Prima Secundae
3. Aristotle's Ethics I: The Good, the Last End, Certitude in Ethics, and Man's Own Act
Class of 2011-02-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/003-aristotles-ethics-i-the-good-the-last-end-certitude-in-ethics/

[0:00] Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dio grazie. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ornament our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Very for us. Help us to understand all that you've written. Name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:33] So, in the first part of Aristotle's *Primum*, he meant the famous first definition of good: the good is what all what want, right? And then, if you recall last time, we went through a little dialectic, right? Is it good because you want it, or do you want it because it is what good, huh? And the conclusion of that great dialogue was that you want it because it is good, right, huh?

[1:04] Which you see, maybe both clearly in the beginning for an induction. If you go through all the natural goods of man, right, and the desires for them, you can see a reason why this is good for us apart from our what wanting it. So you can see that food is good for us whether you want it or not. Not that you don't want it, but and

[1:29] I used to say to the you know the students, you know, is money useful in our society because you want it, or do you want it because it's useful? And they know enough to say that they want it because it's useful, right? So they want it because it's good, huh?

[1:48] Well, now Aristotle also touches, but very briefly, there upon the end, right, huh? And the definition of end is that for the sake of which, huh? It may be that for the sake of which something is, like the chair you're sitting on, is for the sake of sitting, right? Or it may be that for the sake of which something is done, like we study for the sake of knowing, we take medicine for the sake of health and so on.

[2:23] But in the second book of *Wisdom*, Aristotle talks about the the good and the end being basically the same thing. Although we speak of the means as being good, it's in reference to the end that is good. So, chiefly, the good and the end are the same thing, and therefore he makes the interesting statement that those who do away with the end as a cause and so on are doing away with the good.

[2:53] They don't realize what they're doing, right? But if you deny in, you deny that for the sake of which you're going to be denying the good. So you can see all the modern philosophers, modern scientists who deny that anything is an end. Out there, right? It's kind of funny to talk to you know, you ordinary biologists today and say, you know, our eyes are the sake of seeing.

[3:20] They do not quite admit that because you can see with the eyes, you know, admit that. They do not admit that they're for the sake of seeing, right? And the ears and so on. You can hear with them, but they're not for the sake of hearing, right? So we're gonna go through all these parts, and every one of them seems to be good for something, right? But they don't admit that any one of them is for the sake of anything because then they're admitting the road to God or something, you know.

[3:49] And but notice the definition of good and the definition of end are not the same, right? That's very interesting, right? They're basically the same thing, right? But the definition is not the same, right? But if you examine the definition, you can see why the two would go together, right? If you want something, you aim at it, right? And people aiming at something is because it's good or at least they think it's good, right?

[4:19] So you can see those two go together, right? When you see how the good and the end are tied up, then you can also understand better the word better, right? And perhaps the most basic statement about what is better is that the end is better, than is what is for the sake of it, right? So if medicine is for the sake of health, health is better than medicine, right?

[4:51] If studying is for the sake of knowing, then knowing is better than what studying, right? And sometimes I go back to the more general statement that Aristotle brings out that when the same belongs to two things, but the one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. So if hot is said of fire and the air around the fire, but the air around the fire is hot because of the fire which is hotter.

[5:29] And as sweet is said of sugar and of dessert, but dessert is sweet because of sugar, which is sweeter. So if good is said of the end and that which is for the sake of the end, but that which is for the sake of the end is good because of the end, which is gooder or better, if you prefer. Okay. So that's a very important thing. The other statement is very basic about the good, about the better, is that the whole is better than the part.

[6:08] But perhaps the end is better than what is for the sake of it is even more basic than the whole is better than the part, because you could say the part is for the sake of what, the whole, right? Therefore, the whole is better, right? Could give the statement the end is better than what is for the sake of it as a reason why the whole is better than the part, right?

[6:31] Even though without even thinking about that, you might admit, right, that the whole is better than the part, right? But it has a whole computer there and a part of it, right? Better than a whole book than a part of the book, right? You ever bought a book missing a few pages, and I have bought books missing a few pages. It's very annoying to get to the missing pages, right?

[6:52] Huh? It'd be better to have a book that has all its pages, huh? It's better to have all your arms and legs. I think, huh? Missing some, right?

[7:03] So this is an awfully basic thing, this first thing. But Aristotle also brings out a very important what? Proportion, right? And what is that proportion? Proportional, meaning a likeness of what? Ratios. What is that proportion?

[7:27] This is more about the city. No. He brings out after he points out that there are different what? Arts and sciences aim at different goods, right? Then what's the proportion does he see? huh?

[7:54] Yeah, yeah. If. If I say, for example, if I say that seeing is to the eye as hearing is to the, yeah. If you can supply the fourth term, that means you see a what? Proportion, right? And then you can reason from that proportion, right? So you might say if seeing is better than hearing, then the eye is better than the what? Ear.

