Prima Secundae
18. Aquinas on Beatitude II: The Vision of God's Essence, the Wonder to Know What Things Are, and Pleasure in Beatitude (q.3 a.8, q.4 a.1)
Class of 2011-03-31
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/018-aquinas-on-beatitude-ii-the-vision-of-gods-essence-the-wonder/

[0:00] Whether the beatitude of man is in the vision of the divine essence, it's got to be somewhere. Maybe that's where it is. To the eighth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the beatitude of man is not in the vision of the what divine essence itself. For Dionysius says in the first chapter of Mystical Theology

[0:27] that to that which is what the highest part of his understanding, man is joined to God as to one entirely unknown. But that which is seen to its essence is not entirely unknown.

[0:47] Therefore, the last perfection of our understanding of beatitude does not consist in this that God is seen through his what essence. I have to be careful taking Dionysius anybody out of context.

[1:06] I think Dionysius is talking about our knowledge in this life, you know, and kind of the ultimate thing is to realize that whatever we say about God in the knowledge we have of in this life, it falls short of Him, right? He remains unknown, right?

[1:24] Moreover, of a higher nature, higher is the what perfection. But this is the perfection of the that is proper to the divine understanding that it sees its own what essence. Therefore, the last perfection of the human understanding does not arrive at this, right? But subsists below that, right? That's proper, private to God, right?

[1:56] But against all this is what is said in one John three two. When he appears, we will be what like him, for we will see him as he is. That that is, best to my knowledge, is seems to be the most explicit statement of this. I mean, sometimes we say in Saint Paul did you see God face to face, right? This it seems is even more precise, right?

[2:26] Way of saying what the beatitude is. Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that the last and perfect beatitude cannot be except in the vision of the divine essence. Can only be in the vision of God, right? Divine nature, divine substance."

[3:00] That's a conclusion, how does he get at that? Right. To the first, for the evidence of this, two things should be considered. First, that man is not perfectly blessed when he, when there remains something for him what to desire and to what seek. And second, is that the perfection of any power is to be observed according to the ratio of its object. Right. Meaning ratio.

[3:45] Now, the object of the understanding is the what it is. That is the essence of a thing, as is said in the third book about the soul. That's the object of our reason, the what it is. So in the dialog, Socrates is always asking, "What is something?" Right.

[4:08] That's why, that's one explanation they give of the word horos There is meaning definition. Right. It's the limit of our knowledge, the goal of our knowledge, to know what something is. And if you know that something exists, you naturally want to know what is it. Right.

[4:30] So when you first see an eclipse of the sun, what is it? What is this? Things are like said. That's what manna means. What is it? Yeah.

[4:47] So so far, therefore, precedes the perfection of the understanding, so far as it knows the essence of some thing. If therefore, and the some understanding knows the essence of some effect, to which is not able to be known the essence of the cause, that one knows through it about the cause what it is.

[5:22] The understanding is not said to have attained to the cause simply, although through the effect it can be known about the cause that it is. Right. Okay.

[5:38] And therefore, there remains naturally for man to desire. When he knows the effect and knows it to have a cause, but he also knows about the cause what it is.

[5:53] So the whole first book of the what three books about the soul, Aristotle is looking at what the Greeks before him thought about what the soul is. Right. They're all convinced that that there is a soul exists, right? T here is a cause of life within living bodies, whatever that cause may be, but they don't know what it is, right? And Aristotle in the second book thinks out what the soul is, and then he's satisfied.

[6:25] Why these guys take up the powers of soul? But anyway, and in the what physics, he he's got to know what motion is, right? What change is, and he even goes so far as to what define it, right? Kinda funny, you know. Descartes he kind of quotes in a garbled version the definition of motion. and says, Now who understands those words, he says.

[6:57] And of course, you know Aristotle defines place in what time, right? They're always quoting Augustine when he says, "If nobody asks me, I know what time is. If they ask me what it is, I don't know. " But the mind wants to know what time is. Wants to know what place is.

[7:25] The Greeks had a common opinion that whatever is must be somewhere, some place. They didn't know anything about anything beyond that. Aristotle says, "Well, that means that place seems to be the first of all things. " What is this place that a thing can be without place, but place apparently can be without other things? So, what is place?

