Prima Pars
147. Summa I, Q. 43, Articles 1–2: The mission of the divine persons (with Shakespeare's 'dull, unfeeling, barren ignorance' and the three acts of reason)
Class of 2008-06-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/147-summa-i-q-43-articles-1-2-the-mission-of-the-divine-persons/

[0:00] Sent invisibly. Fourth, whether it belongs to each person to be sent? Of course, you'll find out it's only the Son and the what, Holy Spirit that are sent to be sent.

[0:22] Whether to be invisibly sent, whether both the Son and the Holy Spirit are what sent invisibly, right? Six to whom the invisible mission of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit comes to. And then seven about the what, visible mission, huh?

[0:53] That dove descending, I guess, huh? Fire coming down on top of the apostles, huh? Son becoming flesh and so on. And the eighth thing, strange little article here, whether any person sends himself, visibly or invisibly, right? Don't let you think about that and see. There must be a way of dividing it into two or three, huh? Yeah.

[1:37] First half and second half. First, second. Well, maybe you could divide it into three. That's right. The first and the second, and then the third through the last would be the third part. So what would be the. you could divide the whole the whole eight articles into how many? Two or three? Three. First one against the second and the third, and the third would contain all the rest.

[2:14] That's just a guess. You have visible and invisible. It looks like you have the first two, and then you have invisible for three. Invisible and invisible is three through eight. So I think invisible kind of implies visible. Mm-hmm. I think the first one is just on whether the suitability of descending, and then two through seven is just on descending itself, and then the third one is eight, which is whether any person can send himself, send himself, send himself.

[3:03] No, the terms of these divisions there. One thing I may have studied for a number of years ago is about prayer, right? And in this Summa Secunda, Secundae there he takes up prayer under the virtue of religion, right? He's got, if I remember right, to this, but one big question, like sixteen articles, and

[3:31] they go back to the sentences. He takes up prayer, right? And those sixteen articles are not just one question, sixteen articles. There are several questions, each of which has a number of articles, right? So you get kind of the way this needs to be divided, right? And then just kind of, you know, students brevitatis, right? Just, you know, see. But then it comes to the categorization, like who should pray, you know, to whom should you pray, for what should you pray, and so on, right?

[4:04] And and how should you pray, right? And so these naturally fall into certain what categories, only less than sixteen, right? And then, so if I remember right, there I have to go back, you know, to see exactly the details, but the sentences, the division was more explicit then, but then the order of them is better in the Summa. So you can go back to the sentences and get the distinction of the groups of articles, and then the order of the groups is better done in the Summa, if I remember right.

[4:42] So sometimes you find something from the earlier work, you know, and you might find this divided up into sentences, but haven't made that comparison exactly.

[4:58] So it's an example of how sometimes something is more distinct in the earlier work than in the later, although it belongs to the wise man to order, so the order is more perfect, and of course the order here is is more Thomas's order because in the sentences it's according to the distinctions of the parts of the work that he's commenting on and the questions that arise, you know, apropos that text, but not necessarily the articles are in the perfect order of learning, right?

[5:29] That's that's where he's warning us there in the beginning of the book, right? That the exposition of books requires, you know, this question comes up and so on.

[5:39] You know these horrible things called introduction to philosophy books. You know, used to as a college professor, they'd send you, you know, free copies of these things, hoping you adopt them for your course, you know, and so on. But I mean, you know, they all got a section there on the existence of God, you know, pro and con, and so on. And so if you are using that book as an introduction to philosophy.

[6:04] You'd have to talk about whether God exists or not, right? And what people say on the other side side. And that question doesn't really, you're not really ready for that question until you've done a lot of things beforehand. So, in expounding that book, the introduction to philosophy, you know, and some universities they might have, you know, they might adopt, you know, departmental book that everybody uses, you know, for their introductions, and then you'd have to say something about it, you know.

[6:31] Don't read this book. Well, I know, I know, but it'd be out of the order of learning, right? Even if you try to defend, you know, show what's good about the arguments for, and what's bad about the arguments against, or something, you'd still be dealing with something that they don't have the the foundation they need for, right? They need to come before. So it's out of the order, out of the order of learning.

