Prima Secundae 34. Whether Sense Desire Moves the Will, and Whether the Will Moves Itself (Question 9, Articles 2–3) Class of 2011-10-20 https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/034-whether-sense-desire-moves-the-will-and-whether-the-will/ [0:00] To the second, one proceeds thus: It seems that the will is not able to be moved by sense desire. Funny you should even ask that question, right? [0:16] For the mover and the what agent is more outstanding, right, than the patient, right? As Augustine says in the twelfth book on Genesis, the letter, right? [0:30] Aristotle argues that way too, and he talks about the acting upon understanding, right? That it's even more immaterial, or just as much as as the undergoing understanding, because the agent is more, as Augustine says, Praestantius, right, superior to the patient. But the sense desire is below, right, the will, right, which is the intellect, intellectual desire, right? Just as sense is below the what understanding, therefore the sense desire does not move the will. [1:10] It's like the the corporal moving the general or something, you know, just never done right? You mean a churchy, I think. Corporal, I used to call corporal. Moreover, no particular power can make a what universal effect. [1:45] But the sense desire is a particular power, for it follows upon the what particular knowing of the senses. So I mean, how do the senses know good and bad, right? By what's agreeable to the sense or disagreeable, right? And that's a very particular way of knowing the good, very limited in some ways. Therefore, cannot cause the motion of the will, which is universal, as it were, following upon the universal understanding of the what understanding. [2:29] We quote our style sometimes in the rhetoric. you know, We hate the whole genus of thieves, he said. Moreover, as is proven in the eighth book of physics, [2:43] the mover is not moved by that which it moves, right? So that the motion would be reciprocal, right? But the will moves the sense appetite, right? Insofar as sense desire obeys what reason, huh? Therefore, the sense desire does not move the will. That's a beautiful objection, aren't they? [3:15] But against this is what said in the epistle, I guess, of James, right? Jacob, for each one is what tempted by his own what? Yeah, concupiscentia means sense desire primarily, right? It doesn't mean the will so much, huh? And abstract and what? But one would not be what abstracted from concupiscence unless his, oh, I suppose he's withdrawn from what he should be doing, I suppose. Another long bite, huh? [4:00] Unless the will, his will was moved by sense desire, in which there is concupiscence right? The concupiscible appetite, they name that. Therefore, the sense desire moves the will, right? You get the authority of James himself, right? [4:24] Let's see what the master says now. I answer it should be said as has been said above that which is grasped under the what [4:37] aspect of good and suitable, right? Moves the will by way of what an object, right? Now that something seems good and suitable happens from what two things? [4:57] What does he mean here? From the condition of what is proposed and of the one to whom it is what proposed, right? That's even true about the mind, isn't it? It seems so to your mind. It's partly because of what somebody says, but also what's inside you, right? It finds it suitable or not, custom, things of this sort, right? [5:29] For convenience or suitable, is said secundum relationem by relation, right? Whence it depends on what both of the extremes, huh? And hence it is that gustus diversely disposed, right? Not in the same way takes something as suitable and as not suitable, right? So if you have experience in wine tasting, so on, you know, and say, well, this first is going to taste differently, you know. [6:01] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Whence the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, "Such as a man is, so does he end the period here." Right? Aristotle going back to that, he's talking about the permanence of damnation and that sort of thing, right? Now, because qualis, qualis sic, qualis you can't change that qualis once you're once you're dead, right? Where the tree falls, there it's alive, right? [6:38] Says in scripture. Frightening. Your will could be fixed in the bad. That's terrible thought. Aristotle says in the third book on the soul there, when he's talking about people make bad decisions, right, bad acts, and so on, and they pursue something because it seems good here and now, right, and they don't look at the whole picture, right. They don't look before and after, right? That's where he says that man is the animal who has the sense of what time, you know. [7:19] You realize how much your life is tempered with time, right? But it's only because in time that you can change, although it's hard to do, qualis, how you are, right? [7:32] And that habit, the disposition is changed, then how you are is different, and then things seem different to you, right, than did