Prima Secundae
16. Summa I-II q.3 a.4–5: Replies on Peace, Charity vs. Faith, and Beatitude in the Speculative Intellect
Class of 2011-03-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/016-summa-i-ii-q-3-a-4-5-replies-on-peace-charity-vs-faith-and/

[0:00] Now, what about this objection here from peace, right? To the first thereof, it should be said that peace pertains to the last end of man, not that it is essentially beatitude, right? But because antecedently and consequently it has itself to it, huh? Antecedently, insofar as are removed all what disturbances, right, and things that impede us from the last end. In some sense, you might say the end of government is what peace, right?

[0:39] Huh? Then you can pursue your thinking, your geometry, and so on without disturbances, right? Okay. Consequently, insofar as man, the ultimate end having been achieved, he remains what pacified, right? His desire being what quiet, right? Okay. Doesn't we

[1:11] go that much into the idea of peace there in terms of what the tranquility of order that he defines some way? But you know how Thomas speaks of the. He defines the kingdom of heaven as the ordered society, right, of those who see God.

[1:35] Well, I mean, there's an order among the blessed, right? Yeah. And as I say, your body will be shining more bright than some, and maybe other people's body will be shining more bright than yours, right? You know exactly where you belong in the scale of things, right? Okay.

[1:55] But you know the the angels, you know the you know the first hierarchy and the middle and the lower beginning, middle, and end, as Dionysius says, and then in each hierarchy there's three orders, right? Beginning, middle, and end, and each order is beginning, middle, and end, all the way down to the to the last individual, right? You always have somebody that's unless you're the highest angel, you always have somebody above you and somebody below you, right?

[2:27] You know, you know the the cartoon, the joke there, you know, where the boss. Chooses out the gate below him, chooses out the gate below him. I'll be answering the last gate that will be below him. He goes out and kicks the dog.

[2:47] So, well, your dogs in heaven get to kick around. You won't be. You'll be enlightened by those above you rather than mistreated by them.

[3:05] But in the Psalms, here, it talks about you know the house of God or something like that, delighting in that, right, as well as in God Himself, right. So you're delighting the order of heaven, right now, however low your place may be. Augustine says it's great joy to see God

[3:30] in degree, right? And your heart will be at rest, huh? But so one saint will outshine another, right? A different meaning outshine, but speak of that in this life too sometimes. I have a second argument here about the good being the object of the will. but even though the will, the good is the object of the will, can't be the what? The first act of the will, or the first object of the will, cannot be the act of the will itself, right?

[4:17] So that good that it's aiming at is something other than an act of itself. To the second, it should be said that the first object of the will is not but its act, right? Just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but the what? The Visible, right? Whence from the fact that beatitude pertains to the will as its first object, right? It follows that it does not pertain to it as its own what?

[4:54] Act. On the third objection, about the mover. To the first, it should be said that the end is first grasped by the understanding than the will. So the good as known is the object of the will, and the good as known by reason, right?

[5:24] So what is reason knowing first is not the act of the will. Nevertheless, motion towards the end begins in the what? Will. That's interesting. When Thomas talks about faith, hope, and charity, and he says, "By faith we know what the end is. By hope we what? Tend towards the end. By charity we already join to the end, huh? But hope is in the what? Will, right? So where you're tending towards the the good, right?

[6:14] So sometimes that's one of the arguments they give for the the will being more in beatitude than reason, right? The charity is more what? Is higher than what? Faith, yeah. So you might say, well, faith is to reason as love is to the will, charity is the will. Then alter the proportion, like Euclid does, and you say, well, then as what? Charity is to faith, so the will is to what reason?

[6:48] But charity is better than faith, and will is better than the reason, right? Okay. But you got to remember that faith is not what a knowledge of God in Himself, right?

[7:08] Why charity, even in this life, is a love of God in Himself. So, got to be careful, right? You can see how people, you know, could think that the will is better in that sense.

[7:42] Okay. Sometimes you'll see an argument which is higher, the reason or the will, right? They'll take the fact that charity, the theological virtue, is better than faith, as. Yeah.

