Prima Secundae
6. Question 1, Articles 2–3: Nature Acting for an End and How the End Specifies Human Acts
Class of 2011-02-17
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/006-question-1-articles-2-3-nature-acting-for-an-end-and-how/

[0:00] Article two: Whether to act for an end is what private to rational nature, right? To the second one proceeds thus: It seems that to act in account of an end is private to rational nature.

[0:22] For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never acts in account of an end that is what unknown to him. But many other things which do not know the end, either because they altogether lack knowledge, as creatures that don't have sensation, or because they do not grasp the the definition of an end, as the brute animals.

[0:54] Therefore, it seems to be private to the rational nature to act in account of a what end. So you know, if you talk about nature acting for an end, they'll say this is anthropomorphic or something. You know. The projection. Yeah.

[1:21] Moreover, to act in account of an end is to order one's action to an end. But to order things is a work of what reason? As Shakespeare tells us, the definition of reason, right? Therefore, does not belong to those who lack reason.

[1:43] Moreover, the good in the end is the object of the will, but the will is in reason, huh? The rational part of the soul, as is said in the third book about the soul. Therefore, to act in account of an end is not except of rational nature.

[2:06] But against this is what the philosopher proves in the second book of Natural Hearing, the physics, that not only the understanding but also nature acts in account of a what end.

[2:25] Yeah, I was watching the growing one when summer I was growing these peas. You know, we call them the snow peas. Snow peas, yeah, yeah, and you know, you kind of stretch lines, you know, so they can grow up in the sky, and they keep on, you know, producing these things that loop around. They pull themselves up. I was convinced they're acting for an end. Just, just a you know clear example of a plant acting for an end.

[2:58] But relationship. I answer: It should be said that all agents necessarily act for an end. For of causes that are ordered what to each other, if the first be taken away, is necessary for the others to be what subtracted, taken away. Interesting word that subtrahi to run under.

[3:44] But the first among all the causes is the what final cause, the end. The reason for this is because matter does not obtain form right unless it be what moved by the agent right. For nothing reduces itself from potency or ability to what act.

[4:14] That's you know most universally treated in the ninth book of what wisdom. There was a former student here writing in. Kind of interesting. He had such an amazing gift for rightly recognizing all the proper distinctions that ultimately made any issue clear. I remember one time in particular when we spoke in depth about act and potency.

[5:23] Understanding that one distinction with the kind of clarity led me to have has helped me in graduate studies, in teaching, in being able to put into words why something wasn't quite right or why it was true, both in work and in life. And that was just one little discussion with him. Mark remains the smartest man I've ever met, and also one of the most humble and wise.

[5:45] That humility and wisdom go together. So something can't give itself what it doesn't have, right? So potency that lacks act can't give itself what it doesn't have. Otherwise, it wouldn't what lack. It had it, and it doesn't have it. It can't give it to itself.

[6:23] So he says the reason for this is because matter does not achieve form except according as it is moved by the agent. For nothing reduces itself from potency to what act. But the agent does not move except from what the intention of the end.

[6:46] For if the agent was not determined to some effect, not inclined to some effect, it would no more do this than that. Nor then that it produce a determined effect is necessary that it be determined to something certain, which has the notion therefore of a what end.

[7:13] But this determination, just as in the rational nature, is through the rational desire, which is called the will. So in other things, it comes about by a natural inclination, which is called natural what desire.

[7:34] So sometimes you see somebody saying that the plant wants what sunlight, right? Or wants water. Yeah, it's inclined towards that, right? So it sends the roots down, right? And grows towards the sun.

[7:52] But nevertheless, it should be considered that something by its acting or by motion tends to an end in two ways. In one way, as moving itself to the end, as man moves himself to the end, right? But in another way, as moved towards an end by another, as the arrow tends to a determined end. From this, that it is moved by the what? Sagittante. How do you say that?

[8:28] Yeah. Arrow shooter. Arrow shooter. Who directs his action to an end? Right. Those things, therefore, which have reason, move themselves to the end, because they have lordship over their acts, right? By free judgment, which is a faculty of will and reason. But those which lack reason tend towards an end by a what natural inclination. As it were, moved by another, not from what themselves, since they do not know the definition of end, right?

