Prima Secundae
33. Dividing Theology, the End as a Cause, and Whether the Understanding Moves the Will (Question 9, Article 1)
Class of 2011-10-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/033-dividing-theology-the-end-as-a-cause-and-whether-the-understanding/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father and the Son, and the, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand all that you're written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

[0:29] Amen. Before we go into question nine, though, let me just come back to something that I want to want you to see here. Remember the old rule of two or three, or what, or both, right? Okay. And I am going to apply it to theology here, but before I do, just exemplify it a little bit here. Just take the Our Father, right? Okay.

[0:59] You got seven petitions: huh? Hell be thy name, thy kingdom come, and so on. Seven of them. Now, how do you divide the seven into two or three, or would you do it into both of them?

[1:13] Well, sometimes you say people divided into four and what three? Three. And these are all about the good, and these three petitions are about the bad. Right? That's a perfectly good way to divide it, right? Now, Thomas, in in the Summa Theologiae, he divides them into what three?

[1:44] And it would be the end, right? The means to the end, and the impediments to the end, right? So here it's easy to see how these two come together, right? Because in a way, you could say you could divide these two if you wanted to, and subdivide the end into the the good, rather into the end itself and the means to it, right? Like our Lord said, to anybody he says, "Lord, Lord, we'll enter the kingdom, " of God who does the will of my Father in heaven, right?

[2:22] They were asked to be associated with the saints here in heaven. You know, we've done the will of God, right? Come to me, just our our canon says, huh? Okay. Now, there is another, I think, division. There is one that Augustine gives sometimes, where he'll divide these three against these what five,

[2:47] and I think the division is these three here are fully answered only in the next life. So God is not sufficiently honored or praised in this life. The kingdom said doesn't come fully in this life, huh? And when you say they will be done on earth, it is in heaven. You're implying, right? We're trying to do that, but it's not done as well as it's done in heaven, right?

[3:11] Not perfectly. So these are fulfilled only imperfectly in this life, but fully in the next life, right? And these ones here are more or less for this life, right? Okay. So I guess we won't be receiving communion now, right? Things like that, and we won't be sitting there and we'll be temptations, right? And the evil one will be excluded, or so on, okay?

[3:39] So if someone says should you divide these seven into two or three, I'd say both, right? So sometimes they state the rule as the rule of two or three or both, right? Okay. And in this case, you had actually two divisions into two, right? And you don't want to neglect any of these because they all illumine something, right? Okay.

[4:05] Now let's apply this to theology, right? Here's somebody in Rome, Father, right? What part of theology are we in in this course? I say, right? What would they probably say? Moral. Yeah. And they're dividing theology, therefore, into what two? Moral and dogmatic. Yeah. Okay. So this is one way of dividing theology into dogmatic and moral theology, kind of a common thing in seminaries and places that might be you see elsewhere, right?

[4:52] Okay. And sometimes people even, you know, more in this area, more in that area, right? Okay. Now, is there also a division of theology into three?

[5:15] God in Himself, God as the beginning of all things, God as the end. Yeah. As we're told in the Apocalypse, right, where God says, "First, I am the Alpha and Omega," and then He says more precisely, or fully, "I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last." And finally, He says, "I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end," right?

[5:38] Okay. So one part is about God in Himself, right? Another about God as the beginning of things, efficient cause, maker, so on, and then God as the what end? And those are the three that Thomas follows most precisely in the Summa, what? Contra Gentiles okay. So the Summa Contra Gentiles, the first book is about God in Himself, substance of God and the operations of God and so on.

[6:17] The second part is about God as the beginning of the universe, the creation and so on. And the third part is about God as the end, and then his providence, right, moving things towards the end huh Okay. I'm setting aside this other little division there that you have in the Summa Contra Gentiles because he does those three things, insofar as they can be known by natural reason as well as by faith in the first three books.

[6:42] Right. And then the fourth book he does those same three things, right, but in regards to those things like the Trinity and the Incarnation and our final stage, right, which can only be known by faith. Okay. Now he alludes to that in the beginning of the Summa Contra Gentiles Okay. Let's go back now. So this is another way of dividing theology. God in Himself. God

[7:18] as the beginning. And then God as the end, right? Okay. And that's, let's say, most explicitly in the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? Did you see that division?