before. So, it's [7:49] kind of funny for us to think, too, you know, that opening children in heaven, right? And some of the little things that little children do, you know, and parents and so on, grandparents get a kick out of these little things that little children do. but there won't be any children in heaven, right? They'll all be back at the age of thirty three, I guess, isn't they? And there won't be any, you know, all those little winning ways that children have sometimes, huh? [8:15] They won't be around anymore. We probably won't miss them. No, you know, I mean some people, you know, it's you know how they think that they can their pet dog or their pet cat, they can't be happy, you know, huh? Yeah. I suppose some mother to think you know, huh? I remember mothers often say you know, well, you know that, you know that all of a sudden they they grow out that age, you know. [8:38] I remember my mother saying that to the time, yeah, after dinner you come and sit in your mother's lap, you know, and then off against her age you don't do that anymore. And they kind of miss you know this this rapport with the children, you know. And so I imagine a mother, you know, saying that even more than a dog or a cat over here, know that opening going children, you know, and [8:58] even my grandparents there was always, you know, the kind of spice of life was, you know, when the husband comes home from work, you know, and the mother tells. You know what so and so did today. You know, and they always get a kick out of that, and so on. And I hope we do that thing. [9:16] It's interesting, but sure. Much our life is, you know, different times of life. You know, we're not the same exactly, right? And we can change to some extent. [9:28] Now it is manifest that according to passion, that's not a word for emotion, right? That according to the passion the undergoing of the sense appetite, man is changed to some what disposition, right? But disposition is a you know, for the categories is more general word, more weaker word than what habit, right? Huh? [9:54] So people can be angry all of a sudden, right, or have some other emotion, right? And they're disposed. In a certain way, right? Whence it follows that a man, in some passion, something seems suitable to him that does not seem to him existing outside the passion, right? Maybe to hit somebody or even kill them, right? Huh? Might seem suitable thing to do, right? Huh? And then later on you regret this when your anger has, you know, gone down, right? [10:27] Just as oh, use the same example. Okay. Probably it's probably more known to us. Yeah. Um. I told you about a metaphor. Shakespeare, you know, he speaks of the two lovers. They're in the very wrath of love. He says, "Clubs cannot part them, right? " Yeah. But it's a beautiful metaphor because you're using what? Two strong emotions, one in the irascible, one in the concupiscible, but they have a certain likeness that allows this to be a magnificent what metaphor, right? [11:07] Including the idea of separating them by clubs. You need clubs to separate the two dogs that are fighting you know and you need clubs to separate the man and woman sometimes, and so that's why those those powers are named the one the irascible appetite and the other the concupiscible appetite, right? [11:30] Go at each other in different ways. The irascible man and then but but they're they're real well known. They're intense. Pope John Paul uses that same kind of coupling of those two with when he's talking about work. Part of his poem, he's talking about mining in the earth, and he refers to it as. I think he puts together anger and love. It's kind of the anger. Yeah. [11:58] For the difficult good. Yeah. It's good, so you love it, so you sort of direct your anger to do this great, thing. Overcome these obstacles and get out the mine out the good. You know, I always go back to what Shakespeare says: "Things in motion sooner catch the eye, than what not stirs, right? " So the emotions that are more like emotion, even give their name to those faculties, right? [12:23] So desire is more like emotion than love is, or liking, you know, and the joy, is, because joy is kind of resting in the thing that you you wanted, right? But wanting is a kind of seeking of it. I was noticing, incidentally, you know, [12:46] third word that Aristotle uses there in the Metaphysics. There, he calls it sometimes a methodos, right? Sometimes he calls it an episteme, and then sometimes he calls it a zetesis, huh? I noticed I was reading the proemium the other day that at the end of the proemium he says in this zetesis and methodos, huh? A zetesis you translate it as a seeking, a search, right? And then I was noticing at the end of the summary there the early philosophers there, you know, and in this zetesis, right? [13:21] You know, we're in the zetesis. Well, zetesis means a search, a seeking, as they say, and episteme, which means coming to a halt or a stop. Episteme, I translate by a phrase, reasoned out knowledge, reasoned out understanding, but that's something