[7:55] Is it is it the extension between the walls of this room? What place is? Well, he has a whole investigation of what place is. It's a beautiful, beautiful thing in the fourth book of the physics, and then he takes up time afterwards. And he kind of gave the course on place and on time. He had to take two different courses: one for place, one for time.

[8:23] They were in a different time, a different place. So the mind naturally wants to know what these things are. One of my first great efforts was to try to find out what comedy is, right? Because Aristotle defined tragedy, but the part on comedy where he defines comedy has been lost. You see, so I was trying to figure out what the definition of comedy would be, right?

[9:01] But also this, you know, Shakespeare's definition of reason, huh? I think is if you understand this, of the best definition we have of reason as reason, huh? But you want to know what this reason is, huh?

[9:19] Everybody talks about reason, but very few, very few know what reason is, or can we say clearly what it is? Even something as basic as the good, right? I mean, even that first definition is is helps us a lot if you understand it, huh? Then later on we try to know what good is even better, right? That first definition is is a good start for knowing what the good is, huh?

[9:50] The people who talk about the good without ever knowing what it is are not in a very good position to talk about it. It takes a long time to understand these things there. Now, when Aristotle talks in the Posterior Analytics, he talks about the four basic questions there, right? The looking sciences. Does it exist? And then, if it does exist, what is it? And is this so? If it is so, why is it so, right?

[10:31] And the two are kind of similar, right? So just as we naturally we know that something is so, we naturally wonder why it is so, right? And so, likewise, when we know that something is, we naturally wonder what it is.

[11:05] So it wants to know then the what the cause about the cause what it is, and this desire is what the desire of wonder, right? And it causes the what investigation, the inquiry, as is said in the beginning of the what metaphysics. As is someone knowing the eclipse of the sun, he considers from what cause it proceeds, huh?

[11:42] About which, because he doesn't know what it is, he he wonders, right? And in wondering, he what inquires? Yeah. So wonder is said to be the beginning of what philosophy, huh? Nor does this inquiry come to rest before or until one arrives at knowing the essence of the what cause, huh? So you know, in the Council Thomas's life as a student, he was supposed to be known for blurting out in class, "What is God?

[12:19] What is God?" And he always talk about God. What is God? That's that natural what wonder, right? You know, we have a tendency I suppose to kind of dull the wonder of our students, huh? Wonder why. That's probably due

[12:46] to the customs that form the the modern world, huh? You study those customs, you know, whether it be the democratic customs or the customs that arise from the union of science and technology, right? You see, in a way, this wonder kind of disappears. The only thing you wonder about is that there are artifacts, right? The new,

[13:14] what do you call, Kindles and all these computer stuff. I told you a story about when William F. Buckley there was on TV there, and one of these programs you're about to host and so on, and the guy's looking out the window there in New York and see the skyscrapers, you know. Yeah. You know, wasn't this wonderful? Buckley says twice. Can you explain a little bit more about that?

[13:49] That element of wonder, in what way? Well, oh, the Tocqueville in Democracy in America speaks of this as being the effect of democratic customs, and turns men towards the practical. Okay. And then in modern science, you know, you have this union of science and technology, right? And Heisenberg in his gift for lectures there talks about how this turned them away from a contemplative attitude towards the world to this more practical one.

[14:34] Okay. The interest is not what nature is, but, what you can make it do. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. How to make money on it? Yeah, yeah.

[14:47] And the commercial origin of the modern city, right, give it kind of a practical stamp, as opposed to the aristocratic. I agree. Those things haven't, and the major sources of the modern world and its customs.

[15:12] I take those passages from the world historian there on the difference between the origin of the Greek city and the modern city, huh? Because the origin of the Greek city was aristocratic, and the origin of the modern city was mercantile, commercial. And so there was a kind of a practical stamp there in the modern city from the very beginning.

[15:37] And then in the sciences there, you know, you had this union of science and technology, which in a way turned natural science into kind of a technical science. That's the way Heisenberg speaks about it, huh? But I kind of go back into a more general thing: the way that when two arts or sciences come together. Which dominates the higher or the lower?

