Prima Secundae
7. Aquinas on the Last End (Summa I-II, Q1, Art. 4): One Feast, One House, One Mutual Happiness — Why Ends Cannot Go On Forever
Class of 2011-02-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/007-aquinas-on-the-last-end-summa-i-ii-q1-art-4-one-feast-one/

[0:00] The Father, and the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deus. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order illuminate images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:38] I was reading about the angels this morning in the Summa Contra Gentiles and how they differ in that way of understanding from us. You give us a text there towards the end of the second book, but better stay off that. Interesting.

[0:52] I brought a copy here of Two Gentlemen of Verona, right? Just to expound a bit on that etymology of the word happiness, right? And got to be careful because the etymology of a word is not necessarily its what meaning, right? And because the Indo-European nomenclature, the etymology is from hap, right? It doesn't mean that you have to think of happiness as something being the result of hap, right?

[1:24] But that's where it gets the origin of its meaning, right? But like in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, he'll translate the Greek word eudaimonia by happiness, so happiness can be used as a name for the end of man, right? The Two Gentlemen of Verona begins with the scene of the Two Gentlemen of Verona, and Valentine is leaving, and Proteus is in love with Julia, and he's not ready to leave, right?

[1:55] So Valentine says the opening words: "Cease to persuade my loving Proteus, home-keeping youth have ever homely wits. Were it not affection chains thy tender days, he's tied down to Julia, to the sweet glances of thy honoured love. I rather would entreat thy company to see the wonders of the world abroad, than living dully sluggardized at home, whereout thy youth with shapeless idleness. But since thou lovest love still and thrive therein, even as I would tonight to love begin.

[2:38] And Proteus says, "Wilt thou be gone, sweet Valentine? Adieu. Now the words here: Think on thy Proteus, when thou happily seest some rare noteworthy object in thy travel. You happily seest. What does that mean? Something good to see. Yeah, something good to see, right? Okay, now the next line is more more explicit here. Wish me partaker in thy happiness, when thou dost meet good hap,

[3:17] and in thy danger, if ever danger do environ thee, commend thy grievances to my holy prayers, for I will be thy bedesman, Valentine. It's the rosary, huh? Okay, but those lines, huh? When thou, excuse me, wish me partaker in thy happiness, when thou dost meet good hap, when you have good luck, right? When you are happy, therefore, right? In the sense related to the etymology there, wish me partaker in thy happiness, huh?

[3:49] Okay. And of course, this is pertains to friendship, right? That you want to what share the happiness of your what friends, right? And you want them to share in your what happiness, huh? Now I'm not going to go through the whole play because it'd take too much time here, but

[4:12] Proteus is not only getting faithful, right, as his name indicates, huh? Amen. Proteus is the one who, in the Greek mythology there, takes on different shapes all the time, right? But at the end, he is what repentant, huh? And forgiven and reunited with Julia, forgiven by Valentine and so on for his pursuing the girl that Valentine fell in love with. Okay. And it's very good, the you know the repentance there,

[4:43] huh? Because he's about to to advance himself on Valentine's girl, and Valentine discovers them, huh? Ruffian, let go that rude and civil touch. Thou friend of an ill fashion, and Proteus, Valentine, Valentine says, "Thou common friend, that is without faith or love? For such is a friend now. Treacherous man, thou hast beguiled my hopes. Not but mine eye could have persuaded me. Now I dare not say I have one friend alive.

[5:21] Thou wouldst disprove me. Who should be trusted now, when one's right hand is perjured to the bosom? Proteus, I am sorry. I must never trust thee more. But count the world a stranger for thy sake. Sake. The private wound is deepest. O time most cursed amongst all foes that a friend should be the worst. Proteus says, "My shame and guilt confounds me. Forgive me, Valentine. If hearty sorrow be a sufficient ransom for offence, I tender it here.

[5:58] I do as truly suffer as ere I did commit. And Valentine says Then I am paid. He says, once again, I do receive the honest. Who by repentance is not satisfied, is nor of heaven nor earth. For these are pleased by penitence; the eternal, the eternal's wraths appeased. As beautifully said,

[6:26] and so he's reunited with Julia. I don't think we're going to all the complications, and he with. Anyway, the the bride of Valentine is this daughter of the Duke, right? And so the Duke is now you know in favor of Valentine too. I'm not going to all that happens, but just towards the end here now.

[6:56] He says, "The Duke, please you, I'll tell you as you pass along that you will wonder what hath fortuneed or fortunate. " By the way, it's pronounced in the English. Notice that you will wonder what hath fortunate, what has happened by fortune, right? You'll wonder because it arouses.

[7:18] Come, Proteus, 'tis your penance, but to hear the story of your loves discovered. That done, our day of marriage shall be yours. So they both get married, right? Okay, and now we come to the last line of the play.