perfect at the end, right? In the beginning, it's a zetesis, right? So you can say philosophy in the beginning is a zetesis. It's like the beginning of each article here. [13:51] It's a pro and con. and so on. There's a zétesis, is seeking, is searching for the truth, right? And then finally, if you're good at it, it's reasoned out. [14:05] Now, in Euclid and geometry, there you don't need the zetesis of any length, you know. But as you get to the more difficult sciences, the search, you know. [14:19] Modern philosophy, of course, is a zetesis without any episteme. And they even admit that. That's what God bless him, David Tracy is a nut out of Chicago. Yeah. And he said on the I think it was the 50th anniversary of Bernard Lonergan's great work, whatever it was, insight, or something. And he's writing that well, theology is all about the the journey. We don't really know where we're coming from. [14:51] We don't even know where we're going, but we're going. Why? Why bother? Yeah. Thomas says in in the commentary on this, on the Epistle of Saint Paul, that if a man is at this stage and doesn't know the articles of faith and the commandments, you know, time is going against him. Time's running out. Yeah. And in this way, right on the side the object, right, what seems suitable, the sense appetite moves the what? [15:30] Well. So you start from a distinction that something suitable is partly on the side of it and partly on the side of what you, right? And sometimes I see people, you know, they see something that's kind of good, and you try to, you know, interest them in something, you know, but it's not for me, they say, right? You know, they don't see it as fitting them, right? [16:00] And. So this is not for me. The opposite being, it's for me, right? This is my thing, right? It's my thing, right? And sometimes I listen to Bach's music I say now. Am I really correct that this is the best music ever written? You know, I probably maintain that, you know, but it probably fits me in some way. This is this is for me, you know. This is this is my thing, you know. [16:30] This is my music. That could be deceived, right? You know. You're happily deceived. Yeah, or Shakespeare, you know. So I got you. You can see this with with food, right? Too. They're talking about the nutritional value of insects now. You know. and... And, and Bring them in from the garden. And I, I see, I see in the in the papers, you know that it won't be long before you'll you'll see in the supermarkets. [17:07] You know, you know, insect sections. I don't know. I think you know. Give a Halloween in the ant farms. You know, We got we can we can corner the market on stink bugs [17:22] Do you know how how in Africa, you know, they you know rub them like that, you know, and, then eat it, you know, and so on. I guess. Have you ever had chocolate coated ants? I have things that are called chocolate coated ants. In quotation marks. No, I had chocolate ants. I didn't know what. I would have eaten if I'd have known it was, but it tasted fine until I knew what it was. [17:43] I think there's more chocolate. than that Yeah. Reasoning subsistence. Closest I got to that was frog legs. That's as close as I can. I had a friend used to eat frogs legs. I was always too. It tastes like chicken to me. That's what he said. Chicken. That's what he said. Yeah I guess I was just telling us about the Indians the life and Oh yeah. Down down Southwest, don't eat snakes. [18:17] Sometimes I mean, that's to me. You ever had that? What do you call it? Hamburger helper. It's fine. It's fine. Get some macaroni cheese in there. [18:35] That cheese makes a difference. Now the first objection was saying that the will is more what? Prestantius, as Augustine says, right? To the first therefore, it should be said that nothing prevents that which is simply. and secundum se, prestantius, right? To be towards something weaker, weaker, yeah. Now, this is again that famous distinction there, simply in some way, right? [19:17] The will simply is what. More noble or something. Yeah, more outstanding, I suppose. It's kind of the prestantia, right? Now stands out, right? It's more outstanding than the sense desire, but as regards the one in whom what the passion dominates, right? Insofar as he is what subject to the passion, then the sense desire is preeminent. I was reading the next greatest poet, or the only rival of Shakespeare, who is. Homer, yeah, of course, he begins there in the first book, right? [20:04] With the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon, right? And they both have this anger, right? Huh? It's the kind of being, and and I was reading the Latimer translation there, and Latimer's talking about the characters of these men, right? Huh? And they're, you know, probably noble men, but still they're kind of dominated by their anger, right? Huh? And so, [20:31] to the extent you know that Achilles doesn't come in until his best friend is killed, right? The man whom he said was questioning to the father, "I'll bring him back alive." You know, don't worry about