Prima Secundae
24. Aquinas on Degrees of Beatitude, Happiness in This Life, and Whether Beatitude Can Be Lost (I-II, Q.5 aa.2–4)
Class of 2011-04-28
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/024-aquinas-on-degrees-of-beatitude-happiness-in-this-life-and/

[0:00] So. Take a little break here. Whether one man can be more blessed than another, right? The second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that one man is not able to be more blessed than another, for beatitude is the reward, of virtue, as the philosopher says in the first book of the ethics. But for the works of virtue, to all an equal reward is given, for it is said in Matthew chapter twenty, verse ten, that all those who worked in the vineyard, each took got their own what.

[0:43] A day's pay. Yeah, denarius. Because, as Gregory said, equal right reward of eternal life, they all what achieved, right? Therefore, one is not more blessed than another, right? Huh? And this, age of democracy, you know, this is kind of a good thing Kind of assumed without proof, right? That it's going to be equal. Moreover,

[1:12] beatitude is the what highest good, but the highest cannot be something greater. Therefore, beatitude of one man cannot be greater, be a greater beatitude, huh? There's another one. Subjective. What? Beatitude is subjective, not the object. Yeah, yeah. More of a beatitude, since it is perfect and a sufficient good, huh? You know what Aristotle said even about happiness, right? Perfect and sufficient good. It puts to rest the desire of man, right?

[1:53] But desire would not be at rest if there's some good that what it's lacking, some good that is possible to be supplied. If some good is lacking, right, is able to be supplied. If, however, nothing is lacking, that is able to be supplied, there could not be something what some greater good.

[2:22] Something else could not be greater good. Therefore, either man is not blessed, or if he is blessed, there cannot be a greater beatitude greater than another.

[2:35] But again, this is what is said in John fourteen. In the house of my father, there are many mansions. These are the same two ones I was saying that Thomas was quoting in the Summa Contra Gentiles. I just happened to be on that part there. Through which, as Augustine says, they diverse what worth of merits are understood in eternal life. So Augustine apparently understands that with Thomas, right?

[3:00] But the dignity or worth of eternal life, which is given for merit, is the beatitude itself. Therefore, there are diverse grades of beatitude, and not of all is there an equal beatitude.

[3:16] Well, Thomas says, answer. It should be said, as has been said above, in the definition of beatitude, two things are included. One is the last end, which is the highest good, and the adeption, or, obtaining, or the enjoyment of what the good itself.

[3:40] As regards the good itself, which is the object of beatitude, like you were saying, Father, and the cause, there cannot be one beatitude greater than what another,

[3:54] because there is not except one highest good, right? So the object of every man's beatitude, every man's beatitude, is the same highest good, being God, right? To wit, God, by the enjoyment of which men are what blessed.

[4:16] But as regards the obtaining of this good and the enjoyment of it, one can be what more blessed than another, because the more one enjoys this good, right? The more blessed one is, huh?

[4:35] But is possible that that one more perfectly enjoy God than another, in that he is more what better disposed and better what ordered to its enjoyment. That's by charity I suppose. and by this he's able to be more blessed than another.

[5:03] So if we both hear the same piece of music by Mozart, and one of us enjoy it better, but it's the same piece of music that we're enjoying, right? Huh? One of us is better disposed. Got better ears, or something? Huh? And he's better disposed, right? Huh? Imperative, huh? Okay.

[5:28] Now the denarius, huh? The unity of the denarius in that parable of our Lord, huh? Signifies the unity of beatitude on the side of the what object, huh? But the diversity of mansions or dwellings signifies the diversity of beatitude according to the diverse grade of what enjoyment, huh? Interesting. He speaks in terms of enjoyment rather in terms of seeing more clearly. I think you admit that too, because it consists of beatitude.

[6:03] more in the seeing than in the enjoyment. I think, but the two are connected. I see. To the second, should be said that beatitude is said to be the highest good, in so far as it is the what perfect possession or enjoyment of the highest good.

[6:27] What about lacking something? To the third, it should be said, to no one what blessed is lacking some good that he desires, because he has the infinite good itself, which is the good of every good, as Augustine says. There we are. I told you that in the article on the goodness of God, right? He doesn't have an article on, you mean the good of every good, right?