[6:53] Or, you know, a lot of times they'll go and maybe not have a an ethics course of some sort, you know, and they'll be talking about some particular moral problem, you know, about business or about medicine or something, you know. But presupposes so many things, right? And so you're really taking up these questions that are controversial now or being discussed now, or you know, but the occasion for discussing this question is an occasion for discussing it out of what the order of learning.

[7:25] So, you know, put away all these things, maybe go back and learn things from the the beginning, right? You pick up a modern logic book and may say something about the syllogism, you know, and what they like about it, what they think is deficient about it, incomplete about it, you know. That's not where Aristotle begins, you know. I see, I see a beautiful thing, you know. You know, if you look at Thomas's proemium to the logic, right?

[7:56] She gives them the beginning of the Peri Hermeneias, and more completely the beginning of the Posterior Analytics. Well, there he divides logic according to the three acts of what? Reason, yeah. And of course, in the first act of reason, you're talking about distinction and division. That's our second act. You're talking about statement, right? And the third act is what? reasoning, right? I was re-reading Richard II, you know, and thinking again about this beautiful phrase he has in there.

[8:30] He says, "Dull, unfeeling, barren ignorance." This is a line there. Dull, unfeeling, barren ignorance. Yeah, think about it again, because I always recognized why he calls ignorance barren, right?

[8:56] As you know from your study of reasoning, right? Reasoning is coming to know or guess something. In the fullest sense, it's coming to know something you didn't know, but something you knew already, right? It's coming to know a statement that was unknown to you before, but through statements that you know already. So knowledge is what not barren, but knowledge is what fertile. And if you know some statements, you can sometimes, by putting them together, come to see another statement, right?

[9:31] Okay. This is very clear in Euclid, right? You learn one theorem, and you can use that theorem to prove something else, that to prove something else, and keep on going, you know. And so knowledge, you could say, is fertile, right? That not only do you know something when you have knowledge, but you can come to know something else you don't know, to what you do know, right?

[9:53] But Shakespeare calls ignorance barren. It's beautiful, right? And a lot of times you know, I'm explaining what reasoning is. I'd say now, two dogs get together, they produce sometimes a dog, right? They don't produce a cat. If two cats come together, they produce a cat, not not a dog. Human beings come together, they produce a human being. Well, if two statements come together. What do you get?

[10:19] A statement. And when you add, subtract, and so on, two numbers come together. What do you get? A number, right? Okay. So the idea of reproducing, right? The idea, you know, it's very much in the idea of the syllogism. So this is touching upon the what third act of reason, right? Now, the first act of reason is understanding what something is, right? And there we talked, you know, most perfectly about definition,

[10:53] but division, how that is, not something else, and more generally distinction. So to say that ignorance is dull, not sharp, right? But dull. is To say it can't distinguish things, it can't divide them, it can't define things, right? Okay. I I'd seen that, you know, years ago. I'd seen this word dull and barren before, but I didn't, you know, see the word infinitive too. I'd say. And you know, what happens to words sometimes?

[11:34] They get a degradation in meaning. Take take the word imitation, for example, right? When Aristotle says that tragedy is an imitation, right? Well, the word imitation has had degradation in meaning. Because in our commercial society, an imitation is an inferior likeness, right? And when Aristotle says that tragedy or comedy is an imitation of human life, it doesn't mean it's an inferior likeness. He means simply it's a likeness, right?

[12:10] As he says in the book, you can represent men as they are. He says you can represent them as they are thought to be. You can represent them as they should be, right? You see, can represent them, you know, make them better than they are, right? So that's not opposed to an imitation, but in our word imitation would seem to be, you know, inferior likeness. Well, I think we use the word feeling, right?

[12:34] Mm-hmm. And the the theology department at Assumption, you know, they got very tired of students, you know, saying, "I feel that this, you know, is so or that is so," right? And finally made a rule, you know, we don't know what you feel. We want to know what you think. So tell me what you think, not what you feel. And so that became like kind of a rule: you are not to say I feel this or that.

