Prima Secundae
31. Circumstances of Human Acts and Whether the Will Wants Only the Good (Q.7 aa.3–4; Q.8 a.1)
Class of 2011-10-13
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/031-circumstances-of-human-acts-and-whether-the-will-wants-only/

[0:01] Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our minds images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, Help us to understand what you have written. In the. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:27] Now just reading Thomas there again on the proemium there to wisdom there in metaphysics and he's talking about the argument that Aristotle gives why wisdom is more certain than the other sciences. That's a principle that Aristotle gives in the book on science there, the Posterior Analytics, and he's saying that the science that requires fewer things to consider is more certain. And so the example in the

[1:02] Posterior Analytics is that arithmetic is more certain than geometry. And Thomas points out, you know, the most fundamental thing in geometry is the point, and in arithmetic it's the one, right? Well, the point adds something to the idea one, namely what position? It's here or there, right? So if you go through the theorems of Euclid, say in geometry, sometimes you have to distinguish a number of cases because of the arrangement of the things, and you say as you distinguish all the cases, you need, right?

[1:38] You realize it's not as certain as arithmetic, right? It's arithmetic, not to say where the one is, it's nowhere. So, and then you go to natural science, you go from the arithmetical body of geometry to your body or my body or the dog's body, many more things to be considered, right? He says, and least certain is the what practical sciences, huh? Because you have to consider all these circumstances.

[2:08] So here we're at the what source of the what incertitude relative to the other sciences, the least certitude anyway, of the practical sciences. All these circumstances you got to take into account.

[2:27] So to the third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that unsuitably the circumstances are numbered, huh? Or enumerated, we'd say, in the third book of the what ethics?

[2:46] For circumstances are the act are said to to be those things that have themselves in an outward way to the act. But these outside things are what time and place. Therefore, there is only two circumstances: where and when. Where you did it and when you did it, right?

[3:14] Moreover, from circumstances is taken that something be done well or what badly, right? Huh? But this pertains to what is called the mode, huh? Of the act. Therefore, all circumstances are included under one, which is the modus agendi, modus operandi, as we say, modus agendi now.

[3:48] So these two first objections would limit them, right? Huh? Moreover, circumstances are not of the substance of an act. Circumstances something outside the substance of the act, what it is. But to the substance of an act would seem to pertain the causes of the act itself. Therefore, no circumstance ought to be taken from a cause of the act itself. Thus, therefore, neither quis who I guess, huh?

[4:23] Nor propter quid in account of what, which is cause and effect. Nor circa quid about what. Are circumstances? For quis pertains to the efficient cause, propter quid to the final, and circa quid to the material cause.

[4:44] Against all this is the authority of the philosopher, in third book of the Ethics He quotes Cicero almost as much as Augustine here in the Summa, right?

[5:00] I answer it should be said, and now he's quoting what Cicero, the great Roman rhetorician, who's also called Tullius, right? He has many, many names.

[5:13] We have a first and a second name, right? Sometimes a middle name. That's called a middle name, second name. Oh, oh, I'm sorry. Yeah, first and second name, family name. Yeah, yeah, and then the third name, yeah, family name.

[5:30] Answer: It should be said that Tullius or Cicero, in his what rhetoric, right? Assigns seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse, huh? So if you're into memorizing Latin verses, you can memorize quis quid ubi quibus quibus auxiliis cur quomodo quando, right? Quis is who, right? Quid is what. Ubi is where. Quibus auxiliis by what tools or aids? Cur, I suppose. Why, right? What's the name of that work?

[6:06] Yeah, by Anson Cur Deus Homo Why God a man? That's nice, concise, just the way it's said, huh? Quomodo in what way, huh? Quando, right? When, huh? Okay.

[6:25] And then Thomas summarizes this, in other words, once you consider and act, whodunit. That's what people want to know whodunit. Quis feit, huh? By what, what, aids or instruments he did it? What he did, right? Where he did it, right? Why he did it? In what way he did it? And when he did it, right? Okay. So Thomas gives them, I guess, in the same order that Cicero was giving them, right, doing this summary, right?

[7:09] But Aristotle, in the third book of the Ethics, adds another to it. Quid, right? I suppose what I did about whom or about what, huh? Which, by Tullius, is comprehended under what? Quid, huh? Of course, Cicero says that Aristotle is a what golden river. I mean, he knew what he's doing, talking about, huh? And he's talking about Aristotle's rhetoric in particular, right? When he says that, huh?

[7:39] So maybe he got some of this from Aristotle. Who knows? Okay. Now, have these guys, Tullius and Aristotle, followed the rule of two or three? It doesn't seem like it. Could we possibly understand this without following the rule of two or three?

[8:00] Let's see what Thomas does. And the reason of this enumeration can thus be taken, right, huh? Taken into your mind, thus huh? Then can I think I'll go to two or three. For a circumstance is said, what is outside the very substance of the act, right? What exists outside the substance of the act, but in some way touches upon it, huh?

[8:30] But this can happen in three ways, huh? In one way, insofar as it touches upon the act itself. In another way, insofar as it touches upon the cause of the act, huh? And in a third way, insofar as it touches upon the effect. So he looks at the act itself and before it at the cause and after at the effect, huh?