[7:00] That's one of the five chapters there on the good in the Summa Contra Gentiles huh? I'm glad I got into the Summa here, right? Yeah. A quote from Augustine, yeah.

[7:12] And and the reference down here is in on the 134th Psalm, right? In my footnote here. No, well, I don't. I have it. De Trinitate, Book 13. Oh, really? Yeah, yeah. We got lines on the Psalm too. Yeah. Huh. Psalm. Well, I bet you Augustine is quoting the Psalm or referring to Psalm. That's probably the case. Your edition is going directly to the source. We're going directly.

[7:41] It's quoting his work. It's his commentary on the Psalms. Oh, is that what it says? Yeah. In there, I think you said it was from the Psalm. No, it says De Trinitate, Book 13, Chapter 7. This is in the Latin period, is in the translation in Psalm 134. I think checked that. Maybe. It's got the min Latin ML. That's the min, yeah. Yeah. 37. Well, it's possible Augustine probably said it more than once.

[8:09] That's possible. And the editors of this volume chose one citation. Your volume does not. Yes. We have the same. This is Marietti. Yours is Marietti too, isn't it? Yeah. Here's Ed B. But someone is said to be more blessed than another from a diverse what partaking of the same what good, huh? But the addition, however, of other goods does not what increase beatitude.

[8:42] Whence Augustine says in the fifth book of Confessions, "Who knows you, meaning what God and other things? Not an account of this is he what more blessed, but an account of you alone is he blessed. huh? Not an account of those things, but

[9:14] Now let's find out if we can be blessed. In this life, huh? Okay. Or pursuing something worth figuring that one out. Save yourself a lot of trouble. To the third one proceeds thus: it seems that beatitude is able to be had in this life, huh? For it is said in Psalm one eighteen, "Blessed are those who are immaculate in the way, right, and who walk in the law of the Lord, right."

[9:45] Now go back to immaculate conception there, right? Yeah, immaculatae. This, however, can happen in this life, huh? Therefore, someone in this life is able to be what blessed. I'm just going to solve that, huh? First, Aristotle says, "You know, we call a boy happy because we what foresee that he's going to, you know, develop into something, you know, but he can't be happy, boy."

[10:24] A little differently, about boyhood than we have, you know, if you put democratic society. Moreover, an imperfect partaking of the highest good does not what take away, I guess, or destroy the notion of beatitude. Otherwise, one would not be more what blessed than another. But in this life, men are able to partake of the highest good by knowing and loving God, although imperfectly. Therefore, man in this life is able to be blessed, right?

[11:03] Just a question of more and less, huh? Yeah it's like the beatitude. right Blessed are the poor in spirit. blessed there he's talking about the the the end, right?

[11:16] Moreover, what is said by many cannot be wholly false. What is said by many? That seems to be natural, which is found in the many, right? For nature does not entirely what fail. But many place their beatitude in this life, as is clear that of Psalm one forty-three. Blessed they say is people to whom these things are, to wit, the goods of the present what life. Therefore, someone in this life is able to be blessed, huh?

[11:55] I don't like that. I don't trust that one. Because you know, Scripture also says the number of fools is infinite. But so when everybody says that the end is most men say the end is pleasure, right? So there is some truth that, right? But against this is what is said in Job fourteen: man born of woman, living for a brief time, is filled with many miseries.

[12:34] Like, Hamlet there, soliloquy. But beatitude excludes misery, right? Therefore, man in this life cannot be what blessed. Thomas answers that some partaking of beatitude can be had in this what life, but the perfect and true beatitude cannot be had in this life.

[13:11] And this can be considered in two ways. First, from the common definition of beatitude, for beatitude, since it is a perfect and sufficient what good, that's what Aristotle even said, it excludes every evil, right? And it fills every what Desire. desire. In this life, however, it's not possible that every evil be excluded, right?

