Prima Secundae
12. Why Happiness Is Not Power, Bodily Goods, or Pleasure (ST I-II q.2 aa.4-6)
Class of 2011-03-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/012-why-happiness-is-not-power-bodily-goods-or-pleasure-st-i/

[0:00] Now, whether the power, whether the beatitude of man consists in power? Okay. Who wants power? Politicians. Politicians, yeah. To the fourth, then one proceeds thus: it seems that beatitude consists in power.

[0:34] So this is more known to you, isn't it? than the true, beatitude. It's more known to you. That's a little different because Aristotle doesn't really do that clearly. I mean, it kind of well, you know, makes sides to you know the multitudes view, you know, what happiness is and so on. But but it doesn't have kind of a formal treatment of false happiness and then true happiness.

[0:58] But Thomas is kind of following the great Boethius there. Interesting. False happiness is more known to us than true happiness. That's what Chesterton says about truth is necessarily stranger than fiction, and he gives the reason why: He says because fiction is a product of our mind, and truth isn't.

[1:23] He's right. To the fourth, one proceeds thus: it seems that beatitude consists in power, huh? For all seek to be like God as a last end in the first what beginning of all things.

[1:43] But men who are in power, on account of the likeness of power, most of all seem to be God to be conformed to God. So notice what we say in the creed there: I believe in God, the Father. Almighty. Yes, that's the first thing, right? Okay.

[2:02] Whence also in Scripture they are called gods, huh? As is clear in Exodus twenty-two, you will not detract from the gods, huh? Therefore, beatitude consists in power, huh? That convinces me, huh? I'll be most like God. Almighty when I'm, powerful, and commanding you guys. Christ, master. Throw it away. That's what Lord Acton said: all power tends to corrupt and. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. I explained the Bible a little bit.

[2:43] No, he was corrupt. Moreover, beatitude is a perfect good. But what is most perfect is that man can also what rule others, right? Which belongs to those who are constituted in power. Therefore, beatitude consists in power. Aren't the most excellent men those who command others? Right? How can you command others unless you have power over them? Right? So power will put you in that status of commanding and ruling others, huh?

[3:20] Commander in chief. Yep. Yeah. Remember President Kennedy saying that the first thing kind of amazed him was that one's orders are not carried out in the government. Get lost somewhere down in the bureaucracy, you know. You don't just say you do this and it doesn't get done at all.

[3:41] Ask the Pope about that one. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I mean, you see, an organization, you know, the college, like the actual president or whoever it is, people, you know, drag their feet and doesn't get done. Like disobedient children. Yeah, yeah. Like Stalin, they maybe obey a little more.

[4:03] Put the fear of God in them. Moreover, beatitude, since it is most desirable, right, It is opposed to that which is most of all to be fled from. But men most of all flee servitude, to which is opposed power. Therefore, in power, beatitude what consists? Huh?

[4:35] So, what do you think about power? Impossible. But against this, beatitude is a perfect good. But power is most of all imperfect, huh? For as Boethius says in the third book of the Consolation, human power, huh,

[5:06] expels what? You leave the cravings of care. Yeah, The anguish, I guess. Anguish. Anguish of care. Yeah. It doesn't know how to avoid the what darts of

[5:23] yeah of the anxiety. Yeah. And moreover, the one what? Judge powerful, I guess. It depends upon the ones, huh? What would you say? Those whom he himself terrifies himself more fears, right? Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants whom he inspires with fear. indeed. or whom he fears still more. Yeah. Like Stalin, right, always. Yeah, yeah. Don't yeah. Keep your back against the wall.

[6:07] He's always knocking off those guys who've been close to him, right? huh? Yeah. You read about the ancient tyrants, you know, and of course, you know, you had to, have this, you know, shave by somebody, you know, and the only person who had shaved them was their daughter, you know. They couldn't trust any man to shave them with the blade.

[6:33] That's kind of the standard thing. Have your daughter shave you. That's why monks grow beards. That's why monks grow beards. Yeah, well, I was a little bit curious about James the First of Scotland, you know, and and because he was eventually killed when he was king, you know, huh? But all the dangers in those days, right? I mean, you were always bumping somebody off. that you thought was about to bump you off, just, you know, terrible chaos, you know.

[7:06] Yeah. What good is that power though? when you have all that that uh, fear of your associates there. I just read Jesse Jack- Jesse Jackson's I think it's his half brother or it's his brother. I'm not sure which one. And uh, he's in prison because he bumped. He either he did or he attempted to bump off some business people. It's not. That's that's his. You know, the man is not even with God.

