Prima Pars
152. The Logic of Names: One Thing Known Through Many Thoughts, and the Names of God
Class of 2008-07-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/152-the-logic-of-names-one-thing-known-through-many-thoughts/

[0:00] This is just a frame of self-confidence to the man. Now, let's just think a little bit about names, okay? This might seem to you, as, this must be a come down. We're just going to talk about names, you know, okay? And but notice, as Augustine says, the Our Father, in the Our Father, he not only teaches us what to ask for, but what to desire and which desire that.

[0:27] What's put before all the other petitions? Hallowed be thy name? See, okay? However you understand hallowed be thy name, you can't get name out of it.

[0:41] And so that makes it an extremely important, name, okay? And I know when the Second Vatican Council revised the orderly revision of the Decree of Indulgences, right? They singled out the edition I have, the first edition, six litanies, right? One for all saints, one for Joseph, one for Mary, and three for Christ, right? One of them is the litanies of the Holy Name, right? And you may have heard this book of Dionysius of Thomas seems to admire a lot It's about the divine names, right?

[1:18] So, So names are very important, right? Okay. Now, this is fundamental, the logic of names. In fact, the beginning of logic is really the logic of names. So the Isagoge, as Thomas explains, genus, different species, part and accident, can be taken as a complete division of univocal name. huh? I mentioned that before.

[1:52] Now, you've heard it said that two is often not enough; you need three, okay? And the first great example that Aristotle is in logic, but it's more explicit in the first book of Natural Hearing, where he says the change is between opposites, between contraries, and then he argues that the two contraries aren't enough to explain change; there must be a third thing, and that's the subject of the two contraries.

[2:22] But then he stops and says, "three is enough." you know? Well, you can find many examples of this, but in understanding names, you have to have three things in mind, and that is what. Name.

[2:41] The names signify things through thoughts. the names are vocal sounds which relate to something sensible. And first things we name are sensible things, but these thoughts are kind of hidden, right? Okay. And so just like you realize the change between contraries, then you know more hidden is that third thing involved, right? Well, this third thing, right, the last thing, it's kind of hidden, right? Okay.

[3:21] But there are three things, therefore, right, to understand the names: vocal sound itself, the thing it signifies, and that through which it signifies that. Now the best, the, easiest sign that thoughts are involved is that you have names like not just Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, but names like man and dog and cat and horse. You have these universal names, right? And there's no man or dog, cat, or just this dog, this man, okay?

[3:54] So you can see that the thought is involved there in these names, right? Now, going to look something very universal about this, huh? I'm going to divide it into two.

[4:11] Now, one name can signify one thing through one thought. No big deal, right? So when I study geometry, I have a name like square, right? It signifies one thing, one particular figure, right? And through one thought, which is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, right? Okay. And if you have many names, right? The most obvious thing is you can have many names

[5:03] signifying many things through many thoughts. So I have the name square and the name circle and triangle, right? I've got many names signifying many things, and through many thoughts, right? It was kind of obvious, isn't it Not that hard. You can expect, but, okay? Now we get to more complicated.

[5:49] Can one name signify? Many things through many thoughts. Is that possible? Like the word to see, right? To see can signify the act of the eye, right? And Hamlet says, "I see my father now." as if the ghost has appeared again. He says in my mind's eye, right? Meaning his imagination. And my mother used to say, "I see said the blind man, but he couldn't see at all."

[6:32] Meaning he understands, right? So here, the word to see signifies many things: the act of the eye, imagining, and understanding, right? But the thought is different in each case, isn't it?

[6:50] Don't have in mind exactly the same thought. And and and we actually have a name for this kind of name. What's the name? Equivocation. Yeah. Which then is subdivided to equivocal by chance, and equivocal by what reason? Reason. Yeah. I was reading this in this little guidebook to England. I don't know if this is the origin of the word sirloin, but St. James I was in Lancaster He had a very nice piece of beef, a loin of beef, right?