your son. You know, he's responsible for the death of his friend. You know, so they're dominated by anger, right? [20:50] Huh? Then when Hera wants to get her way in the war. There for a while, she dresses up, you know, puts her perfume musk on, and she distracts Zeus from the governance of the universe. [21:04] And then, you know, he doesn't until later on he wakes up and you know something has gone wrong in the valley, you know. Yeah, yeah, Homer's gods are very human, you know. So it's [21:22] you see those fragments. They have the you know natural theology fragments. I call them, you know, where Heraclitus and other great thinkers there make fun of the the gods and the worship of the statues and so on. But Heraclitus, says if a man should, talk to his house or something, you know. [21:51] So, in some what, I think you'd say, in some way, the emotion can be more powerful than the will, right? But not simply, not simply. They hold the will. You know, the man responsible for following his passion, right? [22:23] Now the second objection is interesting. To second should be said that actions and choices of men are about singulars. This is a very important thing, right? [22:38] That what you do is something, but singular, you know, universal. You don't commit adultery in general, but you commit adultery with this woman under these circumstances, right? Huh? Okay. [22:54] So you got to realize that actions and choices of men are about the singulars, whence from this very fact, huh? That the sense desire is a particular what power? It's about the particular. It's about that. It has a great power towards this that through it a man is thus disposed that to him something seems thus or otherwise about singular things, right? Okay. So the man knows universal adultery is wrong, but this woman in particular seems very desirable, right? [23:29] And and the act he's going to perform is in this what singular thing, right? So the the senses and sense desire, both of them seem to have a greater what power to move him about the singular than the universal does. It's kind of what remote, right? Huh? Aristotle even talked about that in the ethics. There, the universal doesn't move you unless you what apply it, right? [24:02] That's an important way to see how how the senses and the sense appetite can be so influential. It kind of shows too, and I suppose how the fiction can be very powerful, right? Because it's universal singularized, right? Or the singular universalized. They say both, you know. But that's kind of a [24:33] well, of course, that kind involves the whole man, right? Universal singularized and singular universalized. That's a good way that he turns in since it bases the objection, right, which is based on universal singular, and the fact that the singular is in but actions in singular. So going back, you know, we saw earlier in this book here where he talked about the what why we have to have the secunda secundae right? [25:07] Because we have to descend more to the singulars, right? Why did Pius the twelfth make who was it the Cinefrancis? You know the the patron both of moral theologians and of confessors, right? Rather than Thomas, why? Because he descend more to the particulars, right? And that's necessary for the excellence of moral theology or the the practice. Yeah, yeah. [25:42] Aristotle, you know, in the beginning of the the proemium to Wisdom, there, right? He's kind of going through human knowledge and starting with sensing, and then memory, and then experience, and then knowledge universal and science, and so on. And he makes this comparison there between art and experience, and which is better, right? And as far he says, as far as acting is concerned, experience, he says, doesn't seem to be inferior to art, but even but more successful in in some cases, right? [26:16] And I used to take the example there of of little medical problems, you know, like being nauseated to your stomach, right? You talk to people, you know, about nausea and so on. Some people find they eat this particular thing or drink this particular thing, then they kind of get over their their feeling of nausea. And someone else, oh, wine to make me worse, you know, you know, you see. [26:43] But as far as curing me, I might know better than what the medical doctor, right? What would you know? Because it might be peculiar nature, right? Huh? So ginger ale or something like that, right? Or popcorn or vodka. [27:02] I had that experience. I I had just up in Nova Scotia when I first got there, and the doctor gave me medicine to take for headaches. Me, so nauseous, I couldn't eat anything. But I used to get up, and I'd been real nauseous at night. I used to get up and eat popcorn. Yeah, yeah, I got permission. Go up, pop a bag of popcorn. That's the only thing I could eat. [27:23] That's an example too, you know, of a psychologist who knows the universal universals more than the average person, right? And so he knows all these different kinds of mental illnesses, right? Huh? But he might not be as good as as a friend or a parent who knows