Prima Secundae
28. Summa I-II Q6 Art. 2-4: The Voluntary in Animals, Voluntary Omission, and Whether the Will Can Be Forced
Class of 2011-09-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/028-summa-i-ii-q6-art-2-4-the-voluntary-in-animals-voluntary/

[0:00] So let's look at Article Two here now. There's so many claps. This confusion we have here about the animals, right? Whether the voluntary is found in the what brute animals?

[0:19] Shakespeare has a pun there in Julius Caesar about Hamlet Hamlet, I think it is, about Brutus, right, killing the brute part of him, you know, and so on. The second one proceeds thus: It seems that the what voluntary is not in brute animals. But now, see, it's like Thomas is going to take the other side, right? Because he always, usually, he's so confused.

[0:51] Yeah. I mean, in the previous article, did he say, and therefore man alone is voluntary. No, he says maxime voluntarium invenitur, right? But it's not as if he was excluding it entirely. Well, let's see, you know, if we're interpreting that correctly, huh? Because we could be mistaken, you know.

[1:22] For the voluntary is said from the will, right? But the will voluntas, since it is in reason, as Aristotle says in the third book about the soul, right, cannot be in the brute animals, right. Therefore, neither can the voluntary be found in them.

[1:51] Moreover, according to this, human acts are voluntary. Or by this that human acts are voluntary, man is said to be the lord, right, of his own what acts.

[2:09] But brute animals don't have dominion over their own act, right? For they do not so much act as are acted, as Damascene says, right. Therefore, in brute animals, there's not the what voluntary.

[2:42] Moreover, Damascene says that praise and what blame follow upon voluntary acts. But to the acts of the brute animals is not owed either what praise or blame.

[3:05] Yes, there is. That's a bad dog. That's like you class blame. So can you blame the cat for eating the mouse? You give a penance. That's the other bad day.

[3:28] Therefore, in them there is not the what voluntary. But against this is what the philosopher says now, in the third book of the ethics. That's where he takes up the voluntary, that boys and what brute animals, boys who don't have the use of reason yet, much to speak of, but even brute animals who don't have reason. They communicate, they share, you might say, the what voluntary, the voluntary.

[3:59] And the same says the same two other guys that are being associated with stuff, both Damascene and Gregory. Well, I rarely disagree with Damascene, and Thomas rarely disagrees with Damascene. And he has great respect for Gregory, and he got a great deal of authority. Great deal of authority. yeah. So,

[4:22] now, I answer it should be said, as has been said, that for the definition or notion of the voluntary, it's required that the beginning of the act be what within the source of the act be within, with some knowledge of the end.

[4:49] Does that mean that it's not going to allow the trees the sharing the voluntary? Because they don't really know, you know, the end in any way, do they? I know. Never asked him. Yeah, or if he asked him, they never answered. Had this thing going with the grandchildren, you know, I talked to one of the trees, and he even got a name, "Dendron the Greek word for tree.

[5:21] It's gonna be a lot of fun with that, you know. Talk to him at two a. m. in the morning, you know. Yeah. Then he goes back, and but he might be a lot of fun with that. They kind of knew I'm kidding them. My brother used to talk to the guy in the sewer.

[5:47] I answer it should be said that as has been said, to the notion the voluntary is required that the beginning of the act, right, the source of it be within. But with some knowledge of the what end. But there is already twofold knowledge of the end, perfect and what imperfect, huh?

[6:12] But a perfect knowledge of the end is when not only is grasped the thing which is the end, but also is known the what? Notion. The notion of the end. That's kind of what we were saying before, isn't it? Huh? But the animal doesn't know the food under the aspect of an end, right? But he does know the end in some way, right?

[6:43] And the proportion, right, the ratio of that which is ordered to the end, right, towards that thing, right? And such knowledge of the end belongs only to the reasonable nature.

[7:04] Trying to get reasonable back into the use of rationality, right? Reasonable is too much limited to to being reasonable, you know, in the one sense. She called man a you know they say man is the rational animal, right? Have you seen man as a reasonable animal? People say, well, that's not true. Especially if you live in Washington D. C. Yeah.

[7:32] Yeah. What's the comic said? Man's a rational animal that gets angry when caught up on to live in accordance with the dictates of reason.

[7:54] The imperfect knowledge of the end, right, is that which consists in only the what apprehension of the end, right? Without knowing those two things, the definition of what an end is, right, huh? And the proportion, a ratio, a relation, a order of the act to the end, huh?

