Prima Pars
149. Summa I, Q. 43, Art. 6 and a Logic Aside: Who Receives the Invisible Sending; How Names Signify Things Through Thoughts
Class of 2008-07-03
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/149-summa-i-q-43-art-6-and-a-logic-aside-who-receives-the-invisible/

[0:00] To the sixth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the invisible mission does not come to all who what partake of grace. For the fathers of the Old Testament were partakers of grace, right? But to them does not seem to have been made an invisible mission. For it is said in John chapter seven, verse thirty-nine: "For the Spirit was not yet what given, because Jesus was not yet what glorified."

[0:39] Therefore, the invisible mission does not come to all who are partakers of grace. This may be a very special way that the Holy Spirit is given on Pentecost, right? Kind of by antonomasia, you might say. That's really, happy, you know, It's not the only way of the Holy Spirit, but it's one that really stands out, right? Is as in prominence, shall we say, right?

[1:09] Moreover, the progress in virtue is not except through grace, but the invisible mission does not seem to be observed according to the progress of virtue, because the progress of virtue would seem to be continuous, since charity always either goes forward or what falls fails, and thus the mission would be continuous, right?

[1:42] Therefore, the invisible mission does not come to all partaking of grace. Moreover, Christ and the blessed most fully had grace, but to them there does not seem to come about what A mission.

[2:06] because mission comes to one who is in the distance, who is at a distance. But Christ, according as His man, and all the blessed, are perfectly united to God, therefore not to all those partaking of grace does it come about an invisible mission.

[2:32] Moreover, the sacraments of the New Law contain grace, but nevertheless, to them is not said to come about any invisible mission, because they have grace another way than the soul does.

[2:48] Not therefore to all things which have grace does it come about an invisible mission. But against all this is what Augustine says: invisible mission comes about to sanctify what creatures. But every creature having grace is sanctified. Therefore, to every creature of this sort, there comes a invisible mission. I answer: It should be said that has that has been said above. The mission, in its very definition, implies that the one who is sent

[3:39] either begins to be where he before was not, as happens in created things, or he begins to be where he was before, but he begins to be there in a new way. And this is according as missions attributed to divine persons.

[4:02] So don't be a victim of false imagination. Think of you know him running out from father down to us, right? You know, like a kind of

[4:13] coming to be where he was not before, right? Thus, therefore, in the one to whom a mission comes, it is necessary to consider two things: one is the indwelling of grace, and the what newness, right? The innovation through grace, right? To all, therefore, there comes about invisible mission in which these two are what found.

[4:50] Now, what's that mean? That innovation through grace, right? We're going to expound on that a bit in the reply to objections. The first objection was saying, "Hey,

[5:07] it doesn't seem that there was an invisible mission to the fathers of the Old Testament because the Holy Spirit is not yet given." To the first, therefore, it should be said that an invisible mission was made to the fathers of the Old Testament. Hence, Augustine says in the fourth book about the Trinity that according as the Son is sent what invisibly, there comes about something in men or with men, and this was made or done previously in the fathers and in the prophets.

[5:47] So he was sent to Abraham, right? Sent to Isaiah and so on. What therefore is said that the Holy Spirit was not yet given, is understood about that giving, with a what? Yeah, which was, a.

[6:11] So that seems to me to be antonomasia. Like like Romeo says that did I ever love before? You know, well he didn't love. He loved Rosalind, right? But this love that he has, for Julius Agree, you know, For I swear, He'd never seen beauty like this before, right? So he couldn't have really loved before, right? So that's kind of antonomasia, right?

[6:44] Well, Thomas is saying that the text should not be understood like the objection understands it. That the Holy Spirit was not what given at all to Abraham or to. Oh, the given. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Although the words might seem to indicate that, but maybe they should be understood by antonomasia, right?

[7:08] What the what the soldiers say? We haven't yet begun to fight. Yeah, yeah. See? It's 18-nothing yet. You know, We're really going to fight you now. But that that's obviously kind of an antonomasia, right? Now the second objection is saying, well, one progresses in the virtues, right, through grace and so on. So it's going to be continual mission going according to the.

[7:51] She says the second should be said that even according to the what. Progress in virtue, or the what growth of grace, there comes about a what invisible mission.

[8:09] Whence Augustine says in the fourth book about the Trinity, that then to someone is sent the Son, when by someone he is known and perceived. That's the, as far as a quote was given before, right?

[8:25] As far as to be known and perceived is what possible, for the what. captus, how do you translate that? Kaptu. Capacity. Capacity, or the one preceding God, right, or the one perfect in God, the rational soul.