[13:01] Tell me what you think, you know. And So the word feeling has got kind of degradation there, right? But nevertheless, there is this tendency, you know, to all us to some extent, right? Not just the students to say, I feel that this is so, right? And they're usually talking about a statement, huh? Okay.

[13:25] I feel we should do this, or I feel that this is going to happen, right? You know. So you could tie this up then, and we use also the word, you know, we say he's got a good sense, right? We use the word drawn from senses, meaning he has good judgment, right? Okay. So you could tie this up then with the second act, huh? When you think some statement, right?

[13:50] You feel that this is so, right? That's a statement, right? So there you have the first, the second, third act is perfectly ordinary Shakespeare, you know. It's one of these incredible examples, you know, of a precision in Shakespeare, that serves no clear poetic purpose, right? And a precision that, if you saw it at first sight, you know, would kind of distract you from getting the poetic effect of his work, right?

[14:21] But it's a good example of that, huh? It's amazing how much he, and how well it's ordered there. It puts that last, right? Yeah. Because. The first act is ordered, to, the second, the second act is ordered to the third, right? So is he well educated, or he just kind of stumbled upon it? He just lucky. Well, nobody knows where Shakespeare's wisdom comes from, right? You see, but is the gift of nature, right?

[14:55] Um, uh, or from his reading, or a bit of both, right? But it's so well done, you know, that it seems to be something natural, right? And, but anyway, without even knowing where his wisdom comes from, it's there. And it's a beautiful thing, then, Richard II, you know, where, Gaunt, the dying Gaunt, who's the uncle of King Richard, wants to give him a little bit of advice about his making a ruin of England, right?

[15:27] He's going to be in deep trouble before long, right? And maybe you hear me because I'm dying, you know, and people sometimes only listen to when they're dying because then there's no reason to extenuate and, so on. And York is saying it's not going to do any good, right? Direct not him whose way himself will choose. So well said, though, right? And this is true in life, right?

[15:52] Direct not him whose way himself will choose. The guy won't. There's no docility. Won't listen to the church even, right? Huh? That's what it has to say. Will choose his own way, huh? So it's you know it's incredible the wisdom of Shakespeare in some of those phrases, huh? I had thought about this before, but just reading it again. I got thinking gee, I think the three acts of reason you know.

[16:19] So so those uh theology students are actually speaking Shakespearean language. As I say, I say the word "feeling" has got that degradation, right? You're talking about emotion, right? But you know, um I saw it in fact, to Warren Murray about the thing a bit there, and he's pointing out the word to assent right? Assentire Well, that's usually a statement you're talking about, right? But you use again the word what sense there, huh?

[16:45] You use sentire cum ecclesia Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, and of course, feeling is is is is you know used in the sense of touch, which is the touch of certitude, the you know the one where unless he can touch the Christ, he's not going to believe about the wounds and so on. So it's not etymologically a bad word, but it just has a degradation in democratic customs, you know, like the word imitation does.

[17:15] Imitation, I think, the degradation comes from from commercial customs, right? And every time something is successful, then they put out a cheap imitation, and they try to you know you know sell it, and people buy because it's cheaper, you know, and so on. And like Bailey's Irish Cream, well there's all kinds of you know cream of the kind that aren't as good as Bailey's the ones I tried, you know, but they cost less, you know, much less.

[17:42] And so imitation means a cheap likeness, huh? Imitation, this imitation, that. But I think feeling has got degraded because of democratic customs, where people you know live by their feelings in the sense of emotions, right? I mean, that's kind of equivocation of the word "feeling. Feeling to mean emotion, and then you know, feeling means that you think this is so, right? So this this word is really unthinking in a sense.

[18:14] Shakespeare uses this unfeeling. Yeah, yeah, but in the sense of the second act, though, you know. Yeah, See, in a sense the students, although they you know, they're using it in a bit of a degraded sense, they're trying to express what they thought in the sense of a statement.