[8:19] So when you study the four kinds of causes, you learn the ratio of end, right? Or like specifically, right? That for the sake of which, right? Okay. So the animal knows in some way the food that he's looking for, that animal is looking for, right? But is it not under the definition of that for the sake of which he's acting? Because then he wouldn't always act in the same way.

[8:48] And the relation of the thing, the order. And such a knowledge of the end as imperfect one is found in the brute animals, through sense and natural what estimation,

[9:13] the instinct we say sometimes in man too. Now, the perfect knowledge of the end, there falls upon that the voluntary, according to its what perfect or complete reason. In so far as the end being what grasped, someone is able deliberating about the end and those things which are for the end to be moved in the end or not to be moved towards it. Right.

[9:49] But the imperfect knowledge of the end, there falls upon that the voluntary in an imperfect way. Insofar as the one grasping the end does not deliberate, right, but is immediately moved, what, in it then?

[10:10] Whence only to the reasonable nature belongs the voluntary in its perfect what, meaning, but in its imperfect meaning it belongs also to the what, brute animals. But it doesn't extend it to them then, in trees, huh?

[10:32] Because they don't really have knowledge. So is the animal then more alive than the tree? Because you think of something being alive that moves itself, right? Well, does the animal move itself more than the tree does?

[10:59] Because all motions are seeking some end, but the tree doesn't know the end, right? While the animal, in some imperfect way, knows the end, right? But maybe man himself is even more alive, right, than the dog or the cat, huh?

[11:15] Because he knows the end under the definition of the end, right? He knows the relation and order of the act to the end, huh? So he's more alive.

[11:36] I've always wanted to be more alive than the dog or the cat. But you always think of the cat, the dog as being more alive than the tree, huh? The bushes, something. Grass.

[11:55] Used to watch the snow peas, you know, the way they entangle and you know, so they can climb up a trellis or something, right? Yeah, yeah, just really action for an end. You see that, right? But they don't know what they're acting for, right? It's marvelous the way they do, huh? They act for that end to get the sun, right? Magnificent. Isn't vegetable snow peas? We have a lot of them here Yeah I know, you know, when you try to harvest them, you know, they kind of disguise themselves to the degree, you know, yeah, that's a whole more down here, you know, more here.

[12:35] What wonderful things! Talking about the poor guys, there's not the question why, there's but to do and die. That puts on the level of plants. Definition snow peas, yeah. There's not the question why.

[13:02] Now, what about this first thing from the from the the word, right? To the first thereof, it should be said that voluntas, I suppose, the word names the what reasonable desire.

[13:19] I know it's the word appetitus. I mean, it means originally what desire, but then it names the faculty, the power, right, of desiring. Because that's more what known. What does the great Shakespeare say? Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. So desire is more like motion than say love or joy, right? And so

[13:48] you you name even these these you know epithumia and the irascible appetite, right? By the emotion, it's more like emotion, right? And so, and it eventually names the whole power, right? Even though desire is not the only act.

[14:11] So he says the word voluntas, that means a name now, names the rational, the reasonable desire, right, or power desire, and therefore is not able to be in those things which lack reason, right?

[14:28] But voluntarium is said denominatively, right, from the will, right? Aristotle remember that, and we're getting the categories talking about denomination, and it can be drawn to those things in which there is somewhat partaking of the will, right? According to some what coming together or some agreement, right, to the will, right, some likeness to it. And in this way, the voluntary is attributed to the what brute animals, huh?

[15:04] In so far as through some knowledge they are moved to the end. Okay. But Thomas doesn't deny the origin of the word voluntary from will, right? But there's some what partaking of the will in the animals, huh? Just as Aristotle will say that the animals partake in a way of prudence or foresight, huh?

[15:28] When the birds fly south, you know, when the winter comes, right? They partake of. Squirrels store their nuts or something, Yeah. Yeah. The people go to Florida in the winter. They call them snowbirds. Snowbirds. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, so there's some partaking of foresight, I guess, in the birds, right? Going south.

[15:55] Okay, that makes sense. Now, to the second, should be said: from this it happens that man is the lord of his own act, that he has deliberation about his acts. From this, that reason deliberating has itself to what opposites, then the will can go and he decide to do or not to do it.

[16:25] And in this way, the voluntary is not in brute animals, not in that perfect way. And that's that's kind of like when Aristotle talks about dialectic and say that it's reasoning, dialectical reasoning is reasoning from probable opinions even to contradictory conclusions. So it's possible for reason to go one way or the other, right? I guess that's the reason why we can be redeemed in the way the angels cannot, right?

