Prima Secundae
32. Does the Will Want the End Only, or the Means Too? One Act or Two? (Q.8 aa.2–3)
Class of 2011-10-13
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/032-does-the-will-want-the-end-only-or-the-means-too-one-act/

[0:00] To the second one proceeds thus: It seems that voluntas, I don't know exactly the best way to translate voluntas, but it's got the same name as the what act of the will, as the will itself does, right? So,

[0:17] just like understanding the fundamental act, there reasons, same name as the power sometimes. So it seems that voluntas, willing, is not of those things which are to the end, but only of the what end. For the philosopher in the third book of the ethics says that the will is voluntas is of the end, choice, electio, of those things which are what

[0:47] to the end, right? Moreover, for those things which are diverse in genus, diverse powers of the soul are ordered, as is said in the sixth book of the ethics. But the end and those things which are for the end are in a diverse genus of good. For the end, which is the what honest good or the delectabile, the pleasant one, is in the genus of quality or of action or passion.

[1:23] But the useful is in the what ad aliquid huh? As is said in one ethic or, if the will is of the end, it will not be of those which are for the end.

[1:40] Moreover, habits are proportioned to powers, since they are their perfections. But in the habits which are called the operative arts, um, other is the one that is ordered to the end, and the other that is towards the end. Just as to the the sailor of the boat, right, the gubernatore, pertains the use of the ship, which is its end, but to another art pertains the making of ships, right, the construction of ship, which is the called the end.

[2:12] Therefore, since the wills the of the end, it will not be of those things which are towards the end. But against this is because in natural things, through the same power, something goes through the what middle and arrives at the end. So the stone, right? The same thing goes falling and arrives at the end. But those things which are for the end are certain means by which one arrives at the end, as to a term.

[2:51] Therefore, if the wills of the end is also those things which towards the end, some nice argument fight like this there, huh? Now Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that the will is sometimes voluntas, the word voluntas, huh? Sometimes the power itself is called right, the voluntas. Power by which we will. Right. Sometimes the act of the will itself. If, therefore, we speak of the will according as it names a power, thus it extends both to the end and to that which is to the end.

[3:35] For to those things a power extends; each power extends itself, in which to all those things in which can be found in any way whatsoever the notion or the definition of its object, just as sight extends itself to all things that partake in any way whatsoever of color. Right. But the notion of the good, which is the object of the power of the will, is found not only in the end, but also in those things which are what towards the end, huh?

[4:11] Okay. But that's not, of course, the sense which we're concerned with primarily. This article, right? If, however, we speak of voluntate according as it names properly an act, thus properly speaking, it is of the end only. Right. For every act named from the power itself names a simple act of that what power. right. Just as intelligere names a simple act of the what understanding.

[4:45] So what's his name? The philosopher has a book on the human understanding, right? That names the power, right? Human. Yeah. Or Locke. Locke. But that also is what the name of an act, right? Understanding. But it names the simplest act of that power.

[5:12] But that is a simple act of the power in which it what. By itself. Such the object of the power. But that which is good for itself, right, and willed is always the end, right? Whence will is property of the end, right? Huh. But those things which are towards the end are not good or willed on account of themselves, but in order to the end, right?

[5:47] I get up in the morning and I open the box and there should be three pills in there. I open it and I say, "Hey, there's four pills in there. What's that doing? Four pills in there? I must have dropped two of one kind in there, you know. Yeah, I got to make sure I get the, you know. I don't have double the same, so I think I think I eliminated the proper one, but a little bit.

[6:09] Do we would have eliminated that problem if you had been bumped off at seventy? Yeah, that would have solved all my problems. So not will and come themselves, but from order to the end, right? Whence the will is not born towards them, except in so far as it is born towards the end. Whence what it wills in them is the end, right? I wonder why I will to take my pill, right?

[6:41] I was building health, right? Yes, it must be. Or preservation of my health, I guess. Preservation of my life. Or pretending you're healthy. Yeah, preservation of my life that way, yeah, yeah. I don't have to be healthy, but keeping me alive, I guess. I don't know.