[13:48] For the present life is subject to many evils, which are not able to be what avoided, both of ignorance on the side of the intellect. I mentioned that thing in the Summa Contra Gentiles where he says, "Error est magna pars miseria, to be mistaken is a great part of misery." He says ignorance, and disordered affection on the side of what desire,

[14:20] and the multiple penal things on the side of the body, like Augustine now this toothache. Remember that terrible toothache? I mean. Yeah Remember it Yeah Yeah, I think it's in the is that in the Confessions? Yeah, terrible. Yeah. Well, you did find that. I think he had to pull it out.

[14:51] Wait for the door to open after. As Augustine diligently pursues in the nineteenth book of the City of God, likewise the desire for the good in this life cannot be what satisfied, for naturally man desires permanence of the good which he has. But the goods of the present life are transitory, since also the life itself passes away, right? Which we naturally desire, and we what wish it to remain what forever?

[15:30] Yeah. Because naturally, man what flees death. So you can't have all you want, and you can't avoid these evils he mentions, right? Once it is impossible that in this life true beatitude could be had, right?

[16:03] Secondly, if one considers that in which beatitude especially consists, to wit, in the vision of the divine what essence or substance, which vision cannot come to man in this life, as has been shown in the first part of the Summa,

[16:26] from which manifestly appears that one is not able in this life to obtain true and perfect what beatitude. Of course, that first part even Aristotle says, right? That's why he kind of concludes, you know, and call these men what call them happy as men, right? As if men don't have the full notion of happiness.

[16:56] But you know, you know, they're quoting Solon there. You know, call no man happy till he be dead, because you don't know what's going to happen to him, right? Look what happened to Oedipus, you know, and these great tragedies, right? And how these men are, you know, or how Othello was so happy there when Desdemona arrives on the island, right? And look what happens to him. Who can control his fate, as he says, right?

[17:18] So I mean, this is the idea that given that that a man can fall from great happiness to terrible misery, right? You can't be sure of anything in this life, right? That makes me think the wisdom of this old woman who I never knew she was long dead before I was born, Grandma Quigley. I was told she was at some social thing with all the other grandmothers, and she was Grandma Quigley.

[17:44] I think she had no grandkids, but my mother called her Grandma Quigley anyway. Grandma Quigley was at some function with all the other old ladies. They're all bragging about their kids and how successful they are. This and that, blah, blah. Grandma Quigley didn't say a word. I never get. She had a bunch of kids who never married, which is kind of strange, but that's another story. So finally, they got tired of talking about all their wonderful kids, so they said, "Well, Mrs.

[18:06] Quigley, why don't you tell us all about your kids and how wonderful they are?" She said, "None of them's dead yet." You weren't gonna spray, but he finished the race.

[18:18] I think so. That's a paraphrase I told you. No, called no matter if actually what he did. Where did that paraphrase come from? That's mine. paraphrasing Solon I mean. Solon. Yeah.

[18:52] Now the first, therefore, should be said, that some are called blessed in this life, either on account of the hope of what obtaining beatitude in future life, according to that of Romans eight, by hope, right? Being saved, or on account of some partaking of beatitude, according to some Enjoyment of the highest good, right? That's the name of the encyclical by Pope Benedict. Spe Salvi, that is one of the whole thing.

[19:35] Now, what about the second one, which kind of speaking of what, more or less, right? To the second, it should be said, the partaking of beatitude can be imperfect in two ways.

[19:51] In one way, from the side of the object of beatitude, which is not seen in its what, essence or substance, and such an imperfection takes away the notion of true beatitude.

[20:11] In another way, it can be imperfect on the side of the one partaking, who attains to the object of the what, beatitude. Yeah, to wit God, but imperfectly, huh? With respect to the way in which God Himself, enjoys himself?

[20:41] And also incomprehensible it is, if you think of God in human terms, right? You know, because he's enjoying himself infinitely. And you say, "I enjoy myself infinitely." You say, "What's wrong with you?" You know.

[20:58] I'm not enjoyable infinitely. And such imperfection does not take away the true notion of beatitude, huh? Because, since beatitude is a certain operation, as has been said above, true, the true definition of beatitude is considered from the object, which gives what the species to the kind of act it is. Not, however, from the what subject?