[7:41] Now, how do you connect these two, right? Because you have the our father. The first two belong to dogmatic, and the third to moral. Yeah, the moral theology, what you have what we call moral theology, is found in the what third part. And notice the moral theology here, which is mainly the second part of the Summa, right? It begins with the consideration of of the end of man, right, which comes under the consideration of God as the end of all things, but especially of the rational creature, right.

[8:22] So it doesn't mean that all of this series is simply moral theology, but it kind of fits in there, right? Now, which division do you think is is being followed here in the Summa Theologiae, right? And Summa Contra Gentiles is very clearly this here, right?

[8:44] Well, the whole of the what second part of the Summa, right, would probably be classified as moral theology, right? By the first part and the third part would be more what? Dogmatic theology, right? Kind of strange, isn't it? I mean, you know. I say I kind of cheated there because the first time we did some things in the prima pars, right? And then we did some things in the third part, right?

[9:15] So you don't have dogmatic theology, showing my immoral bent, you know. But, And then now we're doing a little more theology, but to look at that stuff, so you know. Okay, but I'm not following the order of the summa, right? I'm doing the first to the third before the second, right?

[9:36] Well, how can you get such a kind of screwed up thing? Maybe in terms of dividing theology another way, in terms of divinity. This I was thinking about this today. Divinity and humanity, and under humanity, you say, well, but Christ is the way for us, so that would be morals. Yeah. Yeah, I mean somebody could say in a way that in the first part of the Summa you talk obviously about God Himself, right?

[10:08] You talk about God as the beginning, right? You touch upon anything as the end, but not in so much detail, right? And then you take them up again as the end, in particular for man, right? In beginning the second part and the means to that end, right? And then you can say Christ is the way, the truth, and the life. So He's not only the end, the truth, and the life, but He's the way, right?

[10:31] And the sacraments you can say are what tools to get to the end, right? Not tools to make the universe, tools to get to the end. So it makes some sense to that, right?

[10:45] Although I kind of prefer this division to that. it's more revealing, right? Now, before theology, there's a different division of sacred doctrine, right? Which is intended for all men, right, and not just for the students that are going to go into these things in some great depth, right? And you find that in Augustine's Enchiridion and in Thomas's Catechetical Instructions, right? And there again, sacred doctrine is divided into what?

[11:22] Three. Three, right? But the basis for the three is not this, but it's yeah, faith, hope, and charity, right? So both Augustine and Thomas, according to faith, they take up the creed, right? And then according to hope, they take up the Our Father and sometimes the Hail Mary, but I'm more interested in the Our Father, right? Because prayer is tied up with hope. And then the

[11:55] two commandments of love and the ten commandments are taken up under what charity, right? Now, in terms of this here, the creed is mainly corresponding to what is later on called dogmatic theology, and the obviously the part for the charity corresponds to moral theology, and probably would put also the Our Father there. So Thomas would take up, say, the Our Father there and the treatise on virtue of religion there in the second part of the second part, right?

[12:31] Virtue of religion's primary act is devotion, right? Then it has the act of prayer coming from that, and so. So in a way, we're in moral theology that brings out some things, but also you might say we're kind of a lopsided compared to the Summa Theologica, right? Summa Contra Gentiles right The Summa Contra Gentiles doesn't develop all these details about moral theology, right? It gets some basic things, but it doesn't go into the great depth the second part does, right?

[13:08] So it gets a little bit unbalanced Thomas does mention this division here at the beginning. If you go back to the *female priest, you'll see that division*, there, right? But it's a little bit hard to. That was neatly fitting in in my favorite book, *Summa Contra Gentiles*. So now, I was looking at the. Physics the other day there, and in the first book there, where Thomas is commenting on Aristotle, and Aristotle recalls the distinction of the four kinds of causes, right?

[13:47] And he kind of briefly describes the four kinds of causes. And he notes that Aristotle, when he comes to talk about the fourth kind of cause, which is called the telos, right, Greek, or the end, he notes that Aristotle in the text there, he explains

[14:09] the end by saying three things about it. He contrasted with the third kind of cause, the mover or maker, is at the beginning of something, right? And the end is at the what? The end of things, right? It's last, huh?