[9:00] Now it attaches itself or touches upon the act itself, either by way of a what? Somebody that measures it, and these two measures are time and what? Place. Of course, the natural philosophies I've spoken of is two what? Measures, right? Time is the measure of what? Motion, right? And locus or place, the measure of the thing that's in place, right? And so both time and locus are given in the categories under the chapter of what?

[9:35] Quantity, which which species are distinguished by what? Some kind of measurement, right? Or by way of the quality of the act, and that's the modus agendi, right? Okay. So he divides what? That. First into two, and one of the two into two, right? Okay.

[10:07] From the side of the effect, as one one considers what someone did, right? Huh? quid, quomodo, quando, ubi, right? That includes that check of quid in Aristotle's two Okay. And on the part of the cause of the act, as regards the final cause, one takes propter quid, on account of what? On the part of the material cause or object, one takes about what? Huh? That's when Aristotle brings in, right?

[10:38] And on the part of the agent cause, he divides into two: the principal one, who done it, and secondly by what, what? Instrument. Yeah. Okay. So I robbed you with a gun, right? Okay. What's relevant to know that I did it, and what I used to rob you with, right? And if I did with a gun, that's going to be more serious than if I did with a stick, maybe I don't know.

[11:05] Or just growling at you. Okay. So that's the way Thomas arrives at those seven or eight circumstances, as Tully and Aristotle have enumerated them, right?

[11:24] It's interesting. Porphyry in the in the Isagoge he enumerates five, right? Huh? Genus, difference, species, property, and accident. Aristotle, the categories, distinguishes what ten, right? Substance, quantity, quality, relation, so on. And in the ancient times, in the Greek commentators, said the book of the five names. That's Porphyry's Isagoge, and the book of the ten names. That's Aristotle's categories. But if you try to understand why there's five here and why there's ten here, you have to divide into either two or what?

[11:58] Three. Three. Yeah. So like with the five and Porphyry, you divide the essential ones: genus, difference, and species against the non-essential, property, and accident, right? And then you subdivide each of those, right? But you're dividing into two, and then one two is divided into three, and the other into what two, right? When Thomas divides the ten of the categories, he divides them into three, right? And he keeps them subdivided, right?

[12:27] A name is either said of what? He distinguishes them by the way that a name can be said of individual substances, as regards what it is, or regards not what it is, but something in it, or as regards something outside of it. He subdivides the second and the what? Third, right? To get all ten, huh? But in the texts that we have of Aristotle, is not he isn't

[12:55] given us the rule of two or three there, right? Thomas does, right? So. He supposed he supposed to do it. Yeah, well, you know, so they call you a teacher in the scripture too. He said, you know, you need someone to break the bread. This is known as breaking the bread, right? Dividing it, right? I mean, Thomas seems to divided following the rule of two or three, right?

[13:15] As if our mind can only what Handle digest it, right? Huh? Otherwise, Falbule would say you are going to have going to be indigestion, a constipated mind, right? Huh? Just yeah. So, but sometimes I say, what's the difference between an enumeration and a division? Because a division is something logical, right? Enumeration is what. Oh, let's enumerate the ten grandchildren, let's say, or the seventeen grandchildren, and but I can't really divide this in any way, right?

[13:56] Obviously, six girls, four boys, and five daughters. But numeration is is different from a division, isn't it? Enumerate the Ten Commandments, right? One, two, three, four, five, six. You know. But when they divide the Ten Commandments, you got the two tablets, right? The three and the and the seven, right? And you can you know subdivide the seven too, right? Since that's more than three, huh?

[14:28] The same way you can enumerate the the seven sacraments, right? I told you about my friend there was was teaching the freshman chorus for the confirmation kids, you know, and review of the faith, right? And I came in class the first day, and he says, "What are the seven sacraments?" And this is not a review; it's first view. They couldn't collectively come up with the names of the seven sacraments, huh?

[14:56] And plus, they had things like graduation, you know, some kind of ceremony, and they showed you how how bad off they were, right? Huh? The bishop I was mentioning the other day that I heard on EWTN there, he was saying when he went to catechism class, the priest was was conducting the class, right? He said, "No," he says, "You all know the catechism, of course, But now we're going to do some St.

[15:20] Thomas," he says. Because in those days he did, He had to memorize the Baltimore Catechism, you know, and so on. So at least you know the names of the seven sacraments. How well you understood them is another question, but I mean, you know, you know, you can round these things off more or less. So let's do the five ways, he says. The priest. I don't know. So good start for this bishop, you know, huh?

[15:44] Yeah. Warren Murray had a had a nun in grade school who who did the Summa with him a little, but you know, so at least there are there are these yeah these surprising things you hear about sometimes. Somebody told me that for the confirmation students the first day they asked, "Who's the Pope?". One kid out of twenty years old could name him. Yeah. What his name was?

[16:10] Yeah. Yeah, he said it's Benedict. I don't remember the number after his name, but I know he's Benedict. I know when I grew up as Pius XII, you know for such a long time doing my thing, and then even you know as an older man now, John, I mean John Paul II was pope for so long, right? Even now I want to pray for Benedict. You know, I sometimes find myself saying John Paul II.