[7:37] I know the story. He was shaving the abbot, and the abbot started to insult him with something. He said, "One more word, out of you and I'll...

[7:48] And he meant it. Yeah. yeah. He says, "Answer. It should be said that it's impossible that beatitude consists in power. " Having impossibility for Thomas, huh?

[8:08] On account of two reasons. First, because power has the notion, the aspect of a beginning, huh? As is clear in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle takes up the word beginning, right? It's in the fourth sense of beginning, huh? But beatitude has the definition of a last end, huh? Okay.

[8:36] That's interesting. Just give that first reason. That was quick. Yeah. Quick reason. I mean, actually, power is is what an ability to do something, right? Huh? And so it's you know, source of something, but not the end itself, huh? Just like the ability to see is for the sake of seeing, right?

[9:04] Can't be the end itself, huh? And this next argument is one that I remember being given by the great Boethius. Secondly, because power has itself to the good and to the bad, right?

[9:24] So beatitude is the what proper and perfect good of man, huh? So not open to good and bad, right? Whence beatitude is more able to consist in some good use of power, right? Which would be through virtue, right? Than in the power itself, right? So most men abuse their power, right? In the book of the rhetoric, there, when Aristotle's talking about the emotions and He's talking about the emotion of fear and the things that are to be feared, right?

[10:01] And he says one thing to be feared is to be in the power of another man, because as it really says, men do evil whenever they can.

[10:11] So I told you that story, you know, running into the student there when I was teaching at St. Mary's, and he's still kind of hazing, the freshman, you know, and the sophomore that had been in class, you know, he's standing around this poor freshman carrying his books for him, you know, and because I I cut him out, I saw this, he he cut out though, he says, you know, power of course, he says, what do you expect?

[10:33] Well, there's no power he had with this kid, you know, look he's making do this. If he had absolute power, what would he? But he he would just be completely corrupt.

[10:49] Now, what is Thomas doing here? In the next paragraph, huh? He's going to knock down what many birds with one stone, right? A number of stones. It's possible, however, to bring in four what general reasons to showing that in none of the foregoing, right?

[11:16] Does what? In none of the foregoing exterior goods does beatitude consist, right, huh? Of which the first is that since beatitude is the highest or the greatest good of man, right, huh? It does not suffer with itself something what bad, huh? It's not compatible with itself and something bad, right, huh? But all the foresaid can be found both in the good and in the bad. This is an argument that Thomas gives against all these in the Summa Contra Gentiles but which Boethius before him has given in the third book there, the Consolation of Philosophy.

[11:59] So you can have the bad as well as the good being famous, right? For having glory, right, huh? And you can have them being honored, right, uh? And having them being wealthy, right, huh? The good and the bad can be wealthy, right? Probably more than that, but the good can be wealthy, And so the bad can be powers, but just the good and they they tend to be, huh?

[12:28] Okay. So that's one reason against all those things, huh? The second reason is because since of the definition of beatitude is as Aristotle teaches in the first book of the Ethics that it be enough to itself, huh?

[12:51] It is necessary that beatitude having been attained. No good necessary to man will be what lacking, right? But having attained each of the foregoing, there is possible to be many goods necessary to man to be lacking, as example, wisdom, right? The health of the body and things of this sort, right?

[13:24] You heard that story. of Euclid teaching the king geometry, and you know, well, I'm a king, isn't there some you know quick way for me to get this? And that's what Euclid is supposed to. do. There's no royal road to geometry, right? Okay. But also, you know, what does profiting me? You know, and he says, because I want to slave, you know, here, pay him, a drop or whatever it is, so every theorem he learns, right?

[13:53] He's profiting nothing, though. So not even geometry will be found, right? These things, huh? Okay. Third, because since beatitude is a what perfect good, right? Huh? From beatitude, is not possible that some evil what come to one, right? Which does not belong to the foregoing. For it's said in Ecclesiastes 5: 12 that wealth is riches are sometimes what conserved in the harm of their oh Lord, huh?

[14:37] And similarly clear in the other three, right? Some men are killed because of their power, and some because of their fame, or so on. Some of the wealth.

