Prima Secundae
13. Beatitude Is Not in the Soul or Any Created Good (Summa I-II q.2 aa.7–8)
Class of 2011-03-17
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/013-beatitude-is-not-in-the-soul-or-any-created-good-summa-i/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father, and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illuminate our images, and rouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. Help us to understand all that you're doing. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:34] So, Article Seven here. The seventh one goes forward. Thus, it seems that beatitude consists in some good of the soul. Well, Thomas is going to see a distinction. I admit to saying that. For beatitude is a certain good of man, but the good of man is divided into three. This goes back to the Greeks, huh? Which are the outside goods, the goods of the body, and the goods of the what?

[1:08] Soul. But beatitude does not consist in the exterior goods, as we've seen, nor in the goods of body, as has been shown above. Therefore, it must consist in the goods of the soul, right? If that's a complete division, and you eliminate two possibilities, the remaining one must be the one.

[1:34] Moreover, that to which we wish some good, we love more than the good that we wish for it. Just as we love more the friend to whom we wish money than the money, huh? But each one desires good for himself, huh? Therefore, he loves himself more than all other goods, huh? But beatitude is what is most loved, which is clear from this that, on account of it, all other things are loved and desired.

[2:16] Therefore, beatitude consists in some good of the man himself, but not in the goods of the body. Therefore, it must be in the goods of the soul.

[2:29] Moreover, perfection is something of the thing that is perfected, but beatitude is a certain perfection of man. Therefore, beatitude is something of man, but it's not something of the body, as has been shown. Therefore, it must be beatitude is something of the soul, and therefore it consists in the goods of the soul. So, this is kind of. Surprising, right? You think Thomas is going to take the side that's good of the soul, right?

[3:04] Okay. Against this, as Augustine says in the book on Christian Doctrine, that that in which the blessed life is constituted is loved on account of itself. But man is not to be loved on account of himself, but whatever is in man should be loved on account of God. Therefore, in no good of the soul does beatitude consist.

[3:39] So Thomas now the body is going to see a distinction. I answer: It should be said that has been said above. The end is said in two ways. To it, in one way, the thing itself which we desire to obtain, right? And then the use or the attaining or possession of that thing.

[4:04] If therefore we speak of the last end of man as regards that very thing which we desire as the last end, it is impossible that the last end of man be the soul itself or something of it, because the soul itself, considered in itself, is as in what existing in potency, in ability For it becomes for the one who knows inability, comes to be knowing in act, right?

[4:43] And from the power to be virtuous to being virtuous in act. Since therefore potency or ability is an for the sake of act as an account of its what completion, it is impossible that that which is in itself existing in potency have the notion of the last end. Whence it is impossible that the soul itself be the last end of itself, huh? Because its potency is something else, right?

[5:18] Potency is for the sake of act. Likewise, also neither something of it, whether it be its ability or the habit or even the act, for the good which is the ultimate end is a perfect good, filling a completing desire, satisfying desire. But human desire, which is the will, as opposed to emotions, right, is of the universal good.

[6:01] But every good existing in the soul itself is only a good partaking, a participating good, you might say, and consequently it's a particular good.

[6:18] Whence it is impossible that something of it be the last end of what man? It's not a universal good, right? Particular good, huh? But if we speak of the last end of man as regards the attaining of it or the possession of it, right? Um, or some use of that thing which is desired as an end. Thus, it pertains to the ultimate. Thus, something of man on the side of the soul pertains to the last what end?

[7:06] So, if you're talking about the end in the sense of what the possession of the thing we desire most of all, right? Then it's something of the what soul, right? Because you possess this thing by something of the soul.

[7:26] Because man, through his soul, reaches, huh, beatitude. So the thing, therefore, which is desired as an end, is that in which beatitude consists and makes blessed, huh? But the attaining of this thing is called what? Beatitude.

[7:56] Whence it should be said that beatitude is something of the soul, right? But that in which beatitude consists is something outside the soul. That could be God, first, huh?

[8:16] So beatitude is something of the soul, but that in which beatitude consists is that which we attain by something in the soul, by knowing and loving it, right?

[8:29] Now, going back to the first argument, there, right? Is that a either-or syllogism, right? Well, and you have an either-or syllogism, you've got to what exhaust all the possibilities, right? So when Thomas asks, you know, in the later on are faith, hope, charity virtues, huh One of the objections is every virtue is either a moral virtue or a virtue of reason, but these are neither them, and goes to the virtues of Aristotle.

[8:58] Thomas says, well. It's a virtue in a different sense, right? Supernatural virtue, but is that division of virtue therefore complete, right? So the first, therefore, should be said that according as under that division are comprehended all goods, right? Huh? Which are what desirable for man? Then the good of the soul is said not only the what power or the habit of the act, but also what the object, right?

[9:44] Which is extrinsic. And in this way, nothing prevents us to say that that in which beatitude consists is a good of the what soul. That is to say, it's an object of the soul, right? But it's not something of the soul. That in which the beatitude consists, right? Though the beatitude is something of the soul. It's kind of subtle, huh? Yeah. This is a very subtle argument, right?