[9:12] And therefore, they are not able to what order anything to an end, but only towards an end are they ordered by what another. For the whole of irrational nature is compared to God as a tool to the chief what agent,

[9:40] and therefore it is private to the natural, the rational nature, that it tends towards an end as it were, acting itself or leading itself to an end, but for a irrational nature, as it were, acted Or moved by another, right? Or led by another, whether it be to an end that it apprehends, as the brute animals do, right? Or in an end not apprehended, just as those which altogether what lack knowledge.

[10:21] So this goes back to the second book of natural hearing, right? Where Aristotle, at greater length, here defends the idea that nature is acting for an end.

[10:35] But that's another course. But it's interesting that Thomas will bring that up here, right? Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that when man, through himself, acts for an end, he knows the end. But when he is led by another, huh? That's when he acts at the command of another, right? Or when he is moved by another, right, impelling him, it is not necessary that he know the end, right?

[11:19] And so also is it so in irrational creatures? I always tell a story about when I was a freshman at the College of Saint Thomas. There, my brother Richard had ensured that I had Kasurik as my advisor, and Kasurik looked at my list of courses and he said, "Duane, where's your Greek? " I said, "My Greek. " And he says, "Yes. " He says, "Why aren't you taking Greek?

[11:45] " And I said, "Well, other things I'd rather take. " He says, "That's not a reason. " He said. You don't study philosophy, so you take Greek. What was I supposed to do?

[12:01] But whatever Greek I know, you know, today is due to the fact that Kasurik insisted that I take at least a semester of Greek, you know. And he knew the reason why. And so, you know, even the amount of Greek I didn't know was very valuable to me in all my what.

[12:21] Yeah, I see some things Thomas doesn't see because he doesn't know the Greek, you know. But I see some things in the Greek, you know, that others don't see, huh? Okay, so I was led by an end without knowing the end.

[12:39] So I took Greek for a purpose, but I didn't know what the purpose was. I remember some dummy there in the education department in college, there, you know, arguing with one of my professors who was taught, you know, Spanish and French and so on. You know, well, you can read in translation. You know these works, you know. Yeah. But if you read, you know Dante in Italian, or read, you know, somebody else in the original language, then you realize how much you are missing in the translation.

[13:12] And, but you can't know that until you what learn that language, huh? So it's very valuable for me to know some Latin, know some Greek, you know.

[13:47] Okay. So in some cases, even for man to act for an end, it is not necessary that he know the what the end, huh? And so also Thomas says it is true and what irrational creatures, huh?

[14:10] So was there a purpose for my studying Greek? Do you think? Was there a purpose? Yeah. Was an action done for a purpose? Mm-hmm. I simply didn't know it. Not required.

[14:30] Sort of like the builders out here, they may or they may not know why the architect has to do it a certain way. Yeah, yeah. They don't have to. They just have to do it that way. Yeah. There is not the question why. There is what to do and die. Yeah.

[14:51] Or. Now to the second, it should be said that to order to an end is of the one who what you know moves himself to the end, huh? Can't do his translate. Acts himself to an end. That's not right in English.

[15:16] But of that which is directed towards an end by another, right, it is to be ordered to the end, right? Not to order oneself to the end. Which can be of true of an irrational nature. But what? By some.

[15:39] But by someone having a reason, right? Okay. You see, you run to these natural scientists nowadays who don't want to admit that nature acts for an end because then you have to admit there is some mind behind nature.

[15:59] But when Aristotle argues this thing in the second book of the Physics, huh, he's kind of interesting one argument in this regard, where he's saying that so much does action for an end appear in the insects, even you know, Those little things. that some people wonder whether they have a mind. I used to say to students, what is Aristotle saying here? He's not saying that they do have a mind, right?

[16:29] But the fact that people wonder whether they have a mind is because they see action for an end here. So Aristotle is not reasoning from the insect having a mind to its acting for an end, but he's reasoning, he's acting for an end because people wonder whether they have a mind.

[16:56] So I say you can't really reason from nature having a mind or not having a mind to its acting for an end. But if you see action for an end in the case of the insect and even the case of the plant, right, then you can say, well, does an action for an end require a mind?

[17:17] Well, yes, but either in the one acting for an end or in what is directing the one that is acting for an end. And then you can go on and say, well, is it by mind or because it's what is directed towards an end? I used to take you know some of the experiments of Fabre, you know, who described the insects, and I think I've talked about those, but just recall one example there where he observed this insect, you know, would

[17:50] paralyze its prey or its victim, and then he would go and dig a hole, running back and forth between that and the victim, till it was big enough to hold the victim, and then he grabbed him by the antenna and pull him over and drop him into the hole, and then deposit his eggs upon it, right, and then cover him up. And when the young sprouted, they had what fresh food there that was good, you know.