[17:12] Because we have to deliberate in the way the angels don't have to. They have a full knowledge of what they're doing. As Gabriel, Michael, and Raphael would tell you, right? But

[17:26] in that sense, there's no history of the angels. History is sort of human in the way that you do this, and I want to think about how I'm going to react to that. And this is kind of like the unfolding history is. What's a

[17:44] blit screen for that? Lightning, sonny, it's over like that, you know. Something to be said for that, you know. Ignore it, but otherwise, you make the right choice.

[18:02] And those who referred their glorious nature back to God were saved, and those who rested in it, right, their own self-sufficiency, so to speak, right, were lost.

[18:18] It's a short book. I remember Paul the Six there talking about the devil there after the Vatican II, you know, and all this disorder was coming in, you know, and devils there. But then, how inscrutable is his evil, right? Huh?

[18:37] What was I reading? I used to read the Gospel of John. Was it one of these references where Christ saying, "You know, he was going to betray me," you know, and he says in more than one place, you know, but even you know, well before the time, so to speak. And it seems such a strange thing that he would choose, you know, this man that he knows going to betray him, right?

[18:56] Huh? I mean, it seems I can give more reason in terms of of example for us, right? You know that even in the the church, right? There are people who, you know, bishops, even you know, priests and as well as laymen who who

[19:27] turned evil, right? Pope Paul got in a lot of trouble because he once said, "But there'd be other Judases in the church." He got a lot of flack for that. Oh yeah. Oh dear.

[19:49] That was one of Ralph McInerny's novels. was called "Judas Priest."Yeah."Frightening thing Okay what about praise and blame, right? What they follow upon the voluntary act, according to the what perfect meaning of what the voluntary, right? Which is not found in the brutes, according despite your objection, right?

[20:36] Give him a cookie, give him a snack. Yeah. Yeah. You can train these animals to some extent. Can't trust them completely. Can't trust us completely.

[20:53] Somebody sent me some information about this new discovery of the intelligence of monkeys and and how you show them a computer screen with a bunch of numbers on it and you know they're just scattered around one through eight or one through ten or something and then you just make them into boxes and the monkey will tap them on the screen in the order that they were placed and whereas people look at them and the numbers disappear they go ah and get it all right the monkeys will do it right every time every time and every time they get it right they get a peanut or something man I heard read about a psychologist who decided to raise the monkey what it was with his kids,

[21:31] you know, and so on and I guess to the monkey you know is much more dexterous at first huh and ahead of him. But you get to language and then he starts

[21:41] to slow down Art class yeah yeah but I guess yeah yeah one psychologist had a monkey or it was that would you know he just smelled like a man right And because he could go on the bus you know or streetcar it was and drop a coin or something you know and and bring a newspaper with him right of course he sat down in the seat here just kind of, you know

[22:07] and but they couldn't quite you know solve the thing and all of a sudden he took a crumpled newspaper He kind of gave away a little bit you know in the seventies they had a commercial for Quaker State oil showing a chimpanzee changing the oil in the car yeah you know the the one thing with numbers you couldn't change your own oil in the car you're dumber than, than you're dumber than this monkey grease monkey yeah Grease monkey that's what I think of yeah well when the when the monkey writes a computer program for people to do tricks on then I'll I'll be impressed take a little break now just you're Go back to Article Three here.

[22:55] Whether the voluntary can be without any act, that's interesting. To the third one goes forward thus: it seems that the voluntary cannot be without an act. For the voluntary is said what is from the what, the will, right? But nothing can be from the will except through some act, at least an act of the will itself, right? Therefore, the voluntary cannot be without an act.

[23:28] That seems to be so, right? You know, you have to do violence to your mind to see these objections. Reading some of these objections there, you know, about the Trinity there in the sentences this morning, you know, the objection says the Father is more powerful than the Son because he's not, but he can generate his Son and the Son cannot generate a Son, right? That sounds pretty convincing.

[23:59] How's he going to get out of this? You know, it's beautiful the way he does. I am just reading it over. It's terrible, Dad. Wasn't it? Somebody said somebody told us that's what Voltaire used to do to the clergy to humiliate them. yeah,

[24:20] He just mocked them. Yeah. Yeah, right. right. That's. That's what I was told. Yeah. Make mockery, make fools out of the clergy. Moreover, just as through the act of the will, someone is said to what to will, so seizing the act of the will, he is said not to will, right? But not to will is to cause the what involuntary, right? Which is opposed to the voluntary.