[10:15] This means it's easier to argue against riches being beatitude but to see this distinction, right? But you can't find in yourself something that would exhaust your ability to love, right?

[10:33] This isn't that fullness of goodness in oneself, right? I was playing around with the numbers last last day. in the eighth book of, of Euclid, right? Huh? And how many theorems are there in the eighth book of Euclid? Huh?

[10:56] Well, obviously there is twenty-seven, right? Okay. Now, I was saying what's the significance of eight? The eighth book having twenty-seven theorems. Pardon me. Oh no! Oh my goodness! Did I win the prize? Yeah, you do, but it isn't what you think.

[11:20] Well, eight and twenty-seven are two what? Cube numbers, right? Huh? Okay. Three, three, three. Yeah. Eight is two cubed, and you know, twenty-seven is is three, right? Well, in the middle of the book, right, you have the famous theorems, right, that between any two square numbers there's one mean proportional, and between any two what? Cube numbers, there are what? Two mean proportionals, right? And therefore, these theorems are attributed by the Greeks to Plato himself, right?

[12:05] So that's why there's twenty-seven theorems in the eighth book, right? Because you had this famous theorem of of Plato, right? Huh? That between any two cube numbers there is what? Two mean proportionals, right? Now. let's show them. 8 is to twelve as twelve is to what? Eighteen as eighteen is to what? Twenty-seven, right? So eight is two thirds of twelve. Twelve is two thirds of eighteen, and eighteen is two thirds of what?

[12:52] Twenty-seven. So maybe you leave these out. Just say eight to twelve, eighteen, and twenty-seven. And Plato showed this apparently, and Euclid does anyway, that between any two cube numbers there will be two mean what? Proportions, right? And that then the duplicate ratio.

[13:25] Okay, now suppose you take something like, let's say, twenty-seven and one twenty-five, right? Now what are two mean proportions for that? How do you find them.

[13:51] I mean, how would you put that? You know, five cube would be one twenty-five, right? Yeah, that's five, and this is three cube, right? What do you do? Well, wasn't

[14:07] the theorem that's between any two, whether there's two mean proportions? Yeah. Yeah, but it wouldn't be twenty-seven and sixty-four. Yeah, twenty-seven and sixty-four. In sixty-four, that's one. Where's the other? No, but when you find twenty-six, sixty-four. That's a cube number in between, yeah.

[14:27] But that's the point. is that The theorem is actually not that there's cube numbers in between, but there's two mean proportions between any two cube numbers. Between any two, oh yeah, any two at all Well there should be between twenty-seven and sixty-four. There should be two, but that's yeah, that's possible. Oh yeah, yeah, I can, I can do that too. So between twenty-seven, sixty-four, all right, all right, you get two mean proportions too.

[14:49] All right, I guess so. In between any two. So you could take between eight and one twenty-five. Yeah, yeah, five, all right. But no, so this I woke up to what I was thinking about. No, if you take the the the least that same ratio, like two and three, right? And you take what? Two times three, which is what? Six. And then you multiply two times six, you get twelve.

[15:15] Three times six, you get what? Eighteen. So here, what do you take? You take three and five, and they're what? Fifteen. Three times fifteen is what? Forty-five.

[15:31] Forty-five. And five times fifteen is seventy-five. How? No. Oh, I did up here. Seventy-five. Well, seventy-five is three fifths of what? And forty-five is what? 3 fifths of that. That's 45. Is that right. You have 3 nines in here. Yeah. Two more nines makes forty five. Right. Yep. Forty five. And then what? Let's see. Well, there's nine fives in forty five. So there must be

[16:21] fifteen. Yeah, that's right. That's right. Because nine and fifteen is three fifths. Mhm. Yeah. So you have three fifths, three fifths, three fifths, right? Mhm. It's a triple ratio. Right. So

[16:44] now you know why. That's just a. My device, let's say. Yeah. I won't forget. I won't forget that Euclid's got twenty seven things, right? You know. Those are the first two what? Cube numbers, eight and twenty seven, right? But he had the famous theorem there that that Plato showed that between between two cube numbers you have two mean proportions.

[17:13] Beautiful, beautiful. This is the fourth taste of beatitude. Is that what you're telling me? That's right. That's right. But to the truth, after a while,

[17:24] it kind of wore off the enthusiasm after a while. But you know, it just completely satisfies my desire to know. You know, to know this. At least it fascinates me a while, you know.

[17:38] Do you wake up your wife in the middle of the night? No, no. She couldn't care less about Euclid You learned that after the first time. I tell you what. one summer there, I decided to teach. You know, my kids and the kids in the neighborhood there, Euclid, right? So little boys can go around and start doing the Euclid, right? But halfway through, the boys are still with me, but the girls are all got into.

[18:00] it. They used to baking it up. in the kitchen. It all goes back to the fact you didn't have any sisters. You never got over it. Okay. Okay.