[7:02] Just as to understand properly is those things which are what known secundum se by themselves, to wit, the what the beginnings, right? But of those things which are known through principia, there is not said to be what understanding, except in so far as they are considered.

[7:29] Except in so far as what. Beginnings are considered in them I guess. The principles themselves are considered in them, right? And this is the famous proportion of Aristotle. For just as the end has itself in what desirable things has the beginning in what understandable things, right? This is said in the seventh book of the what ethics, right? That's a famous proportion Aristotle has. So just as one's mind is setting the principles from that to set the conclusions later on, right?

[8:03] So because when desire is the end, then when it comes to desire, the what because of that what is for the end, right? So sometimes when they speak of the end, the principles, they'll say that it's one thing to come from the what principles to the conclusion, another thing to see the conclusion in the principles, right? That's kind of the circle in analysis that they'll talk about sometimes.

[8:38] So the mind begins knowing the principles, but doesn't know what follows from them, right? And then it moves from the principles to the conclusion, and then it what comes back, right? That's that's why Aristotle's books are called the what prior and posterior analytics, right? Because completion is to go back to the beginning and see it in the beginning, huh?

[9:05] I think that's the way that St. Bonaventure, the mind's journey to God. He says, "You see, become the reason from the effect, the cause, and then you'll see the cause in the effect." So you sort of, in some way, come back to. I guess the more perfect is you see. He says, "Through" is the word he uses for. Yeah. It flows up a little. Through. Yeah. And then in is the more perfect.

[9:35] Yeah. But I see all these conclusions on God when I see him face to face, right? Or if you don't see them, the angels point them out to you. They certainly will. Yes.

[9:52] You wonder what kind of conversation there would be in heaven, right? You'd be so absorbed in God, you're not going to go and talk to somebody else, you know. That's what somebody asked me the other day. Will we have time to read when we're in heaven? I said, just imagine yourself face to face with God. The first moment you see him, you can pull out St. Thomas and read about the beatific vision.

[10:13] No, I don't think so. So you know, Thomas is not simply denying altogether, is it here? huh? Because he he says that the will is not born towards the the means, except in so far as it's born towards the end.

[10:40] So if I'm willing, what, to taking a medicine to preserve my health or something, right? Then I'm willing the medicine in so far as I'm willing the the end, right? So it seems to be admitting, right? In that way that it can be both, right? But not simply or properly by itself.

[11:05] So the first thing then the text from the philosopher he says speaks of the will, according as it properly names a simple act of the will, right? Not however as it names a what power.

[11:20] That's funny he says that. See that now. But Aristotle denying that the other probably is, but it's interesting, curious that he just says only that.

[11:45] Reading Thomas there, and you go from Thomas's commentary, which is based on the Latin text he has, and sometimes you go to the Greek of Aristotle, and it's not exactly translated, you know, correctly, you know.

[11:58] In the very beginning of the of the metaphysics there, the first thing is, usually translated in English, all men by nature desire to what know. And what is the word to know there in the Greek?

[12:16] No, no. And in in Thomas's translation there, one that he uses, it says all men by nature desire to what? scire. Yeah, which could mean to know, but it's to have put the word scire there, right? Rather, but the Greek word is eidenai, which would mean to see, to understand, right? So really, really, there seems to be the correct translation. That first sentence is all men by birth want to understand, right?

[12:54] So Thomas doesn't have the word for understand, but this word scire, which is more tied up with something that comes after understanding, right? This is more to To know the conclusion, right? And it's interesting, Townsend. Commentary there, he says, "Well, that's because they want to understand, you know." So this is going back to Aristotle has, but doesn't have it in his translation,

[13:21] right? So is that is to know in this sense? He says, "He now says, if I just heard you correctly, the reason why we want to know is so that we might understand." No, that falls upon to understand, right? Upon to understand, yeah. In other words, it's more fundamental to understand, right? And so he's kind of, you know, I was correcting in a sense, you know, getting back to Aristotle's word without having a translation, you know.