[16:36] Yeah, yeah. It's old now, though he's not the pope anymore, so I guess he doesn't do my prayers anymore either. It's kind of nice. Yeah. But but. It's something to do with the names of these people, right? There was one there was one CCD class. They had a famous teacher in there. So the bishop came and he asked the class, "How many sacraments are there? " So one of the girls goes, "Seven for boys and six for girls.

[17:02] " Who put her after that? She got she got a bonus extra credit for the sister. Okay, now the first objection in terms of only time and place should be what?

[17:29] To the first, therefore, it should be said that time and place do stand around the act by way of a what measure, but other circumstances stand around the act in so far as they what attain it in some other way, right? While still existing outside its very substance or what it is.

[18:00] Substance often has that sense of what a thing is, right? So Aristotle and even Plato, I guess, too, using the term logos, tes ousias, right? And they translate that in Latin ratio substantiae, right? The ratio of what it is, right? The thought of what it is, for definition, because the word logos has so many meanings, right? So many things it applies to.

[18:30] Okay. Now, what about the second one here about being done well or badly? This mode, which is well or badly, right? Huh? Is not laid down as a circumstance. You say, well, why not, right? But something falling upon all the circumstances, right? Okay. So, do I do do well? They're eating my candy in church. No, that's not what you eat candy, you know, and.

[19:06] So this pertains to all the circumstances, right? So it's not, it's not a, it's not divided against the other circumstances, but something that falls upon all of them, right? Okay. Was a good meaty that ribeye steak? Depends. That might be not on Friday, you know. Yeah. Especially not a good Friday. Yeah. Yeah. See. So I did badly eating the ribeye steak on Friday, but

[19:36] that's something that falls upon any of these circumstances, right? Where, when, so. But it's a special circumstance, right? Modus agendi, right? You have to understand a special circumstance is laid down the mode which pertains to the qua to the act is when someone walks what swiftly or what slowly, right? Huh? Or someone. strikes. someone, what fortiter or mise and so on and others. Only touched him. I didn't, you know.

[20:09] He knocked me to the floor. No, you tripped over his shoe. Yeah, yeah, sister. It's St. Joseph's sister. They're in grade school. And sister Corona is your name, right? Huh. But but your nickname was Cannonball Corona.

[20:31] And at least to myself. And they tell you other stories, but the kid was flipping around. Those pencils at the top of the little desk he had, he had a little place there with the pencils, you know, something like that. And she had that stick, you know, wooden stick that she used to point things out, and wham down. I guess he got his fingers out and timed you know, but she bumped me.

[20:51] She bumped me. Something you know, yeah. The question was, you know, she was a little excessive there, you know. Cannonball Corona. But the question is, you know, so he'd say, you know, how hard did you come down, and the kid, you know? Yeah. Some people see some sisters had they could with their glasses. You know, they had thicker glasses in those days. You know, they could go up to the board to write, and they could, you know, see that kind of rearview mirror.

[21:19] You know, who's fooling around while they're writing something on the board? So. Eyes in the back of her head. Yeah. Sister Carolyn, the principal there. Yeah. Still remember coming up the the steps there, and my brother Mark had been in school for a couple of days. He was sick or something like that, and so she asked me about my brother Marcus. I'm telling her, but she says, "Look at the person to whom you are speaking.

[21:46] " Yes. We didn't go to the children's mass, on Sunday, we went to some other mass, right? We get called into Sister Carolyn's office there, you know, and of course everybody's trying to be the last guy in here behind everybody else, you know. They're afraid. And she's a good, she's a good sister. Okay. So notice that an objection was saying that all these circumstances are included under one.

[22:20] Well, that's not a circumstance. That's something that falls upon all seven or eight of these circumstances. So something can be done badly, right? Because of any of these, right? You know, it's always a question there. You know, my my friend, Doctor Samuel Johnson, there, right? Huh. Well, Boswell was a lawyer in Scotland, right? Is the guy wrote the famous thing on the famous biography of Johnson. But sometimes Boswell would would.

[22:57] You know, speak to Johnson about some case. You know, and of course, this will come out sometimes about beating the what the kid in school, right, the teacher? And Johnson's rule was, there's no permanent damage. You're not a case, right? The kid's got a broken arm or leg, maybe. You can say that the teacher, you know. Yeah, well, this this is the kind of circumstance can take into account, right?

[23:25] You know, where did you hit him, and how hard did you hit him, and you know, did you blind him, or did you? Yeah, yeah. So, any of these circumstances can lead to calling some action good or bad, or worse, or not so bad. Okay.

[23:47] Now, the third one is talking about the causes into the substance of the thing. To the third, it should be said that that condition of the cause from which the very substance of the act depends, right, is not said to be a what circumstance, huh?

[24:10] But some condition joined there too, huh? Just as in the object, that is not said to be a what circumstance of theft. There'd be another's, huh? Somebody else's property? For this pertains to the substance of theft, right? Okay. So you can't say that that's a circumstance of a theft that I took something that's not mine, rather than my own, right? Okay.