[18:25] So we get through the first objection. First objection. Okay. And second objection. The second should be said that as far as pertains to the what thing proposed, that the beatitude is most loved, right? Huh. As the good, what, desire, right? Huh. But the friend is loved as that as the one to whom one what, Desires good. Yeah, or for whom one desires good, right? And thus also man loves himself.

[19:13] Huh. Now I think we talked about that in the love and friendship, course, didn't we? Two kinds of love. The kind that turns are amor concupiscentiae right, and amor amicitiae, right. But one is the love of the good that you want for even yourself or someone else, right? And then the love of friendship is the love of wishing well, the one to whom you wish well, the one to whom you wish is good, right?

[19:38] St. Thomas says there is not the same what ratio of love in both, right? Two senses of the word love, huh? So I can be said to love candy and love myself, right? Candy is the good I love for myself, right? But my love of the candy, my love of the what, myself is. It's not the same kind of love, right? It's not the kind to which I wish well, right?

[20:06] Thomas's example is that he doesn't want the wine to spoil, right? Not because you wish well to the wine, but to yourself, right? Now, whether by the love of friendship, man loves something above himself, right? There will be place for considering this when we treat about charity. You might, you know, guess what the answer will be, but we'll leave that. Okay.

[20:49] But notice that question there. If you apply it there to God, um, is God the good that you want for yourself? Yeah. Yeah. Or is God also the the one to whom you wish well,

[21:12] and wish well more than yourself, right? Now, think about that, right? That's what Francis de Sales is the love of complacence and the love of benevolence. Yeah.

[21:28] Yeah. Now, third argument is from the perfection, right, of the soul being beatitude. To the third, it should be said that beatitude itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is a certain good of the soul inhering in it, right? But that in which beatitude consists, as you say, the object, right, which makes one blessed, is something outside the soul, right?

[22:02] So you say you never be satisfied with yourself. Does some people think that they're satisfied with themselves? Yeah. They try to think that. There's so much good in me that I satisfies my desire for the good. But notice,

[22:46] in a sense, this desire that the the will has for universal good, right? Now, I see, like in the works of Thomas, right? Um, something good for for many, right? Yeah. And not just for me, right?

[23:06] And my understanding of of Thomas doesn't equal Thomas's understanding, right? Huh? Or I haven't got everything out of these books I can get out of them, right? Huh? You know.

[23:27] Looking at the first lectio and the beginning of the Physics there today, I say, "Gee, who is that?" I missed that a little bit there, you know. And I was reading the three questions about the soul, and I just kind of finished reading them. I just said, "Gee, who is that?" I was talking to Warren Ray on the phone. I said, "Warren, you know, I kind of understood a little bit that thing in the Dianoia there, you know, that reason, that proportion, you know, these are back proportions, right?"

[24:06] So. Did Warren Warren Ray know why there was twenty-seven? No, but I'll throw him at him and just annoy him. Just annoy him, you know. I have no idea. What was the name?

[24:21] Is it anything more than scientists? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, I just do it kind of playfully, you know, because it helps my memory, right? Okay. You know, I probably won't forget now. There's twenty-seven theorems and kind of the way they're ordered, right? Too, you know, a long time. But

[24:41] second, Shakespeare's exhortation, you know, there's what? How many words in there? Forty-nine. Yeah, which is seven times seven, huh? Seven symbol wisdom. Is that intentional?

[24:55] Maybe providential. And begins on the seventh syllable, right? Which is symbol wisdom, right? It ends on the sixth syllable, which is symbol of what completeness, huh? Because it's the first perfect number. Is that all by chance? So I kind of said that I was giving that my talk there at the convention, and I said, "But this way madness lies." But

[25:19] I never forget the forty-nine words, though, right? And so when I lay down my challenge, you know, for anybody in in fifty words or less, right, to write an equally good exhortation, right, I challenge them, right, or even a hundred words. I give a hundred words. Don't ever take the job. Okay. Article 8, where the beatitude of man consists in some created good?

[26:00] To the eighth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the beatitude of man consists in some what? Created good. For Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of the Divine Names that the divine wisdom joins the ends or the last of the beginning right to the beginnings of the second. From which one can take that the highest thing of the lowest nature is to attain the lowest of the superior nature.

[26:36] But the highest good of man is beatitude. Since therefore the angelic in the order of nature is above man, it seems that the beatitude of man consists in this that in some way he attains to the what? Angel.

[26:58] Interesting argument there. Moreover, the last end of something is in its what? Yeah. or in the greater state. Yeah. Whence the part is an account of the whole as an account of the end. Remember, I was mentioning before how the two most basic statements about the better are perhaps that the end is better than what is for the sake of the end, and the whole is better than the part, right?

[27:30] But of those two, perhaps the most basic one is the end is better, because you could say the the whole is the end of the part, right? So you can kind of see that principle here. But the whole universe of creatures, which is said to be the what? Greater world, right? Is compared to man, who, in the eighth book of the Physics, is said to be a little world.