[18:24] But if he had killed the victim, right, then it would have corrupted and not been suitable food for the young. So our friend Fabre tried to put pressure on the insect's head in the way that the insect would do, and he found he was always killing it rather than paralyzing it, right? So it's got like a doctor's hands in a sense, right? It would squeeze the head of the victim enough to paralyze it and not to kill it, right?

[18:59] It's acting for an end, right? Huh? You know. And but then he noticed that he always dragged it by its antenna, right? So one time when he was over digging the hole, he cut off the antenna. Yeah. And then the insect came back and and finding frustration filled up the hole without the victim, right?

[19:21] Well, if he was smart enough to figure out, you know, you know, don't kill him but just paralyze him, so he could figure out there's a million other places to drag him. I used to say, you know, you know, that our forefathers, you know, they they say hit the woman over the head and and then grab her by the hair and drag her back to your thing, you know.

[19:42] But if the hair came out, they could, you know, figure out you could grab him by a leg or some other part. Slow-minded they might have been, you know.

[19:53] But this insect can't figure out there's some other place to, you know. Yeah. So in a sense, he's Seeing action for an end and seems very intelligent. And now the next question is: Is he doing this by what? Having a mind, right? And this experiment that he performed would indicate that it's not by mind, right? If you had a mind, you wouldn't be smart. No, but but if you had a mind that could figure out too much.

[20:18] you wanna Wanted to paralyze the victim and not, and how much you press it to paralyze and so on. How difficult it is to do that, right? If you had a mind to figure that out, it's only could figure out that there's some other place to grab it from besides the antenna, right? Finds a beautiful example, you know what this is, but of the order, you know, that you have to proceed, right?

[20:39] That you don't even ask the question: Does that insect have a mind or not, right? Until you see action for an end. And once you see action for an end, then you start to wonder whether it has a mind, right? And you may conclude that it doesn't have a mind, right? In which case it would be directed by another, right? But in a sense, the moderns want to begin from saying that nature, what, the insect or the tree doesn't have a mind, therefore cannot be acting for an end.

[21:15] That doesn't; it's out of order the way you're thinking there, right? And you can see Aristotle's care there, right? He? Didn't say, you know, ah, it must have a mind because they're acting for an end. But no, he takes the fact that people wonder whether they have a mind to figure these things out. They can be intelligent like we are, you know. They wonder because they see this action for an end, something that's obviously directed towards an end.

[21:45] But nature is not directed towards an end, and then it would be simply by chance that it reaches this end, and therefore it would reach the end what rarely.

[21:59] And but that's they don't reach the end rarely, but almost all the time, right? So therefore, they are acting for an end. And then the question arises: Is it by now action for an end requires a mind? It seems to in some way, right? Then the question is: Do they have a mind, or are they directed by a mind? That's a question. Doesn't even arise until you see action for an end.

[22:32] Beings, you know, still peas. That's kind of remarkable the way they would they would grow and you know, seeking to to draw themselves up into the sky and get sun, you know, amazing. See it with all those vines, you know, squash and different things. Yeah. Put out those little curly. curly cues Didn't they make some horror movie about that? And people get wrapped up with these plants.

[23:06] No, some insects are caught by these plants. I mean, they're they're designed to catch insects, and they they digest digest them. That's kind of interesting.

[23:19] Okay. To the third, it should be said that the object of the will is the end and the good in what in general. Whence there is not able to be a will except in those things in in those things which lack reason and understanding, right? Since they cannot what apprehend the universal.

[23:48] But there is in them either natural desire or a sense desire, which are both determined to some what particular good. When you say when you make the act of contrition, Mary, toward the loss of heaven, you know, so on. But most of all, because they offend me, my God, what all good, certain of all my love. Well, you have to have a will and reason to to be penitent in this way.

[24:17] yeah. My brother Mark used to talk about that, you know. You know about the damned souls, right? You know how they had rejected. You know what is the reason for everything else being good? That the God's goodness was the the reason for everything being desirable. That is desirable.

[24:44] Why did I reject that? You know, I mean, how could I have been so? You know, St. Thomas, takes that in Romans, and he talks about how all men want the good in general. Well, that's what he said, and that's where the mistake always is.

[25:07] But it's manifest, that particular causes are moved by a universal cause, right? Just as the ruler of the city, who intends the common good, right, moves by his command all the particular what offices of the city, and therefore it is necessary that all things which lack reason are moved to their particular ends by some what rational will, which extends to the universal good, to it the divine will.