[8:30] But Aristotle is also pointing out that if one art commands another art, right, then the good that the art that commands aims at, right, is better than the good that the art that obeys aims at, right? So if this art is subordinated to that art, like the pharmacist obeys the medical doctor, right, it's because medicine is subordinated to what? Health, right?

[9:04] And you can reason sometimes from one ratio to the other ratio, depending upon which is more known to you, right? So if you see this art commanding that, then you can guess that this end is superior to the other one that's subordinate to it, right? But vice versa, if you know this good is subordinate to that good, then the art that aims at this good will be subordinate to the art that aims at the higher good, right?

[9:34] Aristotle will use that later on to guess that the political art aims at the highest good, right? Why? Because it seems to command all the other arts and sciences to some extent, right? But before he does that, he brings out another thing: that there is a what? Highest good or a last end. Right, huh? That not every good is desired for the sake of some further good, right?

[10:08] And this is a very important thing, right? But how does Aristotle show that not every good is desired for the sake of another good?

[10:21] Because there would be an infinite number of you'd have to you could never start with whatever good to reach that end. Okay. It would make in vain, right? What we're doing, right? You're doing A for the sake of B, and B for the sake of C, and C for the sake of D, right? So A and B and C are not worthwhile until you get to D, but that's not worthwhile to get to something else, right?

[10:50] And so you'd be doing everything for the sake of something that would make everything you're doing worthwhile, but you'd never get to something that would make everything you're doing worthwhile. But maybe you could say more forcefully, though, too, that if you desire A for the sake of B, you can't desire A before you desire what B. And if you desire B for the sake of C, you can't desire either A or B until you what?

[11:18] Yeah. So if everything is being desired for the sake of something else, how could you begin to desire anything? Because anything you were to desire, you'd have to desire for the sake of something else, in which case you couldn't desire it until you desired the other thing. But that could be the first thing you desire, because that's desired for the sake of something else too. So there must be some end that is simply an end, right, and not a means to some further end.

[11:52] And this will be the chief and the greatest good, right? So in a sense, Aristotle he's showing that there is a chief good of man, a greatest good, huh? There is a good that is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else, but everything else for the sake of it. And later on, we'll be doing this other reading where Aristotle first draws a line about what that good is, right?

[12:18] He talks about the importance of knowing that, huh? It'll have a big weight upon life, he says, right? And if you don't know it, you can't aim at it, right? Okay.

[12:36] So that was the first and the longest part of the what Proemium, right, huh? That the ethics is about what? This end that is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, right? In the second book of wisdom, Aristotle says if there is no such end, right, there really wouldn't be an end. Everything would be a what? A means, right?

[13:05] Now on page two of your text, did everybody have the text? I had some copies. Anybody else need copies? Anybody else need copies? Yes. Okay. So we're on the second page now, right? We just finished the first part at the third paragraph there, or sentence. The knowledge then aims at these things being something what? Political, right? He's aiming at finding out what happiness is, right? That's the name of this chief good.

[13:43] Now in the next few paragraphs, he's going to be talking about the way we ought to consider these things, right? So he says, enough will be said if it is made clear according to the underlying matter. This is the basic beginning for understanding how to proceed in any science, right? You have to know what the matter is, huh? What it's about, right? And then you can decide what,

[14:19] how you should proceed, right? Okay. And it's in some way similar to what you have with matter in the first sense, huh? Because in the mechanical arts, right, the servile arts,

[14:36] the instruments you use have to fit the matter. So my brother-in-law there practices the art of carpentry, right? Huh? And my wife the art of the tailor, right? But they don't use the same tools. He might use a hammer and a saw and all kinds of other gadgets, huh? But my wife never makes a dress with a hammer there. No, she uses a saw to cut the material.

[15:10] But my brother-in-law doesn't use a scissors to cut the wood, and he doesn't put it together with a needle and thread, huh? See, that's a very obvious thing, right? But the tool you use, right, has to fit the what matter, right? You can see that very clearly in the mechanical arts because they're more known to us.

[15:38] Much like that, even in geometry and natural philosophy and wisdom and so on, and ethics now, right? What is the matter? What is the science about, right? And your tools and your way of proceeding have to fit that, huh?

[15:56] In the sentences there, huh? In the opening articles and so on, Thomas has a very beautiful article. Whether the the mode of theology of Scripture is artful, artificialis, right? Which I wouldn't translate artificial, but as artful, principle here, right? He says that, among other things, that he should. And seek more or less certitude than the matter what admits. And he has a beautiful example, he says, it's equally absurd.

[16:37] He says, right, to allow the geometer to persuade you, right, and then to demand that the rhetorician, right, have a demonstration, an argument that is necessary in the midst of no, you know, doubt, right? Huh? It's kind of beautiful, you know, if you know the liberal arts, you know. In the trivium, you've got rhetoric, right, and in the quadrivium, you've got geometry, right. So someone who's been trained in the liberal arts would see, yeah, you don't expect the, the, you know, who's going to be the next president?