[24:41] But a circumstance would be that it's large or what small, right? So if I took somebody's pennies, that is that, but it's pretty small. Yeah, I mean, maybe shouldn't be bothered to be punished, right? Okay.

[25:01] And likewise, in the case of other circumstances which are taken on the part of other causes, I know what they call this thing. They call the hate crimes nowadays. Okay, that that's like taking like a circumstance, right? Huh? You did it out of what hatred of? Right. As I stole from a black man because I hate blacks, or I stole from a Jew because I hate Jews, or something.

[25:33] That's like the guy that said he's a vegetarian not because he likes animals, but because he hates plants. For it is not the what end which gives the species to the act, right? That is a circumstance, but some in what adjunctus, right? Huh?

[25:57] Just as the man, the. The courageous man, I guess, strongly right or courageously acts in account of the good afforded to him. That's not a what circumstance, right? But that he strongly acts for the liberation of the city or for the salvation of the people or something of this sort, right? Then that would be a circumstance, right?

[26:23] Likewise, on the part of that which is quid, right? For that someone, what pouring over someone, I guess, washes him is not a circumstance of ablution, but that he does so with what something cold or hot, right? He chills him, he heats him up, he heals his wounds. This is a what circumstance? So we can see how touchy the circumstance business can be, right? And how it contributes to the incertitude of these things.

[26:58] huh? It's like the man walking down the street. Why is he walking down the street? He's going to the drugstore. Why is he going to the drugstore? To get medicine for his mother-in-law. She's got an infection. He's going to get penicillin. Oh, why is he going to get penicillin? Well, because he knows she's allergic to it.

[27:19] Our guy was telling me there that the neighbor boy comes over, you know, and he sees the potted plants on the, you know, the ramp going into the house, right? Looking at my friend, and he takes one of the things and knocks them over and smashes it. So the guy picks up. yeah. i'm always complaining you know. he beat her a kid, you know. What do you do in those circumstances, huh? Now, fourth article.

[28:06] To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that those are not the chief circumstances, on account of which, right? And those in which there is what the operation, as is said in the third book of the ethics.

[28:25] First objection. For those in which there is operation, seem to be place and time, right? Of course, that's the first meaning of in, right? In place, and to that sense of of in is attached in time. It's Thomas's in the commentary in the fourth book, where Aristotle takes up place and time, which do not seem to be the chief among the circumstances, right? Since they are most of all extrinsic from the act.

[28:57] You can see I kind of relate to it. You say, oh yeah, does it make Mike Striffen where I kill you, or when I kill you? You know, seems to be kind of beside the point, doesn't it? Well, in some way, yeah. Kill a guy in church, it's different. Yeah. You know, like these Renaissance things, you know, there the the in Florence and so on, there, you know, where they decide the best time to kill someone off is during the consecration, right?

[29:23] So that that adds, you know. Yeah. Some severity. Pretty serious. There is malice there, yeah. Yeah. It's not that they're they're trying to disgrace the sacrament, but you know they're doing that. So it's not the very substance of what they're doing. They they want to kill the man, which is that's the only reason for being bad. But it adds sacrilege. So it's worse for me to to make you in the church than make you on the street.

[29:55] I still kind of outside the act in a way, isn't it? It's a circumstance, right? But to be taken account, right? Moreover, the end is extrinsic to the thing. Therefore, not not to be the chief, one of the chief, or the most chief of the circumstances.

[30:19] More of that is chief in each thing, that is its cause and its form, right? But the cause of an act is the person acting. The form of the act is its mode, right? Therefore, these two circumstances seem to be what chief, huh?

[30:44] Against this is what now? Who said this? Gregory Nyssa, that's who they think it is. Yeah, but they have a footnote here they said Nemesius, huh? that's another guy. Yeah, that's the other the other quotes from Gregory Nyssa are the same. Yeah, Nemesius. Is he a doctor of the church or what is he? Nemesius. Nemesius? I don't know. Yeah. yeah. Sometimes, Anyway. okay. But he says anyway, Gregory, whoever he is, Nemesius, that the chief circumstances are cuius gratia, something is done, right, huh?

[31:21] And what it is that is done, right, huh? Okay, that's the one. Aristotle said the same thing, right? Answer: it should be said by the article should be said that acts are properly said to be human, as has been said above, in so far as they are voluntary, right? But what's the mover of the will and the object of the will? It's chiefly the end, right? That's going to be the principal thing then, right?

[31:55] And therefore principalissima—that's the what superlative, huh? The chiefest of all the circumstances, huh? And therefore that is the chiefest of all the circumstances, huh? That which attains or touches upon the act on the side of the what end, right? That is cuius gratia, that for the sake of which.

[32:22] Secondly, the act which attains the very what substance of the act—that is what he did, right? The other circumstances should be more or less chief, according as they more or less approach to what to these things, right?

[32:45] So the first objection based upon misunderstanding, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that to those things in which there is operation, the philosopher is not understanding time and place, but those things which are joined to the act what itself. Hence Gregory, that's him, or Nemesius as it were expounding the saying of the philosopher, in place of that which the philosopher says in quibus est operatio, he says what is what.