[25:50] It's a marvelous, text, Thomason. Not to think about there. Eventually, you gotta go back to the second book of physics I want to see that more fully, right? Yeah. Okay, we'll go on to the third article here. To the third one proceeds thus: It seems that human acts do not receive their what species from the end, for the end is an extrinsic cause. huh? So when you divide it to four causes, we say matter and form are intrinsic to the thing, right?

[26:28] But the end and the mover or maker are extrinsic. For the end is an extrinsic cause, but each thing has its species from some what intrinsic principle. Like this is a chair because of the form that's in the chair, right?

[26:50] Therefore, human acts do not receive their species from the end, but from their form. Moreover, that which gives a species is necessarily before, but the end is yeah, is after in being, posterior in being.

[27:13] Therefore, human acts do not have their species from the end. That would be preposterous, huh? I'm never. It's used as a sign, you know, that that reason is what looks before and after, right? That the preposterous is something very much opposed to reason, right? It's out of order, right? Putting the cart before the horse, huh?

[27:38] Used to have a pun there in Descartes' name, you know, Put the cart before the horse. Moreover, the same cannot be except in one species. Can't be two species at the same time. Can't be a dog and a cat, can you? You're a dog or a cat, but not both. But the same in number act can be ordered to diverse what ends, huh? Therefore, the end does not give the species to human acts, huh?

[28:11] Okay. But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the morals of the Church and the Manichaeans. That's priority of the morals of the Church over those of the Manichaeans.

[28:30] But according to what the end, as end is guilty or praiseworthy, according to this are our works what culpable or praiseworthy. Well, what's Thomas going to say about this?

[28:53] I answer: It should be said that each thing obtains its what species according to its act and not according to its what potency or ability.

[29:08] Whence those things which are composed from matter and form are constituted in their species through their forms. If you take the cat and the dog, you eventually break them down into the same what matter, right? So one is a dog, one is a cat by its what form. Maybe this table and this chair, if you break them down, you get the same matter, right? So they differ specifically because of their what form, right?

[29:34] Okay. And form is act, right? Opposed to the matter, which is able to be formed in different ways, right? And this also should be considered in what their motions, huh?

[29:53] For since motion is in some way distinguished by what acting upon and undergoing, right? That's my translation. Okay. Both of these obtain their what species from act.

[30:14] For action or acting upon is from some act which is the principle of what acting upon something. And passion from the act which is the what term of the motion, right? So if the fire heats the what water, right? The fire is able to heat the water because it actually has heat.

[30:41] So its activity proceeds from its form, which in this case is is heat, right? But the water is what being heated, right? And you talk about what it's undergoing by the result of its undergoing, which would be to be hot itself. Okay. So in both cases, you're knowing what the acting upon is by the act that's able from which is able to act upon something in some way, right?

[31:13] And the one that undergoes by what it undergoes, right? Okay. So the guy that was teaching me Greek, the Father Peter, taught Greek a lot, didn't he? First, explained to me what P. A. Pelikani meant in Thomas' prayer, you know, Father Peter, you know. Ah, I didn't know the history of the pelican that type of my, life. But he's able to what act upon me, right? Ah, because of the knowledge he actually has of Greek, right?

[31:50] Huh. And this is a kind of what form or act, right? Okay. But I'm undergoing this, right, process, acquiring some Greek, right? Which is going to be what. Student formation of my mind or affirmation of my mind, okay. So, acting upon, undergoing are specified by some act. In one case, that's the source of the acting upon, right? And the other, which is the end or or or limit of of the undergoing, right?

[32:25] And they go listen to it, not go to the Greek here. Why shouldn't they go on and try and less in Greek? Greek suffering Greek. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I told you this guy who's teaching philosophy, but talking about the students, you know, they seem to be saying, you know, why are you doing this to me? You know,

[32:51] in the De Anima there, the book on the soul of, Aristotle, you know, one of the places where he distinguishes the various senses of undergoing and acting upon. Watching Irving calls you at a school that purgatory of childhood, you know? Beat it out of the man. Beat the ignorance out. I remember, remember, you know, Johnson is advising.

[33:20] What's his name? Boswell. Boswell, yeah, he was defending some teacher who's being, you know, you know, tried for for beating the kids, right? Well, of course, for Johnson, the rule is, you know, if there's no permanent damage, you know, there's no case against a teacher. If he's missing an eye or a leg or something, there's no problem. There's no permanent damage. Okay. Hence, calefactio right, which is heating something up, right?