[14:32] So I'm the cook tonight, let's say, right? So I get together all my ingredients and so on, and then I start to work at it, and finally, at the end, I've got this beautiful meal. See, that was the end, that was the goal of all my activity, right? So I, the third kind of cause, the mover or maker, right? I'm at the beginning of this, right? This wonderful meal, waiting for its very eating of it, is at the end, even in time.

[15:00] Okay. That's one way he notifies this cause, right? But then the second thing he does is that this kind of cause is that for the sake of which, hou heneka in Greek, right? Huius gratia, right? I guess I say in Latin, right? In English, we usually say that for the sake of which, huh? But Thomas notes that in this second notification of this cause,

[15:36] the end is not said to be what last, but to be first. The last shall be first, and the first shall be last. That's a little different one from what our Lord was talking about, but it's interesting, right? And how can it be last and first, right? What's last in time or last in being, right? At least these kinds of ends that we're familiar with, huh? But it's first in what intention.

[16:08] You know how important it's to look before and after, as Shakespeare taught us, right? Okay. And then the third thing he says is that the end is something what good, right? Or at least it appears to be good, right? But first of all, it's something what good, right? Because the apparent good is only moving people insofar as it resembles or has some element of what's really good, huh?

[16:39] I'm kind of struck by that because when we take up the word cause more formally or fully in the fifth book, it's taken up under the word beginning, right? And as Aristotle points out, every cause is a beginning. Not every beginning is a cause, but every cause is a beginning. And he defines beginning as what's first in being or becoming or knowing. So the idea of being a beginning is to be first.

[17:07] And so the end, as a cause, has got to be in some way first, right? So that first notification Aristotle gives that it's at the end, which the word itself indicates. I mean, the word end, right? Doesn't seem to fit it as a cause, right? But that second thing he says—that's that for the sake of which, where it is first, not in time or being, but always first in intention—that's the definition of this as a kind of cause, right?

[17:43] But it's interesting that the word that we, the common or basic word we use for that is "end," which touches upon it's being last, not first.

[17:55] Now, of course, the word "end" has got other meanings, huh? And I used to, you know, my talk in college there to students about this. I always say, you know, happiness is the end of life. The end of life is death. Therefore, happiness is death.

[18:14] Get the idea that the word "end" has got more than one meaning, right? And so you got to distinguish the sense in which it is a cause, right?

[18:31] Aristotle kind of plays on that, right, in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, right? What's last is not always the end in the sense of that for the sake of which you're cooking meat. There, you got burnt meat. Is that the end? You're that for the sake of which you you're doing it? No.

[18:53] I notice there's another word that I use in English sometimes. I'm trying to explain that the meaning of "end" when I say "end" is a cause is the meaning of "end" that is a purpose, right? And I think the etymology of purpose actually is put forward or put before, right? So the word purpose fits more end in so far as it's first in what intention, huh? But yet it's not the the basic word we use here, which is which is end, right?

[19:26] And I suppose it's more known to us that the end, even that kind of cause, is last in time. Than the way in which it's what first intention. What does that mean? You know, it's a little more hidden to us, right?

[19:46] To our senses, right? We see that the the meal, the cooked meat, or the the eating of it, right, comes last in time, right?

[19:56] Things in motion sort of catch the eye, as Shakespeare said, right? So that first meaning of end is end of the table, then end of the motion, right? It's not until the third sense that we have the sense of that for the sake of which, right? So we take the the word that starts with something more known to us to name this kind of cause, even though it doesn't really name it so much insofar as it's a cause or a beginning, right?

[20:23] Like the word purpose does. That's a little more, you know. Could we have a hard time knowing what's meant by purpose than by end, right? It's the end of the playlist time now, right? Coming in, right? The end of school. Well, yeah, that might be good, yeah. The end of school. recess Yeah. but I say you you know stop playing. You got to come in now, right?

[20:48] My father's father was a tough man, and he said, "Come in. You could be up at bat, and you would drop the bat and come in." He was a boxer, you know.