[27:54] Is. Greek? Was it? Microcosm. Microcosm. Yeah, microcosm. Yeah, and that was said by Democritus, I think, as the perfect of the imperfect. Therefore, the beatitude of man consists in the whole universe of what? Creatures. Warren

[28:19] Murray is asking interesting example of the of the Socratic question there, right? Now, as a scientist, he's sometimes asked, you know, why are these great scientists atheists, right? And like Einstein, to me, is kind of atheist, right? And and Niels Bohr was an atheist, you know, and so on, and other great scientists. So it kind of runs through them, right? And I suppose it's kind of you know the start of an attack upon the church or something, right?

[28:53] Why are these scientists atheists, right? And Warren says, well, maybe it's the reverse. Why are atheists right? Why are atheists scientists, right? In other words, that they, and for some reason or other, deny God, right? Then they have to find a substitute for God, right? And therefore, they see this in this kind of this very intense study of the natural world, right? And reminded of it here, right?

[29:22] You know, we'd say, you know, that that one is what, um, in the way, even the way Galileo, Galileo is a believer. I don't mean to put him in the atheist, but when Galileo is saying, why is he studying the universe, right? Well, the whole is a greater thing than the part, right? So we're we're a part of the whole. To pan is the all, is the Greeks would call To pan, the all, and so by seeing that the universe is the greatest thing there is, and therefore we got to find our fulfillment in the understanding of the universe as a whole, right?

[29:55] The way Einstein especially gave his life at the end there, after the general relativity theory to the cosmology, right, the study of the cosmos as a whole, right? But that goes back what you said. The more basic statement is that the end is is uh better than what's for the sake of man, and the universe is for the sake of man, not the other way around. Well, no, if you take universe as a whole, man is is a part of it.

[30:20] It's true. Yeah, so you might so you might say that the whole is better than the part, right? In some way, but then you say, but why is it ever suggest for us? Well, you got to be careful about that, obviously, because we might be a very you know elevated part, right? In some way, our soul is the end of matter and so on, but nevertheless, the universe as a whole is something better than man, right?

[30:42] Okay, you got to be careful about that. But when you say the universe is a whole, that includes man, wouldn't it? Yeah, yeah. Man include the angels too, right? The scientists might not know that, right? Okay. So. Anyway.

[31:03] Moreover, through this, man is rendered blessed, that his natural desire is brought to rest, right? But the natural desire of man does not extend to a greater good than he is able to what grasp, as it were, right? Since therefore man is not capable of a good which exceeds the limits of what the whole creature. Yeah. It seems that to some created good, man can be made what blessed, right?

[31:38] Huh. I am satisfied, as Einstein said, to understand the universe. You know, and therefore the beatitude of man consists in some what created good, right?

[31:59] Against this is what Augustine says in the nineteenth book about the city of God. As the life of the flesh is the soul, so the blessed life of man is God, whom it is said in Psalm one forty three, blessed are the people whose Lord is his what? God. God is his Lord. Okay.

[32:25] Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that it's impossible. " That possible word again there. That is impossible. The Aristotelian distinguishes the sense of impossible, right? The strict sense, the impossible is one that no way can be, right? But also the other things are called impossible because they're hard to realize. I answer. It should be said that it's impossible. I think Thomas is taking that in the absolute sense, for the beatitude of man to be in some created good.

[33:02] Now, why does he say this? For beatitude is a perfect what? Good, huh? Which wholly brings to rest desire. Otherwise, it would not be the last end. If there still remains something to be what desired, huh? But the object of the will, which is the human faculty of desire, right? And

[33:33] I pay tuition. Is taken for the for the faculty, right? The object of the will is the universal good, right? Huh? Just as the object of the understanding is the universal truth, right? You should tell the students, you know, in some sense you know everything, right? Because everything is something, and you know, understood something and nothing, right? So in some way you know everything, right? I used to have some students say, "I'll go home and tell my dad that Mr.

[34:02] Burke, I said we know everything. " Well, it's a couldn't have quit obviously, but in some way, yeah. The first thing your father would say is, "We don't have to pay tuition anymore. "

[34:14] That kind of nonsense, philosopher. Yeah. But is there something out there that isn't something? So you see, I could be the universal. The mind and sense is right, and it can go from confused to distinct. So it can go on from that, knowing everything in kind of the most confused way possible, right?

[34:39] You know, Nietzsche is kind of satirizing these philosophical conventions where everything is satisfied. We're talking about being, you know. He's going to write an essay entitled "The Boredom of Being."

[34:51] But I mean, in some sense, to say it's being or it's something, right, is about as confused as you can be. Indistinct, right? I mean, yeah. But at the same time, it does show that in some way our mind is open to everything, right?

[35:07] Some people go from the confused to the more confused. This is this is reminds me a little bit of the way Boethius proceeds, right, in the second part of Book Three when he takes up perfect happiness because he he sees happiness as what the sumum bonum, right? The sumum bonum is God, right? Therefore happiness is God, right? So you can kind of you know see that right away, huh?

[35:48] In a quick quick way compared to the philosopher might see you normally. Okay. For beatitude is a perfect good which wholly brings to rest the appetite. Otherwise, it would not be the last end if there still remains something to be desired. But the object of the will, which is the human desiring power, is a universal good, right? Huh? Just as the object of the understanding is the universal truth, right?