[34:10] Is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat, right? Calefactio vero the passion, is nothing other than a motion to heat, right? Okay. And the definition makes known the what? Definition species, huh? Ratio species. What it is.

[34:37] And in both ways, human acts, whether they are considered per modum actionum or per modum passionum passionum, right? From the end, they gain their species, huh?

[34:55] For in both ways, we can consider human acts in that man moves himself, and he's moved by what himself, huh? For it has been said above that acts are called human in so far as they proceed from deliberate what will, a will that's grounded on deliberation and reason, right?

[35:21] But the object of the will is the good and the what end, and therefore it is manifest that the beginning of human acts, in so far as they are human, is in fact the what end, and likewise the end of them. For that to which the human act term is it ends at, you might say, is what the will intends as an end. Just as in natural agents, the form of the one generated is conformed to the form of the one what generating.

[36:02] Now that's kind of interesting. He says that because you. Talk about a natural thing there. Aristotle will sometimes speak of the form as being an end, because the form is the end of what generation, right? So the form of the chair is what

[36:22] the end of the generation of the chair, right? So you might say that the generation of the chair is the wood of the chair being reduced to act, right? Being reduced to this what form, right? So the form can be in one way considered as being the what an end, right? And so that the form gives you the what species, right? Okay.

[36:59] And because, as Ambrose says upon Luke, that mores properly are called human, right? Moral acts properly obtain their species from the end, for the same thing are moral acts and what human acts. That's kind of interesting there for the use of the word mores. Can be kind of careful about that, I think a little bit,

[37:30] because mores means what custom, yeah, yeah. Those customs, something the same thing, you know, that always has that sense. It's curious, huh? Because sometimes Aristotle even speaks of nature's custom, right? Although custom is sometimes, you know, divided against nature, right? But nature's customary way, kind of extension of the word, right? Tocqueville wrote about the importance of traditions and mores for this type of democratic republic. Yeah. Yeah.

[38:11] Yeah. Yeah. People always talk about the distinction these two books in in the talk for you know, but what the French means and what the English means and so on, manners and mores and so on. But

[38:41] I suppose there's a way in which you could say that you can accustom men to many different things, right? In a way you can't do with maybe the dog, although there's something of that in the dog, right? And the cat, and they can have certain things, but there's a limit there, right? But you know, you think of all the occupations of men and how men are accustomed to to this or that by their occupation and and.

[39:09] They do these things without thinking, you know. Once you drive someplace a distance, you say, "Gee, what have I been doing?" You know. Or I I can run and I, I shave, you know, and sometimes I think about what I'm doing, something I don't, you know. I get, seem to get shaved in both ways, both. I'm thinking about what I'm doing, and I'm not thinking, you know, what I'm doing.

[39:31] I don't cut my throat, I mean, and I'm not thinking about what I'm doing. In fact, it seems to go faster, you know. My brother once said that when he joined the Marines, the first morning, you know, they get in at three o'clock and they do this, and they scare the heck out of everybody, and then they go to bed, and of course, like an hour and a half later, they wake them all up with, you know, big noise, and everybody's just totally discombobulated, everybody's disoriented.

[39:55] And he said he has very, very heavy beard. Later in his military, he was only there for a year or so, whatever. But they used to make him shave three times a day because his beard was so fast, it grew so fast, he had to shave it every day. But his first morning there, they woke them all up and they scared the heck out of everybody. So he was 18.

[40:15] He says he had one of those straight razors, you know, the old kind, not the straight razor, but the kind you drop in, you know, the top opens, the old-fashioned kind. He said he was so scared he barbers haven't shaved. He never had a razor in there.

[40:29] He almost went out. He didn't even notice until the commanding officer or whatever told him, "Hey, got to shave." He said, "I did." My cousin was a flossy major, you know. He was in the Navy. This officer let him keep the thing, you know, his mustache, right? And so the one time they were being inspected by an upper officer coming down there, I mean, what's this man doing with?

[40:54] Oh, he was a philosophy major. Oh. See, we don't know what to do, yeah. He put on. Yeah, it's not in the it's not in the manuals. Deal with that.

[41:22] Oh, he was a monk. Can I ask about this notion of understanding moral acts either as actions or passions? It's kind of opaque to my mind. Know how an act of justice or an act of courage, or temperance, can be considered as an action or considered as a passion? How could you explain that act in terms of being an action? How can you explain it in terms of a passion?

