Prima Secundae
29. Violence, Fear and the Involuntary (Prima Secundae Q.6, aa.5–6)
Class of 2011-10-06
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/029-violence-fear-and-the-involuntary-prima-secundae-q-6-aa-5/

[0:00] Father, and the Son, the, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you've written.

[0:25] Seeing a text from Thomas there where he says there's three teachings right, where man teaches a man right, then where the angels teach us, and then where God teaches us, huh? And he speaks the difference of these three, of course the ascending order, right? So we're invoking Thomas, a man teaching us, right? And the guardian angel is a higher teacher than Thomas, and then God Himself, right?

[0:51] Who is the Didaskalos hodis didaskalos. You should add the Blessed Mother, in there, because she's the mother. One of the titles of our enlightenment is Mother of the Light. Of the Light. Mother of the Light. And we used to when I was in college, they they had the mother wisdom as was kind of an invocation at the beginning of class, the good old days.

[1:14] Okay, so we're up to the fifth article, right? Mm-hmm. This might seem to contradict the fourth article, because the fourth article is saying that what you cannot move the will violently, right? But it's kind of a contradiction in words almost, huh? To say that, huh? So just as if you move a natural body violently, you're moving it naturally. No, because that's not coming from within, right? Right.

[1:45] And so when you move the will, if you could, right, it wouldn't be voluntary, right? It wouldn't be an act of the will. It wouldn't be coming from within. Notice in the body of that article where he says, um, in the second paragraph, just as a natural desire is a certain inclination from a what? Inward beginning. Inward beginning. And without knowledge, right? Right. All right. Before that, he said the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an inner beginning, knowing, right?

[2:19] Right. And then what is forced or violent is from an outside beginning, right? Hence, it is against the very definition, you might say, of an act of the will, that it be coerced or violent, huh? Just as it would be against a what definition of a natural inclination of motion. And notice he develops a likeness there, right? A stone by violence can be thrown, what? Borne upwards, yeah.

[2:52] But that that violent motion going upwards should be from its natural inclination cannot be, right? You have to change the very nature of the thing. Likewise, man can be drawn by violence, but that this be from his will is repugnant to the reason of violence, which is to be outside, as the other to be what inside.

[3:17] Okay. So how can the violence cause the involuntary? Like he's going to talk about next article, we'll see what Thomas does. To the fifth, one proceeds thus: It seems that violence cannot cause the involuntary, for voluntary and involuntary are said according to the what will. It's an idea I was talking to Warren about that word voluntary. You know, he was talking about how in Latin and even in French, the word voluntary doesn't emphasize will as much as it does in English, right?

[3:52] That's probably the problem with a little difficulty there in in in the word, right? And somebody will say, you know, how do you say it in Latin? there? Vult, it doesn't, the stone, doesn't want, but they'll say the word vult, you know, the word for will, right? So it's more open to that broader meaning. But quoting the conclusion of the previous article, but violence cannot be what ought to bear on on the will, right?

[4:25] Therefore, violence is not able to cause the what involuntary, right? So how is he going to get out of that knot? You heard my comparison between Aristotle's remark about plots and and the knots, because one of the divisions Aristotle gives of the plot is it has two parts: the tying of the knots and the untying of the knots, right?

[4:54] And who time must untangle this? Not I. It is too hard, and not to be untied. Let's change this play. But Aristotle mentions that the what the inferior dramatists, right? They might be better tying a knot than in untying it. And I think the example of that is when you go and see some types of movie or something, or even maybe read a work of fiction, and you get very engrossed in the tying of the knot, but then you're disappointed in in the artist's what?

[5:29] Resolution. Yeah, yeah, resolution. Well, I think that's same thing true in philosophy, right? That the average certainly modern philosopher, but the average philosopher is better at tying, you know, his own mind into a knot, and our minds too, right? Than he is to what untie that knot that was knot I was creating before, right? So I was tying your mind into a knot, right? He can't be.