[8:00] Saint Paul teaches us, right? Okay. Incidentally, hope is also better than what faith. Thomas talked about that in the disputed questions on hope, right? Okay. But anyway, clearly charity is is is clearly said by Saint Paul, right, to be greater than faith or even hope, right? So you say, well,

[8:30] faith is in reason as a subject, and charity is in the will, right? So faith, in a sense, is to reason what what charity is to the what will. Then you alternate the proportion and say, then as charity is to faith, so is the will to reason. Charity is better than what faith. Therefore, the will is better than what reason, right? That's some probability argued, right? But then again, you come back and say, yeah, but is that proportion exact, right?

[9:11] That charity is to the will just like faith is to reason. But charity is loving God as He is in Himself, right? Faith is not seeing God as He is in Himself, right? So that seems to be a more exact proportion to say, seeing God as He is face to face, is to what? Reason, as loving God for His own sake and so on, is to the what?

[9:38] Will, yeah. Then it's not as clear, you know. That St. Paul is not saying in that text that love is better than seeing God as He is face to face. He said it's better than what? Faith, yeah, yeah. So, how could charity love God as He is in Himself? Charity is an act of the will which follows upon knowledge, because you can't know Him as He is in Himself, and how can you love God as he is in Himself?

[10:08] You know that's an interesting thing because you know if we go back to you know our course on love and friendship, right? When Thomas talked about the causes of love, right, and basically the three causes of love: the good, and then knowledge, right, and then what? Likeness, right. Those are the three main causes of it. And remember that one of the objections against saying that knowledge is a cause of love is that what?

[10:41] The one who knows more doesn't necessarily what? Yeah, yeah. So, well, of course, knowledge is not the fundamental cause of love. It's the good, right? So the the the the love is going out to its object, which is the good, right? And so the person who knows God less, you know, let's say he doesn't know as much theology or something like that, might love God more, right?

[11:13] Than the person who knows more, right? People think I must love God an awful lot if I know as much about Him, you know, more about Him than other people. But that's kind of a commonplace of observation in Christian life. The man who knows more in this life does not necessarily love God more, right? And even you can say, you know, the devil knows God better than you and I know, and he doesn't.

[11:45] Love God, you know, he's kind of kind of hatred of God now. So there's got to be some kind of knowledge there, right? But love can go further, right? And this goes back to a different, another difference between reason and the what will, and that is that the object of reason has got to be kind of in the mind in order for you to know it, right?

[12:17] Okay. Why the the will goes out to what the thing, right? In itself, right? So it's kind of a contrariety, you know, of will and reason, and therefore the fundamental act of reason is sometimes called apprehension, right, simple apprehension, grasping. Right? Huh? To know something, you gotta be grasping. Right? Now that doesn't seem to name the perfection of the will to be grasping. Right? But the kind of fundamental thing in love there is giving.

[12:54] Right? Huh? So you're going out to the thing. Right? Huh? Okay. So, guys, the song says, "I left my heart in San Francisco." Right? Huh? Okay. Um. So there's all kinds of signs that love goes out to the object. Right? Huh. Um. Why? The reason is the reverse. Right? Huh. So in that sense, the will is. More proportioned to God in this life, right? Because you're going output, right?

[13:29] I use kind of a little likeness there, and I say, I can more easily jump into the ocean to go swimming or something than I can put the ocean into me, right? That's a little bit like, the example there with the little boy appearing to Augustine, right? You can't put the ocean in this little hole you've got on the beach there, right? Huh? So how can you get the Trinity into your mind, right?

[13:57] And Augustine is trying to put the Trinity into his mind, right, and understand it so far as he can, right? So, but you know, the little boy can jump into the ocean rather than you can do that more easily than put the ocean into him, right? So, in some sense, the will is more what proportion to God, huh? And therefore, God leads us to Himself through faith, but in faith, the reason is moved not by the evidence, but by the what will, right?

[14:33] The will is moving the the reason to what assent, huh? And therefore, you know, Christ talks to Thomas there, right? Huh? Blessed are those who not seen and believe, right? Huh? But the reason why it's meritorious, right, to believe, is because the reason is not what forced to assent to these things, huh? I was reading, like, Chapter 10 there in Book One of the Physics this morning, and

[15:08] Aristotle is talking about how all the Greek philosophers before him they're thinking that change is between contraries and so on, but they say so without giving a reason for it, right? And Aristotle has a famous phrase there,

[15:27] as if coerced or forced by the truth itself, right? And that's not true about faith, right? Your mind is not coerced by the evidence itself, right? Huh? And that's why kind of annoyed, you know, at these translations, you know, of of the Epistle to the of the Hebrews, right? Where they say, you know, the evidence of what is not seen, right? Well, the Greek word is not evidence there.