[7:27] And humorously called it sirloin. So I'm going to check in that library soon to see if that's the origin. Think of these odd little facts. So

[7:43] we call this thing here has got a name. We call it equivocal name, and sometimes it signifies many things or many thoughts by chance, right? Sometimes there's like the word to see a connection called equivocal by reason, right? I'm not going to go into that, you know, spare that today. but. You know, I go into the distinction of various ways a name becomes equivocal by reason. Now, likewise, it's possible for many names,

[8:17] and they signify instead of many things, one thing through one thought. Is that possible? Can many names signify one thing through one thought? Yeah. In fact, we have a name for this, these names, right? We call them synonyms, right? Okay. So, you know, when you translate from one language to another, right? You have many names, right? Signifying the same thing, but through the same thought, as Aristotle says in the Peri Hermeneias, right?

[8:58] The sound is different, right? So, what I call man, they call homo or something, right? Okay. And sometimes even the same language you have, right? Drying up and desiccation, right? Okay. Signify the same thing. Okay. Um. So that's kind of surprising, you know. It's a little more unusual than many names signify many things and many thoughts. That's kind of what you expect: one, one, one up here, many, many, many right through here, right?

[9:30] But here it's many names signify one thing to one thought, right? Okay. Now, much more subtle thing: can one name signify one thing to many thoughts?

[10:06] Yes. Now, give you an example. Take take geometry, they say it's an easy science, right? Euclid defines a point as which has no parts, and perhaps it could be more complete, but has position, right? Okay. It's kind of definition of the point. But now we also say that the point is the beginning of a line. We also say the point is the end of a line.

[10:43] And sometimes, you know, when a student, you know, would ask me, "Do points really exist?" And I'd say, "Well, aren't there bodies that don't go on forever?" And I get them. You know, the idea of surface, right? And there is a which has length and width but no depth, right? Then I say, does the surface go on forever? No. Then there's a line, right? Length without width, and then does the end of the line go on forever?

[11:10] No, it's got an end. That's what the point is. Okay. So here I have many thoughts of one and the same thing, right? The point is that which has no parts but position only in the continuous, right? It's. I can also think of it as the beginning of a line, or the end of a line. I got three thoughts.

[11:34] One thing. See. So I see. So I'm really smart, huh? So I use the word point. I signify one thing, to three thoughts. Okay.

[11:50] Take an example from Arithmetic, huh? Science of numbers. Euclid defines even number, right, as a number that can be divided two equal parts, right, or a number that has a half. That's number the same, right? Okay. But then he turns to odd number. He gives two definitions of odd number. It's a number that doesn't have a half,

[12:21] and it's a number that differs from an even number by one. And sometimes he reasons from that second definition, right? So he has one name directly you know, phrasing the name? Odd number, right? Signifying one thing, right? Through what? Many thoughts, right? Okay. That's unusual, right? Okay. This is this is this is the most unusual of the cases so far, right?

[12:57] Let's take the example from logic, from the first book of logic, the Isagoge of Porphyry, right? Porphyry, you know, takes up genus first, and then he takes up what species, right? And he takes up what difference, right? And he gives us a definition of difference. If you take it as a name, it's a name said with one meaning, right? Of many things, other in kind, signifying how they are what they are.

[13:31] So like quadrilateral is said of many what? Kinds of quadrilateral, right? Like the rhombus and the what? Square, right? Okay. Signifying how they are what they are, right? Okay. But then he gives a couple other notions of difference. Difference is a name of what the species has in addition to the genus.

[14:04] And then he gives another notion of difference. A difference is a name separating species under the same genus. So notice the differences of, say, square, equilateral, and right angle. Equilateral is a name said right

[14:29] with one meaning of many things other than kind, like square and what and rhombus, yeah. And the right angled is said of square and oblong, right? Said of many things other than kind, signifying how they are what they are, right? Okay. Genus says basically what they are, but differences say how they are what they are, right? They're four sided, you know, and so quadrilateral, but how they are, they're equal, and but the angle they meet at, and so on.

[14:58] Okay. Um. So we've got three notions of what difference. So so I have one word, difference, signifying one thing through three different thoughts. Okay.

[15:19] When Aristotle takes up the continuous in in the categories in the chapter on quantity, he defines the continuous as that whose parts meet at a common boundary, like the parts of the line meet at a point, parts of the say the circle two semicircles of a circle they meet at a line, and the parts of a body meet at a what surface, yeah. Okay. But then when he gets into the sixth book of Natural Hearing, he recalls that definition that he gave in logic, but then he works out another definition of continuous, that which is divisible forever.

