reading about the First World War there, and you know the Manchester's biography there, Churchill, of course. They're talking about this Dardanelles invasion. You know about that? Because all getting carried away, you know, the Englishman because they've all read Homer and they all know about where Troy was. They're really getting you know, it's very excited about this, and all their schoolboy lessons, you know, are coming back and they're really enthusiastic about you know going, going and fighting the same place where Achilles did, and the rest of the great heroes.

[52:19] Didn't last long, I did. So these things are are the same in in reality, right? But the generation is more the same as the fatherhood, right? And the ability to generate is more the same as the, yeah, because they're they're cumulative, right?

[52:59] Right, why the the father is more distinguished from the son by generation than by the power generating man, though that's involved too. Um. The third objection: Those things which signify the essence in God are common to the three persons, but the power of generating is not common to the persons, but proper to the Father. If it does not signify the essence.

[53:28] To the third, it should be said that when I say the power of generating, it signifies power in recto. How should I translate that? Is is directly right? Okay.

[53:44] And generation in what? Obliquely, right? As if I were to say the essence of the what? Father, right? Hence, as regards the essence which is signified, the power of generating is common to the persons, but according to the notion which it what? Connotes, huh? It is proper to the what? Person of the Father, right? Okay. So if you say the the nature of the Father, right?

[54:20] And you put the Father into the notion of the nature of the Father, right? Then it's what? Private to the Father, right? So does the Son have the nature of the Father? You have to make a little distinction there, right? Yeah. You're not saying without qualifying it, right? You could say not in the same way. Yeah. So we

[54:58] get to stop here, huh? Fourth. So we're gonna run the machine next next. He hasn't even stopped yet.