[36:19] Of course, this is said to be the human what? Ability to desire the will, because it follows upon reason, right? Just as the emotions follow upon the senses, right? So if the if the reason knows truth universally, right, and therefore it knows the good universally, then the will is open to the whole of of good.

[36:48] From which he says, it is clear that nothing is able to what bring to rest, huh? The will of man except a universal what? Good. Which is not found in anything created, but only in God, huh? Because every creature has good that is partaking, right? Of the universal good, right? Having in a partial way, huh?

[37:21] Whence God alone is able to to fill, I guess, huh? What? Satisfy. Yeah, but I think in Latin the word impleri is the word for full, right? Okay, is to fulfill the the will of man, right? According as is said in Psalm one hundred two, who fulfills in good things your desire, right? Nothing can fill your will, right? Otherwise, your will is going to be more or less empty.

[37:59] Okay, that's it. Not full, right? In God alone, therefore, the beatitude of man consists on. That's beautiful way he reasons that out, huh? And this notion of universal good is it going to particularly. make that? The fact that God is the only universal good. Well, no, he he's he's goodness itself, right? Huh. So he includes what?

[38:36] The good in creatures as in a partial way, right? Huh. He does this in a complete way, right? Huh. So if he's if he's goodness itself, and no creature is goodness itself,

[38:54] goodness is that by which the good is good, right? So anything that could be good would be good by partaking some way of of goodness, necessarily in some way partaking what God has, what God is, I should say. Okay. You see, you know one way they they show this is to go back to the connection between perfect and good, right? Huh. And we speak of of perfect.

[39:36] Even Aristotle, in in the fifth book of wisdom, when he takes up the word perfect, he first takes up three meanings of the word perfect, right? And

[39:49] first meaning of perfect is what has all its parts. The second meaning of perfect is what has the whole of the ability of its kind, right? Like Homer is the perfect poet. He doesn't have everything, but he's everything a poet needs, right? Okay. Or Mozart is a perfect musician, right? Huh. Um.

[40:15] Okay. And then the third meaning of perfect is what has reached its what end, right? Okay. And then after that, Aristotle makes another distinction, right, or points out a distinction between what is perfect in its kind,

[40:35] which is lacking in nothing that that kind of a thing should have, right? And then what is lacking in nothing. Okay. And even Averroes says, he's talking about God there. Thomas, right? He agrees with Averroes, huh? That's what Aristotle's talking about there, right? Really profound Aristotle, right? And sometimes when when Thomas, after he shows that God is that God to be is the same thing as God, I am who I am, right?

[41:12] He says nothing is what perfect, ah, except through what being something, right? He says I would not be perfect by my wisdom if I was not wise by this, right? Okay. My justice would not perfect me if I was not to justice. if I could not be said to be just, do my justice, right? Okay, even health would not be perfection of my body if my body were were not healthy.

[41:50] Too health, right? Or my body was not strong. Too strength, right? Huh? Okay. So it's always by some kind of being that one is what perfect, huh? Well, God is being itself, right? Huh? So He's universally perfect, right?

[42:10] Anything else would be perfect by being in some particular way. And by universally, you mean complete? Yeah, universally perfect. Yeah, that's the way we describe that, right? I said the the sense in which God is perfect is given by Aristotle in that distinction in in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? So God, in terms of being being itself, right? He has whatever perfection I have by being something, by being a logician, or by being a geometer, or being a mathematician.

[42:47] there, from the eighth book, right? I don't understand too well. It's beside the point. Okay. Okay. It's by by being in some way, right, that I have a certain perfection, right? But God's being is in no way what limited to being in this way or that way, right? But He's being itself, right? So he so he contains in eminent way any perfection that any creature would have by being in some way, huh?

[43:23] Have being only in some way. I'm not being itself, right? And so I have a little a little partaking of of what God has, but He is universally, right?

[43:38] Mozart is lacking nothing that a physician should have, right? He's lacking in other things, right? But God is in no way lacking, right? So only a good

[43:57] that is good in the way God is good, right, could satisfy, right, or bring to complete rest our will, right? So our will could not come to complete rest in in us, right? In what we are, what we have, right? It could only come to complete rest in God Himself. This is a universal good

[44:28] has a sense of perfect good. Yeah, but but but not just the sense of perfect in its kind, but universally perfect, right? Universally perfect. Yeah. Can you say that his existence is his ultimate perfection? Is what? Ultimate perfection. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's one of the ways Thomas argues, you know, to the to the universal perfection of God, right? His being being itself. Usually in both Summas, I mean, the order of the five things that Thomas divides up the consideration of divine substance, right?

[45:04] But he always takes up the simplicity of God, huh? Before he takes up the what perfection of God, right? Okay, it's kind of beautiful, right? But you can argue more from the simplicity of God when you see it in in in detail, right? Uh, because part of that thing is that he's being itself, right? You can see more from that the universality of his perfection, right? than the reverse, right?