[21:00] Yeah, But that sense of end is more known, right? Yeah, purpose. That's kind of you know, metaphysical they say nowadays, you know. It's it's more known how what the result of your action was than whether you intended or not, right? A lot of times you don't intend what is the result of our what actions, right? A few times weaving around cars, right, to get ahead there, right, not to cause an accident, but it's often the result of their action.

[21:46] Okay, question nine here. What moves the will, right? huh That's a good question, right? Then one ought to consider about the mover of the will.

[22:04] I think it's better to translate that way than to say motive, because then you're talking about the end again, right? And about this six things are asked: whether the will is moved by the understanding;

[22:21] secondly, whether it is moved by sense desire, power sense desire; thirdly, whether the will moves itself. Didn't we say in natural philosophy that nothing moves itself, right? Does the will move itself? Curious to see what he's going to say about that.

[22:50] Now those three are all inside of us, right? And the will, of course, and the sense desire, and the understanding, right? And now the next three articles, if I get to two, right, are dealing with exterior things. Whether it is moved by some exterior what? Beginning. Whether it is moved by the celestial body?

[23:15] Have any bodies? So Shakespeare's plays, you have these people thinking that they're influenced by the stars. They wandered too close to the earth or something, right? And led to these terrible disasters and these families and so on. That Romeo Juliet, the star

[23:36] crossed lovers. Yeah. Doesn't Shakespeare necessarily believe these things, right? And whether the will is moved by God alone, as by an exterior what principle, right?

[23:53] Exterior principle, but it's an interior principle too. Okay. To the first, therefore, one proceeds thus: it seems that the will is not moved by the what understanding, right?

[24:14] For Augustine says upon that verse of Psalm 118, "My soul what wants to desire what the justifications? The understanding what flies before, I guess, before what? And there follows a slow or no affection, huh? We know the good, nor does it delight to do it, huh? Augustine must know, right?

[24:53] Not quite yet, he says, huh? Give me grace but. But this would not be if the will was moved by the understanding, right? Because the motion of the movable thing follows the motion of the mover.

[25:14] Therefore, the understanding does not move the will. huh? Something doesn't move it, the way I move this glass here, right? Moreover, the understanding has itself to the will as showing to it what is desirable, just as the imagination demonstrates what is desirable to the sense desire. But the imagination, demonstrating the desirable, does not move the what sense appetite, huh?

[25:54] Nay, rather, sometimes we have ourselves to those things which we imagine, just as to those things that are shown to us in a picture,

[26:05] from which we are not moved, as is said in the book about the soul, right? Now there you get some stuff in the Diano, right? That's where the objection comes from, right?

[26:20] Moreover, the same with regard to the same thing is not mover and moved, but the will moves the understanding, for we understand when we what will. And I'm myself a philosopher, which is a lover of wisdom, right? So that love is a what mover, and it's an act of my will, right?

[26:46] It's making me turn over these pages. Turn over thoughts. Therefore, the understanding does not move the will, right? Kind of strange, huh? I like husband and wife, huh? Where the husband moves the wife to do some things, but the wife moves the husband to do to do some things too, huh? Yeah. You had this this Chesterton impersonated. I tell you about him. We went to the the pro life dinner there, you know, and the you see him on stage on EDTN, you know, and this guy impersonates a number of people, I guess, but one of them is Chesterton, you know.

[27:38] He was the speaker, right? So he came in with this key and all this thing up there, you know, and so on. But he was talking about marriage, you know, and divorce and so on. And I think he was going to use a line that I'd heard Chesterton said, you know, that. It's stupid, you know, to give incompatibility as a reason for divorce. You said, "For men and women are essentially incompatible."

[28:04] But he's kind of touching a part anyway, you know. And Meggs just said, "Now what you got to know is that a man is a selfish beast, right?" And because women nod their heads, yeah, that's exactly what the man is. That's the way they look about the man, anyway. And and why, to a man, a woman seems to be madly, irascibly sensitive, right? You know, beyond me.

[28:35] Warren Murray is telling me this one right here, where someone said, "A man difference is this: a man will spend two dollars for a one dollar thing he needs. A woman will pay one dollar for a two dollar thing she doesn't need."