[15:57] Okay. So here you have one word, continuous, signifying one thing, the continuous, through two what definitions. One about how the parts come together meet at a common boundary, and the other one in terms of how it's divisible into parts and divisible, divisible, divisible forever, right? Okay. And when I reason out that our understanding is not a body, it's not something continuous, sometimes I reason because the parts of the definition don't meet at a common boundary, and sometimes I reason because thoughts are not divisible forever, right?

[16:40] So I reason from both definitions to the not continuous, the mind being not continuous. So that's a student example, right? Let's see. Next I'll look over here? Can many names signify one thing through? many, what? Thoughts. I want to take one more example of this thing here, it's kind of interesting. And Aristotle's talking about definition and demonstration in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, and he says that a definition can be the beginning of a demonstration, the end of a demonstration, or a demonstration in a different order.

[17:35] Okay. And what he does with demonstration itself is he defines demonstration from its end, the first, and then he defines it from its matter, and he demonstrates the second definition from the first. I can do that with definition, right? I can say definition is speech signifying what a thing is, or speech. Making known what a thing is, and these are defining it by its end, huh? I can say, it's, speech composed of the genus and differences of the species, and then I define it from its matter.

[18:12] right? So Aristotle defines demonstration first from its end. It's. A syllogism making us know the cause and that which it is a cause unlike otherwise. Later on, they'll say, say, what syllogism from necessary premises and so on, right? And he says all things such necessary, it's a from matter. So you can have two definitions of the same thing. So demonstration is a name signifying one thing through two definitions.

[18:47] So you can combine the two to three different thoughts. Now, can many names signify one thing Two excuse me Thoughts, huh? example of that, in philosophy. The transcendentals. And we say this is many things? Yes, yeah, yeah. The transcendental, yeah. Being in one. Now, I mentioned before I was looking at the Parmenides there, of Plato, the, big dialogue on being and one, right? And kind of metaphysical dialogue in terms of the subject, but he's saying, you know, that being partakes of one, and the one partakes of being is it to be one and to be being are two different things, right?

[19:50] And so, if being is one, it must be partaking of the form of the one, right? And if the one as being, it must be partaking of that. Aristotle will say, no, no, no, th those aren't two things signified by what two names, right? But they're one and the same.

[20:12] How can that be? You know, how can that be? And the Aristotle showed it can be, and Thomas more explicitly that that one means what undivided being, right? So it adds a negation, but negation is a being a reason. So it adds nothing real to being, right? You get it adds in thought. That's extremely subtle, right? Okay. Or a good means what a desirable thing, but

[20:54] to be desired is that something real in the thing? No. So I desire something, and because I desire it, we can say the thing is desirable. So that's a relation of reason?

[21:13] So that's very hard to understand, right? That's a really subtle case. Now, perhaps you have another case of that in the third book of Natural Hearing, where Aristotle talks about acting upon undergoing. So if I kick you, is my kicking you and you're being kicked? Are they really two different things? No.

[21:36] But we have two names here: kicking and being kicked, signifying the same thing, but not by the same thought exactly, right? Because kicking is from me to you, and being kicked is in you from me. Two different experiences of being. Another time you're being there, something

[22:01] like that, right? And and Aristotle argues that the real acting upon undergoing means the same thing as motion, right? So I'm pushing the glass along, right? So the glass is changing its place, right? Okay. But it's is the glass changing its place and it's being pushed by me two different things? Or is the glass changing its place and my pushing it two different things?

[22:34] Or is the glass changing its place, looking at the change in itself, right? And calling that pushing is talking about what the fact that it's from me to it, and it's being pushed that it's in it from me. So maybe acting upon undergoing are what

[23:00] many names signifying the same thing but two different five. Aristotle speaks as the road from Athens to Thebes, the road from Thebes to Athens. or is the distance from A to B the same as the distance from B to A? The thought is not the same, right? Distance from A to B and distance from B to A. So two thoughts of the same thing, right?

[23:32] So there can be many names signifying one thing through many thoughts, right? Now, crisscrossing these patterns, you've got two more possibilities to consider, right?