[45:31] So I think there's a reason why he always takes that up before the other, right? And it kind of fits in with with the character of our mind, right? Because it's more known to our mind that the beginning of things is simple than that it's perfect, right? Because Even the Greeks, I mean, the people who thought that there's only material world, they try to take the beginning of things, water or earth or air or something that was simple, you know, and couldn't be broken down into different types, right?

[45:56] But they took something that was at least perfect, right? The most basic kind of matter, right? Didn't take, you know, a dog or a cat as the beginning of all things, right? You know, but the first guy said water, you know, and before him they spoke of earth, right? Earth was the beginning, right? Common mother, thou as Shakespeare says, right? Human breast, you know, feeds, you know, generates, feeds all, right?

[46:26] So, but they didn't see that first thing as being perfect, right? I was trying to read through the last books of wisdom there, which Thomas didn't comment on on the thirteenth and fourteenth books and all, but number places Aristotle's coming back and saying these guys, you know, who didn't see that the beginning of things was the most perfect thing, right? You know, he sees the difficulty, right, that they didn't see that the first thing was the what most perfect of things.

[46:59] I think I mentioned how, I mean, places Aristotle talks about this, but the main places in the ninth book of wisdom where he says that ability is before act, right? In the thing that goes from ability to act, right? But the thing that goes from ability to act does so by reason of something already in act, and therefore what comes simply before in the universe is something what perfect and actual, and only in some respect and it's a very qualified sense does ability precede act.

[47:36] And you know, the second kind of mistake that Aristotle talks about outside of speech, right, in the sophistic refutations, is the fallacy of mixing up what is so simply and what is so not simply,

[47:54] and that's a common mistake, right? It's made all the way through, but it says that's a mistake that the moderns and the materialists are making, right? Because in some particular way, limited sense, right, in some qualified sense, right, abilities for act, therefore they think that's the whole truth, right? That's the truth about the universe as a whole, when it's just the reverse.

[48:23] I mean, that kind of mistake is made all the way through philosophy, right? You know, I can in the Meno there, which is kind of reduction to logic, there, you have Meno saying, you know, well, you can't know the unknown, right?

[48:40] You got to be careful there, right? Because Socrates' whole, you know, he's famous for knowing that he doesn't know, right? So he knows what he doesn't know, right? He says, well, how would Socrates be possible if you couldn't, in some way, know what you don't know, right?

[49:05] I mean, I walk down the street there, and I see somebody coming up the street, and I don't know what his name is. You know, do I know what I don't know? Yeah, I don't know his name, right? Now, is that to to know simply what I don't know?

[49:27] Well, let's say his name is George, and I don't know that his name is George. Then I would know what I don't know, but then I know what I don't know, right? See, then I know simply what his name was, George, right? You see what I mean? See, but in some way, I know George, right? Because I know I don't know his name, and his name is George.

[49:51] So in some way, I know what I don't know, right? But that's an imperfect sense, right? So I mean, you know, what's his name? Meno is saying you can't go looking for what you don't know. What are we paying all these guys to do? Research, you know. The guys trying to find the cause of cancer or Parkinson's, and talking about discovering some gene for Parkinson's or something.

[50:19] I don't know some discovering something, but are these guys being paid if they don't know what they're looking for? Well, simply they don't know what they're looking for because they're not looking for it, right? Well, if they didn't know in some way what they're looking for, how could they direct their activity towards that, right?

[50:46] How could you look up on the internet to find something out you don't know if you didn't know what you're looking for? Google this. Why? I don't know. Asking it, yeah, Google this. Why? I don't know.

[51:05] The unknown Google. The unknown dot org. There'll be a whole website out there, an organization, a bumper sticker. None of the Summa Contra Gentiles as I mentioned before. When Thomas takes up the goodness of God, right? The first article is whether God is good, right? The second one, whether He's goodness itself. The third, whether could be anything bad in God, right? Anything bad can happen to Him.

[51:43] Then the fourth one is whether he's, as Augustine says, the good of every good, right? And then the fifth article is whether he's the what Summum Bonum, right? I think in the Summa Theologiae, the God is the good of every good. That's not one of the articles there, right? So that's you know a little superiority in the Summa Contra Gentiles, man. But

[52:07] then you really kind of, you know, get a complete view, right, of God's goodness so far as we can know it there, philosophically, theologically, right?

[52:22] I mean, part of that depends upon understanding the way in which God is what perfect, right? Because Thomas takes up the perfection of God before his what goodness, right? Even though they might be the same thing, right? But he shows that God is perfect and universally perfect before he takes up God's being good, right?

[52:50] Okay. Now, what about this first objection? Maybe man can only reach the the lowest ranks of the angels, right? Huh? To the first, therefore, should be said

[53:16] that the what highest thing in man attains the lowest of the angelic nature through a certain what likeness, huh? Not, however, that it there rests as in a last what end, huh? But it proceeds usque as far as the universal fountain of the good, huh? That's a beautiful way of speaking, huh? Which is the universal object of beatitude of all who are blessed, right, huh? As it were, existing as an infinite and what perfect good, huh?