[17:12] Who's going to be the Republican candidate? You know, all kinds of speculation. But can you expect a man to demonstrate that this man will be the candidate at this next time around? You can't expect that certitude, right? That's absurd, right? But you know, to have the, you know, the geometer say, well, we'll go out and we'll take a poll, you know, and see what what the people think about about the equilateral triangle or something.

[17:39] So that's absurd, right? You can have more certitude than a pole, right? So he says, enough will be said if it is made clear according to the underlying matter.

[17:55] Is that true too in the mechanical arts? Can the carpenter be as precise, maybe, as the the seamstress? The material doesn't allow that same what. Right. Or can the can the you know the sculptor you know chipping away at the marble be as precise as the painter? You know, maybe you can't be certain exact in this matter, huh?

[18:32] I know some recipes sometimes, you know, and says, well, you put in the oven at such a degree and cook it for long, but then there's a little warning there, you know, ovens differ, you know.

[18:45] And so it may get done too much in your oven or not enough in yours or something, right? And so you got to know your your oven, right? And

[18:55] so for certitude ought not to be sought in like manner, he says, in speaking about all things, just as neither in the products of the arts, huh? And there he's thinking of what I was speaking of there, right? The mechanical arts, right? That's a beautiful comparison he has, huh?

[19:17] But he says there is much difference, huh? In error about good and just things, huh? Now is that true? So men differ much as to what is good and what is bad, right? And somebody must be mistaken about what is good and what is not, right? But there's a certain what, uncertainty there, right? In the case of that,

[19:49] in just things. I know myself. I would, you know, when they had adults in a night class there, I always get them going about taxes, right? I say, well, now. Should the rich man pay more taxes than the poor man? Is that just that he should pay more taxes? I mean, all they can say is in a way he can afford to pay more taxes. Is that a reason to say it's just?

[20:17] You know, if I go to the baker and I buy a loaf of bread for a dollar, and the rich man comes in, did he pay ten dollars or a hundred dollars? Is that just? If he can, you know, he can pay ten dollars more easily than maybe I can pay a dollar for a loaf of bread, right?

[20:35] So you realize how it's not so clear, right? Is he getting more for his money than other people? There are more policemen around his house than around the house? For me, it's unjust to pay more taxes, right? But then, you know, even if you could, in some way, say that he should pay more, right? Then

[21:05] you say, well, should he pay, you know, the same percentage, right? All right, he paid ten percent of his income, and I'll pay ten percent of my income. So he'd be paying more money out than me, but it's the same percentage. Is that the just amount, ten percent? Or should he pay, you know, graduated, you know, like you know, twenty or thirty or something, you know? You realize how how uncertain this is, right?

[21:31] What is what is just to pay? It's not clear at all, you know. Even if we're clear that he should pay more, a higher what percentage or the same percentage? More. What's a reason to say he should have thirty percent rather than ten percent of his income going to this? Can't say. He can live, you know, giving away thirty percent of it, paying ten percent of it.

[21:58] That's no reason to say it's unjust, right? So it's not clear at all, right? What's what's the just amount, right? What has in the debate about tax levels has the term "just" in its meaning modified at all, or is there a dispute as to what "just" really is? Yeah, yeah. I mean, Aristotle's pointing to this, right? You know, it's uncertain, right?

[22:25] Do you see that it's just for him to pay a higher percentage of income than me? Or can you see even that it's just that he pay, you know, a greater amount than me? Is that even clear, right? It's nice that he does, maybe because you know, makes some people happy. Yeah, I mean, that's that's a reason, right? Yeah. All this

[22:55] talk about redistributing wealth, you know, and so on. But would it work for an oligist? It doesn't work, I guess. Eventually run out of people's money to to serve you know, but but certainly that's that's just right you know, it's unjust that some man's making that much money you know, and sometimes we we think that way don't we, you know, but how much more is really unjust you know.

[23:25] I remember when I was back in the fifties there, and Walter Reuther, the labor guy, wanted no salary to be more than ten thousand in the country. It was ten thousand worth more in those days, but it's kind of arbitrary, right? As

[23:43] Bill Cosby said way back when, somebody somebody paid him ninety nine million dollars a year to do whatever he was doing, acting and so forth. And Larry King asked him, "Ever do ninety nine million bucks for what you do? Is it really worth it?" And Bill Cosby just smiled. He says, "Well, they're willing to pay. I'm willing to take it. I don't care. Don't worry." Look at Regan's autobiography there.

[24:08] He says one time they're they're taxing ninety seven percent of his income, right, as an actor, which was worthwhile making a movie for three percent, you know, what you earned. Yeah. So these things are uncertain, right?

[24:26] So if they seem to be by custom only, now this is not Aristotle's opinion. Aristotle thinks that there are some things that are good by nature and some things that are bad by nature, right? But the fact that some people think that they are by custom only, right, is a sign of the lack of what? Suitability, the lack of precision here, right?