[33:20] Who am I complaining about the modern philosophers? You know, which one? You know, it's hard to figure out sometimes what they're saying, right? Huh? So you spend you know most of your time trying to figure out what they're saying, and that leaves you very little time to judge whether what they say is true or false, huh? You know, I've got an example as a professor when I was teaching out of St.

[33:49] Mary's College for three years. When I arrived, he was trying to figure out what Heidegger meant by being. When I left three years later, he's still trying to figure out what Heidegger means. So I say the proportion is all wrong, you're right. You should spend most of your time trying to decide whether what somebody says is true or false, right? You have to spend all this time trying to figure out what he really means, and you are still not sure what he means.

[34:13] You know, I don't think you've ever understood me as Hegel said, as deathbed thinking, but he's really understood me. You know, and well, then he's the only one who admitted it. Yeah, much more prefer a guy who says water is the beginning of everything. At least know what he's saying. You know, it may not be true, and I can find some maybe argument for against this. But if you if you don't know what the guy's saying, you know it's just uh uh it's just crazy.

[34:40] You y. You spend all your time on the what should be the least difficulty and the least thing, and that's the method that, for some reason, so many modern philosophers have, at least twentieth century, found so appealing. It's a method I call "two steps forward, three steps back." That's where they write. It's where they think. You know, yeah, it's hard. Let's do the example from the you know the senior paper one time.

[35:12] The student says, "Desiccation is a greater problem with land animals than with water animals. " Most of aren't too sure what desiccation exactly is, right? But if you'd use the familiar word "drying up" or "drying out," is a greater problem for a land animal than for a fish, right? Yeah, you can see right away, right? A white man might say that, right? You know, you can go right away to judge it with these two or false, right?

[35:40] There is some reason for it being true, right? But use the word desiccation, which most of the students are kind of not quite sure what that means, right? Sounds more scientific, but but it's not quite clear what you know to most people what he's saying, and the way you know they they play with words, you know. Aristotle is often quoted, you know, by Thomists. You know, who use words the way men what use them in daily speech, right?

[36:09] Ratzinger had a talk he gave once, maybe I don't know, ten or fifteen years ago, to a group. You know, he was he was instrumental starting this Communio magazine or quarterly, whatever it is, and he gave him a talk, something about trying not to just they they seem he said they some scholars they tend to get kind of closed in on themselves in their own little circles, their own little vocabulary, yeah.

[36:37] And he he was trying to encourage them not to do that, but without naming names or saying new people who are here. So he gave this talk, and all about that, and using common languages or being accessible. And when he gave his talk, after he finished his talk. some jerk and the audience raised his hand. He says, "Who are you talking about? " And he he just had this humility.

[36:58] he obliged that, and I. Said, "Well, chiefly myself, I suppose. " Wow. My brother, the professor, there at Notre Dame, you know. Who knew these words that even professors don't know, right? Of course, he sticks them into his speech and so on. And our professors are embarrassed to ask because what does that word mean? You know, just some word they don't know the meaning of, right? So they can't be attacking, saying, you know, what the guy's saying.

[37:30] No, well, this is what Belloc did once. He went to Oxford and he gave a talk about some battle or whatever. He goes, I don't know about it. And after he finished, he says, "Is there any questions?" And I was, oh, that was wonderful, wonderful, wonderful. He says, "Really, there's no questions at all?" "No, no, no, no. This is marvelous, fantastic presentation." He says, "You fools! It made the whole thing up."

[37:53] Of course, that makes his name is mud in Oxford. To second objection, right? Although the end is not the very substance of the act, right? It is nevertheless the what chief cause of the act. It's a causa causarum, as we say. Insofar as it moves one to what acting, right?

[38:30] Whence also maximae, most of all, a moral act has its species from its what end. What about the person acting? Isn't that pretty important? Yeah. But to the third, it should be said that the person acting is a cause of the act, according as he is moved by the what end. And by this he is chiefly ordered to the act. The other conditions of the person are not chiefly ordered to the act.

[39:03] Of course, the objection about the modus. The mode here is not the substantial form. The form makes it to be what it is, right? For this is noted in the act according to the object and term or end, but it's a certain accidental quality, right? Because the objection is taken as being the the substantial form, the form that makes it to be what it is.

[39:29] Okay. Now we go to start a question eight, and we have another premium. Then we're not to consider about the acts of the will in what particular, right? And first of the acts which are immediately of the will itself,

[39:51] elicited by the will itself, and then secondly about the acts commanded what by the will, and that's not down till question what seventeen. Now the will is moved both towards the end.

[40:11] And in those or towards those things which are to the end, right? First, therefore, we're not to consider about the acts of the will by which it is moved in the end or to the end.

[40:27] And then about the acts by which it is moved in those things which are what towards the end, ordered to the end. That's not down till question what thirteen, huh?

[40:42] Now the acts of the will towards the end seem to be three. I didn't know that. Thank goodness, three. That's amazing. Seems pretty complete. Yeah, it does.