[14:52] Fourth, because the fourth reason is because man is ordered to beatitude through interior what beginnings. Since to it he is naturally ordered, right? But the foregoing goods are more from exterior cause, and ut plurimum, for the most part, from what fortune, and that goes back to the origin of the what etymology of the word happiness, right? Okay. Now you don't have to use happiness for this false happiness, because the

[15:34] and the etymology of the word, doesn't have to be its meaning, right? But you've got to see that that etymology kind of shows the order, right? False happiness is more known than what true happiness. Fortuna is the word for hap or luck in in Latin, huh? So. The truth, all things. Whence, these are called the bona fortuna, right? Thomas often talks about the Boethius, before that,

[16:09] I mentioned before how Aristotle in the Ethics uses the word eudaimonia, but in the book on the Poetic Art, he uses the word eutychia, good fortune, right? Good luck.

[16:29] So the monk that Friar Lawrence sends to tell Romeo what really happened gets what, waylaid, so to speak, right? And doesn't get the word to Romeo and all this terrible thing happened because of that, right? Bad luck, eh? Whence, it is clear that in the foregoing, in no way can beatitude what, consist. Okay.

[16:57] That's interesting that he kind of groups those together, huh? Because bodily pleasure maybe is going to come up in the next, not the next one, the one after that, right? Sixth one, you know. Aristotle himself, you know, in the Ethics, in the tenth book, when he comes back to to say more distinctly what happiness is or what eudaimonia is, then he also takes up pleasure, right, huh?

[17:25] Since that has a great likeness to it, it's, huh? So Thomas sees a kind of distinction there. So that second paragraph, then, second part of the response there, is in order to overthrow all the ones that have been considered up to this point, right? Okay. So he gives in the beginning there are two reasons that are particularly addressed to power, right, huh? And then he has four general reasons, huh?

[18:17] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the divine power is the same thing as his own what, goodness, right? Hence, he cannot use his own power except well. Now, that's not true about us, I guess, huh?

[18:38] Our own, our powers are our goodness, and and we can be have power without having goodness. But this is not found in men, huh?

[18:49] Hence, it does not suffice for the beatitude of man. That he be like God as regards power, unless he also be like Him as regards goodness. Huh? That's a beautiful, isn't that a beautiful reply?

[19:11] The second should be said that just as it is optimum, huh, best, that someone uses well power in the rule of many, right? So it is most bad if he badly what uses it, huh?

[19:29] And thus power, and human power, has itself both to the good and to the what bad, huh? Like bad men, that's the question people ask. Why do bad men seem to be those who most of all get power, get the most power? It's the power that Stalin. had, or the power that Hitler had, you know. You know, I mean, if Hitler had gotten the e bomb, you know, before we did, and he had bombed, you know, New York City like you bombed some Japs Japanese cities, I don't know what would have happened.

[20:13] You know, we'd all be Nazis, I guess. I don't know. Yeah. You'd see, not have hesitated to use them on London and on New York City and the rest of it. You know. Let's imagine the power the man would have.

[20:32] That's when they convinced you know Einstein, you know, to write Roosevelt. You know, we don't know what they're doing over there in Germany, so we better get working on this. You know.

[20:44] A lot of them kind of regretted that they had invented the atom bomb, but you know, given the circumstances, you know, it's it's too dangerous not to to do so, huh? In addition to the bomb, they had worked on a very long-range bomber which could fly over the North Pole and bomb the Midwest, I guess, and New York too, and they would have been available pretty soon had the war continued much longer.

[21:08] And they could have carried the bomb down to Chicago, then. I don't know if it would have been a big loss. Would have prevented a lot. Would have been like Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Would have prevented more damage, more problems in the United States. You might never heard of Barack Obama. I read. I read sometimes about you know they're sending scientists over to Germany there to see what Heisenberg was doing, you know, and you know instructions, you know, that if he's actually working the bomb, pull him off and so him off and so.

[21:42] So he's lucky he survived the whole thing. They were uncertain about what. They were uncertain about Heisenberg's work. Didn't know what he was doing. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That's a joke, actually. The uncertainty. Oh yeah. No.

[21:57] You know they made a they made a play there about you know Copenhagen right? You heard about that play there? It's about when Heisenberg went to see Bohr there during the war, you know, and Bohr was very suspicious of Heisenberg. They had been very good friends, right? They worked very closely in the development of quantum theory and so on, but but. Much I'm not much sure Heisenberg was a nationalist.

[22:22] They weren't sure of you know. You know, at one point he almost got eliminated by the Nazis. His mother is supposed to have called one of the Nazi mothers and said, "Now we're mothers. We we can we can handle this." So,

[22:49] but Hitler didn't realize the full potentialities of the. Atom bomb, right? He kept on talking about these super weapons at the end. There, you know, but they were they were less than the bomb. But they say if we'd gotten the E-bomb before, Germany had surrendered, we probably would have used it on them too, you know, like we did the Japanese.