[13:53] But again, he has a famous comparison there, where he says that the philomythos, right, is in a way a philosopher, right? Because philosophy begins in wonder, and the the lover of fiction, the lover of plots, right, the lover of myths, is is moved with a certain wonder reading these stories, right?

[14:21] But the Latin translation has the the philosopher is in a way a philomythos, see? And I think the Greek is saying that the philomythos is in a way a philosopher. In other words, it's not that the philosopher is in a way, you know, but a perfectly philomythos But the philomythos, in a sense, is what something like the philosopher has something of the philosopher's character, right? And therefore, we used to say, you know, when I was in college, you know, that

[14:57] to read literature, in a sense, for some people is is a dead end; you don't go beyond that to philosophy, right? And so it's kind of that they it's kind of a substitute for philosophy, right?

[15:10] And it's more interesting to think about God than to think about, you know, whodunit, you know, and stories like that. But if you are not capable of thinking about God, you might find this is a nice substitute, right? Aristotle is making that point, right? And and there's a famous text Monsignor Dionne pointed out there from Albert the Great, right, where he says, "Poetry dat modum admirandi, it teaches us how to wonder, right."

[15:39] In other words, it's from reading Homer that the Greeks learned how to wonder, and that kind of was a stepping stone to the wonder of the what philosopher, yeah. But but the text has it reversed, right?

[15:56] And the the article goes with what the philomythos right? huh? Well philomythos is in the way a philosopher, right? And we said in the beginning of John's Gospel, how do you translate that? In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God. And the Greek seems to say, "And the Word was God." Kai theos ēn ho logos But in Thomas's Latin translation, there, and God was the Word.

[16:24] Maybe there's no article there, you know. Yeah. If you had the article, you might see that maybe the subject of the sentence is, yeah, is the Word, right? I was going to start with that because I'm thinking about again, I'm going to say John's Gospel, right? And then, and then here, right? Thomas's Latin text has got the, and the philosopher is in a way a Philomythos and it should be the reverse, I think.

[16:50] And both, if you got the article, you know, with the, that should be the subject. So you'd say ho philomythos the philomythos is in a way a philosopher, right? Because he is a certain wonder, a philosopher, right? But not fully developed, right? You know. Just reading an essay by Flannery O'Connor on teaching literature. Yeah. She makes she makes this point, but it's kind of a critique of the poverty of the instructors of English literature.

[17:24] That mostly she says they'll do anything to teach literature. They teach sociology, they teach history, they teach all kinds of things that are interesting, but they're not literature. Well, in my own development, there, you know, thinking back upon it, it led to these words of Albert the Great, poetry doc modum admirandi, right? Huh? See, my brother Richard had it. We all had in those old days, you know, but he before me because he's four years older.

[17:50] And the basebooks of Aristotle, right? You know, the Oxford translation. But I mean, what's there? And I remember looking up, looking at the piece of works of Aristotle. The only thing that caught my attention was this book called *The Politics*, right? I was interested in political things at the time, you know, this time the Carthier and so on, right? And these things, you know. And then, when I was a freshman in college, huh?

[18:16] I had to take an English course, but I knew my grammar and such stuff, so they put me in a special English class, right? And among other things, our professor said, "We're going to read some plays of Shakespeare. You probably did read in high school, right? " And so this was the occasion for me to get a complete volume of Shakespeare's plays, right? And that first year in college, on my own, I read not just the plays we read for that class, but all Shakespeare's plays, right?

[18:42] Which I continued to read over and over again, nauseum. Every time I'd use bookshop, I'd come out with an edition of Shakespeare. I said, "What? You've got that play already? You know, four or five editions of the same play, you know? " And so when I get cut off in Twelfth Night, you know, we didn't. Four or five editions I have, and if I find one that's a nice looking edition, you know, it's still nice to read the play.

[19:08] Yeah, you know, again and so on. And if I I'll attach that bishop there, isn't that as I mentioned? But at that time, I turned from a practical philosopher, you might say, right? I went looked at the politics first, but then led me to the ethics, right, which is kind of an introduction to life and reason. But then from then on, I was more a looking philosopher than a practical philosopher, right?