[5:55] God, because he can't be the one of whom he's a son, right? He's the son of God. Most people would have a hard time maybe untying that knot directly. So, but fortunately, Thomas and Aristotle and the great Plato, right? They can untie these knots, huh?

[6:17] But the modern philosophers they tie themselves into knots and they can't get out of them. I remember one time I, you know, teaching a course, he comes back from some philosophical conference, right? And they get in the discussions there at the conference, and he got the guy in contradiction, right? The course said, "Now, what are you going to do? " You know. The guy says, "Well, that's a contradiction I've learned to live with.

[6:42] " That's called despair. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So he's make fun of, you know, is it some of the modern philosophers who don't think that matter exists, you know, and have to get through writing all about this, and they go out to a nice dinner in the restaurant, you know. That's a contradiction they learn to live with, you know. Contradiction they have to live with to live.

[7:08] That's what Chesterton, you know, Innocent Smith and the book "Man Alive" is his professor saying how everything's miserable. We're all we all should commit suicide and so forth. and he says, "really, you really think that Professor, You really think we should all just kill ourselves? " He says, "Oh yes, oh yes. " The guy pulls out a revolver and points it at the professor. He finds reason to live.

[7:34] It's one thing to ask for death, another to see it coming, right? That's the parable, you know. More of that which is involuntary is with sadness, huh? As Damascene says, huh? And the philosopher what says, huh? Aristotle talks about that. quotes the great Sophocles, right?

[8:00] But sometimes one undergoes right violence, but nevertheless is not then what saddened. Therefore, violence does not cause the involuntary. Kind of a strange objection. More of that which is from the will is not able to be involuntary, but some violent things are from the will, as when someone with a what heavy body goes up, right? And when somebody

[8:35] flexes his members, his limbs against their what natural flexibility, therefore violence does not cause the what involuntary. But against this is what both the philosopher, meaning Aristotle, of course. And Damascene say right that something is involuntary by what? By violence.

[9:04] No, Thomas got to see a what distinction, right? I answer: It should be said that violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, just as it is also opposed to the what? Natural, right?

[9:23] Of course, he is more clearly opposed to natural because in the word nature there you always keep the idea of something within, right? So the first meaning of of natural or nature is birth, right? Of course, the thing about birth is that it comes from within, right? So the chair that carpenter makes by art doesn't come from within, and when he contrasts art and nature, we say, well, nature is what from within.

[9:49] So the woman makes an apple pie. The apple pie doesn't come from within the woman, right? And that's by art, not by nature, that she makes the apple pie. But when she gives birth, the baby comes. from within, and then all the other meanings of nature have the sense of something within, okay.

[10:20] An account of this, just as in things which lack knowledge, natural things, violence does something against nature, right? Like when you throw the rock up,

[10:34] when you tie a plant and make it grow in a certain way, or it doesn't want to go. So also in knowing things, it makes something against the will, right? Now what is against nature is said to be what unnatural, right? And likewise, what is against the will is said to be involuntary. Whence violence causes the involuntary, right? But it's not until you get to the reply to the first objection that you see more clearly how what this means, right?

[11:13] Because it doesn't mean that the violent is making something what voluntary that isn't voluntary or that's moving the will. So he says to the first, it should be said that the involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. But it has been said above that the voluntary is said not only the act which is immediately of the will, like the act of loving, right? The act of wanting, and so on, but also the act which is what commanded by the what will, right?

[11:52] Am I going to the red light? Is what voluntary? Voluntary, yeah. Now as regards the act which is immediately of the will itself, violence is not able to infer or act upon, you might say, the will, right? And to make something voluntary that is, but by violence, yeah. Whence such an act, violence can never make what involuntary, right? As regards to the other act, the act commanded by the act of the will, but not act of the will itself, right?

[12:32] The will can suffer what? Is he able to suffer violence, right? As regards this act, violence makes the what involuntary, right? So not in the primary act, right? But in the the what commanded act, right? Okay.