[40:57] First to will, to wish, I guess, huh? Frui to enjoy, I guess. Yeah, best in time, best of all time. And what? To intend. Yeah.

[41:12] So first, therefore we're not to consider about the act of the will. Secondly, about what? Enjoyment, I guess. Yeah, and that's not until question eleven. What's he going to do in eight, nine, ten?

[41:30] And third, about what? Intention. Intention, huh? That's going to be what? Question twelve. Now, about the first three things should be considered. First, of what things the will is voluntas at act. This name from the will itself, voluntas.

[42:00] Okay. Secondly, by what it is moved, huh? That's the next question. Question nine. And then, in what way it is moved? Question ten, huh? So he's very what thorough, you're right, huh? I've been reading these sermons of Bernard Clairvaux and the Song of Song. He's still in the first chapter now. I'm up to about sermon forty-two. He's not going to finish the book. It takes at least a sermon for one verse, you know, one line, and sometimes more than one, because the things that are surrounding it and so on.

[42:40] So I have my question: Is he going to get through the whole Song of Song? I think he does. I only have the first two volumes. I think there's there's four volumes in the Cistercian series, you know. So I got a bite of the two, but we have to buy the paperback edition. It is third, fourth. You might have it on your way down. People by Spencer.

[43:02] Yeah, so I'll go, I'll go up there. That's why I got these first years ago, but but so it's kind of beautiful to see them, you know. Like Montaigne, you know, it's been a classic too on one or two lines at times, you know. Yeah. Got to

[43:23] do that sometimes, you know. Sometimes it gets kind of kind of itchy, you know. It takes a while to absorb these things. Okay. So, in a sense, this first question is about what the object of this first act, right? About the first three things are asked: whether the will, this first act called voluntas, is only of what? The good. Second, whether it is what only of the end, or whether it is also of those things which are towards the end.

[44:11] Third, if the so the answer is yes, it's also in some way of those things which are towards the end. If it is in some way of those things which are towards the end, whether by one one motion, one is moved to the end and to those things which are for the sake of the what.

[44:31] Yeah. Okay. So to the first one proceeds. It seems that the will, the willing, is not only of the what good. For the same powers of opposites, as sight of. white and water. Yeah. And taste of what sweet and salty bitter.

[45:02] It's bitter is the contrary of sweet, huh? Not not sour. Sour is not as far away from it as bitter is, huh? I'm thinking salty. That's not as far away though from sweet. No. So we have these pins now, you know, the sweet and salty. Yeah. Sweet sour. I know they complement each other. Yeah, they have bitter sweet chocolate too. I mean,

[45:27] there it's kind of bringing opposites together. But good and bad are opposites, right? Therefore, the will is not only of the good, but also of the bad, right? Huh? Right. I suppose reason thinks both the true and the false, right? So the will what must love must will both the good and the bad, right? Brother, brother, will to go to the dentist today. That's a bad thing.

[45:57] Yeah. Yeah. Well, yeah. Poor guy. Yeah. Moreover, rational powers have themselves to what pursuing opposites, right? As the philosopher says, that's when Aristotle makes a famous distinction there, right?

[46:20] In the ninth book of Wisdom, huh? Between a natural power which is determined to one or two opposites, like fire, definitely what heats or burns rather than what cools, right? But the doctor, by his art of medical art, he could heal you or make you sick, save your life or kill you. Sometimes doctors use their what medical art to to kill you, right? Okay.

[46:52] And if I possess the art of rhetoric and the art of persuasion, I can persuade people to vote for somebody or to vote against him, right? Huh? Or I can persuade the jury that he's guilty and not guilty, right? Or whichever they're paying me to to persuade the jury. Bad, yeah, yeah. Okay. So these rational powers are for what? Opposites, yeah. It isn't the will and reason, as we say.

[47:22] It's a rational power for the philosopher, but the will is a rational power for it is in reason, as is said in the third book of the soul, right? The rational part of the soul. Therefore, the will has itself to what opposites.

[47:42] Therefore, not only for willing the good, but also for willing what bad. Bad, huh? So these terrorists running around—they they're willing bad things for ambassadors and other people.

[48:00] Okay. Moreover, good and being are convertible, right? But the will is not only of what beings, but also non-beings, huh? For we will sometimes to not walk and to not speak.

[48:27] We will also sometimes some future things which are not beings and act. Therefore, the will is not only of the what good, huh? Well, what are we going to do?

[48:51] I was talking to the students last night there at the house there at the. One of my first studies, you know, was of Aristotle's Poetics huh And on the influence of Aristotle into this, and you know, Aristotle says that plot is the what

[49:11] soul of tragedy, right? Okay. And then Aristotle divides the plot into beginning, middle, and end. He defines them by before and after, beginning, middle, and end, right? Well, in the Metaphysics there, he says the philomythos, the lover of plots, right, is in a way a philosopher. If you love plots, you are loving what has a beginning, middle, and end, and therefore you are loving what to know the before and after, right?

[49:39] Now, which isn't Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? But then you have the what? The other side, right? Other way, he divides the plot into tying the knot and untying it, huh? Just what Thomas does, right? He ties the mind up in a knot, and then he what? Okay. Yeah, yeah. And Aristotle says the young and inexperienced poet is better at tying the knot than what? Okay. Yeah, that's true about the human mind, right?