[16:06] The lower. And I used to give the example there of opera and ballet, right? In opera, you have, in a sense, the play joined with music, right? But what takes place in the opera is primarily the words or the music. Music. Yeah. And Mozart, you know, said in opera the words must be altogether the obedient servant of the music. And you can enjoy Mozart opera without really knowing the words, you know.

[16:41] And. But but but the drama is a higher form than music, huh? More rational, you might say, right? Okay. Now, in in ballet, which is uniting music now with the dance, right? Well, music is higher than than the dance, huh? But in the ballet, which is dominant, the dance, yeah, and kind of the you might say in in the ballet the music is the obedient servant of the dance, right?

[17:15] Makes us what want to dance or enjoy the dance, and makes us enjoy the dance, right? And so, you know, Tchaikovsky's music might be quite good for ballet, right? Mozart's music would be too good for ballet. I think they do write a little bit music for ballet, but

[17:38] the the dancing would be a distraction from the music, huh? Of Mozart. So you know, you have something jumping around on the stage, or you've got to have music, you know, kind of subordinate to that. So Heisenberg, that's like what Heisenberg says about modern science, huh? That the science was subordinated to the technology. It turned natural science into kind of technical science.

[18:14] And of course, you can kind of see in the experiment, huh? The experiment is something made by us, right? So it's in some sense closer to art than to the speculative sciences, in that that way. Also, the artificial existence in cities, especially where people are working in boxes and living in boxes, spend most of their time in these artificial environments. They have a purely materialistic existence and lose touch with other realities.

[18:45] which are higher. Okay. Thus, if therefore the human understanding, knowing the essence of some what created effect, like knowing what motion is, like Aristotle does in the third book of the Physics, right?

[19:16] It does not know about God except that He is, right? That there's an unmoved mover, as we were saying. Now, the unmoved mover is known through motion, but not what it is, right? It's more negative. So unmoved, unmoved is a negation.

[19:36] I don't really know this mover. I know what he's not. He's unmoved. And it remains to him the natural desire of inquiring for the what cause. Once, not yet, is he perfectly beatified? That's it. He has his desire is still not satisfied, huh?

[20:06] For perfect, therefore, beatitude is required that the understanding what arise at the very what it is, the very essence of the what first cause, huh? The very nature or substance of that thing, and thus it has its perfection through union to God as to an object, huh? In which alone the beatitude of man consists. This has been said also before. Now that text from Dionysius, is taken a little bit out of context, huh?

[20:40] He's speaking about the knowledge of those things which are what in the road, huh? In the via, not the beatific vision. In the road where we are tending towards what beatitude, right?

[20:57] That's Thomas when he's asking the class, "What is God? What is God? I want to know what God is." Now to the second, huh?

[21:15] The end can be taken in two ways, huh? In one way, it regards the thing itself which is desired, and in this way, the end of the what higher

[21:29] nature, nay, of all things, right? This has been said. That's God. Another way, the end is taken to the achievement of that end, that thing rather, and thus diverse is the end of the higher, the lower nature, according to a diverse what relation to such a thing. Thus, therefore, higher is the beatitude of God, comprehending, huh? Knowing his what nature as much as it is knowable, right?

[22:05] Then of man, or even of an angel, seeing and not what comprehend, not knowing it as much as its what knowable. So when I listen to a piece of Mozart, say, "What instrument is that playing?" I'm not always sure, you know. So I'm not hearing it as much as it's hearable, right?

[22:31] I'd say when you play the trumpet, Mozart would faint because I just think this ear too much. But again, you know, if you get someone who's really got a good taste, I mean Father Mark had a very good taste for wine, you know. And I told you the story there. I guess, where Ron McCarthy was the president, the, first president of the college. Had a bunch of professors over to a dinner, and he served different wine, and it was on the label, right?

[23:00] No one knew it except for Brother Mark says, that's not bad. He's so kind of amazed, right? Well, I'm sure I would have been floored. The other professors, right? So, if I'm and Mark and I lived together for, I taught at Saint Mary's. Um, we had some wine left over. My brother put a little bottle. In the week we'd have a little testing, you know. Well, maybe fifty percent, I guess, right?

[23:26] But when I test him, he always seems to know, right? So, was I tasting the wine as much as it is tastable? I was tasting the wine, right? But not as much as it is tastable.