[8:48] But then he makes kind of distinction there. But nevertheless, according to that what growth of grace, especially an invisible mission, should be observed, when someone what. Proceeds to some new act or some new status of grace, right? As when someone what, Goes forward into the grace of miracles or prophecies, right? One becomes a prophet, right, or now a worker of miracles, Or enlisted one from the fervor of charity exposes himself to martyrdom, right?

[9:24] Or he renounces the things that he possesses, like you guys have done, Or like like what's saying there, uh Francis there, right? You know, takes off his clothes and he does everything, right? Or when he undertakes any what? Yeah, yeah. So what what Thomas is saying there, he's not denying that there is a mission in a sense every time the soul what progresses in virtue and grace, but especially is there ascending when you what? undertake some new status, right, in the life, huh?

[10:01] So, I assume when Benedict was made pope, yeah, yeah, there's a real sending, right? You know, not that there wasn't before, right? And he was progressing in his knowledge and so on, and love of God, but especially as a mission being sent to you, right?

[10:29] Perhaps that's a, you know, Bernard of Clairvaux, right? Now, time to time he's been sent to me, right? Does that mean he was just, you know, wasting time between the the sendings, right? No, but there was a very noteworthy, huh, sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

[10:52] Now, what about the blessed, though, right? Because they're not progressing in grace. To the third, it should be said that to the blessed there is made an invisible mission in the very beginning of their what? Beatitude, because that's that's very definitely a new status.

[11:16] But after that, there is to them an invisible mission, not by the what? Growth of grace, intensity of grace, right? But according as some mysteries are revealed to them, what? Newly. Up until the day of what? Judgment, right? Which growth is to be noted according to the what? Extension of grace to many things extending itself, right?

[11:52] That's what he says about it, right? About the blessed. To Christ there was made an invisible mission in the beginning of his what? Conception. Not after that, huh? Why? Because from the beginning of his conception, he was full of all wisdom and what? Grace. contrary to some. Popular, yeah. Popular scriptural columns, yeah. So,

[12:24] what does it mean when says he grew in grace? And you know, I mean, it can mean either the outward manifestation of it, right? And our knowledge of what was in there all along, but not that he's really growing in grace.

[12:42] So he had no more grace when he was 30 years old than he did at conception. Could you say that according to his human nature? Well, yeah, we don't. Isn't any grace as God? You know. Doesn't share in the divine life, right? So grace is. sharing the divine nature is Saint Peter says, partaking the divine nature. Let's stop and say seven and eight for next time. We can't do both of them, right?

[13:24] And let me just give a little. Did you do the fourth? Oh, I didn't do the fourth yet. Okay, that's not about the sacraments. That's not the fourth response about grace in the sacraments. That grace is in the sacraments, the new law, instrumentally, right, as in a tool. As the form of the artificial thing is in the what tools of the art, according to certain what, flowing down from the agent to the patient.

[13:59] But mission is not said to come about except with respect to the term, the goal. Whence the mission of the divine person is not to sacraments but to those who, through the sacraments, receive what grace.

[14:19] Someone was asking me just an email today. I've heard of your brother Richard. Said, "No, my brother."This is a. Lecture that logic is principally about the beings of reason, right? Huh? He's recalling what I had said about the the um uh following the commentators that the category is to speak in general, it's about names, signifying things through thoughts. And so I said, well, you know, Thomas says in many places something like what you remember by the saying, and so many have picked that up, right?

[15:05] The logic is about beings of reason, especially about relations of reason. And Albert the Great, following Avicenna, says that logic, in a way, is about things, the things as they are in our knowledge.

[15:27] And as the great Boethius says, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. So the first thing that happens to things when they get into our reason is to be universal, and that agrees with what Albert the Great says that the first thing to be considered in logic is the what universal.

[15:54] Sometimes I say in a more sensible way, kind of a pun of the two meanings of sensible. That the first thing to be considered in logic is names said of many things. That's more sensible for a couple of reasons. Okay. But I think it's in harmony with what Albert is saying, and it's in harmony with

[16:24] commentators, right? Okay. So, but what's up front, and it's very clear in Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, what's up front he's talking about is always either a name or a speech.

[16:50] But since names signify things through thoughts, what happens to things when they're thought, which involves beings of reason and so on, is going to enter into logic, right? Huh? That's going to be very essential to logic, right? Okay.