[15:59] It's actually the word Aristotle uses in the Sophistical Refutations, right? But it's kind of like the the the mind is what doesn't head doesn't have evidence, right? It's something not seen, but the mind is convinced, right? Huh? But involves the will, right? And then that's why in the definition it says not only. The conviction of what is not seen, you might say, but the

[16:34] yeah, the substance of things hoped for, right? Yeah, I think it's hypostasis. Yeah, I think it's the same word, hypostasis, but they translate in Latin "substance of things hoped for," right? But you got to bring in the will there, you know. So, or when Augustine defines the act of the will, he says it's

[17:03] to assent to something while thinking about it, or thinking about something without assenting to it. And I know myself, and when I, you know, I'm thinking about logic, right, and the acts of reason, right. Well, there's one distinction that Thomas gives in the Peri Hermeneias to logic, to the whole logic, where he speaks of the order of three acts of reason: understanding what something is, then understanding the true or the false, composing or dividing, and then what reason, right?

[17:46] So I have to understand what a whole is and what a part is before I know that a whole is more than what a part. And I have to understand that a whole is more than a part before I can use that to prove that in a triangle, if two angles are equal, the opposite sides will be equal. Okay, so there's an order among those three acts, right?

[18:12] But then there's another order in our acts, right? And Thomas doesn't talk about there, but English, you know, in its superiority, really speaks very well about these things. And you could state it two ways, there, kind of. Reason thinks about something before it understands it,

[18:37] and so before it is sensed you might say, something, right? And it see understands how it must be so. Um. Well, what about Augustine's definition, right? Well, it's showing that the act of faith is something different from what

[19:04] what pure reason is doing, right? Where it thinks about something before it understands, right? huh? So the mind, in a sense, is not satisfied, right? That's why it continues to think about it, huh? And that definition of belief kind of gives rise to what you know Augustine says elsewhere, but which is kind of popularized by Saint Anselm, right? That theology is faith seeking what understanding, right? Huh?

[19:38] So you've ascended something that you haven't fully understood. You don't have the evidence for, right? Huh? So it's assentire cum cogitatione, huh To assent while thinking about it, right? And therefore, it's kind of natural to want to think about it more, right? And say, well, okay, God became man. You know, I understand that what you're saying, right? It's kind of a strange thing going on here, right?

[20:05] So why did God what become man, right? And the famous work of Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, right? Why God a man? Huh? Why did God become a man? Huh? That's that's faith seeking understanding, right? Huh? So you're thinking about something without yet what understanding it, right? And you'll be doing that the rest of your life, but but as you go on, you start to understand a little bit more, right?

[20:34] Huh? A little bit, huh? What this thing is, but never to the point that you don't require what faith, right? Huh? So theology is the science, as Augustine says, but which faith is strengthened and nourished and defended and so on, right? But its faith is a fundamental thing there.

[20:57] So now how to get into this discussion here about the acts of the will? Another question. Yeah. You know, I was talking about you were saying, right? Huh? Okay. About this argument that's given there, right? When you talk sometimes in the context of an article, which is the greater power, reason or or the the will, right? And sometimes they argue, well, faith charity is greater than faith, but charity perfects the will.

[21:30] Faith is the perfection of the reason, right? So if the perfection of the will is greater than the perfection of the reason, well then it must be that what the will is better. Yeah. That's an a good argument, right? But is it altogether necessary, right?

[21:54] It's interesting how that you know that I always puzzle that that line of Christ where he talks about the excellence of Saint John the Baptist, right? And then he adds, you know, but he's the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist. How can that be? Just got through saying there's no greater man for him. You know, how can the person who's least in the kingdom of heaven be better than John the Baptist, right?

[22:21] Well, the person who's least in the kingdom of heaven sees God as he is, right? And since knowledge is a cause of love, right? You might love God more than John the Baptist can do on this life, right? So, if you go to heaven and you come to see God face to face, you will love Him much more than you did in this life, and you can't help but love Him, right?