[21:39] You wouldn't say that the imperfect beatitude of this life is is seeing God as He is, imperfectly. No, it's not really seeing God as He is, right? Huh? And knowing what He's not. He's above what we know. He's the cause of the things we know, but what He is in Himself. No. Space. You know, I was

[22:08] talking about you know the the what's wrong with Heidegger's question. You know that people think is so profound. You know, why is there something rather than nothing? Right. And in a sense, you are thinking of what is as being able to be and not be. Then, why is it? But that's only true about contingent things. So the things we know most are the things that can be and not be, like you and me and the dog and the tree.

[22:38] They can be and not be, right? And then you might ask, well, why are they right? And so you have to go outside of them as to why they are right, and you come to something that is necessary, right? And then you might think that you've arrived because, as Democritus says, you know, don't ask for the reason for what is necessary; just must be. But we know from our study of logic there that something can be necessary because of something else.

[23:13] Then you have to come eventually to something necessary through itself, and that's God, right? God is the being that, to himself, necessarily is. So when we see God as He is, we see He must have been because of what He is, right? And you can't even maybe use the word because, right? But through himself, He necessarily is, right? And it's Aristotle's system of metaphysics. You know, it's absurd to ask why a dog is a dog,

[23:48] or why two is two. Why is two two? Can't be otherwise. Yeah, yeah. Through itself. Yeah, but you can't really give a reason why. There's got to be some distinction between this and that that there can be a reason why this is that, right? So you know, why is the light of the sun eclipsed? Right? You know, there's got to be some distinction between this and that.

[24:08] So when you see God as He is, I am who I am, and you say I am who I am. you know, you can't care about the reason why He is. He is through Himself, He is himself. I am who I am, and you are. He who is not, and she who is not. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[24:30] And so, in a sense, Heidegger, in a sense, would be asking about God. Well, why is God? Because God can be or not be, right? Why is it, you know? And then he's getting into a false thought about God.

[24:47] And the real question is, why are there why are there things that can be and not be? Because they don't explain their own existence.

[25:02] But nothing other than God explains why God is. It's been very interesting to see God, you know, just for many reasons, honestly. I remember as a little boy, you know, thinking, you know. You know, what if there was nothing? You know, you know. Okay, you know. Well, we don't run to said there's nothing. You know, well it's absolutely nothing. You know, but what if there was? It's kind of imagination, right?

[25:33] You know, what if there was nothing at all? I remember thinking about that as a child and imagining that, right? Well, of course, we would know that there's nothing. No one would know there's nothing there. You know. This is kind of you know. Somebody gave us that book. I think Oliver Sacks gave us that book. I. Can't remember the guy's name. He's some kind of. I know he's a psychologist, psychiatrist, something, and he had stories about curious individuals he met.

[26:02] One of this woman, she had been in a catatonic state for many years. Yeah. She finally she woke up. Yeah. I saw this doctor talking about her. Like, what's the last thing you remember? Yeah. Before he fell into the state, She said, I was thinking about nothing. And he says, "Well, how do you do that?" And she says, "I just sat there going, nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing."

[26:28] Don't do that anymore. Yeah, Vanda. Yeah. Really, that was the guy. Yeah. Okay. Now what about most men thinking of some men as being happy, right? To third, therefore, it should be said that man regards in his life there to be some beatitude, right, on account of some likeness of the two beatitudes, and thus not wholly are they what feeling in their estimation, right? We have, time for one more article here.

[27:13] Whether beatitude had is able to be what lost? To the fourth one proceeds thus: it seems that beatitude is able to be lost. Objection 1. Beatitude is a certain perfection,

[27:33] but every perfection is inside the perfectible in its what mode? The mode of that perfectible. Since, therefore, man in his very nature is what changeable, right? It seems that beatitude is partaken of by man in a changeable what way? Mutabiliter what adverb.

[28:04] Man is changefully beatified. How do you express that in English? Yeah. You know, in one word, saying that changing way. More of beatitude consists in the action of understanding, which is subject to the will, but the will has itself two opposites. Therefore, it seems that it can desist from the operation by which man is yeah beatified, and thus man would cease to be blessed. So after the beatification on Sunday, he might change his life.