[17:19] So it's not really contrary, right? What Thomas says that logic is about beings of reason, relations of reason. And that logic is about things as there in our mind, as Albert says, and to say that you are talking about names signifying things through thoughts, but that's Aristotle will begin, right?

[17:45] So Thomas sometimes, you know, when he talks about genus and species and so on, he'll say, "Well, you've got some relations of reason here, right? Because the relation of genus to species is a relation of something more universal to something less universal, and thing to universal only in the mind, and therefore this relation of the more universal to the less universal is a relation of reason, right?

[18:13] But then, when he's talking in the Summa contra Gentiles, that no name is said univocally, right, of God and creatures. He goes back to genus, species, difference, accident. He doesn't speak about them as what

[18:36] names of relations of reason, although there are relations of reason involved in them. He speaks of them as a complete distinction of names said univocally of many things. And then he shows that there's no name said univocally of God and creatures because you don't have a common genus, a common species, a common difference, property, or accident, right? So he says both, right?

[19:06] But in Aristotle, there up front is always the the name or the speech. So when you say logic is chiefly about definition, statement, syllogism, there's going to be all kinds of relations of reason involved in these things. But when Aristotle defines them, he starts with logos in the sense of speech, which is vocal sound signifying by human agreement, having parts signified by themselves.

[19:41] This is crystal clear in the Peri Hermeneias. If you look at Thomas's commentary there, right? But Aristotle in the Peri, I'm going to talk about noun, verb, statement, logos, right? And he defines all these things in general as vocal sounds. He's talking about vocal sounds. He's not talking about relations of reason. Well, you might see a contradiction there, but there isn't, because these vocal sounds signify things through thoughts, and things as thought about will have relations of reason, and so to get into those in a way in explaining these names.

[20:19] And I'll come back to to the fundamental thing there that he teaches in the Peri Hermeneias. The commentators bring up in the categories, and they say the categories in general are not just about names his names; they're not about thoughts his thoughts; not about things as things, right? But the categories is about names

[20:49] signifying things through thoughts. Now, what's beautiful about this, among other things, it's a beautiful example of how three is enough. In the first book of Natural Hearing, Aristotle says that what seems to be common to all the early Greeks is change between contraries, between opposites, and that's part out of the tenth reading there. And then he shows eleventh reading: there must be a third thing besides these two, and you can't have change without this third thing.

[21:36] But then he stops and says, "Three is enough." And a lot of times, when I teach the first book of Natural Hearing, I point out that how often this is true: that three is enough, right? It's not always enough; sometimes two is enough, sometimes three is not enough, but it's so common, right?

[21:58] And some say it's a reflection of the Trinity, Some say it's a reflection of the Trinity Well, basically that that? Well, here again, you have three things here: names, things, and thoughts. But you have to see how the three are what connected, right? So I was thinking about this. I tend to think about the same thing again and again. I was saying, "There's some interesting things about this."

[22:36] And then they asked me this for a graduate: Can two names signify the same thing through the same thought? In other words, can you have two names but one thought and one thing? I think we have two different thoughts.

[23:21] Isn't that a synonym. Yeah, yeah. In fact, we have a name for this situation, right? And that is what synonyms. What are synonyms? Well, they are two names, right? Two different vocal sounds, but they signify the same thing through the same thought, right?

[23:54] Now, of course, the more obvious question to ask is: two names signify two things through two thoughts. And you take the name, like circle, let's say, a square. Here's two names signifying two different things, right? Through two different thoughts. So they seem to be exactly, you know, parallel, right? This is a little more puzzling, right? Obviously, when you go from one language to another, you're looking for a different vocal sound, but one that signifies the same thing. Through the same thought, right?

[24:30] And sometimes even the same language, you seem to have two words for the same thing, right? And through the same thought. Now, let me go a little more subtle. Now seeing here, proceeding this way. we've got one thing, on thought. here. Can now the same name signify many things

[25:09] through many thoughts? Does such a name have a name? Yeah, common name, right? Analogous is one kind of common name, right? It can be by chance, right? That's kind of strange, right? You might think that a name signifying a thing to a thought, well, they go together, one, one, one, you know. But here you have two names, but one, one. Here you have one, but what? Two or more, and two or more here, right?

[25:58] Is it? Now, now can one name signify many things through one thought? That's not a question? Is that a possibility? Is that in the second genus? Yeah, but strictly speaking, does the word, for example, animal, right? It's said of dog, cat, horse, elephant, etc. But are these different meanings of the word animal? Does animal mean dog, cat, horse, elephant?