[23:15] Well, anyway, why did why did a very bad one like that seem to get the most power, though? That's what Jeremiah asks. Hopkins has a poem that starts off with that. It's because he quotes the Latin "Iustus quidem es tu, Domine. You are just, oh God. Yeah, I have no complaints. But why does the way of the wicked prosper? Yeah, yeah. But, Thomas talks about how Christ in dying on the cross wanted to come overcome the devil by justice, right?

[23:48] And by the injustice of the devil, you know, and crucifying him rather than overcome him by power, because the devil was a what a lover of power, right? But not a lover of what justice, huh?

[24:05] So, has nothing to do with, you know. What's his name's book there in the modern world? There, chapter on Hitler and Stalin is called the Devils.

[24:19] Not there were other devils in the war, but those two guys in particular, you know, seem to be kind of diabolical, you know, and they're evil.

[24:33] Okay. Now that was the second objection. We just saw that. Third objection: slavery or servitude is an impediment of the good use of power, right? And therefore, naturally, men what flee it? Not because in the in the power of man is the highest good, right? Okay. So life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Yeah, that's liberty, pursuit of this. Okay, so these are all kind of what exterior goods: power, glory, fame, riches, right?

[25:20] Now we get to the good of the body, right? Take a break. Break. Okay. So up to Article Five. Shouldn't get me going, Henry. To the first one proceeds thus: It seems that the beatitude of man consists in the goods of the what body.

[25:46] For it is said in Ecclesiastics thirty, there is not what census. What do you have there in the English text? There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body. But in that which is best consists what beatitude. Therefore, consists in this safety of the salvation of the body, right?

[26:18] I see them in the advertisements on TV. You know, you got your health; you're pretty good. Got everything, right? However, Dionysius says, fifth chapter, the divine names, that to be is better than to what live, and to live better than the other things which follow. But to be and to live a man requires the what safety of the body, salvation of the body. Since, therefore, beatitude is the highest good of man, it seems that the what good condition of the body, I guess.

[26:53] Health. Yeah. Salut. Yeah. Salut. Yeah. It's also that word census. We get they take a census from counting, so that's how it might have a sense of wealth. Oh yeah. You're counting up your wealth.

[27:11] Yeah. Okay. Since, therefore, beatitude is the highest good of man, it seems that the health of the body most of all pertains to beatitude. Moreover, the more something is common, the more it depends upon a what higher beginning, yeah. Because the more a cause is above superior, the more its power extends to many, huh?

[27:41] But as the causality of the efficient cause is considered according to its what influence, so the causality of the end is to be noted according to desire. Therefore, just as the first efficient cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which is desired by all. But to be is what is most desired, what by men. Therefore, these things, in those things which pertain to the being of man, such as is the health of the body, most of all consists in what beatitude, huh?

[28:26] But against this, according to beatitude, man excels all the other animals. But in the goods of the body, he is overcome by many animals, right? Just as by the elephant in the length of life, by the lion in what fortitude, by the By the heart of the deer. the deer, yeah, in running, right? And therefore, the beatitude of man does not consist in the goods of the body, right?

[28:59] So, a healthy dog would be better than a man, if healthless, primarily, or at least an elephant. Yeah. I answer: It should be said, impossible.

[29:20] Is it for the beatitude of man to consist in the goods of the body? For two reasons, huh? First, because it is impossible that of that thing which is ordered to another as to an end, the last end should be its what conservation and being, huh?

[29:41] Whence the the ship captain, I guess, huh? Helmsman. Helmsman does not intend as a last end the conservation of the boat committed to him, right, huh? In that the boat is ordered to something else as to an end, huh? To navigating, right? To sailing, huh?

[30:04] But just as the boat is committed to the helmsman, as you say, to directing, to be directed, so man is commissioned to his what will and reason, right? According to what is said in Ecclesiasticus chapter fifteen, God from the beginning constituted man, left him in the hand of his own what counsel. We placed him. Yeah. The hand is kind of dicey.

[30:42] Now it is manifest, however, that man is ordered to something as to an end. For man is not himself the highest good, huh? Whence it is impossible that the last end of reason and the human will is the conservation of man's what being, right?