[54:00] And also in the Summa, in the Summa Theologiae, he takes up the infinity of God right after the what perfection of God, right? Because he's really seeing, I think, the connection between the infinity of God and his perfection, right? They kind of go together, right? Huh? It's almost like infinity is is modifying, you know, grammatically speaking, the perfection of God, right? Huh? He's infinitely perfect, right? Huh?

[54:32] There's no limit to his perfection, right? Huh? That's why we never get bored in heaven. Say something about Saint John says God is love. It seems to be that's the ultimate thing. God's love seems to be the ultimate good that we can aim at but his existence is even more. perfect isn't he Well, I mean, the, the thing is that when you start to talk about love or desire, in general, you first speak of the good, right?

[55:11] Okay. But God's love and His knowledge and all these things are the same as His goodness, right? No. But you first see it in terms of good because good is the object of the of the will, right? And you know when you're talking about the last end of man, end and good. We saw even from the Nicomachean Ethics, right? Good and end seem to be almost the same thing, right?

[55:40] In a secondary way, the means can be said to be good, but the primary meaning of good is the. end That's where Aristotle, in the second book of Wisdom, says that to deny end is to deny the what good, right? So it's not surprising that the moderns, you know, can deny the end. They don't really have any idea of the good, right? Because the good is chiefly the end, right?

[56:07] Most of all, you know, the end of the whole universe, which is God Himself. You know how Augustine begins the Confessions there. You know, does he have kind of a prayer, you know, or or, or a sigh? Shall we say? Too late if I come to know thee, thou ancient what beauty? Doesn't he call God ancient beauty? The God is is what beauty itself, right? And if you read the what is it the Symposium of Plato, right?

[56:43] Huh? That's very beautiful there, Plato, because Plato has Socrates, you know, talking about beauty, right? And then he talks about the lesser, you know, matters of beauty. He goes on to the higher matters, right? And then he talks about an ascent, you know, and the contemplation of beauty, but all the way up to the beautiful itself, which is is God, right? And it's not in one way beautiful, another way not beautiful, but it's what.

[57:10] Anyway, look at it. Let's make it's it's beauty itself, huh? If you go back to Thomas's explanation there of you know the metaphor of sweet and so on, we speak of the beautiful as what? It's being restful, right? You know, I'm convinced this rock and roll stuff is is not beautiful because it's not restful to listen to, right?

[57:39] Yeah. I was reading about some. I think it was a bishop, maybe even a cardinal, a bishop, I guess, but very busy bishop as they are, very bishop, you know. He couldn't, you know, losing his ability to go to sleep at night, right? Oh yeah. And so,

[57:54] finally, someone found the solution for his problem. Was that was like for half hour or so before he goes to bed, he stops doing his work and listens to some nice classical music, and then he could go to bed and sleep, right? So the the beauty makes you kind of what restful, restful, you know. I mean, he was under the stars there, Irving. Yeah. The beautiful, right?

[58:18] But it helps you to to to sleep, you know, rest. Yeah. So if God is what beauty itself, then He's the only one that completely brings our heart to a what rest, huh?

[58:44] Metaphorically put you to sleep, but so that's the first objection. Okay, the second should be said: if some whole is not the last end, but is ordered to a further end, the ultimate end of the part is not the whole itself, but something else, right? But the universe of creatures to which man is compared as a part is to the whole is not the last end, but is ordered to God as to a last end.

[59:31] Huh? Whence the good of the universe, which is its order, huh? Is not the last end of man, but what? God himself. But Thomas is always quoting what Aristotle says in the twelfth book of wisdom. You know where he talks about the good of the universe, right? Aristotle speaks of this distinction here between that when a whole is ordered to some good, right? Huh? You can speak of two goods, and one is the order within that whole, right?

[1:00:05] And the other is the end for which the whole is. So you can say in the chair here, right? Aristotle speaks of two orders, right? One is the order of the parts of the chair to each other, like this part here comes in at a what? What kind of an angle? Acute, obtuse, or right angle? Obtuse. Yeah, acute angle would be the worst, right? The worstest thing.

[1:00:36] But even a right angle would not be so good, right? Okay, so it comes in at a slightly obtuse angle, right? And not one of those chairs where you go all the way down to a very obtuse angle, put you to sleep, but but so he said there's certain order of the parts to each other, right? And this comes in, and this comes in, this angle, and so.

[1:00:57] But then the whole chair is ordered to what? Sitting. Okay. So sitting is better than what the whole chair, right? The whole chair is for the sake of sitting. So Aristotle speaks of the order of the universe, the order of its parts one to another, right? And then the order of the whole universe to the separated good, which is God, huh? And Thomas is saying that, right?

[1:01:24] Huh? So when the part is for the sake of the whole, yeah, was that the last end of the part? Well, if the whole itself is ordered to a further end, then that is the last end, even of that what part? Okay.

[1:01:44] You know, Paul the sixth there. I remember he used to complain, "Where is the love of the church now?" He'd say, you know. But isn't the the church a greater good than any one of us? You know, so in some sense, I should love the church more than myself.