[26:52] Or does it mean only what's common to them? a living body with sensations? Once in a while in class, the students get mixed up and they want to say, you know, what animal means one thing when you talk about a dog and cat. A dog and cat are two different animals, yeah. But the word animal is not signifying the difference, is it? It's signifying what they have in common.

[27:18] Now, since you have to be an angel, you know, to see many things, right, distinctly by one thought. God sees everything distinctly by one thought. huh? That's quite a thought, right? The best thought. is a thought, okay? But I don't think the same name can signify many things through one thought. I think that's a not not a real possibility, right? Okay.

[27:51] But just synonyms, you have equivocal names, right? And those two possibilities, right? Now, this is the subtle thing. Can two names keep it simple? And two names signify one thing

[28:21] through two thoughts. Or I can, you know, say can two names signify one thing through many thoughts? Right, but keep it simple. Is that possible? About a dog and an animal.

[28:46] They don't signify exactly the same thing, though. Dog and animal, do they? So you always need to be thinking of one thing. Yeah, yeah, that's true.

[28:57] What? I'm just saying it has to signify one thing. What would it be? Like the divine attribute. Yeah, now see that's a very difficult thing, right? And somebody say, "Oh, you just invent this possibility to, you know." So you talk about, let's say the

[29:18] unchangeableness of God, the goodness of God. Are really two different things, right? But now, when two names signify one thing through two thoughts, are those two names synonyms?

[29:34] No, Thomas, you know, he takes up the names of God, right? You have one of the questions, right? And like there's a chapter devoted to that, so it's more than just two. So he takes up up here too, I think we saw. But there's not, they're not synonyms, right? Because synonyms are two names signifying the same thing through the same thought, right? But if you signify the same thing through what?

[30:05] Yeah. Okay. So good example then. Now, can one name signify one thing through two thoughts? I don't know what you mean by thing? I think we can. Yeah. Now, one example of this, perhaps, is the word "continuous," right? Within the categories, Aristotle defines the continuous as that whose parts meet at a common boundary. But in the sixth book of Natural Hearing, he gives another definition of the continuous, that which is divisible forever.

[31:14] So, are these two definitions the same? But you define the same thing, the continuous, right? But one kind of by way of what composition by coming together, another way by resolving them, right? So, a little bit like if you were to define whole and say, well, whole is that which

[31:41] is put together from parts, and then a whole is that which can be divided into parts or distinguished into parts, right? Same, exactly same thought. In one case, you're seeing how the parts combine to form the whole. Other case, you're seeing that the whole can be divided or distinguished into those, right? So here you have one name, right? Continuous, right, or whole,

[32:15] signifying one thing, but through different what thoughts? Okay. Famous example that Thomas, you know, referred to back in the case of Trinity, a little different thing, but how

[32:33] acting upon, undergoing are both motion, yeah, but a little different thought. Now, when you get to the so-called transcendentals, right, being one, being something, one, and so on, what kind of names are they? Because being and one and something one and something, signify the same thing, but not are they synonyms? No, so they signify the same thing through different thoughts. So you have many names, more than two names actually.

[33:29] Signifying the same thing through different thoughts. So you have examples, you know, that are rather strange in philosophy if we ever get to theology.

[33:46] So being something one, even true and good, right, signify the same thing, but not through the same thought. So you have many names signifying the same thing through different what Thoughts. Already, you see some philosophy. right? Now, I mentioned I was looking at Plato's dialogue there, the Parmenides, where they're talking about being in one, and being partakes of the one, and the one partakes of being, and as if being in one with two different. what things, right?

[34:30] That You can partake of, right? You can partake of whiteness, and you can, and color, you can partake of health. Two different things you can partake of, right? These are different forms in Plato's way of speaking, right? And, and, you know, without saying this is Plato's position, right? but the speaker in the Parmenides is speaking about being and one as if they are two words, which they are, right?

[34:55] Two names, but signifying different things, right? And that's up to you to go all wants, right? But actually, they are two words signifying the same thing through different thoughts. what Thoughts So like I was thinking of the names of the first kind of thought. But the different way in which this is done, see, because in the case of being and one, as Thomas points out, but the word one means there is undivided being, and undivided is negation, which is a being of reason, and therefore one adds nothing real to being, so it signifies the same thing, but it adds this negation of reason, so the meaning is not the same.