[22:47] This life you can you can sin and lose the love of God, right? But in heaven you can't, right? Just just just just too obviously good. He's still obviously every good, right? Nothing's really comparable, right? You know, it's really beautiful. Beautiful thing, Thomas. He's talking about the knowledge of the angels, right? And does the angel know God, right? Okay. And he's talking here about now the angels' natural knowledge, as if you know. a Natural knowledge of God, and so one of the objections against any angels' natural knowledge of God is that there's an infinite distance between God and what?

[23:40] God and angel, right? We can't, you can't, you can't go infinite distance, right? Huh? I said, how the heck is he going to answer this, right?

[23:53] And Thomas says, well, even when the angel knows God, right, as he does because he's made in the image and likeness of God, between the angel's knowledge of God and God's knowledge of God, there's infinite distance.

[24:13] So he doesn't, in a sense, do away with the infinite distance, right? Huh? But he transposes it now from their substance to their knowledge, right? Huh?

[24:25] So just as there's an infinite distance between the angel and his natural substance, huh, and the substance of God, so in the knowledge that these two have of God, there's what infinite distance, right? So even the angel who sees God most clearly, the Lucifer, right, wherever he is,

[24:48] even if there be division, right, there's still an infinite distance, right? God is infinitely more knowable. He's infinitely more what? Lovable, right? Than he can be loved by any saint, I suppose, even by the by the Blessed Virgin, huh? Or even Christ, in his human nature, can he love God as much as he's lovable? Only in his divine nature can Christ love God as much as he is what?

[25:22] Lovable. It's kind of amazing thing to see, huh? You know, I when St. Francis de Sales was talking about praising God there in the Treatise on the Love of God, you know, he says, well, you know, it says in Scripture, you know, praise God as much as you can because he's above all praise, right? Well, finally, you want God to praise Himself, because only God can what?

[25:49] Yeah. And uh, and you want someone to what? Love God as much as he's lovable, because you realize no matter how much you love him, you will never love him as much as he's lovable, right? And it'd be, you know, pity, right? Huh? And so this,

[26:19] you know, in my foolish days, you know, see a young lady, I mean, he thinks he's lovable, you know. Why doesn't everyone you know love her as much as she's lovable? She's really lovable, this one.

[26:31] But notice, you have a fortiori there in heaven, right? Huh? When you see how lovable God is, and you're loving him more than you ever loved him in this life? But you realize you don't love him as much as he's lovable. Well, someone ought to appreciate him, right? Huh? You know.

[26:49] Or even you know, I hear the music of Mozart, and I said, "Geez, really, really lovable," you know. I don't, you know, other people love this as much as it's lovable, right? No. I don't think the music of Mozart is infinitely lovable, right? But I know, I know. Sometimes you know, I'll be driving the car, and I turn the radio on sometimes and get some classical music and hear a piece of Mozart, and nothing to do, you know, and I'm just talking on and driving the car.

[27:14] I said, "Gee, but this is really a good piece," and I should go back and you know. But sometimes at the house when I'm reading something and I'm a little distracted, I don't give my full attention to the piece, you know. And now I am, you know.

[27:27] It's good to appreciate the music of Mozart as much as it's appreciable, you know. Or sometimes you have a really good meal, you know, but you ate the wrong thing before you. Your

[27:45] taste buds are all burned out. You can't do justice. You can't enjoy it as much as it's enjoyable. as, I was foolish to have had that that spicy stuff or whatever. it was. Yeah, Yeah. Yeah.

[28:04] All this is a fake memory of what I'm talking about, right? That, that, that, uh, you want someone to know God as much as he's knowable, and someone to love God as much as he's lovable. But you find out that God is the only one who can know God as much as he's knowable, and love God as much as he's what? Lovable, right?

[28:30] I think in heaven, I mean, even though there'll be people above you in heaven, right? But people above you in heaven, but you'll say, you know, you will rejoice. Not that you love them, God less than they love God, right? But you rejoice in the fact that they love him more than you do, right? That someone would love God more than the sinner, right, you know? And, uh, but you still got that idea that you finally want someone who can love God.

[29:02] Does that mean we have to be humble even in heaven? Oh yeah, oh yeah, milty, I think, will remain in heaven, yeah. Yeah, because there's a lot of people above us. Oh yeah.