[23:49] When Brother Mark was in Detroit one time, the friend there, we had a lot of friends who were artists, right? And his his grapes, the these people, you know, they come into a room like this, you know, well, I've never seen a shade of blue like exactly like that. Yeah. They're they're all their eyes, right?

[24:15] So maybe they they see gradations of color, you know, and you know, and usually women are better than men, you know. Well, this is aqua. This is even they got names for all all different kinds. Yeah. What I call those female color names? They're just men just don't see them. They don't know what they are. Teal. Teal.

[24:39] And you know, had a professor come from, you know, he taught you know one semester at the Institut Catholique in Paris. You know, he lived in Paris, and then he teaches semester at Laval. And he showed up with you know, jacket and a you know, he pants and so on, but I don't think we really were matched, you know. No, it didn't bother me at all, you know.

[24:59] If I I want to put my wife or some other woman, what's wrong with that man? You just know a hundred cents. You put a tie. You got you must have to consult your wife to see what which tie you wear with this with this jacket, you know. So so we're seeing the color, but not as much as it is seeable, right? We're tasting the wine, but not as much as it's.

[25:26] So we're never going to see God, know God as much as He's knowable, right? But that's not opposed to seeing Him as He is, huh?

[25:39] As Augustine says, seeing Him as He is in any grade is great, great happiness, you know. I was just reading about Thomas there, and we say you'll see God in the grade of clarity to which He's predestined you. So

[26:07] you see where He's predestined us, huh? This natural desire to see God. How would you reconcile that in many places? St. Thomas says that you need the supernatural virtue of hope in order to even desire to see God as He is. You need the superadded thing to our nature. He seems to be saying here that there is a natural desire. I think he's trying to show the the harmony of the supernatural with the natural, right?

[26:46] I was mentioning that earlier text there, where Thomas is talking about the angels, right, and that their natural desire is not contrary to the supernatural desire, right? And Thomas was pointing out that we naturally love God more than ourselves, right? It seems kind of strange to me to say it, but he's saying that because the the part that necessarily loves the whole more than itself sees that.

[27:18] But if this was not so, then the supernatural desire for God and to love Him would not be affecting nature, but would contradict with it. But

[27:33] our mind might have a hard time, you know, being sure that it's going to see God as He is without revelation. But it certainly does make sense in terms of our natural desire to know what a thing is, and to know what the causes of an effect that we do know. And you can see that, you know, and then you can see how therefore how reasonable is what we're saying is the final end, right?

[28:06] Is there also the problem that how can you desire something that is in fact impossible to nature? Yeah. It's something beyond nature, so how can you desire something impossible? But if we have a natural desire to know what a thing is, and and if it's the cause that we know is right, we have a natural desire to know what that is. How can you deny this in regard to God?

[28:29] Right, we have a natural desire to know what God is, and therefore we have a natural desire to see God as He is, right? Even though we can't arrive at this through our natural powers, right?

[28:45] At best, we can merit it in some sense, right? But even that, it's. More than we deserve. So, what would it be like? My natural desire to fly.

[28:58] It's beyond my natural power to fly, but I can still desire it. Yeah, I suppose that's in your kind of in your imagination, right? Again, that pertains to to the body, right, rather than to the to the soul itself.

[29:23] What do we say to the kid who wants his pet to be in heaven? I could never be happy without Tabitha being there, you know, I'd never be happy without Rover, whoever he is. You'd say, "well, if, that's if you would not be happy without Rover. Rover will be there. It's not to admit that Rover will be there because he won't be there. But in a sense, you will be able to fly in Heaven, right?

[29:53] the gift of agility. huh? So you see, the desire. to... Fly is supernatural in a certain way. Well, no, it's in perfect harmony. Again, there you go, you see the harmony between nature.

[30:11] But you're already excluded, you know, the act of the body, right, from being a happiness, right, huh? So, in running or jumping, I can't find happiness in those things. huh? Even though you might like to jump and run and get exercise. You're chasing that dog out there, weren't you? Was it you out there? I can never

[30:36] seem to catch him. Yeah, you exercise out there. Exercise is for people who will go to purgatory. Rest is for the souls in heaven.

[30:53] Okay, get the last objection. Finish that. okay. Thus, therefore, higher is the beatitude of God, comprehending His own essence, right, than of man or of an angel seeing and not comprehending, right, not knowing it as much as it's knowable, right.