[24:53] Therefore, the voluntary cannot be the act of the will seizing, right? That's the involuntary, yeah. Moreover, knowledge is of the what meaning of the voluntary,

[25:10] to the very nature of voluntary, but knowledge is through some what act, huh? You can't have the voluntary without knowledge, and knowledge is itself an act. Therefore, the voluntary is not able to be without some act, huh?

[25:32] But against all this, that of which we are the lords is said to be voluntary. But we are the what lords, both of doing and not doing, of willing and what not willing. Therefore, just as to do and to will is voluntary, so also to not do and not will is voluntary, right? So I don't go to church on Sunday, you know. That's voluntary, right? Not doing that.

[26:02] It's heaven to be or not to be. That was a popular song on radio. This is my radio past from twenty, thirty years ago, where the singer said something about, and if you choose not to decide, you have still made a choice.

[26:22] Now Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that the voluntary is said what is what from the will." Seems like he's agreeing with objections, right? But something is said to be from something in two ways. Oh, distinction, huh? Yeah, distinction overlooked.

[26:44] I was thinking of that, you know, while we use the expression to overlook a distinction, right? And the contrast between the word "overlook" and "to understand," right? Because "understand" comes from "under" and "over."

[26:59] So, I mean, sometimes "overlook" is not taking the negative sense, and I can overlook a situation or something like that, right? But a lot of times we say when you don't see something, you overlooked an important distinction, or overlooked. It seems look overlooked seems to be the opposite of look over something. When you look over this, I mean, you're going to pay attention to it. You overlook it, meaning you didn't pay attention.

[27:24] Yeah, yeah. It's kind of curious. But I was thinking the contrast between over and under, right, and the word to understand a distinction, right, and to overlook a distinction, right. Well, then there's an overview. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I say so. Episcopus means right, yeah, overlook. Some other. Some other. After a certain point, the bishop, you know, you could play on the two meanings of "over." You can have some bishops overlook more than others.

[27:59] So, in one way, directly, right, what proceeds from something insofar as it is what acting as heating from heat. In another way, indirectly from this that does not act, just as the submersion of the boat, right, is said to be from the what. The helmsman The pilot, yeah. Insofar as he desists from what.

[28:37] That's interesting. It goes back to Aristotle, right? Because when he's giving the correlates, falling upon the kinds of causes and so on, right? Huh? And he says the what a thing is a cause of opposites by its presence and by its what absence right that's kind of touching upon this distinction right

[29:02] and then he takes the example of the man who's the gubernator, right okay but it should be known that not always that which follows to the defect or the lack of an action right is reduced as in a cause in the one acting right from the fact that he does not act on not every time is he held responsible right but only then when he is able and ought to act okay so you know the example I start using in class is that an Aristotle's corollary right I say you know the the man who's on guard duty right and if he he stays awake and sees the enemy approaching and alerts the camp he's the cause of the what safety of the camp right but

[29:56] if he decides to take a snooze or go see his girlfriend or go get a beer or something right and the enemy sneaks up and takes the camp then he's court martialled as being responsible for the surprise you know so it's by not doing what he should be doing right what he is what potest right and debet what he is able and what Ought to do. yeah yeah if the enemy was invisible then it wouldn't be his fault obviously but if they're visible not spirits and so on and he's on guard duty right okay and there's somebody else who's who's not on guard duty that night and he sleeps and he doesn't what alert the camp so he's not held responsible right even though he

[30:44] could have but he was not yeah he wasn't on guard duty so if the gubernator was not able to direct the ship right or was not what committed to him the governing the ship they would not be imputed to him the subversion of the what ship right that happens through his absence right okay

[31:13] because therefore the will in willing and acting is able to what impede this which is to not will and not act and sometimes yet

[31:30] that which is what to not will and to not act is imputed to him as from him existing right and thus the voluntary can be without an act. Sometimes without an exterior act, with an interior act, right? Just as when he does not will to what, when he wills not to act. Sometimes without even the what? Interior. Yeah, when he does not what will, right? Now.

[32:16] So, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the voluntary said not only what proceeds from the will directly, as from what doing, but also from it indirectly, as from its what not acting, when it's able to act and should act, right?

[32:39] So, is the kid responsible for the house not being cleaned or something? That's Why they told him to clean his room? Yeah, but he but he was able to clean his room, right? And and he should have right, but he just didn't.

[33:00] What's the name I was reading here a few days ago? the man asked one son to go out, and he says, "Yep, yep, Dad." He doesn't go out. Other one says no, and he does go out.