[23:50] But are they real possibilities, right? Now you see, sometimes when you crisscross two divisions, like if I crisscross man and woman and good and bad, right? I get four squares, right? And I think there are good men in the world, not too many, but there are some. And there are good women in the world, right? And there are bad men, and there are bad what? Women, huh?

[24:17] Okay. So you get four real possibilities. But if you crisscross, like when Aristotle does the parts of the plot, right? It's either before something, or it's not before something. It's either after something, or not after something. Well, if it's before and after, it's the middle. If it's before but not after, it's like the beginning. If it's after but not before, it's the end. But is there a fourth one?

[24:42] It's neither before nor after. There wasn't any part of the plot. wouldn't it. So it's not a real possibility, right? So sometimes you get what? Only three real things from crisscrossing to you know it's time you know I'm going to do something like that. But I wonder whether this is a real possibility. Can one name

[25:14] signify many things through one thought? Can one name signify many things through one thought? I'm not talking about the angelic mind, or the divine mind. One thought can understand many things distinctly, right? I got to

[25:53] be careful here because one name can be said of many things. Like animals, said a dog, cat, and horse, right? But are dog, cat, and horse three meanings of the word animal? No. So you don't want to confuse what a name signifies with what it can be said of, right? Animal signifies a living body that has senses.

[26:25] And when instead of dog, that's what animal means. And instead of cat, that's what animal means. So those those are different kinds of animals, right? The word animal itself doesn't signify dog, cat, and horse.

[26:44] Okay. So sometimes people get you know I know some people get mixed up right and they think well animal can mean many things dog cat horse no it has one meaning there right but it's said of many things right

[26:59] but if I wanted to think about dog in particular and cat I got to have And horse had three more thoughts. Okay. So is this a real possibility? Signify many things to one thought. Seems no, no. In other words, three is enough again, right? With one name, taking into account these three things, right, that are found, right, you've got really maybe just three real possibilities. You have one name signifying one thing to one thought, and you have one name signifying many things to many thoughts, right?

[27:41] The equivocal name, right? And then the odd, the oddest animal, right? Where the many, one, one instead of that, you have one many, right? Now, what did Plato say or Socrates say? That if I can find a man who can see a one in a many, I'll walk in his footsteps as if he was a god It's. Very important, right? You see a one in a million.

[28:06] This is a very, very unusual example of one in a million, right? So one name can what signify one thing through many thoughts. That's a very interesting one in a million. But this one here.

[28:23] But they see the angels, right? You know, from one thought they can see distinctly many things, but different thoughts from our thoughts. We need a new thought for anything to kind of go distinctly.

[28:38] It kinda gives you a famous article on the calculus, you know, and saying how our mind is striving to be like an angel, right? Because it's trying to define the polygon, let's say, is what or the circle is the limit of polygons. You know, you have a circle like this. You have a square, right? You divide that in eighths, right? Yeah. And you keep on seeing the circle.

[28:59] You never quite reach the circle, right? You can divide it forever, continuous, right? But you're seeing the the circle as a limit of the polygon, right? So you seem to be knowing circle and polygon together distinctly, right? Yeah. And and they're in fact when they reach each other, right, So you see the distinction. So we he says this is you know we're not struck by this as a sign of our intellectual decadence, right?

[29:23] Our mind is striving to be like an angel, right? It's trying to have in one thought a distinct knowledge of two things, right? It's trying to know two things distinctly by one thought. Because we really can't do that, but we're striving to do that, right? But God knows everything distinctly by one thought. The angels by many thoughts. We got to have we're at the bottom of the whole the whole you know intellectual understanding.

[29:50] Something's been a separate thought for everything not distinctly. That's why we have this problem of specialization, all this. And can't get either. Okay. Now, what about the the fourth possibility down here? Can many names

[30:16] signify what many Many things by what Many thoughts. Through one thought? Is that possible? Can many names signify many things by one thought? That's the same problem as up here. So that says no here, but down here you'd be what by one thought you'd be knowing many things. Now, gotta be careful, see. You say when I know what an animal is, in a way I know dog, cat, horse, and elephant, but not.