the friend and knows the the child and what would get them out of their depression or what it is, right? [27:45] What you could suggest, you know, that oh, they've been up for a while, you know, and you know that it's a parent to see that, or it's a friend you might know that with your friend, right? And so you, out of experience, succeed better in curing the depression of your child or your your friend than the the psychologist who knows universals, right? But you're not curing the universal, not universal out of depression, you're getting this particular man, right? [28:15] Huh? A good bottle of wine, Mister Burke Weston. We'll put some Mozart on. Oh yeah, yeah. Have a good cry and take a nap. Just Saint Thomas. Yeah, yeah. [28:33] A couple of peaches and sumac to this. Ah, yes, ah, yes. I'll feel better after that. Saint Saint Philip Neri, somebody, some brother he knew, or something, was depressed about something, and I think he had an inspiration. He knew that what the man needed was exercise. So he said, I'll race you from I put him on a beat. From here to there, I'm going to race you right now. [28:53] Race that go! By the time they finished the race, the guy was cured of his depression. It was exercise. That's the same principle, right? That that action is in the singular, right? So Arista argues that the man of experience is superior, maybe, you know, often to the man of art, right? Although the art of the man of art is more annoying because he knows why this is so, right? [29:21] You should give the example that of tea. You know, I say, well, if you got you using loose T Ds, which I always do, and I usually leave it maybe four minutes, you know. And I mean, some of these guys get you know, ten minutes and forty seconds, you know, instead. You know, but you know, but if you leave it in, say, like you know, about ten minutes, then you start to get it won't be so tasty anymore. [29:43] You get a bad taste, right? Analysts from experience, right, that you have to you can't leave it in that long, right? And therefore, you know, crazy people get a tea bag, you know, and tea bag is made with the the uh the least expensive tea leaves. And they're very you know small and so on and and it it gets strong right away I mean I you know on the road there you know at the Best Western or something you know and they got tea bag that's all you know you just and I throw it away, you know that's it you know but I don't give it 4 minutes you know But I know some experience is going to make it bad right and they would say [30:21] well okay but now why does it get bad right you know see well it's too strong it was just a question of being too strong you can dilute it right but still it tastes bad well then the chemist you know man of art said you know well they're different chemicals you know and they're different release times right so that if you you know after six or seven minutes you start to have different chemicals being released which are undesirable for a good tasting cup of tea right so he's wiser about tea than I am right he knows why you know but I know from experience if I get a good cup of tea I'll get it without knowing nothing about these chemicals right but I know [31:02] from experience that if you leave it in that time you know. You see what I mean? If you cook the meat too long you know loses flavor right you know the cook knows these things it's like the construction workers they're always kind of rolling their eyes about the architect because like well what does he know about building a building yeah you know he doesn't know these materials and Father Robert and I were always joking about the field conditions Yeah. [31:26] So the architect always sort of leaves a blank says well this will be determined by the field conditions yeah you know so the workers got to figure that out yeah yeah I used to go you know when I worked at my father's factory sometimes you know we make a farm wagon you know and go out to the woodlot there on the property and you know I'm starting to get bored he says no I don't want those you know what's wrong with that I want that You know he kind of knows their way you know These guys have been making wagons for 30, 40 years you know and they just I don't want that board there so they have the experience but this is what he's [32:01] saying here right so so in the light of what he says in many places you see that kind of solution to this objection right the fact that it's about the singular although it seems to make it inferior to universal as far as knowing right as far as doing it's more important right now I'll make an exception of this woman because she's just something remarkable you know [32:28] what's that movie is the one with Marlene Dietrich in it it was called the Blue Angel and and the one where the the he's a professor you know kind of a pedantic professor there and but in the German universities there you know where everybody's tense when you get in you know and so on and then students have been hanging out the Blue Angel you know and watching Marlene Dietrich