[29:15] Count on it, bro. Come on. I'll remember that. You- you'll remind me as you look down. As you look down Don't forget Don't forget. Never forget every virtue except humility. I don't know about that. Where our Lord says there, learn of me for I am, meek, and humble of heart, right? I can. Learn other virtues from Christ besides those, you know. But does he single out any other virtue?

[29:59] Maybe love. He does. But you know, does it be as courageous as I am? As if he attaches a great importance to what humility, right?

[30:17] Okay, we're at the third reply to the third objection. To the third, it should be said that the end is first grasped by the understanding. You read that word in Latin in the Latin text. You apprehended, right? Well, that's the Latin word for grasping, right?

[30:37] Nevertheless, the motion to the end begins in the will, right? And therefore, the will to the will is owed that to which we what,

[30:52] Which follows at last the achievement of the end, right? Namely what? Delight or enjoyment. Yeah. Okay. Now, to the fourth objection here about the thing. To the fourth, it should be said that love is preeminent, excels knowledge in what moving, right? But knowledge is a previa, right? Way before loving in attaining, huh? For something is not loved unless it be known, as Augustine says in the tenth book about the Trinity, huh?

[31:35] And therefore, the understandable end we first attain through the action of the what? Yeah, when you come to see God as He is, face to face. Just as the sensible end we first attain through the action of the senses, right? So I have to taste the salmon or taste the steak before I delight in the what? This tastes good. Mmm. See, I have to taste it before I can enjoy it.

[32:09] Yeah. Yeah. See, why if you said, if you said that love is the end, you say, well, you can love God even when you have not attained Him, right? Now, because you haven't attained the end, so how can love be the end if you love before you've attained the end?

[32:35] But after you attain the end, you will love God more than you did before. Yeah, looking before and after there, right? Now, the one who has everything that he wishes is from this blessed that he has all those things that he wills, huh?

[33:00] Which is through something other than through the act of the will, huh? But nothing badly does he will is required to beatitude as a suitable what? disposition for it, huh? This is called the second definition of happiness that Augustine gives, right, huh? And it's one quoted in Thomas from time to time.

[33:32] Now, a good will is placed in the number of the goods which make one blessed, in so far as it is a certain what inclination. Just as motion is led back to the genus of its what limit or term, as alteration to quality,

[33:54] warming up. The warm. Okay, let's take a little break here now before we go on to. Article five here. To the fifth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that beatitude consists in the operation of the practical understanding.

[34:14] For the end of what? The last end of any creature consists in becoming like God, right? But man is more likened, become more like God to the practical intellect, which is the cause of things what understood, than through the speculative intellect, which it takes knowledge from things, right? So God's knowledge is productive of things, right? Okay. But speculative intellect gets its knowledge from things, but the practical intellect is productive of things, like the table and the chair, so on.

[34:51] So that's more alike. Yeah, yeah. The Germans I was reading about De Tocqueville and his correspondence with Gobineau And Gobineau you know, had these kind of racist theories, right, back in the time. And De Tocqueville is very down on what he's doing, and he says, you know, a lot of people are going to accept that are probably the Germans, he says. That's what I'm quoting a lot, you know.

[35:25] I can say how prophetic, you know. Wow. It's interesting to see that, you know, that some of them are, you know, inclined to pick up, you know, these racist theories.

[35:42] Moreover, beatitude is the perfect good of man, right? But the practical intellect is more ordered to the good than the speculative, which is ordered to what? The true. Hence, also, according to perfection of the practical intellect, we are called good, but not according to perfection of speculative intellect. But according to it, we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore, the beatitude of man more consists in the act of the practical intellect than of the what

[36:20] speculative. Hmm. So they can't have what prudence without the moral virtues, right? Right. Moreover, beatitude is a certain good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is occupied with those things which are outside of man. But the practical intellect is occupied about those things which are of man himself, namely his operations and his passions. Therefore, the beatitude of man more consists in the operation of the practical intellect than of the speculative intellect.

[36:58] Being human, we should think of human things and being mortal of mortal things. So. the. Poet said that Aristotle disagrees with. But against this is what the great Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity, that contemplation is promised to us as the end of all our actions

[37:23] and the what eternal perfection of our what joys. There Augustine saying contemplatio right is the end. Thomas says, huh, this beautiful quote from Augustine. That's my favorite work of Augustine, the Trinity. I like it more than the Confessions. Confessions is the most read work of Augustine, right? They read it even sometimes in non-Catholic circles too, you know. Famous work. Just say the Consolation of Philosophy is the most read work of what?