[19:39] And there are things that probably affected this, you know, but, when I taught St. Mary's and I taught Assumption. Sorry, people were very much into teaching the ethics courses and so on, right? But I think that that wonder that I got from reading Shakespeare's plays maybe disposed me for the wonder of the looking philosopher, right? And therefore, it's this example. What the great Albert the Great was talking about, right?

[20:03] The doctrine of the magnum opus, right? But that's why we used to, you know, think. And I think Monty would damn agree with us, you know, that there'd been no Homer, there would have been no philosophers, right? That Homer was necessary, right? The wonder that Homer's Iliad or Odyssey arouses was the stepping stone to the wonder of the what philosopher, right? They couldn't have gotten to that wonder without that.

[20:36] Particularly, you know, the time when Einstein invented his great theories, the fiction he was reading at the time. Some interesting remarks, you know, about Sherlock Holmes. He married this admirable story, you know. So, no second objection to those things which are what diverse in genus, in genera, ex aequo se habentium, having themselves what equally are ordered diverse what powers, right? Just as sound and color are diverse genera of sensible things, and so by different senses, you know what.

[21:51] Yeah, you have a different senses, have a different powers. You know, color and sound, right? But notice they're diverse genera, ex aequo se habentia right?

[22:05] Is color more a sensible thing than sound? No, ex aequo huh, dividing sensible, right? Then the taste is something, and the smell of something would be another ex equo, right? Mm-hmm. Okay.

[22:22] But utile, the useful and the honestum, right? It's always a question how you translate honestum on, honorable good, right? But means the thing that's good in itself, right? But utile et honestum non ex aequo se habent, right? It's not as we're univocal, right?

[22:44] Um but secundum, but s as what? Say, what does secundum say? As such, and what is what to another, right? What is through itself, and what is through another, right?

[22:59] And things of this sort are always referred to the same power, right? Just as through the seeing power one senses at both color and light, to which color is what seen, right?

[23:18] The same we said about reason, right? Could there be one power that knows the axioms, the principles, the beginnings, another one that knows the conclusions?

[23:30] Well, they're not known ex aequo, are they? Because the beginnings are known to themselves, and the conclusions are known to the beginnings, right? So they can't be what pertain to different powers, right? So it must be the same power that knows the beginnings and knows the conclusions through the beginnings, right? There, if you see the exactness of Aristotle's analogy, right, or proportion, right, must be the same power that what wants health and wants medicine for the the health, right?

[24:08] But you can't want what is for the end without find the end, right? It's got to be the same power that wants both, right? Maybe by different acts in some cases, right?

[24:36] Now, what about diverse habits and diverse what powers, huh? Let's go back and see what the objection was exactly. Habits are proportioned to powers, right? Is their perfections, but in habits there are different arts that have pertained to the end, what is for the end, right? So he says to the third, it should be said that not whatever diversifies a habit diversifies the what power, right? What might diversify habits might not diversify what powers, right?

[25:15] For habits are certain determinations of powers to some special acts. So Aristotle has a different habit for the beginnings. He calls nous, intellectus in Latin, right? I I call natural understanding, right? And then what this reasoned out understanding, which is episteme or scientia, right? They're different powers, right?

[25:45] They don't pertain to different. I mean, different habits, rather, but they're not different powers, right? But nevertheless, he says there is some operative art that considers what. The end. Yeah, and that which is towards the end, or each operative art considers both the end and that which is for the end, right? For the the the, uh, yeah, the governing art, huh? You know, how Peter's always comparing the head of the ship, you know, you don't point anybody to be the head of the ship, the guy who has the knowledge, right?

[26:26] You don't just put anybody, just anybody at the head of the of the thing, like Barack Obama. For the ruling art, considers the end as what what it is is doing or about, but that which is towards the end is what it what commands, right?

[26:50] Why the ship making art considers that which is what towards the end as what it does, right? But that which is the end is that to which it orders what it does, huh? And again, in each operative art, there is its own end, and also what is towards the end, which properly pertains to that art, right? Okay.