[33:20] So now, what about the second objection here? Right, the second should be said that to not will is said in two ways. In one way, when it's taken in the strength of one what

[33:42] word, according as it is the what negative of this verb what nolo right, as when I say nolo legere, senses this, I wish not to read right. So also

[34:04] this to not wish to what read signifies to wish not to read, and thus to not will causes the what. In another way, is taken in the strength of a what speech, and then it does not what Affirm the act of will, and

[34:40] the to not will of this kind does not what. Cause the voluntary Yeah. Yeah It's kind of strange text isn't it Yeah It was just the reverse to me. Yeah. Yeah. There's a problem in the text there.

[36:16] Well. It's faithfully reproduced in more than one edition. Yes, he means you know that if I don't want to read it, you force me to read, and it's not voluntary, right? Yeah.

[37:03] You want to read this? No, I don't want to read it. That's an act of my will, right? Yeah. But is that an involuntary? By no means. He's thinking about the fact that if I say you read, and you don't want to, and yet you read, then is it what? It's not voluntary. Um

[37:28] You're not? You're not doing it willingly, you'd say, right? Yeah. You're doing it unwillingly. I'm sort of minimally doing it willingly. I mean, yeah, in some way. You say it's like they say about the souls of purgatory. Do they really want to be there? Well, a little bit. I mean, they want to be there because they need to be there, but they want to get out there as soon as possible.

[37:47] Yeah. Sort of like the martyrs. You know. Yeah. That's the least kind of voluntary. Yeah. We must look at that text as it is, and sometime when we are wiser, we will illuminate it more.

[38:09] To the third, should be said, in that way is required for the voluntary an act of knowledge, just as an act of the will, that to let it be in the power of someone to consider, and to what will and to act, right? And then just as what to not will and to not act when it was time is voluntary, so also to what not what consider, right?

[38:38] Okay. So when someone doesn't, you know, they say if you don't study the church laws or something of that sort, right? Or the teaching of the church about morality, right? It's voluntary, right? You're not considering, right? It's culpable. Yeah. And even the state would hold me. You know, I didn't, I didn't see the the speed sign or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I was saying, ignorance of the law is no excuse.

[39:09] Excuse, yeah. Yeah. And I don't know if you want to make that completely universal, but I mean, you know, ignorance of the law, you should know, right? Huh? You know. I didn't know that a red light meant you're supposed to stop.

[39:27] I don't know how they would take that in the court, huh? Yeah. Yeah. The comedian, comedian says that's a great line for somebody else being examined for murder. Just saying. I forgot it was against the law.

[39:45] Whoops, I'm sorry. See, there's one more article here. whether violence can be inferred to the will. To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that to the will, violence can be what inferred. Yeah.

[40:16] For each thing is able to be what coerced, I suppose, from a more potent thing. But something is more potent than the human will, to wit, God, and therefore, at least by Him, it can be what forced. Not even forgetting how small God is, right? I'm thinking it can be to your will. Moreover, every everything that undergoes, everything passive, is what coerced by the active power, right?

[40:53] When it is changed from it, huh? But the will is a what undergoing passive power, for it is a what. Moved, mover. Yeah, mover, as is said in the third book about the soul, right? By the good is the unmoved mover. Aristotle speaks there, right? Since, therefore, sometimes something is what moved by the active principle, it seems that sometimes it is what forced. Yeah. Moreover, a violent motion is one which is against what nature, but the motion of the will sometimes is against nature, as is clear about the motion of the will to what sinning, which is against what nature.

[41:48] Nature. He votes from true birth, huh? Stumbling on abuse. Perfectly said by Shakespeare, right? Revolts from true birth, from true nature, stumbling abuse. That's from which play? That's from Romeo and Juliet.

[42:13] Not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give. Nor so good but strain from that fair use. revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. Friar Lawrence says it, eh?

[42:30] Oh no, he's a Franciscan. Oops. Yeah. The Franciscan is more suitable, right? To a Juliet. Yeah. So yeah. But would a Dominican, you know, have? Delayed to tell the marriage that way. Oh, you presented the fait accompli to the parents. Call the two parents together and say, "What would you two think if your father, your daughter, and your son were in love, huh?

[43:09] Well, they're giving themselves to each other, right? Okay. Therefore, the emotion of the will can be what forced, right? It's against nature. But against this is what the great Augustine says in the fifth book about the city of God: that if something comes to be by the will, it does not come to be from what necessity. Again, that's one sense of the word necessary, right? The violence, forcing.