[31:05] That's something that has to be directed to something else, huh? Secondly, because given that the end of reason and of human will. Were the what conservation of human being right? It could nevertheless not be said that the end of man is some good of the body, for the being of man consists both in soul and in what body. And although the being of the body depends upon that of the soul, nevertheless the being of the human soul does not depend upon the body, as has been shown in the prima pars, right?

[31:55] So the form is is the what beginning of being, right? And so the body has being through the form, but the form does not have being through the body.

[32:16] But the body is for the sake of the soul as matter for the sake of the what form, and tools for the sake of the mover, right? That through them he might exercise his what actions. Whence all the goods of the body are ordered to the goods of the soul as to a what An end. Whence it is impossible that in the goods of the body beatitude consists, which is the last end of what man.

[32:54] You can argue that these goods we have in common with the beasts, right? Why, beatitude is the good of man, it's proper to man.

[33:03] That's what Saint Jane de Chantal used to say. She used to remind herself of that whenever she went to the refectory. Well, it's what we have in common with the beast. It's then I develop for myself every time I go to the refectory. Off to the trough.

[33:22] Nice to say to the cat, you know, we're having steak for dinner, and see if she would understand me after a while, you know. Having chicken tonight. Now, when I used to argue in class, you know, I would take the division of the goods of man that the Greeks have into the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, and the outside goods, right? And they say now, which of these goods are the best, right?

[34:07] And I'd argue, well, the end is always better than what's for the sake of the end, right? So then I'd argue that the outside goods are for the sake of the inside goods. So the chair is for the sake of my body, right? The food is for the sake of my body, right? The book is for the sake of my mind, right? So if the outside is for the sake of the inside, and the end that for the sake of which something is is always better, then the inside goods must be better than the what outside goods, huh?

[34:44] Now, if they knew a little bit more about the soul and the body, huh, and about matter and form, then I could, you know, repeat the argument, say, but matter is for the sake of form, the body for the sake of the soul, right? Therefore, the goods of the soul must be better than the goods of the body, right? But I didn't think they knew enough about the soul to appreciate it, right?

[35:07] So I could show inductively that the outside is for the sake of the inside, right? And you could give an objection, say, well, what about the art of carpentry, which is an inside good of man? It's a virtue of the reason, but carpentry is for the sake of outside things, right? Or the art of cooking, right? For The sake of the dinner, which is outside of us. But then the chair, though, is ultimately for the sake again of the inside, though, right?

[35:40] So even the art, which is for the sake of something outside of us, that outside thing, in turn, is for the sake of on the inside, right? So ultimately, it always goes back to the outside thing for the sake of the inside, right? But there's a little qualification there about art, right? Which is better, the art of cooking or dinner?

[36:04] Tasty dinner is better, right? The tasty dinner is again for the inside, right? So ultimately, the outside for the sake of inside. So then I would go back and I'd say, well, man is better than the beast, right? Which they were willing to admit, right? And therefore, the goods which man has that the beast doesn't have are better than the ones that he shares with the beast, right?

[36:27] Because if the goods he shares with the beast were the best goods, then the beast would be just as good as we are. Or I'd argue, you know, that the goods that God is better than than man, right? Which they would tend to admit is probable. And and the goods of the soul are more like the goods of God, right? Than the goods of the body, right?

[36:49] Okay. Or I'd argue, you know, the soul is more like God than the body, right? Huh? Therefore, the goods of the soul must be better goods than the body, right? Huh? But Thomas here, because he's shown in the first part, he takes up the soul, right? And Aristotle had shown there that the matter is for the sake of form. Then you can argue again from the end always being better, right?

[37:10] The body is for the sake of it, right? When I, you know, take off from Shakespeare's exhortation, right, I use these other arguments. From things more known to them, right, than that the body is for the sake of the soul. They probably think it's the other way around, right? Because most people use their their reason to see how they can satisfy the body.

[37:36] And see, yeah, reason there for that purpose, right? And as to the appearance of that, right? You know, because most of life is taken up in gaining the necessities of life of life, right? And for a lot of people in you know poor poor countries, right? I mean, they don't even get enough for the body, maybe enough to eat or something, right? Now, so might think that the higher is for the sake of the lower, right?

[38:08] And that kind of paradoxes with parents and and children, right? The parents are doing all these sort of things for the children, especially now, little, right? So the parents exist for the sake of the children, right? And therefore, the children must be better than the parents, right? Even though the parents are presumably more developed. Yeah, and of course you you you're you're taking care of the children so they might become adults, right?