[7:38] And I was just talking to Warren Murray on the phone this morning, because I asked him years ago. I said, "What one line in Shakespeare best describes heaven? What one line in Shakespeare?" He said, "I don't know." So anyway, I was on the phone today, so I was thinking about this, and so I asked him the same question again. You know, what one line? It's I don't know.

[8:03] So well, I asked you this, you know, years ago, Warren. And I told him then, you know, what it was, you know. Okay, now this is such a beautiful line. I have to right on the board, huh? So he says, "That done, our day of marriage shall be yours." Another last line. One feast, one house, one mutual happiness. So this is what he says: That's the last one feast, one house,

[8:41] one mutual happiness. Remember how in those opening lines, you know, wish me particular happiness, right? So if you're a friend, you want to what share your happiness, right?

[9:01] But I'm struck by this line here because. In, for example, Thomas Aquinas, right in the communion prayer, he speaks of heaven as that what ineffable convivial right, that inexpressible banquet, right? Eye has not seen, ear has not heard, presence from the heart of man the things that God has prepared for those who love Him, right? So that's usually said one feast, right? Can Christ sometimes speaks of you know you're eating at the table with my you know, same thing, right?

[9:36] And then he says one house in the fifty seven. You know, the Lord says in my Father's house there are many what mansions, right? And I remembered of reminded of John Paul II when he was dying, and you know he didn't want to he wanted to go, and he said let me go to the house. of. my father, the house of the father. He said, "Let me go to the house of the father, right?"

[10:04] So that's beautiful. Great person there, right? And then on mutual happiness, right? Talking about the last end, right? Isn't it beautifully said? And this idea of one here, huh? It's repeated over these three times. Well, that one psalm, that one thirty-two, huh? Okay. Behold how good it is for brethren to dwell in unity Is it with ancient? And he goes on saying about the oil coming down, right?

[10:36] And then it's like the dew of Hermon, right? And I think this refers to the humanity and divinity of Christ. But anyway, and then the last line, he's going to give them what eternal life. Okay.

[10:50] Well, you mean one, of course, most of all by charity, right? By mutual love, but also one in your hopes, you know, and hope, and one in your faith, and so on. So, Well what Shakespeare would put all that in one line? So I, until a better line comes up. This is, in my opinion, the one line in Shakespeare that best describes, but heaven, one feast, one house, one

[11:25] So I have a lot more respect for Two Gentlemen, of Verona, than most, you know. Incidentally, there's a Friar Lawrence in there too. You know, he doesn't. he just mentioned Friar Lawrence. But Friar Lawrence is the one who marries Romeo and Juliet, right? So he's mentioned in Verona, seeing something. Might be the same Friar Lawrence, huh? Were they Verona too. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Two households, both alike, fair Verona.

[11:53] where we lay our scene The prologue. So, beautiful play there. And could be, doesn't he have? Was it? Is one of his, one of his poems about the? It's not a sonnet, but it's about the two being one. How's it? You mentioned it before, I know. About murdered numbering, yeah, yeah, yeah. And I think of that as Two Gentlemen of Verona, and the last line, one, one, one.

[12:19] Yeah. Yeah, that's beautiful. Yeah, that's why beautifully said. Yeah. So it's something awfully rich about Shakespeare. You wonder where all this comes from, you know? It's incredible, though, huh?

[12:39] So, we're still, you know, trying to find out what happiness is, though, here, right? So we're up to Article Four here in Question One.

[12:52] To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that there is not some last end of what human life, huh? Now I'm kind of struck by this ultimus, right? That Shakespeare saves this for the very last line of the play, right?

[13:16] For ultimus, isn't that by chance that his best line in the last end should be the last line? It does. It's very strange at Shakespeare.

[13:37] The good, according to its what definition, is diffusive of itself, right? This is the famous thing that they take, especially from Dionysius, in the fourth chapter of Divine Names. And that's one of the middle terms that Thomas uses for arguing that God must be good, right? Because he's diffusivum sui, right? He bestows good things upon creation, right? So he must be good, right? If he's diffusivum sui, that's a nice middle term.

[14:14] If, therefore, what proceeds from the good, it itself is good, right? Is necessary that that good diffuses another good, okay? And that, since that will be good too, right? Then that will diffuse itself and will go on forever, right? Like these children, right?

[14:43] And thus the proceeding or going forward of good is an infinitum; it goes on forever, has no end. No end to this, huh? Okay. And then their children have children, and this will go on, you know. But the good has a notion of an end, right? So if the good goes on forever, then there's no what? Yeah. Therefore, in ends. There's a going forward in infinitum. It's a very interesting objection, right?

[15:14] It's like the guy who said, "Think about eternal life. I mean, where's it going to end? " More, he says, those things which are of reason are able to be multiplied without end.

[15:37] Hence, mathematical quantities grow forever, right, without end. For the species of numbers, an account of this are what infinite, because given any number, right, reason is able to think out a greater one. Just add one, and you got a new one, huh?