[43:53] But everything coerced is from necessity. Therefore, what comes to be from the will cannot be coerced. Therefore, the will cannot be forced. Forced back. Well, I answer, Thomas says, it should be said that twofold is the act of the will: one, which is of it immediately, as elicited by it or from it to wit, to will, right? Another is the act of the will commanded by the will,

[44:32] and by means of some other power exercised, right, as to walk, for example, huh, or to speak, right? But to speak is not an act of the will itself, huh? But it's commanded, right, by the will, meaning by medium, right, something in the middle, a motive power, right, huh? As regards the acts commanded by the will, right, the will is able to undergo what violence, right? Insofar as through violence the outside members are impeded, lest they follow out the command of the what will.

[45:17] You put me in a straitjacket right now. But as regards the what the will's own act, violence cannot be what inferred upon it, right?

[45:39] And the reason for this is because the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from a what interior beginning, knowing beginning, right? Just as the natural desire is a certain inclination from a what interior beginning and without knowledge,

[46:09] but what is forced or violent is from a what exterior beginning. Whence is against the very definition, you might say, of the act of the will, that it be what coerced or what violent.

[46:35] Just as it is also against the what notion of a natural inclination or motion, so the stone goes up is what cannot be what natural, right? Huh?

[46:51] For the stone is oh, that's example you're going to use. I didn't know that either. I think you read this ahead of time. No, no, no, no. And I just just came to my mind, like even the cardinal or something. Huh? He's uh he's uh? For the stone is able what through violence to be what borne upwards, right? Like Sisprus. But this violent motion,

[47:17] but that this violent motion should could be from its what natural inclination cannot be, right? Likewise, also a man can be drawn to what to drag to violence, right? But that this be from his will is repugnant to the notion of violence, especially from the outside, right?

[47:45] But now you you get the idea of the smallness of God, right? Huh? And he's more he's closer to me than I am to myself. Right. Strange. To the first thereof, it should be said that God, who is more potent than the human will, is able to move the human will, and this is not what in a violent way, right? According to that of Proverbs 21, it's a marvelous text that Thomas often quotes.

[48:18] The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and in whatever way he wishes, he what turns it, huh? Yeah, what's his name? like, uh, we're going to have Clairvaux there, right? He's? Talking about you know draw me, right? You know, grace. Somebody speaks of the Father. You know, comes in as the Father draws him. But in in the Song of Songs, he's being asked to be you know drawn after God, right?

[48:55] Huh? But is that violence being drawn by him? But if this were through violence, already it would not be with the act of the what will,

[49:15] nor would the will itself be moved, but something against the will, right? He's kind of taking the fact that the what, if God actually does move the will, then it's not by violence he moves the will, right? But because he's the source of the will, right? He's closer to the will than the will is to itself. It's hard to understand, right? Now the second here, not always is a motion violent when the one undergoing is changed by its what active principle, but when this comes about against the inward what inclination of the passive.

[50:14] Otherwise, all alterations and generations of the simple bodies would be unnatural and what violent. They are natural on account of the natural aptitude, natural aptitude within the matter, right, or subject to such a what disposition, right?

[50:43] Aristotle speaks of nature as being both what matter and form, right? So the generation of fire in the old physics, right, from paper or something, right, is what natural because of the matter, right? I mean, natural aptitude for this form of fire, right?

[51:05] And likewise, when the will is moved by the desirable according to its own what inclination, the motion is not violent, but what voluntary, right? That's something I know. Father Merkelbach pointed out that when you acquire a habit, does it make it more or less voluntary? The actions of the habit makes it more voluntary. Yeah. More disposed

[51:35] to. Yeah. Strange. To the third should be said that that to which the will tends by sinning, although it is what bad. And against the what rational nature and truth, right, is apprehended nevertheless as good and what suitable to nature. Insofar as it is suitable to man, according to some passion of the senses, right, or according to some corrupt habit. I was just thinking about this the other day about the devil never tempted into something that's just bad.

[52:20] So as some character good, so that's hard to see. So I just remembered exactly what it says in Genesis about the woman saw that the tree was beautiful and the fruit was good for food and desirable for acquiring wisdom. Wow, you exist.

[52:37] You just forgot about the other stuff. Too late now to go into other articles, but. Do you think we can finish that one? I don't care if I'm glad or not. I think we

[53:01] can. There are eight articles. I mean, four or four of the eight, so we can. Okay. We can. Okay. Okay. Dead half for two lies in the in the middle. So is eight yeah.