[38:38] It's nice when they're little. Ones are kind of cute when they're little, but but if they stayed that way all, never grew up, I'm not sure. So you're trying to prepare them for adulthood, right? Huh? So rather than become a child yourself, at least sometimes do become children. But so obviously adulthood is something better than what childhood, right? Huh? You know a lot of people don't think so, right?

[39:07] Because they think you know think that the goods, body are better, right? Huh? And maybe the kid enjoys his soda pop more than we do, or something, or his candy more than we do, or something.

[39:20] Not so sure now that you know as a little boy I thought candy was a pretty great good, you know, but I'm not quite so sure now. It's too high on the scale of goods now that now that they're a little more mature, you know.

[39:45] Now Thomas, you know, thinking along these lines, huh? Thomas is thinking along, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that just as the body is ordered to the soul as to an end, so exterior goods are ordered to the what body itself, and therefore reasonably the good of the body is referred to what exterior goods, huh? Which through the word what? I guess through wealth is it signified again?

[40:16] Are signified, yeah. Just as the good of the soul is preferred to all the goods of the body, right now. Okay. But they say it's more known to us that the exterior for the sake of the interior, right? And not just the body, but also for the mind, right? Because the the books are, you know. You carry these books around so for the good of the body you carry these big books, and assuming you're developing your muscles this way, or something, or or getting your your balance, if you used to say people put a book in.

[40:45] There's a poem by Emily Dickinson about that. What good a book is? He just starts off with he ate and drank the precious words. His spirit grew robust. He knew no more that he was poor than that his frame was dust. And so, and what liberty a loosened spirit brings. That's exactly what you're talking about. Reading and books are for the good of the spirit, not the good of the soul.

[41:12] mind. Now what about this good of being, right? Huh? To be or not to be, huh? To the second should be said. To be simply taken, according as it includes in itself every perfection of being, right?

[41:37] Is preeminent to life and to all things that come subsequent. For thus ipsum esse, which is God Himself, right, has before in itself everything that is what subsequent, right? And in this way, Dionysius speaks, right, because he's talking about the name of God. I am who I am, right? Huh? But if one considers to be in so far as it is partaken of in this thing or in that, right?

[42:08] Huh? In those things which are not what grasp the whole perfection of being, right? Huh? But they have being in an imperfect way, just as is the being of any creature. Thus is manifest that being with perfection added above that right is more eminent than being alone, right? Whence Dionysius there says that those who are living are better than those who exist but are not alive, and those understanding than those living but not understanding, right?

[42:51] So he's handing that great text from Dionysius. huh? To the third, it should be said, and that because the end corresponds to the beginning, from that reason is proven that the what last end is the first beginning of being, in which there is all what perfection of being, whose likeness we what is desired, huh? According to one's own proportion, some according to being only, some according to being alive, some being what living and understanding, and even what blessed, huh?

[43:37] And this is what few, of course, huh? And this is what. Now, whether the beatitude of man consists in pleasure? Now, this is this is what we all think, right? Now he's on the subject. Yeah. It's interesting Aristotle takes up pleasure there, you know, with his final consideration of happiness in the tenth book, right? And he has to see the distinction there. To the sixth, one proceeds thus It seems that beatitude of man consists in what?

[44:24] Pleasure, right? I was quoting Augustine earlier. There, he's saying that beatitude is gaudium, the very topic. So sometimes he speaks as if it were what something like joy or pleasure, right? Okay.

[44:43] Now, beatitude, since it is the last end, is not desired for the sake of something else, right? But other things are desired for the sake of it. But this, most of all, belongs to what? Pleasure, huh? Because it is ridiculous to ask or to seek from someone on account of what he wants to be what? Delighted, huh? What do you want to be delighted? It seems like it's what wanted for its own sake, right?

[45:17] Okay. Therefore, beatitude most of all consists in pleasure and delight, huh? Okay. So there's a lot of what probability in saying that the end is pleasure, right? It seems to be desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, right?

[45:50] Moreover, the first cause more vehemently impresses itself upon the effect than the second cause, huh? As is said in the book about causes. But the influence of the end is found in the desire for that end, huh?

[46:13] Therefore, that seems to have most of all in the definition of a last end that most of all moves what? Desire, right? But this is what pleasure, right?

[46:30] A sign of which is that pleasure so much absorbs the will and reason of man in that it makes him what? Holding contempt other what? Goods, huh? Therefore, it seems that the ultimate end of man, which is beatitude, most of all consists in what? Pleasure, huh?