[38:10] Ethics, yeah. I wouldn't say it's greater than his work on the Trinity, though. I wouldn't say that. I answer it should be said that beatitude more consists in the operation of the speculative intellect than the practical, which is clear from three things. How does he see all this, Thomas? I don't know sometimes.

[38:31] First, because from this that if beatitude is a what operation and action and act, is necessary that it be the what the best operation of man. But the best operation of man is that which is of the best power with respect to the best what object. But the best power is the intellect whose best object is the divine good, which is not an object of the practical intellect, but of the what speculative.

[39:08] You can't make or do God, huh? Whence in such an operation, to it in the contemplation of divine things, most of all maxime, human beatitude consists.

[39:28] And because each thing seems to be that which is best in it, as is said by Aristotle in the ninth in the tenth book of the Ethics. Therefore, such an operation is most what proper to man, meaning most what private to him, right? Most characteristic of him. And maxime, most of all, what Delightful, right?

[39:58] Secondly, it appears the same from this that contemplation is most of all sought on account of itself. For the act of the practical intellect are not sought for their own sake, but in account of action. But these actions are to some end. Hence, it is manifest that the last end cannot consist in the act of life, which pertains to the practical intellect.

[40:38] Third, also it appears from this that in the contemplative life, man communicates, has in common with the higher things, to wit, God and the angels, to which he is what likened to beatitude. But in those things which pertain to the act of life, also the other animals with man in some way what communicate, although what imperfectly.

[41:10] And therefore, the last and perfect beatitude, which is expected in the future life, the whole consists in contemplation. But the imperfect beatitude, such as can be had here, first and chiefly consists in contemplation. Secondly, in the operation of practical what understanding, ordering the actions and passions of man, as is said in the tenth book of the Ethics, right? Aristotle gives this final consideration of happiness, right? He says, perfect happiness in this life, so far as we can have it, right, consists in wisdom, right, the contemplation of God and wisdom.

[41:53] But then, secondly, in the what perfection of prudence, right? So was Churchill happy, right, when he was head of the government, right? He slept well that night and he became prime minister, right? He's crazy, huh? He knew now as a man who could direct things, right?

[42:17] So Aristotle saw that. So those are the three reasons he gives, huh? Aristotle calls the the happiness of contemplating according to wisdom, kind of a divine happiness, right? And then the practical one is kind of a human one, right? Concerned with human things, right?

[42:55] But we must not allow those who advise us men to think of human things as being mortal or mortal. But we must, so far as we can, straight every nerve to live in accordance with the best in us, and so on. You were memorizing this in the English edition there, you know. And my father comes by and he says, "What are you doing?" So memorizing this name's edition.

[43:15] Oh, sounds good, he said. Father, father, son memorizing this. Yeah. We never even had a chance go to high school, you know. I mean, yeah, it works its way through high school now, doesn't it?

[43:34] I remember I'd you know talk to students about this sometimes. He said, "Well, it's going to be all contemplative next life. We got to you know get ready. We got to do the practical in this life, and then we'll have a contemplative life in the next. We had a contemplative life in this life, and then it's going to help next life. So you've all to do the practical life here and get that, enjoy that, and."To the first, therefore, it should be said that the likeness, the foresaid likeness of the practical understanding to God, is according to what?

[44:19] Yeah. Because it has itself, right? To its thing known as God, to what? Yes, right. But the assimilation of the speculative intellect to God is according to union or informing, right? Which is a what? Greater assimilation.

[44:46] And nevertheless, it should be said that with respect to the what chief thing known, which is his own essence, God does not have a practical knowledge, right? But he has what? Only a speculative, Yeah. That's why Thomas says, you know, theology, practical or speculative. Well, unlike philosophy, where you have speculative philosophy here and then practical philosophy here, it's both, Thomas says, right? But it's chiefly speculative, theoretical, because it's chiefly about God, and God is not something to be made or done.

[45:22] Something to be contemplated. That's kind of interesting. The talks about this, so the distinction, because God knows what primarily himself, right? Well, then I realize God when we know ourselves.

[45:49] You you learn the Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason, right? And now reason is knowing itself, right? And now reason is what like God who knows himself, right?