[18:37] I mean, I feel that this is so, right? You know, I think that is so, right? The statement, right? And a lot of times, I suppose we use the word "feeling," not meaning so much our emotions, although it could have that that to be the meaning we want to give. But you're not altogether sure, right? It's an opinion. You say Well, I feel we should do this, but I'm not going to, you know, say, you know, I'm sure this is what we should do.

[19:04] But I feel that we should, you know. At the corner or something, right? I feel we should skip mass on Sunday. That way we can sleep more. Yeah.

[19:29] See, I feel good about this. That's very emotional. Yeah. That's what somebody said at a funeral, and there was a lot of priests in the sanctuary, and he said, "Really, gave me that good feeling." I don't know what the heck that meant, but he felt good. there were a lot of priests in the same tree

[19:52] So begin again, here, sure After the break? Oh, we haven't got to go. So it's very interesting that Thomas has a whole question devoted here in quite a few articles articles to the missions of the divine persons. Takes it quite seriously what this mission is. To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that it does not belong to a divine person to be what sent.

[20:32] For the one sent is less than the one sending, but one divine person is not less than another. Therefore, one person is not sent by another.

[20:48] Moreover, everything that everyone that is sent is separated from the one sending it. Hence, Jerome says in his commentary on Ezekiel that what is joined and is what joined in one body cannot be sent. Right.

[21:11] So if you're one of those, you know, two persons together, you're like, twins. Yeah, yeah. you can't send your friend, your partner. But in the divine persons, nothing is what. Yeah. Therefore, one person is not sent by another. Right. That would be.

[21:33] Moreover, the objection: whoever is sent goes out or gets away from one place, right? And he goes to another place. They know, right? But this can't belong to divine person. Since he's what everywhere, So often you go from one place to another place? So it's going to take a little while to understand what this being sent means. Therefore, the divine persons does not belong to divine person to be sent.

[22:04] Now, why even speak of this at all? Well, the sed contra you. It's in Scripture. You better pay attention to what you see in Scripture. But again, this is what is said in John chapter eight. I am not alone, but I am the one who what sent me, and who sent me the Father.

[22:26] Now Thomas says, The answer should be said that in the definition of mission or sending, two things are implied. One of which is the relation of the one sent to the one from whom or by whom he is sent, right? The other is the relation of the one sent to the term or the limit, the goal to which he is sent.

[23:01] Now, through this, that someone is sent, is shown a going forward of the one sent from the one sending. Either according to command, as the Lord sends his servant, or by counsel, as the counselor is said to send the king to war, to fight, or by origin, as it is said that the flower is sent forth from the what? tree, Yeah. Do we see there are plants that they send forth?

[23:40] Their flowers that they put forth. Yeah. and it has shown its relation to the what term or limit to which it is sent, that in some way it begins to be there, right? Either because before it was what not at all where it was sent, right? Or because it begins there in some way to be in which it was not there before.

[24:11] After all this, we can start to understand what it means, huh, for a mission of divine person. So he says the mission therefore can belong to divine person, according as it implies on the one hand a going forward of origin from the one sending, and according as it implies on the other side, as far as the term, right, a new way of existing in another, right?

[24:44] Just as the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, huh? According as he begins to be in the world in a visible way, right, through the flesh that he has assumed, right?

[25:00] And nevertheless, before that he was already in the world in another way, as is said in John one verses ten. Okay. So you can kind of see here that's kind of implied here that for a divine person to be sent, he has to proceed from somebody, right? And in that regard, the Son could be sent because he does proceed from the Father, right? And as being sent by the Father implies no, you know, inferiority to the Father, right?

[25:34] But you just get the idea that he is sent, that he proceeds from the Father, right? Okay, and that's why he's said to be sent by the Father, right? But then on the other hand, as far as the other relation, right, to whom he's sent, he has to begin to be there, right? In some way he was not in there before, right. And of course, this will be more a change in the one to whom he is sent than it would be a change in him, because he can't what change, right?

[26:08] Okay. So those are going to be unfolded more, but they get kind of a rough idea of what this this means, huh? Okay. Now Thomas, replies to the first objection that it seems that to be sent, the one sent is always less than the one who sends, right? Huh? Thomas says, "Well,

[26:39] sending implies a lesserness in the one who is sent when it implies a what proceeding from a principal sending, either according to command, right, or according to what counsel, right?