[12:56] So you do violence to the kid there, and he doesn't want to go to bed, right? You pick him up and take him down, put him in bed.

[13:04] Okay, you haven't you haven't conquered his will, but he's in the bed now that he doesn't want to go to bed. And so, did he go voluntarily to the bed? Now, if you had to pick him up and carry him, kicking and screaming, as you see sometimes, kids being carried out of even a church or something like that, huh?

[13:33] Now, reply to the. So you see the distinction there, right? So that doesn't contradict the previous article, right? Now the second objection there. The second should be said that the natural is said what is according to inclination of nature, so the voluntary said what is in accordance with the inclination of the what will. But something is said to be natural in two ways. In one way, because it is from nature, as from an active what principle, just as to heat something is natural to fire.

[14:15] Another way, according to a passive beginning, when nature is what is in nature inclination to receiving the action from an outside what principle, just as the motion of the heavens is said to be natural on account of the natural aptitude of the subject. celestial body for such a motion, although the mover is what is voluntary, right? So they thought that the plants were being moved around by the angels, right?

[14:48] And uh separated substances, So it's voluntary in the part of the what Separate substance uh, who has a will, But on the side of the m of the heavenly body, it's naturally apt to be moved by these separate substances. So it's natural on the side of matter. So in the in the second book of natural hearing the physics right, Aristotle shows that nature is said of both matter and form, right?

[15:18] So he concludes that form is more nature than what matter, yeah. So that's that's a fundamental distinction, huh? Now, seeing whereas I was reading, Thomas there is talking about.

[15:35] The Holy Spirit is given with sanctifying grace, and there's a nice quote there from Saint Paul. And the question is, which is before, right? Does the soul receive the Holy Spirit through grace? Or does he receive grace through the Holy Spirit?

[16:00] Which is before by nature, right? Well, Thomas is making a somewhat somewhat distinction there, right? If you think of of the matter, right, subject, then it's being disposed to receive the Holy Spirit by grace, right? But you are thinking of the active principle, right? And it's also the other in this case too. Then he receives grace through the Holy Spirit, right? And he said, you know, simply is before, right, and some way the other is before, right?

[16:33] I used to ask the question about the Hail Mary, right? We say, "Full of grace, the Lord is with you," right? I said, "Well, is the Lord with her because she's full of grace, or is she full of grace because the Lord is with her,

[16:52] or are both what true in some way, right? But by different what causes, right? Now, because through grace, you might say, she is disposed to receive the Holy Spirit as her spouse, you might say, right? Huh? But the Holy Spirit is the one who gives the grace, so as the mover, right? He's the cause of the other. But this, it has to give us enough talking about the

[17:27] corollary that Aristotle gives, and that two things can be causes of each other, but in different ways, right? So I'd say, you know, is

[17:42] is making money the cause of money, or is money the cause of making money? Or is studying the cause of knowing, or is knowing the cause of studying?

[17:58] Did you study? Both, yeah, but by different kinds of cause, right? Huh? You know, I'd say reproduction the cause of the baby, or the baby the cause of reproduction. What is the right reason? Both are true, right? Huh? Okay, so two things can be, in a sense, causes of each other, but by different kinds of cause, right? I can't be my father's father, right?

[18:30] But these other kinds of causes, this is possible, right? Okay. What is he saying for the heavenly bodies? It's not violence being done to them because they're already inclined to move. in that way Now, to be moved, to be moved, is a passive thing, right? Okay, okay, and that that's like nature in the sense of what matter, right? Okay. So for our own will, it's not. It may be involuntary.

[18:58] We do something that we are not disposed to doing, and even if we didn't will it, like the the example you gave, Father Michael about someone who does things out of bad habit.

[19:15] That's more voluntary because we're more disposed from an inside principle. Okay. Because voluntary is an inside principle. So you don't focus on doing violence to you because you already have that. No, I thought it was it's sort of exactly the opposite. You're more than opposed to it. That goes on to make a similar distinction, He says, and likewise, something can be called voluntary in two ways, right?