[16:02] There you go. But the desire of the end follows the grasping of reason. So, if reason doesn't give out, then it doesn't seem there's going to be any end to this desire for the end. Therefore, it seems also in ends that one goes forward forever without any end, huh?

[16:28] The translator can't retranslate and say, "Therefore, also in ends, one goes forward in infinite." Doesn't sound right in English, does it? Without end, we can say in English.

[16:44] Moreover, huh? I know that argument is from reason, right? Because the desire for the end follows the apprehension of reason. Now he argues from the will, right? Moreover, the good and the end is the object of the what? Will. But the will can reflect upon itself infinitely, right? For I can will something, right? And I can will me to will it, and thus in infinitum, right? Same thing for reason, right?

[17:22] I can know what a square is, and I can know that I know what a square is, and I know that I know that I know what a square is, and this goes on forever, right? He says the same thing with the will then, right?

[17:35] Therefore, in ends in the ends of the human will. One proceeds without end, and there's not any last end of the human will. Used to be the old program that was GE or something on TV, and saying that our most important product is progress. It's kind of endless, right? Your most important product is.

[18:04] That's so twentieth century. Yeah. But against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of wisdom, huh? Second book after the books in natural philosophy, and that's where Aristotle showing that in the philosophy. four kinds of causes, right, for each kind of cause, that there is what the first cause, right? He says that those who make the infinite without an end, they take away the nature of the what?

[18:39] Good, huh? But the good is what has the notion of an end. Therefore, it's against the the notion of the end that one proceed without enda. Is necessary, therefore, to what lay down one last what End.

[19:00] Now, in the. Body of the article. Thomas is going to show this in a very complete way. He says, "The answer it should be said, per se loquendo." Now, that's very important what he says. Per se means what? What?

[19:22] What means literally through itself, right? Okay. It's also sometimes spoken of as such, right? But through itself, as opposed to through another, or opposed to through happening, right? So he's saying per se speaking. It is impossible in ends to proceed forever from any part, right? Okay, or any side he might say in this, right?

[19:54] For in all things which have per se order to each other. It is necessary that the first removed. They removed all those things which are what Ordered to the first, To the first, yeah. Now, why is that?

[20:20] I suppose that if you're speaking in terms of ends, like we had said, if you do A for the sake of B, for the sake of C, but if you if you take away the last one, then there's no purpose in it because you have to wield the last one. Okay. Okay. What about these ten grandchildren? Right? Huh? You know, first comes Kate, and so on.

[20:49] Are they per se ordered? They're not per se ordered, right? So if Kate was not, Sarah could still have been, right? Huh? If Sarah was not, Cecilia could still have been, right? Huh? Okay. So what is the order there?

[21:14] Per se or per accidens? It belongs to wisdom to order things, right? Huh? But would Sophia? Does it belong to Cecilia? I mean, to Sophia as such, to come after Isabella? She does come after Isabella in time, but does it belong to Sophia as such?

[21:52] Or this morning I I read a chapter or two of the Summa Contra Gentiles huh? Not about. And then I read a little bit of the metaphysics, right? And so on.

[22:10] Might do a theorem of Euclid or something, right? Huh? Are these things per se ordered? Might have a cup of tea. Listen to Baron Boehm performing the twenty sixth concerto of Mozart and the twenty seventh concerto of Mozart, huh? Could I listen to the 27th without the 26th? So those are not. They're ordered in some way, you might say, but per accidens, right? Huh? Okay.

[22:50] Went to mass. Then I went drop some things off at the library. Then I had breakfast. Could I have breakfast before going to the library. Could I have breakfast before going to mass. You see. So these things are what accidentally ordered, right? Okay. But what things would be per se ordered? Huh? Well, it was a beautiful thing there in Euclid. Huh? Just tell you this the other day.

[23:19] I'm just getting kind of old now, you know, man. It's a little longer to absorb these chirurgical things. But he had this beautiful theorem. Suppose you have three numbers here, a, b, and c, right? And three other numbers we'll call x, y, and z, right? And he says, suppose

[23:53] a is to b as x is to y. Okay. So the ratio of a to b is the same as the ratio of x to y. And suppose

[24:12] b is to c as y is to z. So the ratio of b to c is the same as the ratio of y to z. Now that doesn't mean that the ratio of a to b is the same as b to c; it might be a different ratio. And the ratio of x to y doesn't mean the same as the ratio of y to z. Okay. But the ratio of a to b is the same as the ratio of x to y, and the b to c is the same as y to z.

[24:45] Okay. Now, given that, Euclid wants to show that a is to c as x is to what? Z. Now, how the hell did you do that?

[25:19] That's not a question I asked Warren on the phone this morning. This is the question: What line just fits seven? I don't know. It's a little bit.