[42:01] Is he saying that you can understand it? Well, he's saying, in a sense, that that the rational creature is moving itself to its own what end. So it's both what mover and moved, right? Would be one part would be moving, another part? Yeah, but but he's saying yeah, but but he's just starting from the idea that that you're responsible for what you do, right? You move yourself to do this, right?

[42:33] And so your your your what you do is in a way moving and a being moved, right? Okay. You speak of being motivated. Yeah. Yeah. And and can you understand the whole act in either way as an action or as a passion?

[42:56] Well, Thomas doesn't seem to be getting into that that kind of distinction right now. You know, I mean, in the strict sense of this, the idea of acting upon undergoing is tied up with motion in the in the natural philosophy, right? But

[43:22] and with what motion is in natural philosophy, right? And there, the mover and the moved are not really the same thing. But when when they distinguish between this and another kind of activity that we have, like understanding, that say or willing,

[43:51] probably the simplest way that Aristotle would distinguish between the two is by saying the one is an imperfect act, right? And the other is a perfect act. What does this mean? Well, when I'm walking home, right? Have I walked home?

[44:15] And when I'm making a chair, have I made a chair? So when I'm making a chair, I haven't made the chair. And when I've made the chair, I'm not making it.

[44:30] But now, what about seeing the Pietà or seeing a painting, right? When I'm seeing the painting, have I seen it yet? So he calls that a perfect act, right? Now it's interesting that if you look at our grammar, right? You know, you'd say

[44:58] I have walked home is perfect, right? And so you're kind of thinking of the kind of activity that is really an imperfect act, right? And that exists when it's been what? Exists when it's not complete, and when it's complete, it doesn't exist. You know, and contrast that with this operation of of understanding or sensing or even willing, right? Um, is to take an example for the ladies, especially in that class.

[45:32] When you're loving somebody, have you loved them yet? Yeah. When you're you're drinking your your your glass of water, whatever it is, have you drunk it yet? So, the kind of difference between these two activities, right? So Aristotle kind of stops there when he distinguishes these two kinds in the ninth book. There, that the happiness has to be in what. So Aristotle kind of stops there when he comes to the ninth book, right? The activity that is perfect, right?

[46:08] Okay. It can't be in walking home that kind of activity, or in making a chair, right? Okay. Because those acts are always imperfect when they are, right? And when they're completed, they don't exist anymore. So often that'd be the end, right? Okay. So it must be an activity like either sensing or understanding or loving or something of that sort, right? Okay. But I don't think he's trying to get into that distinction so much at this point.

[46:39] He's just trying to bring out kind of a likeness to what you have in the more known act, right? Where you have acting upon and undergoing, right? These two different categories, right? And

[46:59] the likeness there consists in the fact that in some way a man is said to what move himself towards what he does, huh? Okay. So and therefore

[47:15] he sees the act is in there as the beginning of it, or as the what the end, right? It's the beginning of it in so far as it's like a moving, and in there is an end, and it's like being moved, right?

[47:37] And so one, in a sense, is is choosing this act, right? The choice is always for the sake of a what end, right? So the end is

[47:51] seems to be specifying the act, right? So that what's the will, what you have in mind when you when you do this, right? And so it's the source of your act, right? But it's also what you're trying to what achieve, right?

[48:12] So he's trying to show show in that way that there's truth to saying that the end specifies the act, huh? But I think you got to be kind of careful because Thomas later on will come back and say, you know, well

[48:34] if you do an act for the sake of something else, it kind of takes on that other thing. So you know, you know, one virtue can command or another virtue, or one vice another vice, right? Thomas also gives example adultery, right? If you commit adultery in order to rob somebody, well,

[48:59] is this an act of injustice or an act of intemperance? Well, it's a bit of both, right? But it's more an act of injustice, right? I mean, a stealing, right? Because the one is being what formed by the other, right? Okay. But then, in the case of the virtues, you know, they speak of charity as being the the form of all the virtues, right? Okay. So,

[49:27] if you do something out of love for somebody, right? Is this an act of love, or what is it? If I teach you out of love, if I teach you out of love, is this an act of love or an act of teaching? Yeah, but which is more? Which is more the form of my act? Yeah, yeah. So the end, there seems, in some sense, to be more formal, right?