[24:49] And he says, and there is much error about good things due to many being harmed as a result of them, right? So is it good to be wealthy? You'd say, well, yeah, yeah, it's good to be wealthy, you know. But then sometimes they kidnap your child and or your wife or something like that, right? See, And for ransom, you know, Don't bother to kidnap my kid because I couldn't put up much, you know.

[25:14] See, so is it good to be wealthy? Okay. Or to be, you know, a courageous man, right? You know, ready to get in there trying to stop a fight or something because you're a strong guy, you know, but you get hurt, right? And the weak guy, you know, he just cowers. So money is good, right? We'd say, courage is good, right? But some people have been undone by these things, right?

[25:41] So, you see, they're good, but you know, it's not always clear that they're always good, huh? For some have perished through wealth, and others through what? Courage, yeah.

[25:58] We should be content, therefore, he says, in speaking about such things, and from such things, right? So the conclusions you reach, right, and the things you proceed from, to show the truth, what? Roughly, right? I read Thomas's commentary on the word roughly there, right? He's saying you're applying universal things, right, to singular, you know, changeable things, right? And you can only roughly apply these universal things.

[26:43] So a lot of times, something bad happens from something good you've done, right? It's a bad result from these things. I'm talking now about, I don't know, if you're following the thing about Egypt there, you know, but, Mubarak might resign today. We don't know. That's the talk, but it's rumor. But anyway, going to speak tonight. But they're talking about, you know, the, the, the. It's not the first revolution that is dangerous.

[27:09] The second, right? So you have the famous example, you know, was it Kerensky there was, you know, in power after the falling of the Russian monarchy, right? And then, then the communists took over, right? So you have all kinds of examples, you know. It's that second revolution that is one to watch out for, right? Yeah. So you got to be careful, right?

[27:38] So to show the truth roughly and in what? Outline, right? Now I always thought I thought that I was going to marry a woman who was a Catholic, right? You know, real Catholic, and a woman who thought that marriage was was a joke a dead end, right? No way out.

[28:07] So should you marry a woman of a different faith? No. But I mean, my my mother was a Catholic. My father was was Lutheran, your own background, you know. And I hate to not have this go on, you know. So, you know, you got to kind of careful about these things, right?

[28:29] So I said, I said, as a rule, I'd say you should marry someone of the same faith, right? And maybe the same background to some extent, right?

[28:43] I know, like in Quebec, there, you know, we'd notice that Quebecers have a different sense of humor than we have, right? So I don't know what about the like the marriage, you know, but I've heard people, you know, you know, going into religious orders in Canada, you know, and. And these have a different sense of humor, right? And how can you live with people you don't share some sense of humor with, you know, or think that they laugh at you don't laugh at or vice versa, right?

[29:07] You know, it's kind of deflating that people laugh at your jokes and stuff like that, right? You see. So I'd say, well, you know, you shouldn't maybe marry, you know, you know, or should a white man marry a black woman or vice versa, you know? See, well, now it seems kind of hard on the child who's gonna, you know, be with the blacks or the whites. You know, they have a hard time, right?

[29:30] You see. I wouldn't want to say, you know, you shouldn't ever do this, right? But I say, for the most part, it's better to marry some of your own faith, your own customs, you know, your own color, skin, and so on, right? But there are exceptions, you know, which turned out very well and so on, you know. And

[29:50] should a man? I always went the idea that a man should be older than the woman he marries. Of course, you always joke about Shakespeare because he married a woman. Older than himself, right? Oh. And but in in the twelfth night, I guess you know where the okay saying you should be sure to marry a woman younger than you know.

[30:12] Oh. So you'll say just you know reflecting on his own experience, right? But I wouldn't say that that a marriage where a man marries a woman older than him is is doomed necessarily or is a bad idea necessarily. When I said right, I would say for the most part, a man should be what older, right? For a number of reasons, one one sense men you know mature later than women, so on, right?

[30:41] And women use their looks and so on, right? So this sort of thing. Aristotle said I think the woman should be eighteen, the man thirty six. I think he says something like that. in fact. but the reason he gives is that the time when the woman is no longer able to bear children, the man has lost interest in sex and so. And so it's a very concrete reason, right?

[31:04] But the difference in age, right? Um. So, but how certain is that? You know, what the age of the man should be and the woman should be and so on, right? I say the man should be five years older, I think, as a rule. But actually, I wouldn't give it as something universal, right? There are exceptions, right?

[31:25] So he says, and in speaking about things and from such things, are for the most part rather than what university, right? Always a man should be older than his wife. Always a man should marry a woman of the same color skin, right? Always, you know. I'd say for the most part, I think this makes sense, right? That a man should marry a woman who's younger than himself.

[31:49] That you know, may have the same skin and religion and so on, but it's not a geometry, right? Where every two is half a four, right? And so on. Don't have that kind of certitude, right? Two for the most part.

[32:09] Now, in the same way, he says, one should receive each thing said. That is to say, the student, right? For it belongs to the educated man to seek certitude in each kind of subject to the extent of the nature the thing admits.