[28:50] A lot of truth to that, you know. You go to the Christmas tree store. Don't you love a bargain? This is obviously directly the French women you know. They can't resist a bargain, you know, whether they need it, you know, huh? And we go in the supermarkets, you know, and it's a good price, and the meat because you'll buy it, you know, huh? Get the icebox getting filled up, you know, the refrigerator getting filled up.

[29:09] There's more room in here, you know. It's just a good price, you know. If I go into a store, and maybe see, maybe the bottle of wine is a dollar cheaper somewhere else, I'm going to run down some other place, you know. I need this bottle enough. No, I've got to go drive to this store, and that store, you know, just to save a dollar, apart from the gas.

[29:41] but against this is what the philosopher himself says in the third book about the soul, that the what desirable understood is the non unmoved mover, right? The will is the what move mover, right?

[30:07] I answer: It should be said, to that extent, something needs to be moved by another, in so far as it is in potency or ability to more than one thing, right?

[30:22] For it is necessary that that which is in potency be brought down to act through something that is already an act, and this is to move it, huh?

[30:37] But there's found a what two ways, huh? Some power the soul is found to be in power to what on ability. Potency to diverse things. In one way, as regards to do or not to do, that is the question: to do it or not to do it, right?

[31:02] In other ways, as regards to do doing this or that, just as sight sometimes sees an act and sometimes does not see, right? And sometimes it sees the white and sometimes it sees the what black, right?

[31:24] Therefore, one needs a mover as regards to things, either as regards the what exercise of the act itself or the use of the act. That's excuse me, that's one. There, just giving another way of saying it. And as regards to the determination of the act, okay, like is it black or white, right? So should I eat now or not eat? Now that's. One thing, right? And should I eat, you know, something sweet or something bitter?

[31:58] Again, bitter sweet chocolate or? C decisions, yeah. Okay. Salmon. Yeah, don't eat salmon. No, no, no. No question about that. I'm determined not to eat? it. There's no choice. I thought somebody's house would be serving it, Oh, it's a terrible. experience. Of which the first is on the side of the subject that sometimes is found acting and sometimes what not acting. Another is on the side of the object by which the act is what specified.

[32:47] Now the movement of the subject is from some what agent, right? And when and since every agent acts an account of some end, as has been shown above, the beginning of this motion is from the end, huh? And hence it is that the art to which pertains the end moves by its command the art to which pertains that which is to the end, as the what ship governing

[33:26] commands the making of the ship, right? As is said in the second book of the physics. We're talking about that before class, right? I was saying Heraclitus is a double comparison there. He says that the art that uses the product commands the art that forms the product, and the art that forms the product commands the art that what prepares the matter, right? Huh? So my father's company they would make farm machinery and farm wagons and things of that sort, right?

[33:55] Huh? And but they had an experimental farm where they would go out and test these things, right? And so in the use of these things, you'd see that maybe there's a defect, and then you have to what redesign the product, right? Huh? So the art that uses it, the farmer's art, you might say, commands the art that forms the product, right? And my father's engineer would say to me, you know, we got some interesting ideas, he says, but now we're going to find out if they're any good because they'd make something according to this and then take it out and experiment with it, right, and see if it develops certain problems, right, in use, huh?

[34:33] So that art is commanding the art that forms the product, which is my father's art, there, company's art, but they command now the wood or the steel or the size of the steel, the shape of the steel that they want to be delivered from the steel company or from the lumberyard, right? Huh? Because they know what they Need right, huh? And my father knew that you had to have you know steels that wouldn't snap when he gets out in the farming, right?

[35:00] Because the cheap products, you know, that were equal to the grain king. There's this name, my father's wagon's grain king, huh? They're the best wagons made in Minnesota, right? So when farmers were out in the field there and they had some cheaper wagon, you know, and it snapped, it's come down, at his hill, and said, who makes a good wagon? They said to my father, right? We're out in Machinery Hill one day and the Minnesota State Fair, you know, and there's you know farm companies there, and the one next to my father gets a young girl in a low cut dress and so on.

[35:34] My father's laughing and says they go in there to see the girl, they come over here to see the wagons. Those farmers are dumb, you know, and they're like, you know what that girl's there for, and not gonna take it by those cheap wagons over there, you know.