[28:44] I don't want to be. I don't want to think about God anymore. Moreover, to the beginning corresponds to the end, but the beatitude of man has a beginning because man is not always what blessed, right? Therefore, it seems that it has an end. huh? This is like back to the argument of Melissa, right?

[29:12] He says, you know, being has no beginning, therefore it has no end, right? If they go together. Anyway. But against this is what is said in Matthew chapter twenty-five about the just that they go into what eternal life, huh? Which, as has been said, is the beatitude of the saints, huh? But what is eternal does not what fail, therefore beatitude cannot be lost, huh? Tom's got a long, long body here.

[29:49] I answer it should be said that if we speak about the imperfect beatitude, such as is able to be had in this life, thus it is able to be what lost, huh? And this is clear in contemplative happiness, huh? Which can be lost either through what? Yeah. As when science is corrupted from some, what? sickness, huh? Or either, or also through some occupations by which one is totally withdrawn from contemplation.

[30:27] It's clear also in the act of happiness, for the will of man is able to what? Be changed. Did he degenerate in vice from what? Virtue, right? What's his name there in Shakespeare's play, Measure for measure. Angelo.

[30:46] It's quite a fall. In whose act chiefly happiness consists? If, however, the virtue remains whole, the exterior changes are able to what? Disturb such a Beatitude, insofar as they impede many operations of the virtues. But they are not able, however, entirely to take it away, because there still remains the operation of virtue, while a man, in a praiseworthy way, sustains the very adversities, right? So the good man uses the bad, well, or the bad man uses the good, even badly, right?

[31:32] And because the beatitude of this life can be lost, which seems to be against the notion of what? Beatitude. Therefore, the philosopher says in the first book of the ethics that some men are said to be in this life blessed, huh? Not simpliciter, but as men, right, huh? Whose nature it is to be subject to what change, huh? So when you say they are blessed, as men are blessed, right?

[32:04] That's a what? Diminution, you know, true notion of blessedness. Just as I what? Know the unknown, right? I know what I don't know. Yeah, in a very imperfect way. So the teacher knows more what you don't know than you know what you don't know.

[32:34] If, however, we speak of the perfect beatitude which is expected after this life, it should be known that Origen lays down, following the error of the Platonists, that after the last beatitude, man is able to become what? Miserable, right? Not interesting mistakes here, Origen, huh?

[33:00] But this manifestly appears to be false in two ways, huh? First, since from the common definition of beatitude, since beatitude is a perfect good, a sufficient good, it is necessary that it quiets or puts to rest the desire of man and excludes every evil. But naturally, man desires to retain the good that he has, and that he obtain what security of retaining it.

[33:36] Otherwise, he would be afflicted by the fear of losing it or the sorrow of the certitude of losing it. It is required, therefore, for true beatitude, that man have a certain what thought that the good which he has, he will never what lose. Which opinion, if it is true, it follows that he will never what lose beatitude. If, however, it is false, this itself is a certain evil, right?

[34:15] To have a false opinion, huh? For the false is the evil of the what? Understanding. just as true is the good of the understanding, huh? As is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. Therefore, he would not truly be blessed if some evil were what in him, right?

[34:40] So, if he thinks that he will never lose his beatitude, that's either what true thinking or false thinking. If it's true, he will never lose it. If it's false, then he's not blessed yet because he has the evil of what falsehood in his mind. That's interesting. Thomas says. Secondly, the same appears if one considers the notion or definition of Beatitude special. For it has been shown above that the perfect beatitude of man consists in the vision of the divine substance.

[35:19] It is, however, impossible that someone seeing the divine essence, the divine substance, wishes what not to see it, Not to see it. Because every good head by which someone what wants to lack.

[35:38] Yeah, since every good had that someone wants to what lose is either insufficient, and one seeks something what more sufficient in place of it, or it has some something not fitting annexed, right? An account of which it comes into what weariness or boredom, huh? But the vision of the divine substance or essence fills the soul with all goods, since it joins it to the fountain of all goodness.