[50:06] It's an act of love. If mother feeds your baby, is this an act of love, or is it an act of feeding? Why, if in the old days, you know, when the child was let out to be fed by some other woman, right? Maybe that's the way she makes a living. That a different act, in a sense. I'm

[50:40] kind of surprised that he has this here, this particular article. That's why I say it kind of stands by itself, this article, right? But going back again to that last text about Moris I actually think a lot about this term, moral philosophy, and so on, and ethics, you know. But ethics has comes the word for ethos, custom, right? Well,

[51:08] why is the science named from a word that seems to mean what custom, right? Now, as you'd say, this is customary philosophy to speak in English. You use the English word for custom, right? So you've called ethical philosophy from the Greek, I guess, and moral philosophy from the what Latin? What would be the English translation of this customary philosophy?

[51:43] I have to wonder why wasn't this named more from what choice, right? Is this philosophy about things that are by choice? I choose to drink too much, or I choose to drink in moderation, or something. I choose to pay my debts, I choose not to pay them. You know, why not? Why isn't this named from choice? And choice kind of more central to what the science is about.

[52:26] Now, Aristotle defines moral virtue. He says it's a it's a habit done by choice, right? He puts choice in the definition of it, right? So, isn't ethics about things over which you have some choice?

[52:51] But maybe the customs are formed by the choices instead, and this bunch of moral choices. Yeah, yeah, Aristotle would talk about that, right? That the habits that you have by custom, you know, you are accustomed to, kind of influence your what choices, yeah, yeah. But is is custom more central, you know, than than the word choice? Why Why is this science being named from from custom rather than from choice?

[53:24] Not choosy philosophers, you know. That looks like a second nature, so. Yeah, but I mean, it certainly gives a great prominence to custom and what it comes from.

[53:41] Now you see, when he divides human virtue, you have the moral virtues and the virtues of reason. But the moral virtues seem to be named from what custom, right?

[53:53] Hence, because you become temperate, right, by repeated acts, you know, if you or you become intemperate by repeated acts of one kind, and so your customs are kind of are what give rise to this virtue or to this what vice, huh? I had a friend who would go to the bar every Friday night and every Saturday night. He and his brother and drink until closing time. I think a little bit, you know, a little bit.

[54:36] You know, they drink a little too much sometimes, you know, and so on. But you get certain virtue or vice from from custom, right?

[54:50] So a lot of ethics is taken up with describing these moral virtues, these customary virtues, customary vices, huh? Is that justified calling it, you know, customary philosophy? It's curious because that's what Saint Benedict, when he speaks about vows, it's Benedictine traditions. One of the vows is conversatio morum or conversion of morals. I think they call it moral, but it refers to the morals. And they all, at least all the translations, they all give these long explanations of why they translated it a certain way.

[55:33] They translate this as your conversion of man or a conversion of this, conversion of life, and well, it has moral connotation, obviously. It's referring to choices. Well, Aristotle talked very much of how custom influences what choice, right? Huh? Okay. So,

[55:56] now, what do you choose to eat or drink? Even you know, seems to be what you're accustomed to, right? I mean, people, you know, in different nationalities. Even though they have the same foods available in the supermarkets of the United States, right? They they might choose to eat something differently, because of custom, I guess.

[56:19] I often wondered if if I could have been brought up, you know, with fish. I know I would be. Yeah. I usually choose not to eat fish, if I could. You don't like fish? No, no, no, no. He's from the Midwest. He likes four-footed things. I I told you one time, you know, he used to come around to the house, you know, and they're selling these, you know, tickets for I mean, things to.

[56:46] No, no, discounted meals, right? And so it's all it sounds like a big deal, you know. It's kind of a nice restaurant, you know, in town. And after we looked at the tickets more carefully, they're good only for Friday nights. And this is when he had to eat fish. he could eat meat on Friday, so. But that's when I discovered in Minnesota: the Wallet Pike with almond slivers, you know.

[57:09] Ooh. And that's really good. So I'm I'm universal there, you know. And I remember one day I helped the pastry correct his exams and something like that. And so he took me out to lunch, you know, and he got a lot of fish, a lot of lemon juice on there, and so on. It's pretty good stuff, you know.

[57:27] You know, but you know, I always paraphrase. You know, the only good Indian is a dead Indian. The only good fish is a disguised fish.

[57:40] So, but anyway, you can see that custom kind of almost seems to determine what our choices will be, right? And you know, you go. I go into a restaurant, and there's you know selections there. You can almost tell what I'm going to choose, right? Um. Because I'm accustomed to choosing this, right? But on the other hand, choice gives rise to custom by repeated choices. You get a certain custom, right?