[35:53] Okay. So he says, hence it is that the art to which pertains the end, right, moves by its command the art to which pertains what is towards the end, right? Now it's more clear as Aristotle says that the use of the form product is what the end of the form product, but the ratio, there's a proportion, right? That the use is to the form product is the form product is the raw materials.

[36:22] So the form product is the end of the what? The wood and the steel that's being what? Yeah, steel's not being delivered to fall on my toe, though one of them did one time.

[36:35] Took me, sewed me up at the hospital, right? Now the good in general, which has the notion of end, that's the third thing, Aristotle said about the end, right? There's something good is the object of the will, and therefore, in this way, the will moves the other what powers of the soul to their acts, right? Because its object is the good, and the good is the end, right?

[37:07] For we use the other powers when we what wish, huh? For the ends and the perfections of all the other powers, huh, are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain what particular goods, right, huh? And always the art or the power to which belongs the universal end moves to acting the art or the power to which pertains some particular end, comprehended or included under that universal end, just as the leader of the army, right, who intends the what common good, the victory of the army.

[37:52] And also the order of the whole army moves by his command, someone from the tribunes, right? Who intends what? Order the order of one squad, I'd say, huh?

[38:09] But the object moves by determining the act, right? In the manner of a what form, right? Of a beginning to this form, from which in natural things an action specified as heating from heat.

[38:32] But the first universal principle is what being and the what true, yeah, which is an object of the what understanding, huh? And therefore, in this way of motion, the understanding moves the will as presenting to it its what object, yeah. So the will is moving the what reason and even the other powers, right, huh? Because its object is the good, the end, right, huh? Which all the other ends are subordinated, right?

[39:12] But the reason is moving the will in presenting to it its what object, right? Like its form. Sometimes they distinguish between the good and the true.

[39:28] It's kind of interesting when Aristotle is talking there about, or Thomas is talking about the division of the fifth book of wisdom, right? All these words there, right? These words that are equivocal by reason, and he divides it into three, right? He divides into two or three, but he divides them into three, right? And he says the first group of words he says pertain to beginnings or causes, right?

[39:55] The second group of words pertains to the subject of science, right? And the third to what properties, right, huh? Of course, the first word in the third section is perfect.

[40:15] And so when you take these things like words like being in one, they would be found in the second section, right? As a subject of wisdom. When you get to things like true and good, you're talking more about the perfection of of being, and therefore they're more like properties, right? But sometimes you have like in this in the De Veritate, the dispute questions on truth that the good is defined as what is perfective of another in the manner of an end, right?

[40:47] Right? The true is perfective of something as a what form, huh? It's going to form your mind, right? But the truth, right? That's kind of what he's saying here, right? Touching upon that difference, right? That the true is more what form. And so when you get to logic, say, the fundamental act of of reason that everything else presupposes is understanding what something is, what makes something to be what it is.

[41:21] That's more like the form, right? Quite fundamental act of the will here is going to be, in regard to the end, willing the end. So the idea of end and form kind of correspond to this.

[41:41] It's hard to see, but to think about that. Related to that, Father Hardin always says, speaking about the use of your will, he says. The most important use of your will is to direct your mind what to think about.

[41:58] Because you, because he says you'll think about what you want to think about, and you won't think about what you don't want. See, Thomas will raise other places this question: if one moves, the other, where does it all begin, right? And all begins with the mind, right? But we'll see that later on. Maybe more. We'll touch upon that. So the first objection, where he has the quote from probably the greatest mind in the church, that would be St.

[42:24] Thomas, right? Did? Not saying he's greater than Thomas, but supposed to be, you know, a time when Augustine appeared to Thomas, right? He says, well, we're both pretty good, he says, but you're better because I had a little, you know, Spleen there when I was young, but you didn't. Thomas chased the one out. Yeah. Think so. Thomas a little more pure than Augustine. so I guess I was too.

[42:53] Yeah. No, no. How funny that, how funny that is, but I sure, Augustine did did all that, and this this uh this uh humility, you know, is really good. Bernard Clever on humility, huh? I think when Thomas gets to talk about the different steps in humility, he follows Bernard, you know. I was reading some modern theologian one day saying, you know, Thomas didn't take Bernard, you know, seriously, you know, he didn't, you know, I was really angry about that.