[27:20] So he's saying that what may be sufficient to distinguish habits is not sufficient to distinguish powers, right? Just like geometry and arithmetic, geometry and natural philosophy, right? Different habits, right? But not different what minds, huh? He said in a faculty meeting, you might think they are different minds. That's a bit of an exaggeration, huh?

[27:50] So Aristotle had the best balanced mind in history, I think. Does anatomy? He does. Yeah. Historical research, you know, does logic. He does very concrete things and very abstract things, you might say, and does them all. Is there any evidence he did something in between? Like, did he write poetry There, are some things, he has set up, you know that are lost, yeah. It's like Thomas is something, of, a poet there they say in that maybe the prayers he writes.

[28:33] To. The third one proceeds thus: It seems that by the same act the will is born towards the end, and in that which is towards the end, right? Because according to the philosopher, where there is one for the sake of another, there is one only.

[29:00] It's got to be interesting, huh? That's from my book of the topics, huh? But the will does not wish that which is for the end to the end, except on account of the end, huh? Therefore, by the same act, it is moved what? To both, huh?

[29:24] Moreover, the end is the reason for willing those things which are for the sake of the end, just as light is the reason for the seeing of color. But by the same act, is seen both light and color. Therefore, the same is the motion of the will by which it wills the end and those things which are what towards the end, huh?

[29:51] Moreover, the same in number is the natural motion which is through the middles to the what? Last to the end. But those which are towards the end are compared to the end as middles to the last. Therefore, the same motion, the will. Therefore, there is the same motion, the will, by which the will is born towards the end, and in those which are to the end. Yeah, I got I got a good theological argument to add to that.

[30:22] At least appearing to be the case, and that is Pius IX when he defined the Immaculate Conception said it was one in the same decree of God's will of the will of the incarnation and his mother. Because that's kind of the end and the means. Yeah, yeah. So it seems. Yeah. But against this is that the acts are diversified by their objects. But those are diverse species of the good, the end, and that which is what useful for the end, which is called utile.

[30:54] Therefore, not by the same act is the will born towards what both, huh? I answer: It should be said that since the end is willed by itself, right?

[31:14] But that which is for the end, as such, is not willed except on account of the end. It is manifest that the will can be born towards the end without this that be born in those things which are what towards the end, huh? Okay.

[31:36] It is possible for me to want to be healthy without wanting to take medicine. Okay. But in those things which are for the end, as such, one the will cannot be born unless it be born at the same time towards the what? The end itself. Thus, therefore, the will is born towards the end in two ways. In one way, absolutely by itself, right? Huh. Another way, as the reason for willing those things that are what?

[32:19] Towards the end, huh? Just like the reason can what? Can see the beginning by itself, right? And as the reason for the conclusion. It is manifest, therefore, that one and the same. Same motion of the will Yeah.

[32:49] Therefore, it is manifest, therefore, that one and the same is the motion of the will by which it is what born towards the end, according as it is the reason for willing those things which are for the end, right? And in those things which are for the end, right.

[33:10] But another is the act by which is born in the end or towards the end, absolutely, right? Huh. And sometimes this precedes what? In time, huh? As when someone wills what? Health, right? And afterwards, deliberating in what way he can be what? Healed. Healed. He wishes to what? go to a medic, go to a physician. They might be healed, yeah. I don't know. Is that medicus of the man?

[33:44] I guess. I think so. Yeah. Just as also happens about the understanding, for first one understands the beginnings by themselves. Afterwards, one understands them in the what conclusions? According as one has sensed the conclusion on account of the beginnings, huh?

[34:08] So he's saying that the will can be moved towards the end, absolutely by itself, right? And then it can be moved towards the end as the reason for willing the means, and then by the same what? Act, yeah. So I guess that's what Pisite was referring to. Mhm. Of course, in the case of God, it can't be any what? Multiplicity of acts, right? Right. So He can will us only in so far as He wills Himself.

[34:42] And he's willing himself as, what? As the end of creation. That's one of the sayings I like from St Bonaventure is God is the beginning precisely because He's the beginning of all things precisely because He's the end. It's interesting, though, where in the Apocalypse there where he said "I'm the alpha and the omega, right? And then he says sometimes the first and the last. He adds that, and then the beginning and the end, right?