[25:36] Too early, man. But I was so enthusiastic about the simplicity of what he does. Well, he uses an earlier theorem, right? Which is a very famous theorem about proportions, and that is if the first is to the second. As the third is to the fourth, then the first will be to the third as the second is to the what fourth. Okay, he proves that earlier, right?

[26:10] Well, how do you do that? He says, well, if A is to B as X is to Y, then you can say that A is to X as B is to Y.

[26:29] First is to the second as the third is to the fourth. Then the first will be to the third as the second is to the fourth, right? And if B C is to Y Z, then

[26:44] B is to Y as what C is to Z C is to Z. Okay. Well, then A is to X as B is to Y, and C is to Z as B is to Y. Therefore, A is to X to Z as C is to Z. And then using the same thing again. First to third again. Yeah. Then A is to C as

[27:21] X is to Z. X is to Z. Yeah. I do that. Yeah. Okay. Because I just delighted. I didn't jump before I read the tickets. It does. It's absolutely beautiful. You know.

[27:46] Incredible. But notice how one of these theorems comes before the other, right? The theorem that if the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth, then the first is to the third and the second is to the fourth, right? Okay. So is the order of this before this accidental? No. And it follows simply from that. And I said, James, how do you figure that out?

[28:16] You better figure it out first, right? That's absolutely beautiful. Incredible. Incredible. One thing after another like that, huh? Okay. When the American poetess said, "You know, you could alone is looked upon beauty itself," right? Pretty good for a poet to say that, right? An American poet, you said. Yeah. Yeah. Emily Dickinson, I think was. Okay.

[28:46] Now, if you go back, this theorem that if the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth. Then the first will be to the third, the second is the fourth. That depends upon other premises. Does that go on forever?

[29:08] I have to get back to something that is what obvious, right? And then proceed step by step, right? Until I get to that theorem, and then from that theorem to this theorem, right? Okay, and then I'm all set, right? Okay. And this can't be endless, can it? So it's got to be limited from the the starting point to the last theorem I do, right? Okay.

[29:49] Once the philosopher proves in the eighth book of the physics, that it is not possible in moving causes to proceed in infinitum. because. Already there would not be a first mover. Who being taken away, others are not able to what move? Since they do not move except by this that they are moved by the what first mover? Okay.

[30:20] Was that true about me listening? I I what? I must have read the Summa Contra Gentiles before I listened to the twenty sixth concerto because I can't listen to twenty sixth concerto without having read them. Huh? Was that an order that I impose upon myself in a kind of arbitrary way that I better read some Summa Contra Gentiles before I listen to the Mozart? Huh?

[30:45] Okay. It was a famous inventor Telsa, I think the name was. Who? Tesla. He was Hungarian and immigrant and real competitor of Thomas Edison. Yeah. Speaking of per accidents or per per se, in order to enjoy his dinners at the Waldorf Astoria, yeah, he had to first calculate the cubic volumes of every vessel and plate and bowl. Yeah.

[31:11] And then he had to wipe them all out with a napkin, a separate napkin each. I think if I remember correctly. Yeah. Is that per accidents or? It is to see it shrink. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But that's interesting from the point of view of you know psychology, right? Because people do get these sort of things in their their head, right? You know, and and they can't depart from them, right?

[31:34] Kind of a form of scruples. or something. Yeah, but it's not a necessary thing, right? Okay. Okay. So let's go a little back to Aristotle's proof there a little bit, just touch upon a bit. Because what Aristotle does in the lower sciences and more particular sciences, you'll see one of these things shown. Like in the physics, right, the first book in natural philosophy, you learn that there is a first mover, right.

[32:08] And in the Nicomachean Ethics, you saw a bit even in the proemium, right, that there is a first end, right, which is the last end, right, first in one way and last in another way. And in logic, you learn, you know, that there's not always what. Not every statement is what a conclusion. Yeah. You know, once you see that a particular statement can be both a conclusion and a premise, right?

[32:38] So there's this theorem say that you know if the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth, the first will be to the third, as the second is to the fourth? That's both a conclusion in geometry, right? And it's a premise, right? Okay. But then the question is, is every premise a conclusion?

[33:00] Well, of course, that's going to be shown to be impossible, right? Huh? Because in that case there'd always be a proof presupposed to proving anything, and you couldn't even begin because any statement you'd begin to use to prove something, someone'd say, "Now before you use that to prove something, prove it." And then whatever you use to prove it, they'd say, "Now before you, you know." So,

[33:27] but it's kind of a similar argument in all these cases. You could say that a statement that is in need of proof cannot be used to prove something before it itself is proven, right?

[33:44] So if you take away the statement before it, it won't be accepted, right? And but if all statements of that sort, then the whole chain of them are what?