[50:13] It's better at tying itself into a knot than to untie the knot, huh? Thomas says you would want to untie the knot, and Aristotle is, but most of us, left to ourselves, would be tied into a knot. You know, Voltaire or somebody giving us these objections, we just be tied in a knot and and give up, you know. I told you when I first started out in philosophy, there was at a some kind of a social function, and I ran into someone.

[50:47] We just got talking to her there, you know. She found I was in philosophy. She said, "Oh, oh, oh!" She told the story of this young man who went to the University of Minnesota, went to this class, and this professor said this, and went to that class, and that professor said that, and this professor said that, and this professor said that, and they're all contradicting each other.

[51:02] Finally, he left the university. and he's out on the farm now and he refuses to pick up a book. There. Yeah, but he's just he's tied a knot and then just can't sort anything out and so

[51:18] so. But what the Summa Theologiae is is kind of an abbreviation of the what? Questiones Disputatae, huh? We might have more than just three objections, you know, but basically it's the same thing. But

[51:36] actually, the way to do if you took the time to teach properly, you would give the guy the objections without the rest of it, and let him struggle for a day or two. How merciful, and then come in and resolve, right? Huh? And the mind is really good. Okay. But against this is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names that the bad is what praeter voluntatis partem from it, and that all want the good, right?

[52:14] All desire the good, all want the good, huh? Okay. So that's what Aristotle says too in the beginning of the Ethics, huh? So he gives a kind of induction there, huh? everybody wants the good, and then he said, and therefore they say, well, the good is what all want.

[52:34] So God is the good, huh? So, answer. It should be said that the will is a what rational or reasonable desire, right? Huh? But all desire, all wanting is not except of the what good, huh? The reason for this is because the what because desire or wanting is nothing other than the inclination of the one desiring towards something, right? Huh?

[53:12] But nothing is inclined towards something except towards something what? Like it. But nothing is inclined except towards something what? Like it or. And suitable, suitable for it, yeah.

[53:29] Since therefore everything, insofar as it is a being and a substance, is some what good. If it is inclined into something that is like itself or suitable to itself, is necessary then that its inclination be in the what good. Good. And hence it is that the philosopher says in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics that the good is what all want.

[54:07] I often thought, you know, you should kind of imitate Socrates in the dialogues, right? Where Socrates comes in and he asks somebody, "What is something?" And they don't come out with a definition of what it is, but they give examples of what what it is. Yeah. So I imagine Socrates talking to a boy, and he says, "What's good? What is good?" And the boy doesn't say, "Because what I want."

[54:34] No, he says, "Candy's good, popcorn's good, hot dogs are good, right? Baseball. Baseball's good, and so on, right?" Then Socrates says, "What do these things all have in common that you call them good? Why do you call them good?" And then he comes out with the sense, the first definition of good, right? Because all the things that he wants, he calls good, right? And I remember my kids, I kind of pull their little boy there, figuring out, you know, when dinner came, you know, if you like what's there, it's a good meal, you know, good dinner, you know.

[55:08] If you don't like it, don't want, don't eat that stuff. It's a bad meal. Then I go the next step and say, "Well, is it good because you want it, or you want because it's good, right?" Okay.

[55:26] But here Thomas is arguing a little differently, right? Huh? He's arguing that what wanting is being inclined towards something, right? But you're going to be inclined towards something that is what like you, right? Or that fits you, right? But you are by nature something good, right? Substance and so on. So you're naturally inclined to something that is what good, right?

[55:59] But it should be considered that since every inclination follows upon some what form, natural desire, right? Follows upon a form existing in what nature, huh?

[56:26] But a sensitive, huh, desire, right? Sense desire, or also what an intellectual or rational desire, which is called the will, follows upon a form, but a form that is what grasp, right?

[56:44] Thus, therefore, just as what the natural appetite tends toward is a good existing in the thing, right? So the plant grows towards the sun, right, and down towards the water in the soil and nutrients in the soil, and so on.

[57:01] So that towards which the animal, the sense appetite, sense desire, tends, or the will is a good what grasped, apprehended, grasped. I think it's right.

[57:19] Yes. In order, therefore, that the will tend towards something, it is not required that it be in fact good in reality, right? In re veritate. But that it be what grasped under the notion of the good, right? In account of this, the philosopher said in physics that the end is a good or an apparent good, right?

[57:52] This is very fundamental stuff, huh? Convinced by Thomas. So I was drawn to this bishop, right? Boom, boom, boom. Shakespeare, Bernard of Clairvaux One two three, Protestant father, Catholic mother. You know, knowing Shakespeare, yes. Three strikes you're out. Sanctuary, now is Benedict XVI is a Montserrat composer? I don't know. I think Benedict, I would say, yeah. Yeah, that draws me to him. Yeah, yeah. So we can, we can get common ground.

[58:38] You're, you're drawn to what is like yourself. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. If a man likes salmon or something, and not drawn to him, you know that way, huh?