[35:17] Huh? Well, we understand the beginning there as meaning the what mover or maker, right? Well, when you go back to Aristotle, and when Thomas is talking a lot of times, Aristotle says in these signs which there are beginnings, causes, or elements, right? Thomas has to stop and explain what that means: beginnings, causes, and elements. And sometimes he takes it, you know, in the way Aristotle does in the fifth book of Wisdom, where beginning is more general than cause.

[35:51] So every cause is a beginning, but not every beginning is a cause, and cause is more general than element, right? Every element is a cause, like in the line of material cause, but not every cause is an element, right? But then he gives another explanation of it, you know, where elements is what kind of taken as a synonym for the material cause, and beginning for the mover or maker, and then causes for the form and the end, right?

[36:20] Okay. So it's a way in which Aristotle sometimes uses the word "beginning" to mean not just any beginning, not just any cause, but the the mover or maker, and that must be the way it's being understood in the what Apocalypse, right? You don't you don't mean God as a beginning, like a point as beginning. You don't mean as a beginning, like like matter as a beginning of many things, right?

[36:46] Or even the intrinsic form of thing, but in the sense of the mover maker, right? So Thomas has stopped in the beginning of the commentary on the Physics, right? Where he explains that, explains it elsewhere. I can see kind of the use of the word "arche," which is the word being used there in the in Apocalypse, right? Kind a little bit of Aristotle and Thomas there to see the appropriateness of the way Scripture is speaking there in the Apocalypse.

[37:26] Okay. Thomas will argue that God doesn't want reason either, right? He sees everything in himself, right? At once. Interesting guy that God, there, you know.

[37:56] Kind of, kind of beautiful there at the beginning of the of the Summa Contra Gentiles. There, where Thomas is talking about the desirability of this knowledge, right? And he says four things. No study, he says, is more what perfect, more sublime, right, more useful, or more delightful. And he backs each up with the reason, you know, and text there. Just most perfect, and he quotes

[38:28] Ecclesiasticus. I think it's Ecclesiasticus, or maybe it's the Book of Wisdom. But blessed is the man. who. Partakes of wisdom, right? Huh. So the man is perfect when he reaches his end. Well, his end is is

[38:47] perfection, right? But then he says sublime because he becomes like God, right? Huh. God who made all things in wisdom, and because likeness is the cause of friendship, then this makes a kind of a friendship between God and man. He quotes scripture saying that, huh? This wisdom, the wise man is what a friend of God, right? And goes on that most useful because the desire for wisdom leads to gratitude and so on.

[39:18] And then there is no boredom or anything like that. He says in this study, right? Even if you have a text there, you know, huh?

[39:27] Thomas must have enjoyed thinking, you know. You remember thinking about about the the lie there, you know, Thomas. One of the brothers says, "There is an elephant in the street." Thomas goes over to look, because there is no elephant there, you know. And they're laughing. Thomas said, "I'd rather believe there was an elephant in the street than that one of my brothers could tell a lie."

[39:57] Something like that. So, quoting Aristotle in that first objection, where there is one on account of another, there there is one only, right? It should be said that that argument or that reason proceeds according as the will is born towards the end, as it is the reason for willing those things that are what. Correct. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Say the same thing about reason there, right? When it's born towards the beginning, as the reason for the conclusion, then by the same act it sees the conclusion and the beginning, right?

[40:51] To the second, it should be said the comparison to color. To the second, it should be said that whenever color is seen, right, by the same act is seen light, right, huh? But nevertheless, light can be what seen without what color being seen, right? Hmm.

[41:14] And likewise, sometimes somebody wishes those things which are what. Towards the end. Yeah. Whenever he wishes that, he wishes in the same act the end, the end, but not over the reverse. That whenever he wills the. Does he will the? Yeah. Yeah. I wonder. I I hadn't heard this before. You can see light without color.

[41:41] That goes back to the De Anima right? He talks about color and light. Yeah, I remember that. That's essential. for the point he's making here, you know.