[34:01] They're one chain in need of proof, right? But there's nothing before them, right? Because everything is of that sort, okay? So but like with with a train in the case of the mover, right? You say, well,

[34:18] suppose there is a a railroad car, and it can't initiate motion, right? Can't move itself, but if it's moved by something else, it can move something. Okay. Now if the thing that's moving it is of the same sort,

[34:38] are you going to get any motion? No. So and does it make any difference whether you have one or two or ten or fifteen ones of that sort? They're like one great what moved mover, not an unmover, right? And so one grand move mover presupposes a mover, but if every mover is of that sort, it's included in that what group of move movers, right? The one grand move mover, right?

[35:11] I mean all all the the cars between the the what the engine and the caboose, right? Are like one grand moved what mover, right? That whole series of cars in between the two moves the caboose insofar as it's being moved by the engine, right? But if all you had was was railroad cars, then you'd have no what motion, right? Okay. So they're per se ordered, right? huh?

[35:40] In that sense one moves only insofar as it's being moved by another, right? That's what it means to be per se ordered, right? Okay.

[35:55] So in the case of these theorems here, I learned that theorem. That a will be to c as x is to z. I learned that through the theorem about the first is to the second as the third is the fourth. The first will be to the third as the second is to the fourth, right? I learned that.

[36:17] But did I learn how to hear Mozart's Twenty Six Piano Concerto through doing that chapter in Summa Contra Gentiles? Did I? I don't think so. Because they're accidentally ordered, right?

[36:39] Okay. Now he says in ends there is found a twofold what order, right? To wit, the order of intention and the order of execution of carrying out. And in both orders is necessary for there to be something first. For that which is first in the order of intention is as the beginning moving the what desire, right?

[37:11] Whence the beginning taken away, the desire would be moved by nothing, right? So the question is, can the first thing you you want be a means?

[37:29] No. And so the first thing you want must be an end, right? And not a means to what? Something else, right? And the means as means cannot be willed without willing be what? The end, yeah. So he says that which is first in the order of intention, the end, is as a beginning moving desire or wanting. Whence the beginning subtracted or taken away, the desire would be moved by what?

[38:08] Nothing. And then the other order he talks about. Says in infinitum inveniatur duplex order, right? That's one order, the order of intention. The other is order of carrying out. That which is the beginning in execution is whence the what operation begins. Whence that beginning taken away, no one would what? Do it. Yeah, yeah. Now these two orders are kind of contrary, right? So you might say,

[38:44] I want to be happy, okay. Therefore, I want to get rid of my headache, right? I wouldn't want to get rid of my headache if I didn't want to be happy, okay? How can I get rid of my headache? Well, by by taking an aspirin, right? So now I want to take an aspirin, right? Okay.

[39:10] Now what? Now I want an aspirin. I don't have any aspirins. I heard they have in the drugstore. Now I want to go to the drugstore, right? Okay.

[39:23] Now I finally come to something I can do. I can walk or drive to the what? Drugstore, right? And then I'll get the aspirin. Then I'll take the aspirin. Then I'll get rid of the headache, and then I'll be on my way to happiness.

[39:45] Or at least happier than you were before. Yeah. So he says there's got to be beginning in both, right? Huh? And in the order of intention, the beginning is wanting to be happy, right?

[39:59] If I didn't care, whether I was happy. or Miserable, I wouldn't be wanting to get rid of my headache, right? The difference is that I'm happy, miserable, right? Okay. And there wasn't something I could begin to do, the first step I could take, right? Now sometimes you hear people and they're all confused about something, some situation in life, you know, and they'll say I don't know where to begin, right?

[40:22] But until they find a place where they can begin to face their problem, whatever it is, then they they can't do anything, right? Okay.

[40:36] So he says the beginning of intention is the last end. The beginning of execution of carrying it out is the first of those things which are towards the end.

[40:51] Thus, therefore, on the side, and you decide, right? Is it possible to proceed, but forever, right? Okay. So someone comes to me and he says, Berkwist, I've heard about this famous Pythagorean theorem, and could you show that to me, huh? " I said, "Well, the only proof I know of the Pythagorean theorem is Proposition forty-seven in Book one of Euclid, right? " Now before you can understand forty-seven, you've got to understand forty-six.

[41:27] Before you can understand forty-six. But if there's always something I'd understand before you could do, could you begin to understand that famous theorem? Take it back to something that's already now in your power because it's obvious, right? Okay.

[41:55] Because if there was not a last end, nothing would be what desired, right? Nor would any action be ended, right? Nor would the intention of the agent what come to a rest. If, however, there was not something first in those things which are towards the end, no one would begin to what do anything, huh? Nor would consul terminate, right? Like I was going through a certain consul there, I won't give him a headache.

[42:25] How can I do that? Take an aspirin. Won't work. Take an aspirin, so on, right? So it's kind of a thing. They would proceed forever, right?

[42:35] But those things which do not have an order per se, but are joined to each other per accidens, huh? Nothing prevents them from having a what infinity, huh?