[46:56] Moreover, since desires of the good, that which all desire would seem to be what? What is best? But all desire what pleasure, both the wise and the what? Fool. The insipid, the foolish, right? And even, even those lacking reason. Yeah, like the animals, right? Therefore, pleasure is what is best. Therefore, the attitude consists in pleasure, which is the highest good. All right, let's go enjoy ourselves. I'm convinced.

[47:33] I'm convinced. Used to be that song, "Enjoy yourself. It's better than you think." Carpe diem. Yeah. This one guy said, "Deny yourself it's later than you think."

[47:57] Okay. But against this is what Boethius says in the third book of the Consolation. I think Thomas has got Boethius on his mind somewhat, right?

[48:13] Sad are the what? End results. Outcome. Of pleasures, right? Huh? Whoever remembers his what? Lust, you might say, right? Um. Understand this if he recalls them, right? Huh? Okay.

[48:38] I'm trying to see this one. So I'm saying about that, but pleasure will be pity or something. I forget what the one is. Ah, which if they were able to make us blessed, right? Huh? Ah, there would be no reason why the beasts, right, also would not be called what blessed, right? Huh? Okay.

[49:08] Thomas says, "Answer. It should be said that because bodily what pleasures are known to what many, right? Huh? And they take on for themselves the name of what pleasures, right? As is said in the seventh book of the Ethics, huh? So it's what what most people would think of. That pleasure is something bodily, right? Do you think that?

[49:41] I could enjoy a theorem of Euclid. I mean, I could take pleasure in in understanding what the soul is or something, huh? Don't they think of pleasure as something bodily? Most men, right? So the bodily pleasure is more known than any other kind of pleasure.

[50:14] When, however, there are what other pleasures that are more what potent, right? It's kind of strange how I should say that, right? You must have tasted other pleasures, right? Are they more potent? In which, nevertheless, beatitude does not consist chiefly, even in these what more potent pleasures, right, than the bodily pleasures?

[50:43] Because in each thing, other is what pertains to its what essence, what it is. Another to its what Property, right? Proprium per accidens right, right?

[51:00] Just as two is more two than what half a four, even though two is half a four, but it's more two than half a four, and it's more two than third of six. So that's a proprium per accidens of it, right? Okay.

[51:18] Just as in man, other is that he is a a reasonable mortal animal, right? Another that he is what capable of laughter, which is a proper accident of man, right? Okay.

[51:37] It should therefore be considered that every pleasure is a certain what proper accident of what that follows upon beatitude, or upon some what or part of beatitude.

[51:57] For from this, someone is pleased that he has some good that is suitable to him, right? Either in reality has this good, right, or because he has it in hope, right, or at least in moment, right. This is what Aristotle said, right?

[52:20] Okay. But a suitable good, if it is perfect, is the beatitude itself of man. If, however, it is imperfect, it is a certain what partaking of beatitude, either near or remote, right, or at least apparent. Whence it is manifest. That neither pleasure itself, which follows upon the perfect good, is the very what nature of beatitude, but something following upon it as a per se what accidens So per se accidens has the same meaning in this text as that term proprium accidens, right?

[53:12] Huh? But what Porphyry would call or Aristotle, it's a property, right? Huh? Okay. Now the pleasure of the bodily pleasure is not able in the what foresaid way to follow a perfect good, for it follows upon the good which sense apprehends, huh? Which is a power of the soul, an ability of soul using the body, right?

[53:51] But the good which belongs to or pertains to the body, that is. grasped or apprehended, known by the sense, cannot be the perfect good of man, huh? For since the reasonable soul exceeds the proportion of what? bodily matter. Yeah. And the way we know that is because it has some doings that are not in the body, right? Aristotle, in the third book about the soul, he shows that understanding is not in the body, right?

[54:27] There's many ways that they they show that, right? huh? But he means understanding the what? Universal, right? Is not in the body, right? Because whatever's received in the body is from that very fact, but individualized, right? Mm-hmm. So if I understand what a triangle is, I'm understanding it in the body. No. Or another way I sometimes show this is that

[54:58] our reason understands the continuous in a non-continuous way. So the body is continuous, huh? But when I understand what the continuous is, or understand what a triangle is, huh? Is the definition and its parts continuous, huh? Do they meet at a common boundary? No. So if I understand the continuous in a non-continuous way, is that because of what I understand?