[36:15] Whence it is said in Psalm 16, "I will be satiated, satisfied when your glory appears." Your glory, not our glory. In Wisdom 7, it is said, "There comes to me all goods together with it." Right? To it, with the contemplation of wisdom. Likewise, it has nothing unsuitable joined, because about the contemplation of wisdom is said, the

[36:53] acquaintance with it right has no bitterness, right? Nor its conviction any what. Weariness or boredom. Thus, therefore, it is clear that by his own will, the blessed one could not what. Deserve what? Beatitude. Beatitude, right? Likewise, he could not lose it by God being subtracted, huh? Because the taking away of beatitude is a certain what? Punishment.

[37:26] But such a subtraction by God, the just Judge, cannot arrive except for some what? Guilt. In which cannot fall the one who sees God's what? Essence. Because to this vision of necessity follows the rightness of the will, as has been shown above.

[37:54] Likewise, neither can any other agent be able to subtract it, huh? Because the mind joined to God is raised above all other things, And from, and thus from this union, no other agent is able to what? Exclude it, huh? Whence it is inconvenience.

[38:23] Therefore, it seems inconvenient that to some alternations of times, man what? Passes from. Passes from beatitude to misery and a converso, right, huh? Because these temporal alternations cannot be except in regard to those things which are subject to time and motion.

[38:50] So, in eternal life, we are partaking of God's eternity, huh? Which has no before and after. So don't look before and after, and you get that vision there.

[39:04] No large discourses. No, no, we don't discourse no movement there. One word. To the first, therefore, it should be said that beatitude is perfection consummated, which excludes every defect from the blessed, and therefore, without changeableness, it comes to the one having it.

[39:31] The divine power making this so, right? Which raises up man, right, into a partaking of the what eternity that transcends every what change. And you got to go back to the definition of eternity which you had from Boethius, right? Which was the what? Tota. Tota simul perfecta possessio vitae interminabilis So it has neither a beginning nor an end, huh?

[40:07] God's eternity, But it's totally and there's no before and after. Hard to understand, right? We understand it by negation of what you find in what time, right?

[40:26] So, Boethius says that the now that flows along makes time. Now that stands still makes eternity, huh? But the life we would, if we could stop the now of time, the life we had would not be a perfect possession of life. But then, in the now that stands still, there is a perfect possession of life, huh? So we're being, we're partaking of the divine eternity, and that's why we call it eternal life, huh?

[41:03] Life everlasting but it's not as... Okay, understand what that means. Now, to the second it should be said, but the will has itself to opposites. In those things which are ordered to the what? end, huh? But to the last end, it is ordered by a what? Natural necessity, huh? That's another meaning of it. Necessary, right?

[41:53] So it's necessary to understand the word necessary. Necessary. Yeah. Which is clear from this that man is not able not to will to be what? Blessed. Yeah.

[42:14] So even the damned want to be happy, right? But it's part of their frustration. They cannot be cut off from it. As we say, nothing quite like the feeling you get when you can say, "I did it myself." So that's part of their frustration is that nobody made them do it. Yeah. There's some some guy there. I think it was in Time magazine maybe I don't know There's no hell, right?

[42:41] You know, I saw him being interviewed on TV. you know, it's a very short thing, you know. But I guess there's a little little bit of this fashionable thinking now going on. I call it whistling past the graveyard. Yeah, I call it wishful thinking. You know, there's no there's no hell. You know, I can do what I want. So it's contrary to God's. Niceness, you know. Yeah.

[43:05] Anybody who punishes people like this can't be very nice, yeah. So. Some of the attributes of God are nice. Yeah, the niceness. That's what Pius XII said there's several truths of our faith that are hard to believe because they're all hard to understand. But there's some that are hard to believe, such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, maybe the maybe the Eucharist, and the fourth one is is eternal damnation.

[43:33] Yeah. It's hard to believe. that. Yeah. Apparently, Origen thought too. You know that there would be, you know, the demons and so on, right? That they could, you know, Reconcile. Yeah, yeah.

[43:52] People kind of false imagine all the things that they do you know Well let's give them a break. Yeah. They've been down there long enough. Yeah.

[44:11] But just as we don't understand the goodness of God very well, you know, very fully, so we don't understand the evil of the sinner very much, you know. Yeah.