[42:16] Okay. To the third, it should be said that in the carrying out of a work, those things which are for the end have themselves as what middles, and the end as a what term, right? Whence, just as a natural motion sometimes what stops in the middle and doesn't arrive at the what end, so likewise sometimes someone does something that is for the end, and unless he does not achieve the end, but in willing it is the what reverse.

[42:59] For the will, through the end comes to what willing those things which are for the end, just as the understanding comes to the what conclusions through the beginnings which are called media, middle terms.

[43:21] Whence the understanding sometimes understands the middle, and from it does not proceed to the what conclusion. And you need a teacher, like Euclid there to deduce one. And similarly, the will sometimes wills the end, and there less does not proceed to willing that which is for the end, right? So I ask the students, can you love wisdom without loving logic? Yeah. Yeah. We're we're out of here.

[43:54] Yeah, but maybe it's not until you you see the need for logic, right, huh, that you're going to love logic for the sake of what wisdom, right?

[44:08] Just like St. Thomas says at the beginning of the Book of Psalms, one thing we all have in common is everybody wants to be happy. Two things differ: is the roads we take, and then the ends of those roads, because not everybody's happy in the end. So everybody wants happiness, but I want the path that includes, you know, sex, drugs, and rock and roll. Yeah. Somebody else wants virtue.

[44:31] But Thomas sometimes says virtue is the road to happiness, and vice is the road to misery, right? And so it's good to know what the road to happiness is and what the road to misery is, so you can. Avoid going down that road. Yeah. But you're always reading in every day paper the morning paper. You know, and I didn't look at it very much. But if you look at the morning paper, well, you've got to find many examples.

[44:54] of misery, right? And how about the road to the man take down that road? You know, is your poor adviser. To that which is what objected, in contray, is clear solution to those which things are said above. For utile and honestum are not species of good, ex aequo divisae? Equally divided. But they have themselves as that which is an account of itself, and that which is an account of.

[45:39] For through itself and through another, right? Whence the act of the will in one of them can be born without this that is born towards the other, but the reverse is not possible, right? Okay. The same thing you can say about the mind, right? Can be moved towards the axioms, and without the conclusions, but not vice versa.

[46:06] So maybe you can love wisdom without loving logic, huh? So you can't love logic without loving wisdom. Logic is not for its own sake. Thank God. That always makes me think these. Same thing as what Saint Thomas says about how the angels are purified towards purification, enlightenment, and perfection in terms of communicating knowledge. He says, "Well, how can the angels that see God? I'm going to be purified.

[46:38] " He says, "Well, one way is remove obstacles. That's what happened to us. " But with them, it's kind of like pointing at conclusions. They They see the principle. They see the vision. They may not see all the conclusions and problems. So the higher angels point out. That's the way their mind is, in certain ways, purified. I always talk to my. I learned a little bit of Greek, you know.

[47:00] And so my brother Richard, if he decided that Kasurik would be my adviser, period. And so he had me meet Kasurik before I even got into college. And so I got my courses for my freshman, you know, thing. Kasurik looked at me. Says, "Duane he says, 'Where's your Greek? Why aren't you taking Greek? '" I said, "Greek. " I said, "Well, the other things I'd rather take.

[47:23] " He says, "That's not a reason. " He says. If you're going to study philosophy, said you take Greek. What the hell was I supposed to do? I took Greek, you know, stumbled through Greek, Father Peter, you know, and

[47:39] whatever you know, Greek I know the days. That's Kasturi forced me to take that semester Greek, you know, and then started reading. Aristotle and halfway through in Greek, you know, but it's been very useful to me, you know. Lots of things I know. I'm even correcting a little bit, you know, translations here, you know, reading St. John's Gospel in Greek and so on. So,

[48:02] but I didn't want to take Greek. Probably didn't want to eat your Brussels sprouts either. But I didn't realize how how it was necessary, you know. I certainly did, right? But if I'd realized it was necessary, then I would have wanted philosophy. Would have wanted Greek, yeah. Yeah. That's a good place to stop before you get to the question nine next time, okay?