Prima Secundae
36. Summa I-II, Question 10, Articles 1–2: Does the Will Will Anything Naturally, and Is It Moved Necessarily by Its Object?
Class of 2011-10-27
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/036-summa-i-ii-question-10-articles-1-2-does-the-will-will-anything/

[0:00] We're up to question ten right now. Then we're asked to consider about the way in which the will is what moved. Is that where? Yeah, in what way? Yeah.

[0:20] And about this, are asked four things. First, whether the will is moved naturally to something, right? Secondly, whether of necessity it is moved by its what object, huh?

[0:42] Third, whether of necessity it is moved by the lower desire, the emotions, right? And fourth, whether of necessity it is moved by the exterior mover that is God, huh? And the king is in the the will of the king, isn't it?

[1:07] To the first, one proceeds thus. It seems that the will is not moved to anything naturally, right? For the natural agent is divided against the voluntary agent, as is clear in the beginning of the second book of the what physics, huh? Therefore, the will is not moved to anything what naturally, right? Okay.

[1:38] I gave a talk on this subject once. I had it somewhere, I don't know. Wherever that which is natural is in something, what always, just as it's always in fire to be hot, right? Because it's natural. But no motion is in the will always.

[2:02] I'm sleeping. My willing. Therefore, no motion is what natural to the will. Moreover, nature is determined to the one, right? But the will has itself to opposites, and this is a contrast Aristotle makes there in the first part of Book Nine of the Wisdom.

[2:24] Therefore, the will wills nothing what naturally, right? But against this is that the motion of the will follows the action of the understanding. But the understanding understands some things what naturally. Therefore, the will naturally wills some things, huh?

[2:57] I answer. It should be said that, as the great Boethius says in the book on the two natures, suppose the two natures of Christ. The great guy is Boethius. huh?

[3:13] respect for him. I was thinking about Boethius this morning because I was reading the the chapter there on whether God knows future contingents. You know, of course, kind of the ability to know this is that everything past, present, future is present to God, right? And it goes back to what you know Boethius taught us about eternity, right? And that's kind of a marvelous thing, you know, because beginning of the constellation of philosophy, he announces that he's a in the Academy, he's in the school of Plato, right?

[3:49] But then he gets to the fifth book, Lady Wisdom, right, introduces Aristotle as a true follower. What's significance, right? That goes back to what I sometimes call the central question, right? Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are?

[4:12] And so you have to kind of see that these don't have to be the same in man, right? Before you can see that God's way of knowing can be different from the way things are, so he knows what time eternally without any falsity, right? In fact, he knows time better than we know it, right? Um,

[4:37] eternally, right? Okay. Contingent things necessarily. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, as Boethius says in the book on the two natures, and the philosopher before him, right, in the fifth book of Wisdom, the metaphysics, nature is said multipliciter, right.

[5:05] Sometimes it is called the what intrinsic principle in what movable things, and such a nature is either matter or a material form, as is clear from the second book of the physics, right.

[5:24] Thomas would be more brief here because a lot of philosophers Thomas will kind of repeat the whole teaching almost, right? But the first meaning of nature is what

[5:35] birth, birth, yeah. And of course, you see that kind of you know in the words nativity, right, which means your birthday action, right, and pre-natal and post-natal and so on, right, before and after birth, right. That's the first meaning of birth, right. But because birth, in the case of birth, the baby comes from within the woman, right? As opposed to the apple pie, which is acting upon something outside of it, doesn't come from within.

[6:05] So you see, kind of the difference, you know. Nature always keeps the sense of something what within or from within, right? And then the second meaning of nature is the source of the baby within the what the mother, right? And then the third meaning kind of generalizes it, right? That's the meaning that you have in physics, right? And then nature is is in the intrinsic principle of motion and of rest, right?