[32:28] I think is this beautiful example of this. For it seems about the same to accept the mathematician persuading, right, which is a weak way of moving the mind, right, and to demand demonstration from rhetorician. Okay.

[32:47] So nobody knows what. Nobody can demonstrate what's going to happen in Egypt, right? Prophet. I might, you know, try to persuade you as what's going to happen, you know, but you can't expect, you know, me to be have the certitude that a geometer has about the equilateral right-angled triangle or something, right?

[33:14] Okay. Now that's the second part of the what? Proemium right? So you know what we're aiming at, and then a little bit about how one can proceed, right? The kind of certitude you can have, right? The exactness you can have.

[33:38] Now he's going into in the last two paragraphs here in this page too. He's going into the who is or is not a suitable what hear of this science.

[33:50] Now he says each man judges well what he knows, and of these things he is a good judge. The man educated in something about that, and simply the man educated in all things. Hence, the young man is not the proper hear of political knowledge, yeah? For he is without experience of the actions of life, while the arguments are from these and what about these?

[34:24] So can young men talk about marriage and so on? We can talk. They know what it's all about, right? No. Kierkegaard has got that famous the banquet, you know, where he kind of imitates in a playful way Plato. But these men go out in the countryside, and they're going to have a wonderful banquet out there in the countryside. No women are allowed, and

[34:55] then after dinner they're going to each give a speech. It's going to be a speech about women, right? But they're now allowed to give the speech until they they feel the influence of the wine upon them and so on, right? And but each guy is seeing woman from different angle, right? So one is a young student is all mixed up about woman, right? Another is an experienced married man, right?

[35:18] Another man is a man who is a tailor who realizes it's just fashion, right? Another is a professional seducer and so on. Each of them see it from a different point of view, right? But certainly the married man would see it differently than the what

[35:34] young student, right? I come from a family of all boys, so probably get a slow start understanding woman. I think if you have sisters, you might more know what a woman is, right? And it's kind of a natural way to pick up some. Knowledge in you know for the rest of our life, right? You know, you get some knowledge from you watching your mother, you know, but if you watch sisters, you get you know some more.

[36:03] I don't know what your experience if you had sisters, right? Now the second difficulty they can have, besides lack of experience, right? Further, being a follower of the emotions, Aristotle takes it kind of for granted, right? He will listen in vain and uselessly, right? Since the end here is not knowledge, but what action, right?

[36:37] It makes no difference whether he is young in age and therefore falls emotions, or youthful in character, right? Huh? What do they say about this one guy? You said you remained a child all his life.

[36:55] For the defect is not by time, but through living and pursuing each thing by emotion, huh? But knowledge is useless to such as it is to the incontinent, huh? Now the incontinent, as opposed to the vicious man, right? I mean, the vicious man does bad and thinks it good to do bad, right? The incontinent man knows he shouldn't be doing what he's doing, but he can't what help himself, right?

[37:21] Huh? I remember a guy, you know, smoker, and he says, he says, never start this, he says. It's an awful thing. Yeah. So what good does it do this man to know that smoking is bad for you, ah? If he can't what give it up, right? Okay.

[37:46] Aristotle later on uses the example there of the man who goes to the doctor. The doctor tells him to what lose weight or tells him do this or that, and he goes off and doesn't do it, right? What's the sense in going to the doctor for medical advice if you're not going to follow the advice that he what gives you? Because that medical advice is not for the sake of knowing, but for the sake of your health, right?

[38:12] Huh? The sake of doing something, and so if you don't do it, it's useless. You're useless, right? So Aristotle sees ethics and in general practical philosophy as not knowledge for the sake of knowing, right? But now it's the sake of doing, right? What should I do as a human being, right? What should I do as a father? What should I do as a citizen or a senator or a king or something, whatever I am, right?

[38:37] Right. That's not knowledge for the sake of knowing, right? When I first picked up the basic books of Aristotle, that, we all kind of grew up with, you know, the Oxford, you know, you see the one volume.

[38:58] One thing interests me. Wrote you was a book called Politics, but that was, unbeknownst to me, it already practical knowledge, right? It's for the sake of doing here.

[39:19] But he says to those desiring and acting according to reason. You know, if you desire to be reasonable, right? Try to be reasonable and so on. Then it's very good for you to know, right? Aristotle saying, right? But if you just follow your emotions, don't bother with this book. Don't waste your time. Waste your own time. Go live it up. Because this knowledge is going to be useless to you, right?

[39:45] In fact, it makes you worse, right? Because you know now that better that you shouldn't do these things, right? And you continue to do them, right? Okay. That's kind of beautiful, Aristotle says, huh? So you need, on the one hand, experience, but Desire also to be what reasonable right to act according to reason. On the top of page three in your text, there Aristotle has an epilogue right.