[42:49] For accidental causes are un what determined, huh? And in this way, huh? It happens that there is an infinity of procedentes and ends, and in those things which are what to the end, huh? So after I do Thomas and the Summa Contra Gentiles and a chapter in the Metaphysics, I might do what a theory of Euclid, I might do one of the Psalms, I might you know go on forever, right?

[43:22] A very unproductive life, huh? No problem. So what about the first objection here about the good is diffusive of itself, right? To the first thing says it should be said that it's of the notion of the good that something what flows from it, right? Because of its perfection. Not, however, that it itself proceeds what from another, huh? And therefore, since the good has the notion of an end, and the first good is the what last end,

[44:15] that argument does not prove that there is not a last end, but rather that from the first end being supposed, right, one proceeds forever, right, downward, right, towards those things which are what for the end, huh?

[44:37] And this would be fitting or belong if one considers only the what power, right, of the what first good, huh? Which is what infinite God's power, right?

[44:55] But because the first good, meaning God, has diffusion by his understanding, huh? Of which it what is to what go forward or flow over into the cause according to some what certain form, huh? Some certain mode is what applied of goods to what flow from the first good by which all other goods partake of a what diffusive power, huh?

[45:34] And therefore, the diffusion of goods does not proceed forever, but as is said in Wisdom chapter eleven, God disposes all things in number, weight, and what measure, huh? So if we just consider the infinity of God's power, it could go on forever, right? But if you consider the fact that he exercises power through what his understanding and reason always acts with a view to some what definite end.

[46:10] That's one of the arguments, incidentally, that Aristotle uses in the second book of Wisdom. You know that there'd be no acting for what by mind, right? If there was no end.

[46:26] So you know sometimes you know you say you know the kids when when they're little they say Daddy can you count to a hundred? I said yeah. Wow, you know. Then a few months or I don't know how much later, you know Daddy can you count to a thousand? I said yes.

[46:44] But you know someone is is is counting to come to the end of numbers, right? I count to a hundred so I can count to a thousand. I count to a thousand so I can count to what

[46:58] a million. I count to a million so I can count to I don't know what comes next. And always I count to this, I can count to something further. Is there anything reasonable about this?

[47:23] I'm not acting out of mind, right? I'm aiming always at something more than I can ever what achieve, right? So can that be my goal? No goal for me to aim at, really, in this case, right? Progress is our most important product.

[47:49] It used to be you know you see every night once a week at this whatever this TV program was and and there was the in their advertisement for the company, right? And you hear our most important product is progress. Great slogan. Yeah.

[48:06] But I think I think the average academic nowadays, you know, they think of you know when knowledge just keeps on what growing, right? Huh? And you're trying to advance your art or your science, wherever it is, right? And if people come after you, advance it further, and you come after them, advance it even further, and there's no what. No reason. Yeah. You don't realize there's something something irrational, unreasonable about that.

[48:47] There's one thing we want to know really in the end, which is the first cause, right? Just God Himself. And then why do you want all that for? Well, there's no other reason, right? Itself, what? Explained, right? Why do you want to see wisdom for right? It's so in the end. Okay. It's beautiful, right? When St. Bernard Clairvaux says, you know, the reason for loving God is God himself, right?

[49:19] No reason. That's it. It's funny, I think you know they don't think about what they're really doing, right? And they're all working to for the progress of their art or science. I think it's going to go on forever, right? Increase Increasing human happiness. They're always increasing human happiness by new invention. Yeah. Maybe Maybe they're happy. Yeah. That's what they say. You know, kind of, you know, all the satire of Americans, you know, but. Happiness is always one purchase away.

[50:09] So they convince you, as Father Harden would say, they convince you to buy things you don't need with money you don't have. Yeah. But sometimes you know you wonder about that, huh? Because

[50:31] the Greeks said the seven wise men said nothing too much, right, huh? Okay. But can you love God too much, or can you what know God too much?

[50:50] No, he's always more. Can always praise God more, right, huh? Can always love God, huh? And as we, the creature, can never love God as much as He is what loveable, right, huh? The only one that can love God as much as God is loveable is God Himself, right, huh? And can the creature ever know God as much as He is knowable, right?

[51:22] Only God can know God as much as God is what Knowable, right? But sometimes you know you think about heaven. You say, "Well, I'm here down kind of the lower ranks or somewhere, and up there is Saint Peter, and he understands and knows God more than I do, right, huh? Wouldn't I have a a desire to know God more in heaven, right? Never disturb the tranquility of heaven with my desire to know God more, huh?

[52:05] Or is it that in heaven I will want to know God as much as God wants me to know Him? Kind of hard to understand, but it seems to be what the truth must be, right, huh? That if you get to heaven, your will is entirely conformed to God's will, right?