[26:59] Because the one commanding is greater, right, and the one advising is wiser, right? Okay. Because it's interesting, because Aristotle gives the counselor as an example of a mover, right, in in the the types of the four kinds of causes, huh?

[27:21] But in divine things, does not imply except the going forward of what origin, which is according to equality, as he said before, right? The one who proceeds is equal to the one from whom he proceeds, having the same nature.

[27:42] So the way Thomas proceeds here, it seems like what he distinguishes three things, right? Command, counsel, and then something origin, right? Although you might say that maybe you're dropping out part of the idea of being sent and the idea of this inferiority, right? And just keeping the idea that there's an origin of one from the other, but you drop the idea of the inequality between the two, huh?

[28:12] Which is why you would take up this question. after not less, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's perfectly ordered here, you know, in, the order of learning, huh? Now thinking about numbers, you know, and of course I had in my mind, you know, when you talk about God, and what Father Boulay was always drumming into us, how the names are carried over to God often by dropping the genus, huh, and keeping the what the difference, right?

[28:42] Could we give an example of those before? Well, anyway, I was thinking about how sometimes in Euclid, one is spoken of as a number, right? Okay. And so I was asking the question: If one were a number, it isn't. Would it be an odd or an even number, right?

[29:06] And so I was putting the question to Warren Murray, and he said, "Well, you know, they they do speak of it as an odd number, right? Okay. So I said, 'Well, that's interesting because Euclid gives two definitions of odd number, right? And one definition of odd number is a number that differs from an even number by one. It's either one more or one less than an even number.

[29:39] That's the second definition of it. I say, well, now one is not a number strictly speaking. Maybe you'd be using number or number equivocally, right? But it is less than two by one. So if you say the definition of odd number is a number

[29:59] More or less than by one from an even number, we can keep the difference and apply it to one, but you drop the genus, which is a number. That's just like you go tell God, right? There's only one God. But it's kind of strange, right? Because the same the same way of carrying the name over, right? By keeping the genus, I mean this difference, but dropping the genus.

[30:33] So, but here suddenly you drop any inequality between the one the one sending and the one sent, but you keep something of the more common notion of sending that the one sent is from proceeds from the one who is sent to be sender, right? To be sender him.

[31:14] Now the second objection, right, is about being what separated, right? The second should be said that that which is thus sent that it begins to be where before in no way it was

[31:40] by its mission is moved what locally, right, in place, whence necessarily is separated in place from the one sending it. But this does not happen in the sending of a divine person because a divine person who is sent, just as he does not begin to be where before he was not, because he's everywhere, so he does not cease to be where he was. He's everywhere. Whence such a mission is without any separation, but it has only the distinction of what origin, huh?

[32:24] And the third objection is is taking it as if he was going from one place to another, right? And Thomas simply replies to the third should be said that that objection proceeds about ascending, which takes place according to a locomotion which does not have any place in God. So you're resolving to the what imagination, right? And as Boethius says, you know, you have to transcend the imagination.

[33:02] You talk about what God. In the same play, Richard II, you know, the queen is feeling sorrowful. She doesn't know why, you know, and the courtiers are trying to tell her, you know, that she's her true things. She's weeping what imaginary things, right? It's kind of interesting that true things, of course, contrast with imaginary things, right? But here you're imagining, right, that the sending of the Holy Spirit, the sending of the Son, is a what locomotion, a change of place, right?

[33:46] Because what we call sending in daily life, right, you go from one place to another. There's no going from one place to another, but there is one person proceeding from another, right? But not by a proceeding that separates him from the one from whom he's proceeding. But yet he's going to be said to be in the one to whom he is sent in a new way, right?

[34:19] But not really by a change of what the divine person, but by change the one to whom he is sent. So when I begin to know God, let's say, or to love Him, you might say that He's in me in a way He wasn't before, right? But has he really been changed? Does my knowing Him or loving Him change Him? No, it's in my knowledge and my love now, right?