[40:16] Usually called epilogue. I mentioned before how the premium to wisdom there has an epilogue, and here he has an epilogue. What he does in the epilogue is to recall what he's done in the premium. In the case of the premium to wisdom, there are two things he's done right. Here there are what three things right. But he recalls them in the reverse order that he did them.

[40:45] He recalls the thing he just did and the thing there and so on right. It's like if I recalled my my life yesterday, and then the day before that, and then the day before that right. Right. So he says, "Let this much about the hearer. He's gotta have experience right. He's got to not be a follower of emotions but a follower of reason, and then he'll be a suitable hearer, right.

[41:12] And how it should be received, the amount of certitude and so on, decision you can have in the science. And that was the second thing he did. And what we propose right. And then in the Greek you have the the Greek word for pave the way right. So we call this whole thing a premium right. But it has these three parts. So Thomas got help here in front of the epilogue in dividing the whole premium right.

[41:37] But he divides premiums that don't have an epilogue too, so not limited like we are. Now let's look at this. Let's try to look at this chapter seven here right.

[42:14] Now one way you can approach this a little more explicitly than Aristotle here is by going back to the definition that Plato gave of a thing's own act. It's going to be our third definition here. right?

[42:46] It's in the poem. thing's own act. And Plato gives this definition of a thing's own act, or Socrates does. It is the act that only that thing can do,

[43:16] or it does better than other things. Okay. So it's the act that only that thing can do, or it does better than other things. Okay.

[43:46] So sometimes people don't have a screwdriver; they can find. They take a knife out of the drawer and they use that to turn the screw, right? But kind of wrecks the knife if you're not very careful, right? Then. And it doesn't work as well, you know, screw right. So we wouldn't say that you know turning the screw is the knife's own act act, but maybe the cut is the knife's own act, right?

[44:11] Okay. I suppose you know I got a little thing I used to open up letters, you know. I suppose I could cut my bread with that and so on, right? I wouldn't cut it as well as the knife, right?

[44:24] In the case of my eye, maybe it's only through my eye I can see, right? I can't see through my ears. I can't, you know. Okay. Um. Or my teeth in front are far away. They can bite the teeth in back can chew, right? Can I bite the teeth in back? I suppose I could, but not so well, right? Could I, you know, chew with these teeth in front?

[44:48] Well, it'd be a little bit hard to hold it there, right there in the right position, so I suppose I could, if you know, if I had lost all my other teeth and how many of them? I'd need a little bit of chewing there, right? So this is the definition of a things own act: the act that what that thing alone can do, right? None of it better.

[45:13] The act that that thing alone can do, huh? Yeah. Or that it does better than other things, right? Got the idea? Okay. Now, just as before, we saw a connection between the good and the end. Is there a connection between end and a things own act?

[45:49] Well, this is a statement we want to manifest. A things own act is its what end, is our purpose, right? Okay. Now, best to manifest this at first by induction, huh? And going back to Shakespeare's definition there of reason, its ability for large discourse, huh? Looking before and after. Well, sometimes we speak of a large induction, right? A discourse that is from many instances, right? So, when I approach this statement here, I'll make a large induction, right?

[46:50] And the stupider the audience, the longer the induction should be. By making a large induction, starting from the tools of man, right? And then from what? The organs of man, huh? And then from the occupations of men, right? Okay. So,

[47:15] in order to manifest this by a large induction from the tools of man, meaning the artistic tools, from the organs, which is a Greek word for tool, but we use it now for the tools, the body the organs of organs of man, and then from the occupations of man.

[47:51] Okay. And so we say, let's start the tools of man. What's a knife's own act? To cut. And what's the ender purpose of a knife? To cut. Yeah. And what's a pen's own act? To write. What's the ender purpose of that? To write. Yeah. Okay. And what's a hammer's own act? The hammer, right? What's the end of it? It's the hammer, right? Okay. Now, without insulting you, I'll go through all the tools of man, right?

[48:40] Thank you. But each tool of man seems to have its own act, right? Huh? Something that this tool either alone does, or that it does better than others, right?

[48:56] And one thing you learn, say even say with screwdrivers, right? You know, this screwdriver is for that screw, and you get a screwdriver isn't for that screw, it's either not going to do it, or not do it as well, right? Especially this one that's hard to move, right? You need one that's really just the right made for that, right? The one that would do it better than others would do it.

[49:22] So you can make an induction then and say that every tool has its own act, and that act is its what end or purpose. Okay. Then you can go to the organs, which is the Greek word for organon, they're Greek word for tool, of the body, right? And you say, well, does the eye have its own act? Yeah, to see. And eyes are for the sake of what?

[49:55] See. See. And the ear has its own act, which is to hear, right? And to hear is the end or purpose of the ear. And the teeth in front have their own act, which is to bite. And to bite is their end or purpose. And the teeth in the back have their own act, which is to chew, right? And that's it. And the heart's got its own act to pump blood and so on, and other things I don't know about.

[50:24] You go through the parts of the body, right? Okay. So each organ seems to have its own act, and that's the end or purpose of that particular organ, right? Now is the same thing true about the occupations of man, right?