[52:34] And then you don't want to know God more than God wants you to know Him. You had to say that, wouldn't you? I don't know what else to say. But it's kind of

[52:48] contrary to our experience, you know. Like they say, I go back and read Euclid now, and I say, "Gee, was I? I really don't understand this stuff very well. I can understand a lot better, right, huh? " And you know, you know, I'll go through my favorite book, "Summa Contra Gentiles," or go through the metaphysics and. You know, like De Koninck said, right? You know, he's been teaching physics since 1935 there at Laval, and I had him in the what the 50s, the late 50s, and he said, "I still want to see something new, and I what go through it, right?

[53:24] So you kind of always want to understand these things better. You want to understand the Posterior Analytics better, right? And so you say, why wouldn't that be so in heaven, right? It's gonna be hard to figure, right?

[53:45] I suppose God gives you know us an equal minds too, right? Huh? And I'll never understand these things as well as Euclid does, or as well as Aristotle does, or as well as Thomas does. You know, maybe God didn't intend for me to understand these things as well as these guys did, right? Huh?

[54:14] My days are numbered. I don't know what the number is, but they are numbered, right? He made everything a number, right? And so my days are numbered, right? So there's even a limit as to how much I'm going to understand these things in this life, right? How

[54:33] much your weight is not number? Yes, it is. Yeah. How much your weight? How much do you weigh? How much do you weigh? No more, no less. You've got a number. Nobody can increase. It'll increase only to another number. That's all. It can decrease to another number.

[54:58] Here with the quality of our cooks. It's easy. It's not going to increase. So in God, in creating, according to His own mind, right? Huh? You know, does He intend me to always understand Him more than I do, or is there some limit that He's aiming at? Huh? That's it for you, Dwight. Yeah.

[55:29] So in heaven, we don't grow in knowledge of God. I don't think so. Not essentially, no, no. You get a certain a certain light of glory, right? A certain measure of light of glory, and that's it for you. You'll be full.

[55:49] My cup will be full. Your cup will be full. You won't complain. And you know, Saint Teresa of the Syllian talks about that. You know that how I be satisfied, right? You know, my cup is full, as you say, right? But your cup, you know, holds more, right? Huh? But I suppose you know. Now I find my appetite for food is less than was right. I still like steak, but I don't need as much piece of steak as they do now.

[56:17] I've got some young guy there eating more steak than I can, you know. And for me, if I try to eat that much steak, now I just get sick to my stomach, I suppose. Or just you know how you you're full, you're full. So I suppose that something like that, huh? If you can, it's kind of almost metaphor, but it helps you to understand, I suppose, you know, in a way proportion to us, right?

[56:43] I'm full. Feast, but all on equally, right? At the feast, right? On the food channels like that, they have you know these people in the hot dog eating contests, and I've got what the number is, you know, how many fifty two hot dogs? Well, whatever they eat, you know. But I have no desire to enter the competition with these these giants, you know.

[57:16] Freaking. Okay. Now, the second objection that reason right can multiply things in the finitum, right? To the second, it should be said that in those things which are per se, reason begins from beginnings naturally known, right? And it goes forward to some what term, some end. Whence the philosopher proves in the first book of the post Analytics that in demonstrations there is not a going forward in infinity, right?

[58:08] Because in demonstrations there is to preserve the order of some things that are per se connected with each other, huh? And not what per accidens, huh?

[58:28] But in those things which are connected per accidens, nothing prevents reason from proceeding, right? Forever, right? Now it happens to quantity or to a pre-existent number, as such, that there be added what quantity or a unit, right? Whence in things of this sort, reason proceeds. Nothing prevents reason from what going on forever. Those kind of infinite, right?

[59:05] Aristotle's styles taking up the infinite there in the third book and physics and different reasons why people think the infinite exists. Right, and one is that the reason never gives out.

[59:23] But reason can make a kind of what mental multiplicity there, right? Which is no really great significance, but it can get as much as it wants, right?

[59:38] Socrates is Socrates. Now Socrates is found what twice. So this one man is found twice in that sentence, right? And then I can come back and say Socrates is Socrates is the statement Socrates is Socrates. Now I got four Socrates, right? And I can say that whole thing is itself, right? And uh I can get as many Socrates. as I want right More than you want. He kind of was refuting Bertrand Russell, you know.

[1:00:09] Bertrand Russell was trying to prove that the part is equal to the whole, right? And this is the way he did it. you see. I think I, mentioned this before. You call it.

[1:00:29] If you set up a table here with all numbers, for the moderns, one's a number. You get one, two, three, four, five, etc. And if I take the double of each one, right? Two, four, six, eight, ten. In this left series here, you have all the numbers, right? Okay. In the second series, you've got only what even numbers, right? Now, will there be an even number for every number over here?

[1:01:07] Yeah. Just take the double, right? So no matter how far you go, there's going to be one number in the second list here, the list of even numbers, for every number in the list of all numbers, right? Okay. So therefore, the even numbers are equal to all numbers, right? But the even numbers are only a part of all numbers. Oh. So therefore, the part is the part is equal to the whole, right?