[30:59] Distinctly, right. Strictly speaking, I know dog, cat, horse only in ability, right, in potency. But I know actually, just animals generally. Simply speaking, I don't know dog, cat, horse, and what an animal is. Just like I know what odd number is, I don't know all odd numbers. Except you know, they come quick, right? So these are not really possibilities. So again, we have three here and three here.

[31:40] Now this is fundamental to the whole of our thinking, right? This kind of universal view of the logical names, starting out seeing that you get a few things involved, here, right? If you didn't realize that third thing there, right, that you wouldn't be able to see all these strange, especially the strange possibilities, right?

[32:02] Now, let's look back over the whole study here of God. In question two of the Summa, right, those of you who were there for the ones where Thomas speaks about the existence of God, right? Okay.

[32:22] Now what does he do there, right? He's trying to prove that God exists, right? And he's got five proofs that God exists, right? Okay. So he's trying to prove the existence of one thing, namely God, right? But the first proof shows it by showing that there is a what? Unmoved Mover, right? Okay. The second way by showing there's a first efficient cause, that is to say, a first maker, right?

[32:54] The third proof by showing that there is a being necessary to be to itself, and the fourth one that it's what a most perfect being, most complete being, and so on. So the word God there is signifying one thing, namely God, but to one thought or many thoughts.

[33:20] Many things? Yeah. That he is the unmoved Mover, that he's the first maker, that he's the being necessary to be to itself, right? I have many thoughts on one thing, so I have one name can signify one thing through many thoughts. Okay.

[33:46] Interesting, right? Now, when we go into the substance of God and so on, we say God is what simple, he's perfect. He's unlimited. He's unchanging. He's one, right? Okay. Now I have many names, not one name, right? But now they're signifying are the many names signifying many things through many thoughts. One thing through many thoughts. There are many things, many names signifying what? One thing. One thing through many thoughts.

[34:18] Through? One thought? No. Through many thoughts. Yes. So it's this hot thing, right? Okay. And Thomas says that these are not what synonyms. Why? They signify the same thing. So why aren't they synonyms? Yeah. To be synonyms, you have to signify what? The same thing through one thought. Yeah. So many names signify one thing through one thought. Then you have synonyms, right? But in these names, you have what?

[34:57] Many thoughts, right? So simple means what? The thought is not composed, not put together, right? Okay. Unchanging is a negation not of not of composition, but of change, right? Okay. So the thought is not the same, not negating the same thing, right? I mean, you're knowing God negatively, right? But you're not negating the same thing.

[35:28] When you say God is unchanging and God is eternal, are you saying exactly the same thing of God? No. So you get many names, but you're signifying the same thing. I think that's what you say, Richard,

[35:41] talking about the unchangeable eternity of God and the eternal unchangingness. You know, such a, you know, I mean, it's kind of good that you're doing it in sense like that, right? Because you're saying you're using the same what? Thing, even though the thought is what different, right? Now, so you speak of the perfect eternity of God or the eternal perfection of God. So that's what he's all thinking, you know.

[36:05] I forget the justice thing. I'm interested in doing meditations or exercises. So you see how important this is for for the names that you have in theology, right? But most I've done, I ordered these from the one, which is kind of the most obvious case, right? It doesn't need too much. You kind of expect one name to signify one thing through one thought, right? And that that's only a possibility.

[36:34] And many names signify many things through many thoughts. Okay. That that seems harmonious, right? But then you have oh, that's one name signifying many things through many thoughts. Huh? They're a little more. Some of you want to do away with equivalent words. You know, it's going to be debatable, right? And you know that's Monty Diagne, you know, when he had going there, you know, he heard that story of him was teaching the sacraments, right?

[37:02] Of course, in those days, you had the great authority of John St. Thomas, right? And John St. Thomas makes a mistake with making the word "sign" be univocal. I mean, you know, separate names for each thought, right, and not have an accepted name for each thing, right? Avoid those problems. But the big reason why you can't do that. So this is a universal importance for philosophy and for theology.

[37:50] But I end up at this note here of how, in the second question, there he's using one name, God. to. Signify one thing, but he seems to have many what thoughts that God is the unmoved mover. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, he makes a separate argument for God's existence that He's pure act. So he's proving that pure act exists, right? Because act is something before, potency as Aristotle shows in the ninth book of wisdom.