[50:46] Does each occupation have its own act? Does a teacher have his own act? It's to teach, right? And what do we hire the teacher for? To teach, yeah. What's a cook's own act? Cook. Yeah. Why do we hire the cook? To cook. Yeah. What's a pianist's own act? Yeah. So they hire the pianist there in the restaurant, right? Play the piano, right? Okay. What's a picture's own act?

[51:23] Hit the ball. Picture. Yeah. Picture. Pictures. Pictures. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. To hit the ball. So each occupation has got its own act, right? And that's why we have the plumber and for his own act, right? Okay. So you can make, you know, you can go on and on, you know, go on their occupations of man, but it won't bore you with doing that, right? Okay. So then you can make an induction from what the conclusion of the first three inductions, right?

[52:03] You say, well, every tool has own act, and that act is its end, right? Every organ has its own act, and that act is its end. Every occupation has its own act, and that act is its end, right? And therefore, in general, the grand induction is that what? Yeah. Yeah. Now, no, Aristotle proceeds

[52:31] along these lines, but to say that happiness is the best, right? It is the end of all, seems to be agreed upon, and it is desired that what it is be said more what? Distinctly. Perhaps this will come about if what man does is taken up, right? What Aristotle's saying, right? For just as the flute player and the sculptor, right, and every artist. And generally, everyone for whom there is something to do, some act, and everything in general that has but its own act, you might say, right?

[53:05] Make it a little more precise. The good and the well-being seems to be in what doing this, right? So also would seem for a man if there is something he does. Are there then some doings and acts of the carpenter and the shoemaker, right?

[53:25] But of man there is none. Think he was a bit here. He is by nature without anything to do. See, you say does a cook have anything to do? Yeah, cook, right? Does a teacher have anything to do? Yeah, teach, huh? And does a violinist have anything to do? Yeah, play the violin, right? Does man have anything to do? As man, see, is any activity that belongs to man as man, right?

[53:54] Like to play the violin belongs to the violinist as a violinist, right? Well, there he's making the comparison to the occupations of man, and then he goes on to talk about the parts of man, the organs, right? Or just as there seems to be something done by the eye, right? The eye seems to have its own act, huh? And the hand and the foot,

[54:28] and generally by each of these parts, should one also lay down something that man does besides all these? Does man have his own act? Socrates was doing that, right? Mark, that's Aristotle, right?

[54:49] Used to use this example in class. I say, suppose you go down there in Main Street, there in Worcester, and get the first man that comes along, right? Hopefully, a man has not been ruined by going to college or something like that. And you say you pull out a ballpoint pen. You say, "What's this for? " Well, it's for writing. Yeah. You pull out a knife, ain't very scary.

[55:09] What's this for? What to cut, you know? And so on. What's the eye for? You'd say, "Yeah, to see, yeah. " What's man for? You would

[55:23] hesitate, right? You would answer right away what a knife is for, or what a ballpoint pen is for, what an eye is for, right? A heart is for, and so on, right? What's man for? That kind of shows that it's less known what man is for than what the eye is for, what the cook is for, and yes, what's a cook for? Yeah, yeah. So that's why you're going to reason from those things, right?

[55:48] Like I'm doing here, right? Okay. Now, does man have his own act? Is there an act which man alone has? Well, if man alone has reason, right? Then the act with reason is man's what own act, yeah. But a thing's own act is its end. Therefore, man's end must be the act with what reason. Clear enough, right? That's one way to develop Aristotle is going to proceed a little differently, but to develop by induction that a thing's own act is its end, right?

[56:29] And then seeing that the act with reason is man's own act, and then you syllogize from those two premises that the act with reason is man's end.

[56:42] Now you can come back and go through this whole process again, but go back and what be a little more precise and say that the what end of the cook is not just to cook, but to cook what well, right? And they won't hire me to play the piano because I won't I won't play the piano well, right? So the end of the pianist is not just to what, but to play well, right?

[57:11] If you have a ballpoint pen, you know, as you write, you know it the blanks, you know it just sometimes it comes out, sometimes it doesn't. Well, is it really achieving the purpose of the ballpoint pen? No. And if they give you a knife and you can't really cut your steak or something, you want a knife that you can cut well with, right? You might ask for another knife or something, right?

[57:38] So you make the same induction, but now adding this idea, right? And why do I wear glasses, right? Well, to see well, right? You know, so the end of the eyes is not just to see, but to see well, right? So you can add then that the act of what

[57:58] a thing's own act done well is its what end or purpose, right? And therefore, the act with reason done well, right, is going to be man's end or purpose, huh?

[58:14] Now, if you go to the automobile place and buy a new automobile and runs fine around the block and then stops, is it? Has it achieved the purpose of it, right? No, it's got to be for the life of an automobile, right, that's going to run. And if you buy a ballpoint pen with a thing and so on, and you write a page and then it stops, is it?