[46:03] So is reason most like God when it knows itself. That's what God does. Knows himself. But there is a likeness of proportionality, right? I mean, what proportion means is what

[46:23] the first is to the second, as the third is to the fourth, right? Okay. So when our reason knows itself, it's like God who knows himself, right? But is that being as much like God, reason knowing reason, as in reason knows God?

[46:45] Because the reason knows God is not knowing itself; it's knowing God. And so, in that sense, it's not like God who knows himself, right? But it's more like what? God who knows God. It's the same thing, you know, right? And that's being more like God to know the same thing God knows, which is Himself, than when reason knows itself. So you are not more like God in knowing Shakespeare's definition of reason, but you like him in some way proportionally, right?

[47:17] Okay, it's a little bit like you used to say about love. You know, what does God love? Well, primarily God loves Himself, right? So I'm more like God when I love myself, than when I love God. Well, I'm like God in some way by loving myself, right? Because God loves Himself, right?

[47:41] But I'm not as much like God in loving myself as I'm like God in loving God. And that's the greater likeness, huh? You know, Aristotle gives the the tool of likeness there in the

[47:57] first book of the Topics, the book about places. And he says, you know, that he gives the two tools there: the third and fourth tool, the two of difference, right, and the tool of likeness, right. And he says one is exercised in seeing differences more when you see the differences between things that are closer together, right? So when the mind sees a difference between a cat, let's say, and a tree, it's not exercised as much as in seeing the difference between a cat and a dog, because the differences are finer there, right?

[48:35] Um, but in terms of likeness, huh? The mind is exercised more in seeing the likeness between things that are further apart, right? So in seeing the likeness between, say, the dog and the cat, the mind is not seeing what, not being exercised as much as in seeing the likeness between a cat and, say, a tree. And of course, the likeness of proportion is the more what distant likeness, huh?

[49:04] So you see, this is to that as that is to that, right? Okay. So I see that two is to three is four is to six, right? The mind is more exercised, right? And so this, when reason knows itself, it's like God by this more distant likeness than when reason knows what God, right? So reason is more like God in knowing the same thing that God knows, but it's also like it in some way knowing itself.

[49:38] So you have to see something profound about the definition of reason and something godlike in some way, right? But it's kind of a pride, I would assume, to say that reason is better what. Knowing itself, then knowing God. Let him know himself, and I know myself. You know. Of course, you know what Karl Marx is doing with the sense to reason, for a man to know himself, right?

[50:09] But he thought, you know, that that man comes to know himself by making other things, right? And he sees his light, latent powers, you know, and so on. Okay, but the but kind of the end is for is for man to know himself. Say for Marx, so he is seeking a certain likeness to God, right?

[50:33] But a likeness that is more remote than the likeness that is had when reason knows and loves God. Here it seems like it's almost the same. It's the same object, right? I think he's at the same object, right? There's a there's a proportion, there, right?

[50:57] It's kind of interesting, I think. So it's interesting to use the word here. Thomas has a little problem, you know, because he didn't follow Euclid's language there, right? Because what happened was that the word proportion in Euclid means a likeness of ratios. So two to three is a ratio. Four to six is a ratio. Three to four is a ratio, right? But two is not to three as say three is to four.

[51:25] But two is to three as four is to what? Six. So you could call that a proportion, right? Well, then they started calling the what ratio a proportion. You find that you know modern science that a proportion is used for a ratio. Now, what do you call a proportion in Euclid's sense? Well, they start proportionality is kind of a clumsy word. You know, I'm sorry, Thomas got caught up in that misuse of language, but in the new and improved edition, right?

[51:57] I've always explained, yeah, yeah, proportion. So he's talking about what Euclid calls a proportion, and that's a likeness, but a more distant one, right? And you can you know see things

[52:17] far apart, right? And sometimes Thomas talks about the importance of proportion in knowing God, right? Because proportion it was you to what see a likeness between things that are very far apart, right? So if I say, you know, two is to three as four is to six, okay, but two is to three as four hundred is to six hundred, as four thousand is to six thousand, you know, as four trillion, you know, I'm talking about trillions all the time in Washington now.

[52:48] It's four trillion is to six trillion, right? You see, well, it's a big, you know, just a trillion, you know, but I still got the same proportion, right? Huh? So the Lord is my shepherd.