[55:36] No, what I understand in this case is the continuous, right? Yeah. So if I understand the continuous in an uncontinuous way, then I don't understand it in a body, right? Okay. So the fact that the soul has understanding, and the same thing can be shown about willing, right? Not in the body, that shows that it's not completely immersed in the body, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Like the soul, my dog or cat is, huh?

[56:05] Okay. So I'll probably stick with somebody here in the back of the car. I love my cat. I did that for a while. But also bring the soldiers home, so that's okay.

[56:22] Unless they won't put the cat above the soldiers' meal. No, not him. Okay. So since the reasonable soul excels the proportion, right, of bodily matter, right?

[56:41] The part of the soul which is what? Free. Free from the body, right? A body organ has a certain infinity, huh? With respect to the body and the parts of the what soul that are concrete in the body, the power of sensing and the power of digesting and power of growing and so on. And of course, a sign of this is the fact that the universal, which we understand, is something that's said of infinity of things, right?

[57:19] So if I understand what a number is, I understand in a way an infinity of things, right? So something the infinity of it in comparison to the body.

[57:34] In that the form through matter is in a way contracted and what limited, whence a form free of matter is in some way what infinite. Aristotle says at the end I think it's talking about sensing and understanding the souls in some way all things, right?

[57:57] And therefore the sense, which is a bodily power, knows the singular, which is determined by matter. But the understanding, which is a power free from matter, knows universal, which is abstracted from matter and contains under itself an infinity of singulars.

[58:20] Whence it is clear that the good suitable to the body, and that through the apprehension of the senses causes what bodily delight, is not the perfect good of man, but is something minimal, something least. Yeah, very little. A trifle. Yeah, in comparison to the good of the what soul. Whence it is said in the Book of Wisdom, chapter seven, that all what gold in comparison to wisdom, right, is.

[58:58] grain of sand. Yeah, yeah. Thomas was going to exchange Paris, right, for Saint John Chrysostom's on Saint John, yeah. This is the Book of John that signifies.

[59:23] Thus, therefore, neither is bodily pleasure beatitude, nor is it even a what property of what beatitude, right? Well, he's really kind of polarizing everything, isn't he? He just. Now, what about the fact that pleasure is desired for its own sake? To the first, therefore, it should be said that it pertains to the same reason to desire good, and that what pleasure is desired, right? Because pleasure is nothing other than a certain what resting of the desire in the good, right?

[1:00:08] Just as from in the old physics, from the same power of nature it is that the heavy is borne downward, and that it rests when it gets to the ground. So by your desire, you're what? So like the weight of your soul, as Augustine says, right? And so you're born towards the good, and then that's the reason why you rest or stay in the good once you you arrive at it.

[1:00:34] Whence, just as the good is desired for its own sake, so pleasure, right, for its own sake, and not as not desired for sake of something else. If Aristotle speaks of a what? Final cause. Yeah. Aristotle in the Ethics here says that pleasure perfects the perfect doing of man, as beauty perfects youth, right? See, it's not the what youth is, but it's kind of something that follows upon the good looks, you know.

[1:01:13] Okay. So pleasure is something that follows upon the good operation of the soul. So, okay. Whence, just as the good is desired for its own sake, so pleasure for its own sake, and not an account of something else. If Popper says the final what? Cause.

[1:01:48] If, however, it says a formal cause, or rather the motive, thus pleasure is desirable for something else. That is an account of the what? Good. Which is the object of pleasure, and consequently is its beginning and gives it form. For from this pleasure has its desired, because it is what a rest in the good desired, right?

[1:02:21] What you desire is the good upon which you rest. That's got a consequence of that that you want to rest in it. Now, to the second, should be said that the vehement desire of sensible pleasure happens from this that the doings of the senses or the operation senses, which are the beginnings of our knowledge, right? Like we were saying before, when you talk about the word "fruit," there, right?

[1:02:52] How it's carried over from the things everyone owns. which are the beginnings of our knowledge, are more what perceptible, huh? Whence also by the many sensible pleasures are what desired, right?

[1:03:16] One of my grandchildren says here, sugar. That's why he's interested in sugar. At least he knows. I mean, different things, but it's got to have sugar in it to really be wanted. Yeah.

[1:03:35] To the third, should be said in the same way: all desire pleasure, just as they desire good, right, huh? But nevertheless, they desire pleasure by reason of the good, and not reverse. Whence it does not follow that pleasure is the greatest and the per se good, but each pleasure follows some good, and some pleasure follows that which is per se in the greatest good, right? So it speaks about that in the Psalms.

[1:04:12] Yeah. So you gotta stop here now.