[31:15] So even even Saint Thérèse of Lisieux can't love God as much as He's lovable. And even Mary, I guess, can't love God as much as He's lovable.

[31:32] Maybe even Christ in His human nature can't love God as much as He's lovable. Well, doesn't he get up to that, Francis de Sales? You want someone who can really love God as much as He's lovable, right? Yeah. He talks about it. He makes the comparison. And sometimes, you know, you think about somebody you know who's being kind of neglected. Uh, why doesn't somebody you know, love her?

[31:55] she'd be a nice lady, you know, huh? You know, and she's not loved as much as she's lovable, right? But if I talk about God, right, you kind of understand that, right? So we're we're happy that God is able to love Himself and to know Himself. They can appreciate Himself, right?

[32:20] It'd be kind of funny to say, about human beings, though. He appreciates himself, right, As much as he's appreciate- he would be appreciated. But uh, uh, that'd be part of our satisfaction, right, to know that God is able to know Himself as much as He's knowable, right, to love Himself as much as He's lovable.

[32:47] And we're just knowing Him as much and loving Him as much as we've been destined to to know and love Him, huh? Got a chance for the article here? Yeah. Okay, now there's a new question here.

[33:02] Then we're not to consider about those things which are what required or necessary, right, for beatitude, huh? And about this, eight things are asked. My goodness. First, whether pleasure is required for what beatitude, huh?

[33:26] And I think I mentioned before in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes gives his final consideration of what happiness is, right? And he also has a long section there on delectatio, right? Because some people, like the Epicureans, thought this is what happiness consists in. So that's a good question. But delectatio is required for beatitude, huh? Must you enjoy it?

[33:57] And dialectically, huh? It's a probable opinion that what pleasure is what beatitude, huh? Okay. So now Aristotle is talking about a probable opinion. He says the opinion of all men, or of most men, right? Or the what? People learning in the science that's about those matters, right? What they hold, or what the most of them hold, or the most famous of them hold, right, huh? Okay.

[34:34] So it's a scientific hypothesis, I guess. That's what Einstein says. Well, it's probable because Einstein said so, right? Um. An opera should the words be all together, the obedient servant of the music, or should the words be like well, Mozart, you know, says this. right. Okay. But you know, if, something is the opinion of most men. Like if most men think of pleasure as being the best thing in life, right?

[35:08] Well, then it's probably because of the number of men holding it, right? So if the number of men or the quality of men holding it can make something be considered as probable, according to Aristotle's definition of that.

[35:25] Second, which is more chief or principal in beatitude, pleasure or division, right? He's going to see some truth in pleasure, right? Otherwise, you wouldn't have this order of the two articles, would he? Okay. In some way,

[35:45] pleasure is required in beatitude, right? Okay. Third, with it requires comprehension, right? Well, if you take comprehension, and stick sense, you know, then that would lead us all out, right?

[36:03] Yeah. But Thomas, you know, it's kind of beautiful at the end of the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, where he takes up God's beatitude, right, and shows how it's superior to that of anybody else, right?

[36:18] Beautiful, beautiful treatment there. Fourth, with it requires the what rectitude of the will. Last thing, close the door. Most of us, huh? That's makes you very nervous. That article.

[36:41] Five, whether for the beatitude of man is required what the body, right? Nobody blessed until the the resurrection, or what? Because there's imperfection, you know, without the body, right? You're you're partial some way. The only part you're there, even though the most important part of you is there. And the part which will see God.

[37:11] Um. And six, whether it requires the perfection of the body, huh? So if I've lost an arm or a leg or something, huh, or I'm fat or something, is this going to impede my beatitude, huh? Or if one was a midget or something like that, right? Didn't have the proper size, or okay.

[37:40] See the way these articles are ordered, right? The body. These two articles on the body there are what placed after these ones talking about what's in the what soul, the will, and patient pleasure. Because you're talking about pleasure there in the act of seeing, right? Not the body of pleasure there. Um. Then it gets to something less than the body, which is the exterior goods, right? Where there's some exterior goods, huh?

[38:13] I was thinking, you know, gee, why don't we put these books in my? I think you guys get some of them, you know. But anyway, you know, I was coming back from mass this morning, and the public sticker and the person in front of me said, I love my library." I think that's you know you know propaganda for the public library there, but say I kind of love my library.