[53:03] Shepherd is to his flock as God is to us, or God is to us as a shepherd is to his flock. You know, things that are very far apart, but but you can still see a likeness there, right? So, given the fact that that we're an infinite distance, you know, big God, right? We can go in. We can go with proportions, you know, and find a likeness between things that are extremely far apart, right?

[53:31] And even us and what? And God, right? God and rock. Yeah, yeah. So, and kind of the the famous parables of our Lord seem to sometimes be based upon a proportion, right? The kingdom of heaven is like a man who found a treasure and sorted it. He had, and so on. You know, it's beautiful. You know. So we'll do the new. We'll do the new Berquist edition of St.

[54:03] Thomas. Ad Mentem Euclid. Euclid by my brother Mark. you know, he's joking about writing a liberalism more a geometrical demonstrata. And see, different theorems. You know, one theorem, you know, the first theorem Euclid did about the equilateral triangle on top of a, you know, the line. So one theorem he had was on a flat and federal republic to compose a pyramid of total power, right? Yeah. And then and then you know axioms, you know how they speak of the fifth postulate, you know about parallel lines.

[54:52] He says, "A liberal's mind in reality if you extend it to infinity, never meet. " We should we should make a collection of these. Yeah, yeah, they're beautiful, you know.

[55:13] I remember, you know, I was reading what's his name, the English novelist there, the one that influenced Dickens. Yeah. That great, no. Not that, you know, this is the earlier guy, the 18th century guy. My my name is Goddard in that. Well, it's Goldsmith, but it's a different author from him.

[55:43] Old age, but anyway, the young man is kind of going to Europe, right, to the Grand Tour, so to speak, and he's being accompanied by his tutor, right, who, you know, wouldn't know Euclid, right? And he was saying to him, you know, a young man's mind and discretion, you know, extend to infinity, never meet. He's trying to he's trying to these kind of you know sayings control the young man from getting carried away in Earth there and and going bad.

[56:13] But it's kinda interesting the way that these things will occur to your mind, you know these things. Okay. So he says the likeness of the force of likeness of the practical intellect to God is according to a what proportionality, right? Okay. So you might say, you know, God is to the universe a little bit like the carpenter is to the chair or something, right? Huh. In the house and so on, right?

[56:47] Okay. But the assimilation of the speculative intellect to God is according to a union with God himself, right? But maybe you could you know add the idea that you're knowing the same object as what he's saying there, right? Which is a multo maior assimilatio much greater assimilation

[57:11] If I had to think about myself through eternity, I think I get kind of bored. Exhaust the subject. But you never get bored with seeing God, huh? You never comprehend this infinite one perfectly.

[57:30] He goes on to point out a second thing that, in regard to what God chiefly knows, it's not practical knowledge. He can't spruce himself or, spruce himself up or get a haircut or anything. You know that's right. He can't will himself to be a body or something, you know.

[58:16] Now, second objection, huh? To second, it should be said that the practical intellect is ordered to the good which is outside of itself, right? But the speculative intellect, the theoretical intellect, which Berquist calls it, the looking intellect or the looking understanding, has its good in itself, right, huh? To wit, the contemplation of what truth, right?

[58:50] And if that good is perfect, right, from it the whole man is perfected and becomes good, right? Which the practical understanding doesn't have, but is ordered to that, right?

[59:09] And Thomas talks about where Aristotle takes up the moral virtues before the virtues of reason, right? He does, then that order he says, or Aristotle does, because they're more known to us, right? But also because them or by them we are disposed for the other ones.

[59:32] So the carpenter makes a chair, and then I sit in the chair and I read Thomas. I won't say that. Yeah. Now. To the third, it should be said that that argument would proceed if man were his own last what end, right? For then the consideration and ordering of his acts and passions would be his what beatitude, right? But because the last end of man is an extrinsic good, right, to wit, God, to which by the operation of the speculative intellect we attain.

[1:00:31] Therefore, more does beatitude consist in the operation of the speculative intellect than in the operation of the practical intellect. Aristotle says that same thing in the tenth book, right? He's saying, you know, if man was the the best thing, right, then this activity that's about man would be the best activity, right? But man is not the best thing, right? So it's activity about the best thing, which is God, right?

[1:01:00] That is the end of man. To one consistent biography, either, right? But now does it consist in the consideration? Oh, I guess we got to stop now.