he goes down he gets seduced by her right you know so if this woman you know destroys the whole man's life as a as a teacher [33:03] Uh Shakespeare has in the play there? Measure for measure, huh? Angelo, right? The angelic one, you know. He's always smiled when he heard other men's weaknesses, you know. But not until he met this one. It makes it just terrible. It's a really beautiful play, though. That's taken from the Scripture, right? The words "measure for measure," right? Mm Mm Yeah it's a play Mm Gotta get off the subject of Shakespeare, right? [33:41] But also, people are influenced in their moral judgments by literature in a way, you know, and even these terrible fictional things on TV, you know. That's what Father Owen Bennett used to say. That's why he wanted. I took a directed study with him on literature and aesthetics, and he said to me, because he studies the priesthood, he said, most people are not going to read the saints. [34:03] Yeah. Not going to read scripture or theology. Yeah. But they'll read good literature. So a priest knows good literature can influence people more than if he's preaching about wonders of scripture or Saint Bernard. Yeah. [34:16] Okay, now what about the moving each other, right? The same objection we had before: with the reason and the will, right? To the third, then it should be said that, as the philosopher says in the first book of the Politics, reason, in which part of the soul is the will, right? Moves by its command, the irascible and the concupiscible, right? Not by a despotic principle, as the slave is moved by the master, but by a royal or political rule, as free men are what ruled by the one governing, right? [35:05] Who nevertheless are able to what move against us, right? Huh? Whence the irascible and concupiscible are able to what move to the contrary of what the will is moving us, and thus nothing prevents the will sometimes being moved by them. Aristotle raised that question of whether the emotions should be ruled as a father rules his son, or as a master rules his slave, right? What does Aristotle answer, right? [35:42] Father and son. Yeah, yeah. Everybody think Aristotle's saying the master and the slave, you know, but no, that that might be that might be the Stoic something, you know. But no, how does the rule of the master over the slave differ from the rule of the master over the? I mean, the father over the son, right? [36:04] The master thinks of his own good. Yeah, he rules the slave for his own good, right? The father rules the son for the good of the son. But father, yeah, I mean the son. And the second difference Aristotle points out, is that the what slave has nothing to say about whether he should go out to the field today or or not, right? But the son is something about whether he should do this or that, right? [36:32] You know. So since the father consults the son somewhat as to his what inclinations, huh? I think I told this example. my father was telling me one time about his business friend, and I that example that he had all kinds of hopes for the for the son, right? So he sends him out to Amherst, which had kind of a prestigious school out here in the East, you know. [36:54] And the son flunked out the first year, right? He wasn't suited to Amherst, but not the college period, right? Finally, the father realizes, despite all these hopes he had, the business friend, you know. So he said to him when he came back, you know, after flunking out, what do you mean? Do you want to do? He says, "in life? He wanted a filling station, you know. So because the father had the money, you know, buy a filling station, set him up in the business, you know, huh? [37:20] Well, he was telling us, you know, you know, to say that that's the way he would he would act too, you know, huh? He would, you know, we'd be working in the factory there, and one of his business friends would come through with my father, you know, and the guy would see me working down there doing the menial stuff, and he says, oh, learning it from the bottom up, you know. [37:37] We had no intention of going on, you know, and taking care of the company, you know, but you know, but you know, kind of the business friend, kind of just making conversation, oh, learning it from the bottom, up you know, like you know the business. But my father would not, you know, kind of force us into that, right? But sometimes you have a father who's a lawyer or a doctor, or something like that, and his son's got to be a lawyer or his son's got to be a doctor. [38:00] I know some families like this, you know, and well, sometimes the son is suited to that, but sometimes isn't, right? And so a parent has to have some what. Discretion. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I suppose as a faculty advisor, you know, you got to consult somewhat the students. You can't rule simply as you shall take this, Greek, yeah, you take Greek, yeah. No choice. So you got to put the foot down, but. [38:38] So just as the son then, or the free man, can what resist in some way, like people are resisting the orders of Obama, so so we can [38:50] the sense desire right can move against reason, even though it's superior, right? Just as the father is superior to the son, right. David had some trouble with his son, didn't he? Yeah. [39:05] Take a little break now. So whether the will moves itself, it seems that the will does not move itself. Is he going to contradict the principle? Omne inquantum huiusmodi est in actu, right? Every mover, as such, is an act. Whatever is moved is in what? Ability or potency. For motion is the act of what exists in ability, insofar as it has its sort. the same thing is not in potency and an act with regard to the same. [39:42] Therefore, nothing moves itself. Okay, that's it. Moreover, therefore, neither does the will move, able to move itself. However, the what mobile moves at the presence of the mover, right? But the will is always present to itself, right? Therefore, if it moves itself, it's always being moved. Oh my God! It's clearly false. Yeah. Yeah. [40:23] Moreover, the will is moved by the understanding, as has been said. If therefore the will moves itself, it would follow that the same thing is moved by two movers immediately, right? Which seems unfitting. Therefore, the will does not what move itself. [40:51] Against all this is that the will is the lord of its own act, right? And in it is to will and not will, which would not be if it did not have in itself in its power to move itself to what willing, right? Therefore, it moves itself, right? It wouldn't have any free will, right? [41:19] I answer: It should be said, as has been said above, that belongs to the will or pertains to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will. But as has been said, and this is the famous proportion of the philosopher, in this way the end has itself in desirables as the beginning, right? In understandables, huh? Now, it is manifest, however, That the understanding through this that it knows the beginning, right, reduces itself from potency and act as regards the knowledge of the conclusions. [42:05] So, being an act with regard to the beginnings, right? It moves itself to the conclusion that it was an ability, right? And in this way, it moves itself, right? So that's the greatest compliment that Monsignor Dionne paid me, right? You can move yourself. [42:27] And likewise, the will through this that it wishes the end, right? It moves itself to willing those things which are what to the end, right? [42:41] So I wanted to be happy, right? Then I realized I had to be wise to be happy. Then I was moved to pursue wisdom, right? And even logic. [42:54] So to that first objection from the physics, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the will is not by the same moving a mover and is moved, right? Whence neither by the same is it in act, and in what Ability, yeah? But insofar as in act, it wills the end, it reduces itself from ability to act in regard to those things which are what to the end that to it enacted what wills them, right? [43:32] Okay. That clear? That's a beautiful portion Aristotle has, huh? Which is connected with the fourth tool of dialectic. What reduces the will from wanting to act in regard to end? That's something you have to go back into nature, right? And to the intellect itself. That's what intellect gets its. Yeah. Yeah. [44:16] Okay. So, in so sense, you don't choose to to be happy. I mean, to want to be happy, right? You naturally will that. And just as the reason you know naturally knows the axioms, right, In the beginnings, right? It doesn't move itself to know those. It's more about [44:46] the undergoing understanding of present, more about the act of understanding, right? But when you understand what the whole and the part is, you know, you just naturally see that a whole is. that's beautiful, isn't it, Tom? Right, Tom sees those things. The second, it should be said that the power of the will [45:16] is always an act present to itself, right? But the act of the will, by which it wills some end, is not always what present in the act in the will itself, and through this it moves itself. Hence, it does not follow that it always what moves itself, right? [45:40] So, thank God, I don't always move myself to study logic. My brother Richard taught me logic, so when I came to the college, there, just give me the final exam for the logic course, and they gave it to me, and gave me credit for the course. Not to take it and you know So that's pretty good. And of course, it was hard too. I mean, you know, some kin, you know. [46:10] So, I didn't know that much logic at that time, but you're more than most people now. Okay. To the third, it should be said that not in the same way is the will moved by the understanding and by itself, but is moved by the understanding as regards the what Object. object, by itself as regards the exercise of the act according to the ratio of end. [46:45] Do we have to stop there, or what is it? Yeah, okay. We'll get the will arrest. That's good, though, see, because we divided these six articles into three and three, right?