[19:40] Huh? In one way, according to action, right? As when someone wishes to what? To do something, right? Another way, according to passion, undergoing, right? When someone wishes to undergo from what? Another, right? Huh? Whence? Since what an action is inferred from something what exterior, the remaining, however, in the one who undergoes the will of undergoing, right, huh? It is not simply what violent, Violent, huh? Because the one who undergoes does not confer something upon us by acting, right, huh?

[20:27] But it confers nevertheless by willing to undergo, right, huh? Whence it cannot be said to be what Involuntary, right? It's kind of like maybe the guy, who's a drinker. Yeah, or the lady says yes, right? I will marry you. She wants him to say something, though, right? Okay. My community has a great example of that.

[20:59] I forget the name of the book. It's this. You're you're up in court to testify against I don't know Vinny the killer. Sitting in the front row, you know that if you if you tell the truth, you're you're dead. So right right as the lawyer is calling on you, start talking about it. A woman runs into the courtroom, sticks epoxy all over your mouth, clamps your mouth shut, and you can't talk.

[21:32] So is it involuntary? It's voluntary because you wanted that in the first place, right? Yes, an example of the child, you see. If the child wants to be picked up, you know, you kind of, you know, he wants to be picked up and carried, you know. Well, then that's voluntary, right? Okay. Voluntary. Well, if he doesn't want to go to bed and pick up his tendons, it's involuntary, right?

[22:02] Okay. To the third, it should be said that as the philosopher says in the eighth book of the physics, the motion of the animal by which sometimes it is moved against what the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless in some way natural to the animal. To whom it is natural that he be moved according to his appetite, huh?

[22:30] So he's saying, if you consider the fact that my body is heavier than air, right, huh? Then to go up hill is against the nature of my body, right, huh? But not against the nature of me as a man who has this ability to walk up the hill and and the will to do so, right?

[22:51] Okay. And therefore, it is not violent simply, but in some respect, right? So I'm doing violence to myself when I get up in the morning, right? Some days more violent than others Especially if I don't sleep.

[23:13] Okay. And likewise, it should be said when someone flexes his members against their natural what disposition, right? For this is violent in some way as regards a particular member, but not simply as regards the man himself.

[23:33] Okay. So, go to Article Six here now. Metus, I guess, would be what fear of some sort. Then. We'd be reading Washington Irving's History of Mohammed and his successors, right? Of course, as they conquer the whole Near East and so on, they usually, if they like you, they'll say you got two choices: either you become a Mohammedan, right, or you agree to pay tribute to the Caliph, right, or you die.

[24:10] One of the three, right? If they don't like you so much, they say you got two choices: to become a Mohammedan or die. And sometimes they don't give you choices at all. Choices to just to die and fighting them, right?

[24:25] I get, I get these. Are people become Mohammedans? As you could imagine. Father Owen Bennett says, "Islam is tyranny tempered by assassination." Yeah. It's a little sensitive. But true. The sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that fear causes the involuntary, simpliciter. For just as violence is with respect to that which is contrary in a present way, right? It's kind of an unusual word. To the will, so fear is with respect to some future evil that is repugnant to the what will.

[25:14] But violence causes the involuntary what simply. Therefore, fear the involuntary simply what causes. Are you going to convert, or are you going to get your head chopped off?

[25:34] Moreover, what is as such so right? Anything added remains such, just as what is by itself hot. Whatever it is joined, nevertheless is what hot, huh? Ipsum manente huh? So long as it remains, it's not destroyed. But that which is done through fear in itself is what involuntary, right? Therefore, also coming fear, the the approach, yeah, is involuntary, right?

[26:17] Moreover, what is under some condition such, in secundum quid such, right? But what is without a condition is such, such is simply so. Just as what is necessary from a condition is necessary secundum quid, huh?