[38:31] I mean, it's good. I'm only separated from those books, you know. I wouldn't need them in heaven. So the exterior goods I need, them. Do? I need my garden. Do I need my my car? The man asked me once if he liked

[38:54] to drive, and he said, "Do you think?". We'll have the pleasure of driving when we're in heaven. I don't. I don't think we're going to care. I don't think that's going to attract our attention.

[39:05] But the eighth article is very interesting. I think whether it requires the society of friends, right? In a sense, a friend is is a exterior what good, right? Very unusual exterior good, huh? But I guess that's why it's put down there, right? At last, because it's coming under exterior goods in a sense. The Quakers. are the society of friends. I didn't put the two together. The society of friends.

[39:39] So he's asking whether Quakers are going to be there, or if they're going to be there. too or what Well, look at Frantzell's paintings, and then you'll find out who's there.

[39:52] Okay. Now Augustine says this is the quote I was referring to one time earlier. For Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity that the vision is the whole what reward of faith, right? Of course, faith is in is in reason, right? But that which is the reward, the

[40:16] and what? It's a reward too. Yeah, a virtue is beatitude, right? As is clear through the philosopher in the first book of the ethics, and Thomas was quoting that in the article on whether the angels merit the vision, right? He quotes Aristotle. He Aristotle saw that as kind of the reward, happiness as the reward of virtue, virtue is its own reward, They say, but that's that's since what it means.

[40:45] Um. Therefore, nothing others require for beatitude except the vision alone. The whole reward of faith. Interesting. Moreover, beatitude is, through itself, the most sufficient good, as the philosopher says in the first book of the ethics. But what needs something else is not through itself enough. Since, therefore, the essence of beatitude consists in the vision of God, it seems that beatitude does not require what pleasure, right?

[41:25] You'll see God, but you won't enjoy. Sounds kind of strange, right? It's something wrong with that, right? Um. Moreover, the operation of happiness or beatitude must be not impeded, huh? As is clear in the seventh book of of the ethics. But pleasure impedes the action of the understanding, for it corrupts the what estimation of foresight or prudence. Therefore, pleasure is not required for beatitude. But that's more like the pleasure the body is probably thinking of there.

[42:02] Okay. But against this is what Augustine says in the tenth book of the Confessions. This another beautiful quote from him. The attitude is gaudium, joy over the truth. Gaudium de Veritate. What a guy Augustine was. I answer. It should be said that in four ways something is required for something. I never knew that. In one way, as a what preamble or preparatory thing for it, huh? Just as learning is required for what science, huh?

[42:48] Another way as perfecting something, right? Just as the soul is required for the life of the body. Third, as aiding in an extrinsic way, as friends are required for doing something.

[43:06] Fourth way, as something what going along with it. If we say that what heat is required what for fire is something that follows upon fire. And in this way, this fourth way, pleasure is required for beatitude. For pleasure is caused from this that the appetite, the desiring power, rests in the good obtained.

[43:37] Whence, since beatitude is nothing other than the attaining of the highest good, it is not able to be beatitude without pleasure what following upon it. Aristotle talks about this in the Ethics. There he talks about certain pleasure that follows upon perfect what operation, right?

[43:59] So if beatitude is a what perfect activity, right? It's naturally what pleasant, right? So pleasure falls upon perfection of the act. The better I hear the music of Mozart, the more joy I have, right?

[44:22] Falls upon perfection, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said, from this very fact that a reward, huh, is rendered to someone, the will of the one meriting what rests, huh, which is the same thing as to be what pleased, huh. This way, desire is often spoken of, or wanting, as a kind of motion, right, towards the thing desired, huh? And pleasure is the what resting in the good desired being possessed now.

[45:06] It was desired. Whence, in the very what reward, being rendered, yeah, yeah, yeah, delight is what included, right? So he's referring to the text of Augustine, where he says this is the whole reward, right? Now, well, you wouldn't. That when is rewarded, one is naturally pleased. That's what he's saying, basically, huh?

[45:48] He's going in the next article be more precise about what is principally consistent, right? Okay. The second, it should be said that from the vision itself of God is caused what delight and pleasure.