[34:53] So in that way, He's said to be in me in a way He wasn't before. He was in me as my Creator and in me as the one conserving me in existence and so on, right?

[35:07] He wasn't in me as known by me and loved by me, right? But now we could say, because I know Him and love Him, that He's in my knowledge and in my love, and therefore in a certain way He can be said to be in me in a new way. It was not before, and that's sufficient to get the idea of what sent, right? So the Son proceeds from the Father, and that's why he's a sender, right?

[35:39] That's what it means. But He sent to me by reason of His being in me in a new way, but not by any change really in Him, but by my beginning to know and love Him. And therefore, he's in my knowledge, he's in my love, and therefore, in a way, it can be said to be in me in a new way. He wasn't before. He's not just in me as my creator and conservator, but he's in my love and my knowledge.

[36:09] Thomas Thomas Aquinas unfolded that habitudo, that relation. In what way is in me in a new way? Okay. You want to do the article or what? I think we can, yeah. Now, can we do the second one here? Not too. The second one goes forward thus. It seems that a mission is able to be what eternal. Eternal, huh?

[36:40] For Gregory says, he's a pretty big authority. Gregory the Great, I guess. Where's the reading about Gregory the Great? What a family he came from, you know. Holy people and so on. Was it? Was it the present Holy Father to the Pope? Oh, you mean inside of South? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. What a family he come from. Yeah. For Gregory says, in that is the Son sent, in that he is what generated.

[37:16] But the generation of the Son is eternal. Therefore, what also his mission? Well, of course, he has to proceed from someone in order to be sent by that person, right? And he's of course proceeding from the Father by generation is eternal, right? But it doesn't really have the notion yet, the full notion of being sent until you begin the what being in the term, right? In a new way, and that involves maybe a temporal change, right?

[37:52] I begin to know him and to love him, right? Now he's said to be in me in a new way. As the object of my love and my my knowledge, in a way he was not before, right?

[38:07] Moreover, to whom it belongs, for something to be sent temporally, that thing is what changed, right? To whoever belongs something in a temporal way, that thing is changed. But the divine person is not changed, right? Therefore, the mission of the divine person is not temporal, but eternal.

[38:37] Now, this is something. This is a problem that comes up in talking about creation. Did God always create the world? Well, we say that no, there was a beginning, right? He could have created. it? eternally, but he didn't. Okay, so

[38:56] God suddenly changed from inactivity to activity, right? You see, or is this something said of God temporarily because of a change in creatures? And now the relation of God to creatures might be in time, but is it a real relation? See, or is the relation said of God by reason of the fact that creatures related to him? That's when Aristotle had first said, right? Huh? That it's possible that something is said relatively of something not because of a relation in it, but because something else being related to it.

[39:35] Like known is said of, yeah. Even though it's nothing in the chair, right? But there's a relation of me when I know the chair. Huh? But we'll see that time solves these problems. Maybe he can solve them for me. Moreover, mission implies a what? Going forward. But in general, the going forward of the divine person is eternal. Therefore, mission, right?

[40:07] But. Now, against all this is what is said in Galatians four. When the fullness of time came, God sent His own Son, right? So, it's in time, right? What's a pretty good text, isn't it? Beautiful text, huh?

[40:30] Yeah, Warren Murray. Was expounding on the fullness of time, you know, saying you know, there had to be you know the Greek philosophers first, you know, before this. So you had that you know philosophy, you know, as a tool for theology, right? And you had to be the Roman Empire, right? You know, because you got a lot of other, you know, government from them, right? Get the roads made.

[40:50] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So all this is a preparation for this one. Yeah The roads to knowledge and the roads to the other countries The roads to Rome.

[41:09] I answer. He says it should be said. In those things which imply the origin of divine persons, there is a certain what difference to be noted, huh? Not made, but noted.

[41:28] For some, in their meaning, imply only a relation to a beginning, as going forward, huh? Or exiting, right? Going out. But some, with that relation to beginning, also determine a what limit and end of the proceeding.