[35:52] but being really means that which is, right? The good is what all want, right? So the good means what desirable being, right? But to be desired adds nothing real to the thing, but is

[36:13] kind of a relation of reason. So when Thomas explains the one and true and good, he says they add to being a relation of reason. I mean, excuse me, a being of reason. In one case, negation, in the other case, a relation, right? Okay. But now, in look at the two definitions of continuous, it's something different, right? Okay. Because you can

[36:44] define something as parts by the way the parts combine to form the whole, and by the way the whole can be divided into those parts, right? So a little different, reason. So the different ways in which two names can signify the same thing through what different thoughts, right? And it's different in the case of the transcendentals and the case of the two definitions of continuous, or kind of definition of giving the whole, right?

[37:10] Now, here's a third way it's going to be done. Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics he says you can demonstrate the definition from matter or parts from the definition from what in. So if I say that. Definition is speech making known what a thing is, or speech signifying what a thing is. That's from the in. If I say definition is speech composed of a genus and differences, right?

[37:49] That's also definition of definition, but more from the matter than from the parts. A very complete definition would involve both, right? You see. Now this is another way in which it's not it's different from the way in which continuous, has those two meanings, right? Okay.

[38:09] So the word definition can signify the same thing through these two different definitions. Now, in the case of of God, it's, it's another way, right? See, but what I've done with those three examples is give you a few different ways that what two names or even one name can signify the same thing through different thoughts, right? So that's a lot of subtlety there right in those two things, huh?

[38:49] But then you know, go back to my example there, the circle. If you call this point A, and this point B, and this point C, and then we call this the line whose end is A, this the line whose end is B, this is the line whose end is C. These are all different points and all different lines, right? But now this point here I can say is the beginning of the line A.

[39:20] You also say it's the beginning of line B. You also say it's the beginning of line C. So I have, three different notions of that center, right? And no one is adequate to all the greatness of that all the greatness of that, right? It is it is truly the beginning of the line A. It is truly the beginning of line B. It is truly the beginning of line C.

[39:42] But I have a better knowledge of that point when I say all three of these things, right? Okay. Well, this is the way creatures are as far as our perfections are divided, right? So my knowledge is not my love, and my love is not my hand, and my hand is not my foot, and so on, right? I'm all, you know. But God is the beginning of all these things, right?

[40:09] So I can have many thoughts of Him, right? Something like I can have many thoughts of this point here. It's the beginning of A line A, the beginning of line B. Whereby these things descend, and that's a different way from all the other ways that I give. So I say once the mind stops and thinks, basically of the fact that hey, names signify things through thoughts. You got three things to be involved here, right?

[40:42] Then you start to go into details and say, hey, they're one, one, one, one, one, one, one, one. Each name signifies a different thing for different thought. So then it gets more involved because you have what two names can signify the same thing for the same thought, and one thought can signify many things for many thoughts and so on, right? But the most difficult thing to understand, I think, among all those is the last one, right?

[41:16] You can have one name or many names signifying the same thing through different what thoughts. It's kind of a strange thing, right? How's that possible, right? Isn't it? Give me

[41:40] four ways, but this is possible. Just trying to exhaust it. It's not such a unheard thing, right? Just to get some particular way in which this is true that many names signify the same thing for different thoughts. I mean, Dionysius has a book called the De Divinis Nominibus about the divine names, right? And all these names that he talks about in the De Divinis Nominibus are they signifying different things?

[42:16] No, they're signifying the same thing, God, but all through different what thoughts? I said impossible, right? But in different ways, right? It can't be like I said that the word definition signifies the same thing for different thoughts when you say it's

[42:44] speech composed of genus and differences and speech making known what the thing is. Aristotle in the Post Analytics, right, he gives a definition of demonstration by its end, the syllogism making known the cause and that which is the cause, not otherwise. Then later on he demonstrates that that it's a syllogism from necessary premises, right? And he goes on to say more precisely the kind of premises it's from, right?

[43:11] But he demonstrates the second one from the first, right? So you have one definition by end and one by matter of parts. That can't be with God, right? He has one definition from his end, one from his parts. He doesn't have any parts, doesn't have any matter, and doesn't have any end. he said, "So it's got to be quite different way, right?" Well, is it the same as as the the way in which being in one signifies?

[43:40] I'd like to be thought that right now. Think about that a little bit. Names, Remember one, one doctoral thesis I thought of all there. you know, began by quoting Shakespeare. what's in a name? And of course the answer. was, Sometimes there are many things in a name.

[44:18] But Shakespeare's talking about the fact that names signify what, Kind of arbitrarily by, by custom or by agreement, right? He says, "What's in a name?" A rose by any other name still smells sweet.

[44:34] So next time we'll do the last two articles here, right? And then we'll kick the bucket for the summer, right? Come back in the fall.