[46:07] Whence the one who sees God is not able to what need pleasure, right? Aristotle talks about that in the Ethics, right? To talk about even human happiness there, he's talking about the Ethics there, and that in what the virtuous man does, he takes delight, right? So the courageous man takes delight in doing a courageous deed, right? The temperate man takes delight in eating and drinking moderately, right?

[46:40] If you're not pleased with moderate eating and drinking, then you don't have temperance, right? That's a sign that you don't have it if you're not pleased with this, right? The just man is pleased in paying his debts and so on, right? Paying what he owes somebody, huh? And so on. And why he says the man who's not involved in his virtuous deeds, he doesn't have pleasure in the very things he's doing, so he's got to go outside of this and get entertained, as they say, to get some pleasure, right?

[47:10] Huh? Because you know his activity itself is not what pleasing, right? Whence the one who sees God, it is not possible that he would what need some pleasure outside of this. So let's go and get entertained, you know. Let's go and hit the paint the town red tonight or something, you know, get a little, you know, a pleasure in our life, you know. Okay. This was

[47:39] a friend of mine was working one summer, you know, in a printing thing where you have to set the type, you know. You're doing that all day long, and you're going to go crazy. So one day, just to be, you know, friendly with his associates, workers, you know, he started accompanying them on their Saturday night out, right? All they're doing is rushing from one place to another to get a little pleasure, a little pleasure, get something to eat or drink, and so you pour a mouth.

[48:03] But you know there was no pleasure in that Tuesday doing all during the week, right? So they're rushing out to get pleasure somewhere else because they take no pleasure in what they were doing during the week. Yeah.

[48:18] Um. Now, to the third, it should be said that the pleasure accompanying the operation of understanding does not impede it, but more what? Strengthen. Yeah. So if I take delight in in that theorem of Euclid, I'm really excited now. I'll do it more intensely, right? Huh? Yeah. But if you take no delight in this theorem, you're not going to be applying your mind much to this, right?

[48:46] Okay. So it does not impede it the pleasures you take in understanding something, but it more what strengthens you, right? If I take pleasure in hearing the music of Mozart, I'm going to listen to it more carefully, right? If I take pleasure in the taste of some wine or food or something like that, I am going to savor it more, right? Therefore, I taste it better, right?

[49:09] Okay. For those things that we what delectabiliter facimus that we do with pleasure, right? More attentively, right? And more persevering, do we do, right? Okay. But delectatio extranea, this is the point, right? That's Aristotle's talking about in the text quoted, right? Delectatio extranea impedes the what operation, right?

[49:42] Okay. My brother Mark was at Leval there, you know. He'd go to the library to study, you know, but there was some girl with long hair that he thought kind of looked attractive, you know. So distracting, he had to go find some other place to go study, right? Well, that's extranea delectatio right? Okay. Sometimes you have, you know, like during class, you see, you know, the guys, guys looking at, paying attention to me, looking at the girl over there.

[50:09] So he's getting extraneous pleasure to the pleasure of my lecture. My first year of law school, there was this exceptionally beautiful woman with this long, thick black hair who sat down in the front of the class, and where a big section, and so everybody kind of sees her because she's right in front of the professor. She was always just toying with her hair.

[50:31] hair is a woman's glory, it says in the Bible, right? Should have been sitting in the back in a burka. It's like you'd be sitting with my habits, right?

[50:45] So delectatio extranea impedes the operation, right? In some ways, sometimes from the what distraction of the intention, because as has been said, to those things in which we delight, we are more what intent. Our intention is to, and when to what we pay attention to one thing vehemently, right? It's necessary that from something else, our intention be what withdrawn, right? So they speak of Mozart, you know, when he's listening to music, his whole soul is in his ear, you know, huh?

[51:23] And for that painter, the whole soul would be in the in the eye, right? Um. But sometimes also from contrariety, just as the pleasure of the senses contrary to reason, huh? It impedes the estimate of prudence, huh? Uh. More than the what estimation of the speculative intellect, huh? Okay. So Aristotle is talking about getting the mean there, you know. That's one of the rules he gives about watching out for what pleasure, right?

[51:57] Okay. Easily gets you off out of the middle. the the uh go in the mean. Okay, so.