[38:22] So that's another thought of God, it's a pure act, And uh, it's supposed to be proving that it to be itself exists, right? It's a harder one, but so it is possible to have many thoughts of one thing signified by one one name. Then later on, he has other thoughts about it. Thank you,

[38:56] Dr. Burka. I just want to check. So, out of those eight cases, it's just the fourth one that's invalid. Yeah, yeah. So, as I say, I do a little bit like I do with that simple example of before and after, right, in parts of the thing. Aristotle's defining, right? You say something is before, but not after; that's the beginning. Something is after, but not before. Something is both before and after.

[39:23] What? And what is it? This neither before nor after. They see, realize that can't even be a part of a play, right? It must be you know, something stuck in there, right? It's the fourth and the eighth, right? He was asking if this one too. Yeah, yeah, see, yeah, yeah. I say no for these two possibilities. right? That's a limitation of our mind, right? That we need a separate thought.

[39:47] But yeah, be careful there not to mix up the fact that what a name signifies and what it stands for is not the same thing, right? It's like that other distinction we met between the meaning of a word and what it stands for. Are they the same thing?

[40:11] Because when Saint John says the beginning was the word, and the word was towards God, right? Well, if you say you're towards something then you're not, what you're towards. So therefore, the word is not God. Then the next sentence says, "And the word was God. " How can he say that?

[40:34] God doesn't have a different meaning when it stands for. Yeah, yeah, yeah. In the second statement of him, the word was towards God. God is standing for what the father. Yeah. Is that you know? Is that another meaning of the word God? You see, see, I think people would would be apt to make that kind of mistake, right? It's understandable, you know. I've always been puzzled by supposition, right?

[41:10] But I think probably the best way to translate in English is to say "stand for," right? Okay, so you can say for me, for example, that I am the son of a man. I am the son of a man, that I am not a man.

[41:26] This is one of the kinds of opposites, relatives, and one of the kinds of opposites. That's why nothing is a beginning of itself. Nothing is before or after itself, because these are relatives: beginning and after and before. So, if I am the son of a man, then I am not a man.

[41:50] Well, when you say I am the son of a man, man is standing for my father, you know, Victor Burquist. Likewise, we say I am the father of a man. Well, a father is not what he's the father of. So I am the father of a man, so I am not a man. No one's a father of himself, is he? So if I am the father of a man, then I am not a man.

[42:18] You see, you see that you see that the Sophists could get you, into, you know, What's the proper answer to that, right? Be gone.

[42:30] Be gone. Yeah. I mean, is a man there now? mean Paul Thomas Berquist, who's in Afghanistan, or Marcus Duane Berquist, who's in Georgia? Is that what it means?

[42:46] No, but it but it's standing for one of those guys, right? It's got kind of a confused standing there because it could stand for either one of my sons. You see, see, it's very subtle, right? But people tend to, you know, want to make that stand for be another meaning of the word, and that's not the same thing. And likewise, the one I was pointing out here today again, if if a name is said of many, right?

[43:15] Well, those many could be meanings of the word if it's said of them equivocally. So, if seeing is said of the act of the eye and imagining and understanding, then in that case, seeing, the act of the eye, imagining and understanding, are three meanings of the word to see, right? But when animal is said of dog and cat and horse, it's said univocally with the same meaning in mind in each case.

[43:43] That's what univocal means. So, dog and cat and horse are not three meanings of animal. But I know some, you know, teaching all these years that sometimes a student will temporarily they mix that up, right, and say that. You know what? What's an animal? What has meaning? It could be a dog, cat, horse. Those have different meanings. of the word animal. you see? And

[44:08] that kind of you know that's the corruption of modern logic. you know where they substitute class for universal. Because a class is really a multitude, right? If I get a class here, right? Class can't be said of anyone that you are the class. That's by some kind of hyperbole.

[44:30] But I can say you are a student. Student is is universal. You are a student all by yourself. And you are a student. You are a student. You are a student. Student. But but I'm not a class. Ah, say more. What's that? Yeah.

[44:51] Was that universal? No, the king can do it. All of us, right? So we begin the fall again. Is that the the plan? I don't know.

[45:09] I'm going to a wedding out in Minnesota. I think I told you that. I could probably come the fourth of September.