[1:02:05] Right. Great, greater good than me, right? But the whole church is ordered to a what? Greater good Yeah, yeah. When Psalm says, "Or glorify the Lord, " praise God And, " he talks about you know he's put peace and order in the thing, you know, and then giving them the best wheat. Well, I think that's referring to Eucharist, right? Huh. So that's so Christ is better than the whole church, right?

[1:02:36] But the whole church is better than what me, right? Okay, so I'm for the sake, in the sense of the good of the church, right? I should love the church more than myself. If I should love Christ even more than the church, right? The church is ordered to Christ, huh?

[1:03:00] Or God, right? Okay. Remember how Thomas was quoting it there in that text, and the proemium is proemium to the Nicomachean Ethics, right? You're distinguishing between those two orders, right? But taking that text from the twelfth book, the order of things to each other, the parts to each other, and the order of the whole to something further, right? First, I'll use an example there: the army, right?

[1:03:33] Now, there's an army. There's an order within the army, right? But then the whole army is ordered to what victory over the enemy, right? So MacArthur says, "In war, there's no substitute for victory, right? " He stands to say that, right? And

[1:03:53] but that's because the whole army is ordered to what victory, yeah. So we'd say that there's no substitute for God, um, because the whole universe is ordered to God, it's to its end or purpose, right? To glorify God, huh?

[1:04:19] Notice how, in a sense, in the Our Father, there, the first thing we ask for is, "Hallowed be Thy name, " right? And then the second thing is Thy kingdom come, right? Huh?

[1:04:33] So why is Hallowed be Thy name before Thy kingdom come? Is His kingdom is ordered to His name? Yeah, yeah, yeah. To glorify God, right? Thomas defines the kingdom of God as the ordered society of those who see God. That's the order within the kingdom, right? But that's for the sake of the order of the whole kingdom to God Himself, right?

[1:05:07] So we've got to admire Aristotle, for seeing this distinction, right? Compared to the universe as a whole, right? The order of the universe, intrinsic to universe, right? The order of one part to the other

[1:05:24] is not the ultimate thing, but the whole universe as a whole is ordered to the separated good, which is God. Okay. Now the third objection. But man, reaching and happy to reach some good.

[1:05:55] To the third, should be said that the created good is not less than the good of which man is capable, as of a what, inward thing, right, and indwelling, right,

[1:06:12] inherent, intrinsic, is nevertheless less than the good of which he is capable as a what, object, which is something what, infinite. Thomas will often take the fact to know that we can go on forever with numbers, right? The fact that our mind is ordered to something what, infinite, right? We don't know what the infinite thing is, right? I think I was mentioning how Heisenberg's student there, Weizsäcker, you know, talked about how the Renaissance and a little bit after that, they went from the finite universe that Aristotle had posited to the infinite universe, huh?

[1:06:57] The famous book there, from the closed universe to the infinite universe, you know. He says this took place at the same time that there came about a decline in the study of theology and God, right? And so there, they don't have the infinite God to pursue, then they've got to have universe that is what, infinite, huh?

[1:07:21] And then he describes how when you know in the physics of the 20th century, he started to discover all these limits, right? And after Einstein's general theory of relativity, it seemed that even the universe might be limited in size, and maybe even limited in time, you know. And he describes you know giving a lecture on on the developments in modern physics and this older physicist getting very angry, you know, this whole thing.

[1:07:51] So an older man gets angry, so you kind of you know teach him with some respect, and he decided to go see the physicist afterwards and see what his objections were. And he didn't have any scientific objections to what he was saying. I mean, see any difficulty? But he just didn't like the idea of these limits appearing all over the place. Well, he began to you know reflect upon that Weizsäcker, you know, huh?

[1:08:13] You know, why was it was? What turns does it make? You know. Well, the point is that our mind does want something infinite, or it is ordered to something infinite, right? And if the universe is not infinite, then it's got to find it somewhere else, right? And Thomas himself says you know that even the early Greeks, you know, they thought there was an infinite body out there somewhere, you know, or the or the air went on forever or something, you know.

[1:08:38] And when they realized that maybe there couldn't be an infinite body, maybe you know then they realized the infinity had to be found somewhere else, right? But the mind is is naturally ordered to the what? Infinite,

[1:08:52] but you can see that most easily in the fact that numbers go on forever, right? The mind keeps on thinking of these higher things.

[1:09:02] With the theorem there about the cube numbers, I said, "What about you know four multiplied four? I think I got to get to that." Maybe five. But so, your mind is not, you know, it's ordered to the infinite, right? But what is that infinite? It's ordered to.

[1:09:22] So he says it should be said that the greater good is not less than the good of which man is capable as an intrinsic, inherent thing. He's nevertheless less than the good which he's capable as an object, which is infinite. But the good which is partaken of by the angel and even by the whole universe, right, is a finite and contracted good. And this is, you know, sometimes Thomas will take that up.

[1:09:53] You know, because God had made a different universe? Well, yes, I mean the kind of universe he wanted to, right? So the something finite and contracted in this universe that we live in, right, which can't therefore be the end for us. Take a little break now.