[44:28] That's what it says in one of the Psalms, I love that. Who understands sin? A long time since I heard a sermon on hell, huh? Come to the monastery. What? Come to the monastery. We preach about it. once in a while. Especially on a hot summer. hot summer day. It's a hot topic. Right. There's there's there's, I saw a version of Jane Eyre the other day, you know, and there's a new version of Jane Eyre out, you know, And you know in the little trailer they have, you know, the crusty clerics say, Do you know what hell is?

[45:15] Do you know who goes? " You know, and poor Jane Eyre, is getting this very strict upbringing, you know. I don't know if the movie guy that was trying to you know present as kind of a harshness, you know, that's it's false, you know, and what is hell? He's saying, you know, to Jane Eyre. You know, we had an old copy of Jane Eyre around the house that the parish priest had given my mother when she was a little girl, you know.

[45:44] So kind of interesting, huh? But the gift that the priest gave to the lady, you know. Now, to the third should be said that beatitude does have a beginning from the condition of the one what partaking in it, right? But it lacks an end, on account of the condition of the good, the partaking of which makes one what blessed. Hence,

[46:27] it's from a different thing that there is a beginning of beatitude, and from another that it lacks, a what End. But that's a good example of a dialectic argument, though, right? Because if something has a beginning, you think, well, it, has an end, right? Mm hmm That's kind of our most of our experience Yeah, anything that comes into existence. You say, can go out of existence. You know, it can seem that that it necessarily is if it comes into existence, right?

[46:59] Because it wasn't always right. So you have to see that in this case. that. There's a reason why it has a beginning, and a different reason why it doesn't have an end.

[47:21] That's a question you raise to the human soul, right now. If the human soul, you know, didn't always exist, but then must not have an end, right?

[47:31] It's kind of interesting there in the what is it in the yeah in the eleventh book, right, of the of wisdom there. Aristotle says, you know, that these forms in matter they all what have a beginning, right? But then he and then he but he excludes them from having an end. The human soul, right? That's kind of interesting, you know, if you read the the Greek text, you know, of course the the Greek scholars, they can't say you couldn't possibly.

[48:05] have thought. That must be a later edition, you know. Well, you see the idea, you know, if the if the soul had a beginning, right, huh? Then must have an end, right? That's kind of a you know you know power of argument, right? It would seem to people, right? Kind of amazing that this soul should have a beginning, and but not an end existence, huh?

[48:34] So I was born in January 18th, 1936. I suppose I was in existence in 1935 too, but as you think in 1936, but in 1934 I wasn't around, you know, and and yet my soul go on forever, right?

[48:51] One place or the other, right? And it's kind of amazing thing to think of, right? It's kind of you know at first sight it seems kind of doubtful, right?

[49:06] Now, of course, you know in in the in Plato the soul existed both before and after the body, right? See, so the the two main opinions is would be that the soul did not exist before the body and it won't exist after the body, and then or else it must have existed before the body and it's going to exist after the body, right? And Aristotle comes in and says, well, there's a bit of truth in both of you, and he says, well, it didn't exist before the body, but the human soul exists after the body, right?

[49:51] And yet, yet that seems at first sight, you know, not as probable, right? As to say it neither existed before the body nor after, or existed both before and after, right? That seems more. And

[50:10] the truth is this other one, right? Now you could also do maybe a fourth opinion there because because you could say that before the body but then wears out and you know that's a problem right there's the other two right and there was one guy in in the dialogue there about the mortality of the soul he argues that Socrates' argument is is unnecessary because Socrates argues that the that the soul is more apt to survive death than the body right and then he says if the body doesn't always survive death especially the bones then therefore it's already the soul will survive death right and he says you know and sometimes even mummies don't he's more than the bones maybe preserved I guess but the Cebes

[51:17] comes in and says well suppose you argue that man is wears only pairs of shoes in his life right and therefore you argue that his shoe still exists so he must still exist right but you forget that you know he's slowly wearing out those he goes into another pair of shoes right and finally buys a pair of shoes that will what outlast him right huh okay and that's these things he's found these are Socrates' argument that's very very interesting dialogue right Just stop here so I can make my dinner huh?

[52:09] Good.