[43:24] Yeah. I think he respected him a lot a great deal, you know. That's probably why he didn't dictate a commentary on the song of songs on his deathbed. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So he says the first objection there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that from that authority is not had that the understanding does not move the will, but does not move it from what necessity, right?

[43:58] Okay. It's interesting. To the second, comparing the understanding to the will as imagination to sense appetite, right? Of course, the text there in the De Anima of course solves that there and also Thomas's De Anima commentary up there, you know. so Thomas is He had cribbed notes He had cribbed, yeah. To the second, then it should be said that just as the imagination of the form, without the what estimate of it being suitable or harmful, right, does not move the sense desire, right?

[44:42] So neither does the apprehension of the true without the notion of the good and the desirable, right? So I was doing a theorem, in Euclid this morning. I wasn't thinking about this. Is good, huh?

[45:06] Even number times itself give you an even number, right? Odd number times itself will give you what? Odd number times itself? Oh, yeah. Yeah. That's proven,

[45:20] isn't it? So neither does the apprehension true without the notion of good or the desirable, whence the speculative understanding does not move to action, right? But the practical intellect, right? As is said in the third book about the soul, huh So Aristotle's De Anima up there.

[45:50] But Aristotle also talks there in the third book about how there's not necessity there, right? Huh? He takes example of the continent man and the incontinent man in the seventh book of the Ethics there, and they both have strong emotions, but the one man follows his reason and not his emotion, the other man gets into his emotion, and so neither the emotions nor the reason move necessarily, right?

[46:14] Huh? If there's both these continent men, these incontinent. men. I guess some of these famous scenes, I think it's unfortunate to see how it's supposed to have been irascible by nature, you know? Look like a dog, you know. Yeah. I was taking the taking out the putting out the bowels after the town to pick up, you know, this morning, you know, and as soon as I walked up the street, there was a little mutt, you know, tiny little tiny dog, you know, and I felt like saying, you know, he's not going to be much protection for you, ma'am, you know, he's going to need you to protect him, right?

[46:52] I was just thinking that I I wasn't going to say this, you know, I just I just got struck because this guy was a little tiny thing, you know, but as soon as she started walk by and I came out to the dark ground, she says, "Stop, stop," she says, you know, but he's a little little thing, you know, it needs to be protected for it, it's going to protect you, Still he came out, argh, like that to me.

[47:18] So some people are given to anger, and you read about people who do horrible things, and you see it every day because out of anger, you know, they strike somebody and so on. But then the men like Saint Francis de Sales, I guess, who overcame this, right, and became known for his mildness, right? But so he went beyond being continent; he got the virtue, I guess, of mildness, huh?

[47:45] Powerful men to have a irascible side to them, right? And they say Kennedy you know, if you can have that, you know, Then your homework, you know, you're pointing to him, chewed out. Yeah. And as I say, Mary's College and LBJ came through to give a talk, you know, and they had him in this kind of side room, they were just chewing out the supporting staff. So these guys are, they're rasable, you know.

[48:09] And I think these these men got driving, you know, you know the way the way Patton could, you know, aim you with the soldiers who got traumatic distress and so on. Yeah. Get out there and fight the Colorists. So Pius the Eleventh was supposed to be supposed to have been very rasable. Yeah, yeah. One time he got an argument with a cardinal and got so mad he took his red hat, threw it on the floor.

[48:32] He says, "You're not a cardinal anymore." Just like that. And Pius the Eleventh, huh? Pius the Eleventh, yeah. Then he reinstated. He was pope. He was pope when I was when I was born, you know. Oh, he was my first pope after thirty-nine, yeah. Yeah, for Pius the twelfth, he'd be forever, huh? Yeah. And then John Paul, I guess. Yeah. Along the yeah.

[48:58] To the third, it should be said that the will moves the understanding as regards the exercise of the what act to do it or not to do it, right?

[49:11] So I was my will moved me to pick up Euclid and do them rather than not do them this morning. And this is because the true itself, which is a perfection of the understanding, is contained under the universal good as a particular good. Truth is one of the goods, right? But as regards the determination of the act, which is on the side of the object, the understanding moves the what will.