[1:01:37] That's not just mirrors. That's smoke and mirrors. Yeah. He kind he kind of said because of this, huh? We're just talking about that, right? Socrates is Socrates, Socrates is Socrates, Socrates is Socrates, right? I don't need all the even numbers. I can just take what.

[1:01:57] You see, because here you've got kind of mental multiplicity, right? Huh? So you're confusing that with the real one, right? Huh? How can you use two twice, right? Well, you can use not just twice, but you can use it as many times as you want to, right? So you're giving a kind of what mental multiplicity in place of the real multiplicity, right? That's kind of subtle thing.

[1:02:24] This objection of Bertrand Russell, he's getting applied for, right? You know there's something wrong here, because you know that a whole is always more than one of its parts, right? But you got a different kind of multiplicity over here, right? Like if I say, you know that

[1:02:44] Sophia is equal to all of you, right? Because Sophia, Sophia, and Sophia, Sophia is Sophia, Sophia, right? All that is itself, and so on. I can get more Sophias than there are people in this room, right? So, okay, or I can take one of you and multiply you in that same way, right? I can say Duane Berquist is Duane Berquist and the statement Duane Berquist is Duane Berquist is Duane Berquist, and the whole statement is itself, right?

[1:03:16] And so on. So you can get more Duane Berquists here than you have what monks, monks here, right? So even though I want a part of this group here,

[1:03:29] but this multiplication of Duane Berquist is what not a multiplication of real being, huh? Thank God, but it's a what mental, you see, okay? And Aristotle in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? He distinguishes the senses of what

[1:03:59] of being, right, huh? And then he distinguishes between the being that is only in reason and the being that is in things, right? And the being in the mind he talks, takes up with the true and false, right? Was it true that Socrates is Socrates? Yeah, and is it true that Socrates is Socrates is Socrates is Socrates, and so on? But that kind of being is is what being a reason, right?

[1:04:32] It's not a being in things out here. There's only one Socrates out here, right? Virginia Woolf had a famous quote. I don't know why it's famous, but a rose is a rose is a rose. Yeah, yeah. Why is that famous? It's memorable.

[1:04:51] You remember it? Because it was so odd, you know. Yeah, yeah. If you could express any more than than it is itself, right? Okay. We we might say God is God, right? Nothing else. But are there two gods now?

[1:05:12] But reason can take what is one in what reality, right? And make two of it in the mind, right? Socrates is Socrates. I've taken the one Socrates and I've made two of him, right? Not in reality, outside the mind, but in the what the mind, right? Intellectus est in ...

[1:05:39] Doesn't Bonaventure have that if God is God then God is? That's not St. Augustine. I think St. Augustine. Something like that. But you know, Boethius says nothing is more true than to say Socrates is Socrates, right? It's more true than to say a thing is itself, right? But that's the kind of being that is what true and non-being is false, right?

[1:06:08] So in a sense, Bertrand Russell is confusing different senses of what being, right? When he says that the even numbers are equal to what to all numbers, yeah. I I told you my law when I used to use the students there, you know, where I'd get them to mix up two different senses of whole and part, right? But the word "being" is even more difficult than the word "whole" and "part," right?

[1:06:36] But this is the as Aristotle says, the most common mistake is mistake for mixing up words. Huh? I was reading Monsignor Dionne's lectures there one year. Le mot is a logique, the word in logic, right? But because we don't see directly our thoughts, right? We have to kind of work through our words, huh? And therefore, get into all these what troubles, right? Only only a reason, only an understanding depends upon the senses.

[1:07:11] Could think there's one thing there or there's one sound, right, or one word. But we we do make that kind of mistake. Very common, huh?

[1:07:27] Okay. To the third, it should be said, huh? That that multiplication of the acts of the will, reflecting upon itself, has itself procedens to the order of what ends, huh?

[1:07:48] Which is clear from this that about one and the same end, indifferently once or many times, the will reflects upon itself, right? Okay. St. Thomas will talk about that when he talks about charity, right? Huh? What are you supposed to love by charity, right? Well, obviously God and your your neighbor, right? And but also yourself, huh? But are you supposed to love charity by charity, huh? You know, because in some sense you can love that you what love, yeah, yeah.

[1:08:29] And then can you love that you love that you love, right? See, but that could be any number of times, right? Huh? It's indifferent, right? Doesn't matter say about that, huh?

[1:08:43] I often think about the fact that I think I know this, and I say I don't think I know that. Ah. But I don't think I'd go often much further than that, right?

[1:09:02] And say that I know that I know that I know, right? So it's kind of accidental, right? I suppose I I want to know God. I want to know other things too, but I want to know that I know God, right?

[1:09:26] Yeah. Should we take a little break now?