[58:06] So I I've often puzzled over that as to why it's called, presumably, moral ethical philosophy means originally customary philosophy, right? And that's just like natural philosophy is about things that are by nature. Customary philosophy is about things that are by what? Custom, yeah. That's not

[58:29] to do with it, right? We got we looked at the looked at one of the replies to the objections. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the end is not altogether something extrinsic from the what act. Because it is compared to the act as a beginning or as a limit, huh? That's the comparison he made there, right?

[59:12] And this is of the the notion of act that it be what from something as regards action, and that it be to something as regards what passion, right? Okay.

[59:34] To the second, it should be said that the end, according as it is before an intention, as has been said, in this way pertains to the will, and in this way it gives species to the human act or to the moral act, right? They're just adopting that way of speaking, right?

[59:55] To the third, it should be said that the same act in number, according as it what at once at one time goes forth from the agent, right, is not ordered except to one proximate end from which it has its what species, but it can be ordered to many remote ends, right? One of which is the end of the other, right?

[1:00:23] For it is possible for one act in the species of nature, right, to be ordered to diverse ends of the will, just as this act which is to kill a man, right, which is the same according to its natural species, huh, can be ordered towards the end to the what conservation of justice, right? And it could be ordered to satisfying one's anger with somebody, right? Okay. And from this there will be diverse acts, not in their natural species, but in their species of what morals, right?

[1:01:08] Moral act. So you'd say, you know, when the judge condemns you to death, right, and you're put to death, right, by the man out there chopping your head off, um, that is an act of justice, right? But when I get mad at you and I whack you in your head off or something, uh, that's an act of what? Injustice. Yeah, yeah, or an act of yeah, okay.

[1:01:38] And from these that there are diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it is an act of virtue, in the other way an act of what vice, Vice, huh?

[1:01:51] For motion does not receive its species from that which is a accidental term, right, but only from that which is. The per se term, right? But the moral ends happen to the natural thing, right? And reversely, the what?

[1:02:13] The ratio of the natural end happens to the moral, right? And therefore, nothing prevents acts which are the same according to the species of nature to be diverse according to the species of moral, right?

[1:02:31] It's got a subtle thing there, right? At least in that example, it's clear, right? If if I'm killing you because you've been, you know, justly guilty of something, and then this is an act of justice, right? In the other case, it's, you know, crime. I'm I'm I'm committing, right? But

[1:03:00] he's talking here about the proximate end. You know, why am I killing you? Carry out the law. Yeah. See. Or I'm killing you because I'm angry with you, right?

[1:03:18] At the same act. When the species of nature, it's the same act, right? But it's not the same act in the what? Yeah. Kind of with words here.

[1:03:45] If I had honey on my toast this morning, I'm going to call my wife honey. Same word. In one sense, it is the same word, right? In one case, it's what the name of what I had on my. See. In other case, it's a figurative thing. It's not the name of my wife. Is that any money?

[1:04:14] Um. So is it the same name? Yeah. It's got the same letters in both cases, right? Sense the same word. Yeah, but if you say that in one case it's it's a metaphor, right? It's a figurative name when you know. Doesn't seem like the same name, does it? Okay, because a metaphor is not a. Yeah, the word as we discussed before. Metaphor of any figure of speech, the word you use does not mean what you mean.

[1:05:02] When you use that word, so is it the same word? So I'm wondering about the name. What name includes in its notion the meaning of the word? See if if it includes the notion of the meaning, then it would be a different name. But if it don't include, but in some sense it's the same word because you have the same letters, same sound, and the same order, and so on.

[1:05:28] You know the letters, right? Same sound, right? But another way there seems to be a difference from if you look at it from the point of view of of the of logic or or the sciences that concern with with the sermo sinologicus, as they call them, it's not the same, right? And that's because I think if you know what a figure of speech is, then you'll know that it's not the same name because a figure of speech is precisely not to have the same meaning, right?

[1:06:00] I think that's that's what I'm trying to figure out. Say if if you understand what a figure of speech is, then you know if if name includes the meaning, that's not the same name. If if you know what a figure of speech is and you're using it, then you know you don't mean the same thing. You're not really using the same name in that sense. What's name's name?

[1:06:29] What you intend to mean? So, and you intend mean, but the name means. Because otherwise, there's no communication. But this is a healthy drinking, and somebody's drinking. Name's name, what you mean?