[49:45] Because also the good itself is grasped according to certain special notion comprehended under the universal notion of the what true. And thus it is clear that it's not the same the mover and mover according to the same. That's interesting, right? And involved in that is the idea that, in a sense, the good is a particular. I mean, the true is a particular good, and the truth about the good is a particular truth.

[50:15] So in one sense, true is more universal than what good, and one sense good is more universal than what true. And that's rather unusual, right? It shows they're not a genus and species, right? Like like animal dog, right? Well, animal is more universal than dog or cat or any other species, right? And the species can't be, you know. Dog can be a particular kind of animal, but animal can't be a particular kind of dog.

[50:48] You know, but it's it's curious, you know, that the true and good are like both are more universal than the other, right? See, how can that be? You know, it seems impossible, right? At first, if you're thinking about, you know, come for the categories, let's say, right? You're thinking about genus and species, right?

[51:15] Color is more universal than than green, let's say, right? Makes sense, you know, if color is more universal than green, then green could be more universal than color. Doesn't make sense at all to me, right?

[51:30] So how is it that that says so? Green is a particular color, and color in no way can be a particular green, you know, the genus. No,

[51:42] it doesn't make any sense at all, you know. But yet you can say that the truth about the the good is a particular, what truth, right? And some of the ancient Greeks, you know, the Sophists, attacked the geometry, saying, "Well, nothing good in your science, right?

[52:03] You're not learning about the good, you know." So I mean, truth, truth is something more what universal than than the good, huh? The truth about the good, but yet the good is more universal than the true because the true or truth is a particular good, right? huh? There's a good besides like Mozart's music or something, Shakespeare's plays, huh? Or house, even for that matter. Maybe even a car unless you have to drive it.

[52:41] So how can that, be? That's kind of strange, isn't it? That's very strange. It's true. That's what Chesterton said. Truth is necessarily stranger than fiction because fiction's a product of our own imagination. But Shakespeare says, "in Hamlet, you know, like a stranger, give it welcome, right? To give strangers welcome, right, It's a thing to do." It's a strange truth,

[53:07] Yeah. I guess we have a lot of strange truths in the Catholic faith, don't we? Should give them welcome, right? You're very interesting, Guy Thomas, huh? What would you do without Thomas? huh?

[53:34] Of course, De Koninck saying, you know, some of these guys are saying, "il faut dépasser Saint Thomas." Good if you can do, it I thought that thing with the woman I was talking to when I was first in philosophy, and she's a doctor's wife, I guess, and so we met her in some social affair and she got talking to me, and she's talking about how her husband, as a medical doctor, finds it hard to keep up with all the advances, you know, in medicine, right, nowadays.

[54:02] I guess some of them don't keep up with it all, you know, at that time, but you know, that's just a dirty secret, you know. Don't tell their patients. Yeah, yeah, yeah. They don't know about the new things. And and then she kept having a conversation and said, I suppose you'll find it hard keeping up with your field. And I said, "Madam, I said the problem in my field is catching up."

[54:25] So I never met anybody who's really caught up with Aristotle or Thomas. Even Monsignor Dionne or Charles De Koninck, those are the greatest guys I've known in this or the greatest I've known, you know, would not claim to have really caught up with Thomas, you know. And even books I've read, you know, many times, you know, say, and that is something, you know. De Koninck was saying, you know, he'd been teaching, you know, the physics there since 1935.

[54:50] I had him in, you know. 50s, but every time he he goes through this again, he sees something he didn't see before, right? And I told you about that famous conversation when he and Monsignor Dionne were in Rome for the Vatican II you know, periti, you know, for the Bishop of Cardinal Quebec and so on. And Monsignor pointed something out, you know, he kind of said, "How could I have missed that all these years?"

[55:12] You know. So I mean, you know, I mean, neither one of them would would claim to have caught up with Thomas, you know, but although one go beyond him, I mean,

[55:25] he makes particular things, you know, about the animals or something. He might, you know, I mean, these fundamental things. I don't know if anybody's caught up with them,

[55:36] including myself, of course. Okay.