[41:56] Of which some determine an eternal limit, huh? As generation, right? And breathing, right? For generation is the going forward of a divine person into the divine what nature? And breathing, passive accepted, implies the going forward of subsisting love. That's what the Holy Spirit is: subsisting love. It's amazing.

[42:31] But some also, with the relation to beginning, imply a temporal what term? As being sent, huh? And giving, right? Huh? For something is sent to this that it might be in it, and something is given. To this, that it might be had.

[43:04] But a divine person to be had by some creature, or to be in a new way of existing in him, is something temporal. So God begins to be in me in time, right? Or I begin to have God in a way I didn't have him before.

[43:27] Whence mission, sending, and giving in God are said only what, temporally. But generation and breathing only from what, eternal. Yeah. But procession and going forth are said in God sometimes eternally and temporally.

[43:53] For the Son from eternity proceeds that he be God, right? But in time that he be what a man, right? According to a visible mission. Or also that he be in man according to a what invisible mission Now the first objection, now to the first, therefore it should be said that Gregory speaks about the temporal generation of the Son not from the Father but from his what?

[44:28] Well, that's easy way out, right? Or because from this the Son has that he can be sent that he was generated from eternity, right? Unless he proceeded from somebody, he could not be said to be sent by a person. So unless he proceeded from the Father, he could not be sent by the Father. And he proceeds from the Father eternally, right? Okay. That's not yet the big notion of being sent, that that implies a temporal what, term huh?

[45:04] Now the second objection says, "Well, if you're going to admit something in time for one of these divine persons, you're going to admit change, right? " And this is what Aristotle said on the time is measure of motion, change, right? Now to the second should be said that a divine person to be in a new way in someone, or to be had by someone, right, temporally.

[45:36] Is not because of a change of that divine person, but because of a change in the creature. Just as God is said in time to be the Lord, right, of the things he's made, right, on account of the change of the what creatures.

[46:00] So some things are said of God in time, by reason of a what? In time of a creature. Yeah. Gets developed a lot in the famous questions disputatae de potentia right? Huh?

[46:22] Notice another thing here about um. And we're going to come back to the beginning of the reply. To the second, should be said that a divine person is said to be in a new way in someone, right? Or to be had by someone temporally, right? Notice the use of the word in and the word to have, right? Huh? Now, in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle takes up the word to have, and he gives you know the basic meanings of the word to have.

[46:56] He also has a chapter on it in the what categories, right? The last chapter in the categories, what to have. But then Aristotle makes a very interesting observation. He says that the word to have seems to have as many meanings as the word to be in.

[47:17] And Thomas goes back to the eight meanings of in in the fourth book of natural hearing and compares them to the meanings of have, right? Huh? Okay. But just stop and think, right? You might say that the the genus is in the what species, huh? Like animals in dog or cat, right? But you might say that the species what. Is a genus. Yeah, but you could also say the species has a genus.

[47:46] Okay. Um, you could also say the genus has a species. And the species is in the genus. In those sense. Okay. Or you might say that the the whole has parts, and the part is in the whole, right?

[48:07] Um. I have you now, right? Okay. And you're in my power. So there's that connection here, right? So maybe there's a connection here between saying that a divine person is in someone in a new way, and that one in whom he is a new way has God in a new way, right? Huh? Thing. It's kind of interesting to see that connection between in and what has, huh?

[48:50] Now, to the third, should be said, um, that. This is the one about what mission implies what going forward, but the going forward of the divine person is eternal, therefore the mission is right. He says to the third, then it should be said that mission not only implies a going forward from beginning, but it also determines its meaning and the what temporal term of the procession, right?

[49:23] Whence mission only is what temporary, or he says you could say that mission includes the eternal procession, right? And it adds something, right? To what eternal effect, right? Now the relation of the divine person to its beginning is not except from eternity.

[49:50] Whence what the procession is twinned gemina Eternal and temporal, Not an account of the relation to the what? Principle, is it twinned right? But it's twin on the part of what? It's temporal. Eternal and eternal. Yeah. Okay. So, let's stop there. It's a mouthful, right?