[58:57] And it kind of separates us, huh? Or if he likes Mick Jagger. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, what about this famous thing that there's the same power of opposites, right?

[59:15] To the first, therefore, should be said that the same power is of opposites, right? You're admitting that, right? But not in the same way does it have itself to what Each. to both.

[59:29] For the will has itself both to the good and to the bad, huh? But to the good by what desiring it, and the bad by what fleeing it, huh? Fugiendo, huh? Get the word fuga, Fugiendo Okay.

[59:52] So you can see the wills of both the good and the bad, huh? But the one that's wanting, right, wants the good or what appears at least to be good, right? And it flees the bad or what at least what appears to be bad, right?

[1:00:07] Getting up in the morning, so. I get up in the morning because I'm bored if I get. I go read a little Thomas, you know. Fresh the line. Wake up.

[1:00:31] Now, the what actual desire of the good is called what Voluntas, huh? According as it names an act of the will, right, huh? For now, in this way, we are speaking about what Voluntate, right, huh? But the flight from the bad is more said to be what nolente. Yeah, nolente, huh? Said no word for me. Yeah.

[1:00:59] Whence, just as volentes is of the good, so nolentes of the what? Yeah. And Thomas made up that word. So if you compare that to the mind now, can can the mind know the true?

[1:01:25] But can the mind know the false? Well, if I know the false is false, then that would be true, right? The false is false. But could I know, for example, that two is half of five? Could you know that?

[1:01:47] You might think that two is half of five, but could you know that two is half of five? Yeah, yeah. But you might think that you think. Yeah. Being in error. But then I'd be mistaken, mostly. That's what this saying that I used before, that when we learned years ago in studying about knowledge and saying the only thing worse than ignorance is error. So somebody I forget who it was said it said men don't get into trouble so much by the things that they don't know, but the things that they know that ain't so.

[1:02:24] Not to the second it should be said, huh? That the rational power does not have itself towards what pursuing any opposites whatsoever, right? But to those which are contained under its what suitable object, huh? For no power pursues except something what. Fitting itself. Yeah, an object that's suitable or fitting, convenience.

[1:03:13] Actually, convenience what etymologically means coming what. Coming together. Together, yeah, yeah, fits, comes together. Harmony. But the object of the will is the what? Good. Good, huh? Whence

[1:03:31] the will has itself to what pursuing those opposites, huh? Which are what comprehended under good. Just as to move and to what rest, to speak and to be sound, huh? And scriptures say there's time to talk and time not to talk, and others of this sort, huh? But in both of these, the will is born towards it under the what. Under the Good. Yeah. Yeah.

[1:04:10] So my will can choose to speak or to be silent, right? Bring into court, you can speak or be silent, right? Forever hold your peace. Yeah, yeah. Speak now or forever.

[1:04:32] Should I reveal what I know or not, huh? Father Hardin says. one, of the many, many times, One of the most important uses of your will is to direct your mind what to think about, because you are going to think about what you want to think about, and you are not going to think about what you don't want to think about. He says, "Train your will in that way to direct your thoughts."

[1:04:57] If I knew a man had been unfaithful to his wife, would I tell the wife, or would I choose not to tell her? Yeah, see, but see, might say it's being good, right? Better you know.

[1:05:14] If someone is asking you a recommendation about somebody, right, you might have to on that particular man, but he might have to reveal something of his lack of qualifications for the position, right? Yeah. Get

[1:05:44] to the third now. About the connection between the being and the what? Good, chair convertible, right? To the third, it should be said that that which is not a being in veram naturam right? Reality? Reality is taken as a being in what reason? Whence negations and lacks are said to be what beings of reason, right? Huh?

[1:06:19] So to be ignorant is that to be? Is that a being of verum natura, as he says, or in patiuni? No, that's being in reality. Being,

[1:06:39] oh, it's a lack. I am sorry, it's a lack. It's being a reason. People exist in reality. We're ignorant of that. To which way and which way future things, in so far as they are what apprehended, are beings, right? They're beings of what in reason, right? Huh? So dinner tonight, if you know what's going to be for dinner tonight, that can exist in your mind, right? But doesn't exist yet, reality.

[1:07:14] Insofar, therefore, as this kind of being are what? Yeah, and thus the will tends what towards them, right? Huh? Hence, the philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics that the lack of evil has the notion of what? Good, something good, right? Huh? Okay. Had a car, there mystery or something like that, right? Huh? That was good. That was good. Say, Bonaventure says about the saints in heaven, they think about hell because they consider what they really deserved and what God was kind enough to give them, so it doubles their joy.

[1:08:00] Hmm. Yeah, I guess the saints in heaven will still be humble, right? Huh? They'll still be virtuous. Heaven, I would think. Yeah, they still fear God. Yeah, yeah. Fear the Lord and endure forever. Huh.

[1:08:15] It's not a fear of being punished at this point, right? That's what it says in the Psalm: "Fear the Lord is holy, Mm-hmm. Enduring forever." Yeah. That's good. That's good. It's helping us, too, in a moment, to write a master's thesis on fear. All these things like that. Okay.

[1:08:43] Take a little break here now before we go to article two.