[26:40] So that's necessity, like Aristotle talks about from the end, right? Is it necessary to eat? It's not necessary in the way that two must be what half of four. And so many people go on these, you know, strikes. You know, and they don't eat, right? So it isn't necessary. You don't necessarily eat, do you? If you want to live. But If you want to live, yeah, another condition, yeah.

[27:07] Okay, so what is necessary absolutely is necessary. So secundum quid what is necessary from condition is necessary. secundum quid, I actually find that kind of distinction quite often. But that which is done through fear is involuntary absolutely. It is not however, voluntary,

[27:31] except on the condition that one avoid the evil that he what fears. Therefore, that which is done through fear is simply what involuntary. I'm not sure I found that term. Found that term exactly. But against this is what Gregory Nissa says,

[27:54] and also the philosopher that the things which are what done through fear are more voluntary than what Involunt. involuntary, right? So if I give up the faith and become Mohammedan to avoid having my head chopped off, this is more voluntary in my part than what. Involuntary. Yeah.

[28:29] Well, he says I answer it should be said that as the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics, this is Nicomachean ethics, huh? That's where I stop in the first part of the Nicomachean Ethics. Of the third book, talks about the voluntary and choice and so on, right? And the second part talks about the first two virtues, right? Courage and temperance. He's already in the second book of the ethics defined moral virtue as a habit with choice, right?

[29:00] Existing in the middle towards us, as determined by right reason, and so he wants to talk about choice and voluntary and so on to understand virtue better, right? Beginning in the third book.

[29:16] And Gregory Nissa, I guess, huh? He must be named from his town, right, huh? I have to wonder how to refer to these guys, you know. You see, Augustine of Hippo, you see that sometimes, don't you? Augustine of Hippo. So Thomas would be Thomas, what? Aquinas. Aquinas or something, yeah, whatever it was. But if you say Thomas Aquinas making a thing out of it, seems like a name, right?

[29:42] Huh? I don't think they call Augustine Hipponensis or something, you know? Yeah, Augustine Hippo. Hippo. Yeah, Hippo Hippoite, isn't? What they do that, like, they say Francis of Assisi. They don't say Francis of Sisi. Yeah, yeah. Some things they do, and some they don't. I know the Lebanese do that with Hardini. The Saint, this one here, he's named after the town Hardini. Yeah, yeah. So they just call Saint of Tall Hardini, or they just call Hardini.

[30:17] Yeah, yeah. A lot of people come. Some saints, they get that. Some of them, or some people. Yeah, some people come over from Italy, You know, they're talking about the some people in the parish, have been over to Sicily, you know, where their relatives were, and so on. And how people came over and they had the name of the town, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay.

[30:38] So the same thing says Gregory Nissa, right, in his book about man, right, huh? That these things which are done through fear are mixed from the voluntary and the what? Voluntary, right?

[30:53] For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, right, is not voluntary, right, huh? But it becomes voluntary in some cases. case to wit to avoiding the evil that is what fear, fear, right? But now, as you said, in the sed contra, quoting both Gregory and Aristotle, these things that are done through fear are more voluntary than involuntary, right? So he's kind of start, you know,

[31:27] manifesting that. But if someone rightly considers, right, that's what I have in our little prayer beforehand, right? Allows us consider more correctly. If one rightly considers, more of these sort, things of this sort, they are more voluntary than involuntary, right? They are voluntary, what simpliciter, right? Involuntary secundum what? Yeah. Now you've made this kind of distinction between simpliciter and secundum quid, right?

[32:07] Do you know what you don't know? Yeah. So what you don't know is simpliciter what? Unknown, right? But in some way, it is what known, right, huh? Okay. I'm always forgetting people's names now.

[32:31] So I don't know their name, right? What you know? Yeah, I know that. I know they don't know their name, right? So what I don't know, I know what is I don't know. Your name. Yeah. Okay, you Michael. By the grace of God. Yeah. Okay. Who's like God? Okay. And I mentioned how in the great dialogue, the the Meno right? That's the objection that Meno has. Because Socrates is saying, you know, I don't know what virtue is, and in the conversation we just, you know, completed, it appears you don't know what virtue is either.