[58:37] So is the end of man just the act with reason done well for a day or a week or throughout what life, huh? So eventually Aristotle will bring out that third part, right? One swallow does not make a summer, right? We've got a party there? and the guy's taking a drink. One swallow does not make a summer. He's like Aristotle, so. that makes a pun upon the word.

[59:18] Now, there's two other ways in the kind of syllogizing, what I call the syllogism, compound syllogism, and you could approach this whole thing through the compound syllogism, of which there are two main ones.

[59:38] I was giving kind of the syllogism, right? Now, the compound syllogism, the two common forms are the if-then and the either what or, right? Now, if you approach this through the if-then,

[1:00:00] it'd be. shorter than going through this long induction, right? And so on, gave a general statement that you can apply to man. But you might say you have to be able to see a proportion, right? So you might say, what is to man as, let's say, seeing is to the eye?

[1:00:23] Now, if I ask you what is to the ear like seeing is to the eye, you probably see right away that it's hearing, right?

[1:00:32] But what is to man as seeing is to the eye? Is there some activity that is to man as seeing is to the eye? It's an activity that characterizes man that man either alone has or most of all has, right? And that would be the act with what reason. So now, once you see this proportion, then you can use the if-then argument, right? You can say, well, then if seeing is the purpose of the eye, then the act with reason is the purpose of man, proceeding on that proportion.

[1:01:10] But everybody knows that seeing is the end of the eye, right? And therefore, the act with reason is the end of what man. So this is a little another way of kind of approaching the same thing, right? Seeing a proportion, right, and constructing an if-then syllogism, and so on. And I could do that for any one of these ones. I could say, what is to man as cutting is to the knife, right?

[1:01:44] What is to man as cooking is to the cook, right? And then once you see the proportion, you can construct the if-then statement. If cooking is the purpose of the cook, then the act with reason is the purpose of man. That's based on the proportion, but you all know that cooking is the purpose of the cook, right? Therefore, the act with reason must be the purpose of what man.

[1:02:11] Now, in proportion, if you change one of the members of proportion, you got to change other members, right? So if I add now that not just seeing, but seeing well is the purpose of the eye, right? Then I'm forced to say that what is to man as seeing well is to the eye. We can't simply say the act with reason. You've got to say the act with reason done well, right?

[1:02:39] Okay, you're forced to see that. Well, then, if seeing well is the purpose of the eye, then the act with reason done well is the purpose of what man. If cutting well is the purpose of what? The knife, and the act with reason is to man as cutting is to the knife. Then the act with reason done well is to man as cutting well is to the knife, right?

[1:03:15] And therefore, you can what construct and if then so just measure what, right? Hundreds of thousands of right. I leave the point a bit. But then, if you say the purpose of the eye is not only to see well, but to see well throughout life, then you say seeing well throughout life is to the eye, as the act with reason done well throughout life is to man.

[1:03:44] But seeing well throughout life is the end of the eye. Therefore, the act with reason done well throughout life is the end of what man. The schema, right? Okay. Now, sometimes we

[1:04:07] proceed though kind of an either or argument, huh? Aristotle seems to be doing somewhat there, you know. And sometimes we take another thing that comes out about happiness, that happiness is not just living, but living well, right?

[1:04:28] So the end of man is not just to live, but to live well. Everybody knows that, right? But now you say living, do you mean living the life of a plant well, or living the life of a dog well, or do you mean living the life of a man well? Well, what does the life of a man have that the dog doesn't have? Reason, right? So you get to the same position there, right?

[1:04:55] Huh? It's the act of reason, right, or act with reason done well throughout life, huh? I know. So at this point, I'm not reasoning that the end of man is the act of reason itself, but an act with reason, right? And I leave for the later part of the Nicomachean Ethics to say does the end of man consist more in the act of reason itself, right, or an act directed or measured by reason, right, huh?

[1:05:37] And say that's a further precision to come later on, right? Because both an act with reason, act of reason, like reasoning itself or understanding, is an act with reason, but also a reasonable love, right? A reasonable fear, a reasonable walk, a reasonable talk. These are all with reason, right, huh?

[1:06:08] But this man's in consists more in the act of reason itself, or reasonable talk, reasonable making. Okay. So in the next paragraph, Aristotle seems to be touching upon this either or, right? What then will this be? To live seems to be common even to the plants. But what is man's own thought? The life then of nourishing and growing should be set aside. That's not to be man's own life.

[1:06:45] Following this, there would be something sensing, which is what an animal is distinguished from a plant, right? But this also seems to be common to the horse and the ox and every animal. There remains the doing of what has reason.

[1:07:00] But of this, the one is obeying or persuaded by reason; the other is having reason and thinking, right? And this being said in two ways, that according to act should be laid down, for this seems to be said principally, right?

[1:07:19] Okay. Then he goes on the next paragraph to bring out this second part of the definition, right? Is not only man's own act, but man's own act done what well, right?

[1:07:36] We take a little break now. I think we do.