[33:08] So let's put our heads together and try to figure out what virtue is. And then Mino objects to this investigation. He says, "How can we go looking for what we don't know?"

[33:22] And that seems to make some sense, right? But what are these people being paid to find a cure for? What cancer or some other thing? Do they know what they're looking for?

[33:38] But they have to know in some way what they're looking for, right? They're looking for the cause of cancer, right? In that way, they know what they're looking for. The cause of cancer, right? You know, But they don't know it. Simply speaking, otherwise we'd have to pay them. We'd already have the the answer, right? Yeah. So that's a clear example of one kind of sophistic argument that Aristotle talks about in the book on the Sophistical Refutations, and it's the second kind of mistake outside of words, right?

[34:12] So it's called a fallacy of simply and not simply, or simply in Latin, "simpliciter secundum quid," right? Well, you're gonna you're gonna try me for doing something out of fear.

[34:31] You know, is it voluntary or not what I did, right? You know, there were there were these in the early church there people who were who were

[34:45] in times of persecution, right? They what? Processed them. Yeah, yeah. And then somebody didn't want to admit them back in, right? But they were admitted back in in the judgment of church, but they had to do what? Penance of some sort, right? Huh? In other words, they're not saying that this was well voluntary. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[35:12] For each thing simply is said to be right according as it is an act, right? But according as it is only in our what apprehension, it is not simply, but what they couldn't have quit, right? Huh?

[35:35] Now this which is done through what fear, according as it is an act, according as it comes about, or is an act, according as it comes to be, right? Huh? For acts are found in the what singular, and the singular as such is here and what now.

[36:03] And according to this or by this, it comes to be an act according as it is here and now and under the other individual what conditions, right? Huh?

[36:17] Thus, that thing that comes about through fear is voluntary in so far as it is here and now. In so far as in this case there is the impediment of a what that is fear, just as and this is a common example Aristotle gives the projection of the what merchant goods, right, in the sea becomes voluntary in the time of the what tempest. On account of the fear of the danger, right?

[36:48] and it's in Jonah, isn't it? there, that he's just throwing things over because Whence it is manifest, it's simply it is voluntary. So if I throw the things out of the boat to keep the boat from sinking, was it voluntary? Yeah, even though so much against my my will, right? I don't want to lose these goods, right? But given the circumstances, okay.

[37:18] Once there, what belongs to it, the notion of the voluntary, because the source of it is within, right? But what is taken, huh? But

[37:37] the one takes that which comes about through fear, right? Huh? As outside of this case existing, in so far as it impugns the will, this is not except according to what? Consideration. Yeah. Do you want to lose your goods? Well, considered as such, no. I don't want to lose my all my goods abroad in Tokyo or Hong Kong or where it was. Okay. But

[38:06] given circumstances, what's actual here and now? I choose to save my life. Yeah. And therefore, it is involuntary secundum quid. That is, in so far as it's considered outside, it's existing outside the case, right? Huh?

[38:28] So if you're at one edge of the cliff and my lovely pet dog's on the other edge, whom do I rescue? I don't lose my dog.

[38:42] You see. But did I voluntarily save your life, right? Given the circumstance, I can't save both the dog and you. Maybe if I did the reverse.

[38:59] I don't want to lose you. I don't want to lose the dog, right? Okay. From the circumstances, I should lose the dog, I guess. Huh? Right. That makes sense. Why is it more voluntary? We're saying saying what's here and now is is what real, right? What is in that consideration? It's only in the what the mind, right? Okay. So throwing the goods away. In the. Taking all the circumstances into account, is more voluntary than involuntary.

[39:39] But considered in the abstract, losing all these goods that I've invested my money in, therefore all this. That's contrary to my will, right? He gives the same argument with guardian angels. Does guardian angel become sad if you suffer some loss, ultimately loss of your soul, and you are sad? He says, "Well, one yes, one no. Absolutely speaking, he doesn't want you to be lost because his will is God's will, and God wants all men to be saved, so He wants that to be done.

[40:11] But considering the here and now, you because of your sins, you deserve to go to hell. He'll throw you right down. Like, he's used the example of the merchant with the ship. You ask him, absolutely speaking, when he's loading the cargo, "Do you want to throw this stuff over? " He says, "No, absolutely not. " But when he's in a storm, he says, "Come on, get rid of this stuff.

[40:29] It'll help us. " Wasn't Saint John Damascene who who first brought the distinction between the antecedent will of God and the consequent will? You know, because when it says, you know, God wills all men to be saved, right? And then people say, "Well, then God's will is not always fulfilled, right? " Because some are not saved, you know. They say, "Well, that's not God's will simpliciter, right?

[40:50] " Because they take into account all the circumstances of how the man has acted and so on, right? Okay. You see how often this simpliciter secundum quid can come up as a fallacy.

[41:13] Yeah, it's very common. To the first, therefore, it should be said that those things which are done through fear and through what Force. force, not only differ according to the present and the future, but also according to this: that in that which is done through what force, the will does not consent, right? But it's altogether against the what motion of the will, right? So the kid being carried down to the bedroom, right?

[41:54] Huh? But that which is done through fear becomes voluntary, right? In the circumstances, right? Therefore, because the motion of the will is born towards it, although not in account of itself, but in account of something else, to repel the evil that is feared, like the boat sinking, right?

[42:23] It suffices for the what notion of voluntary that be what voluntary in account of something other than itself doesn't have to be willed in itself. You

[42:36] love your neighbor for the sake of God when he's robbing me. For the will is not only what we will on account of itself as an end. But also that which we will on account of another, as an end right.

[42:54] So you know all these amputation of legs and so on, things of that sort. Who would want this in itself, right? To have a leg or something like that, but to save the body, I guess you know. Chemotherapy or whatever, any of those things. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, you know, some war and all these people losing their legs and so on. You know, but it kind of was necessary to save their life, right?

[43:15] And even today, it's clear, therefore, that in that which is done through force, the will, interior will, does nothing, right? But in that which is done through what fear, the will does something, right? I think we sometimes get confused in English, don't we, sometimes because we speak of as if you know, a man's being tortured, something like that. But this is violence. right? Huh? And and maybe it's more a question of fear, right?

[43:49] Huh? Okay. And therefore, as Gregory Nyssa says, the way he said in English, Gregory Nyssa Gregory of Nyssa Of Nyssa Okay. And therefore, as Gregory Nyssa says, to excluding those things which are done through fear in the definition of violent, he says not only that the violent is that whose what source is outside, but adds conferring nothing, right?

[44:25] The thing undergoing nothing to it, because to that which is done through fear, the will of the one what fearing confers something, right? Huh? Okay. That goes back to the definition there Stoll gave of the violent, right? That the one undergoing confers nothing, right?

[45:01] Now, to the second, it should be said that those things which are absolutely said, something added remains such as what hot and white, but those things which are said relatively are varied according to a comparison to diverse things. For what is great compared to this is small compared to another. Okay. But the voluntary is said something said to be voluntary, not only in account of itself as it were absolutely, but also in account of another as it were relatively.

[45:39] And therefore, nothing prevents something that is not what voluntary to another compared to become what. Voluntary compared it to another thing. Yeah. yeah. Okay.

[46:01] It was not voluntary that the merchant was to throw his stuff overboard. Absolutely, speaking. When he considers sales, profits, and all the rest, yeah, but compared to the storm that threatens life, it isn't.

[46:18] To the third, it should be said that that which is done through fear, without what condition, is voluntary. That is, according as it is done in act, right? Huh. But it's involuntary under condition that is, such a fear was not what pressing up, pressing up. Hence, according to that argument, one could more conclude the what. Opposite, huh?

[46:55] Okay.