[6:32] And then you see that that can be both matter and form in different ways, right? And the one that Aristotle comes to at the end of those meanings is the one that he gives here, right? He's not giving all the meanings here, then, right? Just the third and fourth and fifth meanings and the thing, and then the last meaning here, quaelibet substantia, right? huh? Or et quidlibet ens, huh?

[7:03] Nature means, in that sense, what a thing is, right? So I have to say to my colleagues now: Why does Heraclitus say nature loves to hide? What's the first reason for saying that? Nature loves to hide. Yeah, what's what's within is hidden, right? Huh? Nature loves to hide. But these guys haven't studied this.

[7:33] It's very bad. And according to this, that is said to be what natural to a thing that belongs to it by its own what substance, what it is. So you see, Thomas often, you know, he's talking about what it is. He'll say the substance or nature of the thing, right? Kind of using different synonyms in some senses of these words. And this is what belongs to a thing per se or through itself.

[8:07] Now he says in all things, those things which do not belong to something per se, right, are reduced in something that is within per se, as in a what principle, right? So in a sense, I think what you got here is a what an axiom, right? Huh? So you have the through itself and the through another, right? Huh? And the through itself is before the through another, right?

[8:36] Huh? And the through another is so because of the through itself, right? You can apply that to all kinds of things, right? In a sense, you can, apply it to the question of the unmoved mover, huh? The move mover is a mover to itself. No, so if I move this class, I get my class wet here, but my book, right? this is a moved mover. It's a mover through something else, right?

[9:06] So eventually, have to come to something that is what a mover through itself, and that's going to be an unmoved mover. The same when you talk about in our thinking, right? Some statements are known through other statements, right? But there aren't some statements known through themselves, right? Then there would be no statements, what? No, no, no, be no, right?

[9:36] Sometimes we will this through something else, right? But there is nothing we will to itself. Would we what? Wouldn't will anything, right? So, so in all things, then those things which are not within. Per se are reduced in something that is within per se, as in a what? Principle, right? So sometimes you'll see Thomas Aristotle saying that the through itself is before and a beginning of the through another, right?

[10:17] The through itself is a, is before and a cause, right? The beginning or cause. And therefore it's necessary that taking in this way nature, right, for what a thing is,

[10:39] always a beginning in those things which belong to a thing is something, what? Natural, right? That's why the natural road in our knowledge, right? Is is always a beginning, right? Roads. And this manifestly appears in the understanding. For the beginnings of our understanding knowledge are things, what, naturally known, naturaliter nota. Just as, what, and likewise, huh, the beginning of voluntary motions must be something naturally, what, willed.

[11:27] Now, this is the good in general, right? In which the will naturally, or towards which the will naturally, what, tends, huh? Just as every power naturally turns towards its, what, object, right?

[11:44] And secondly, and also the last end, right, huh? This is the famous proportion of Aristotle, which has itself in this way in desirable things as the first, what? Beginnings of demonstrations in understandable things, right, huh? And universally, this is the third thing, all those things which belong to the one willing, according to his very what? Nature. Nature, right, huh?

[12:19] For not through the will do we desire only those things which pertain to the power of the will, but also those things which pertain to what? Individual power. Yeah, and to the whole man, right? Whence naturally man wills not only the object of the will, but also those things which belong to the what? Yeah. As the knowledge of truth, which belongs to the understanding, and to be and to live, and other things of this sort, which regard his natural consistency, right?

[12:55] Which are all comprehended under the object of the will as under what? particular good Yeah. That was, uh, Father Owen Bennett told us about some cartoon from, you know, the 40s or something, and, uh, the man on the street was being interviewed, and he says, what do you think of life, sir? And he says, I'm in favor of it.

[13:23] Yeah, he'd been fairly strong coming out to what he's saying now, you know? Yeah, yeah. He's pro-life from conception on, you know? So, he's saying right, right, right, right out, so.

[13:44] Maybe he'll shame some of the other candidates to say something like that. So, son-in-law was was asking about Romney, and about Romney's position, you know, so it's up in the thing, but he's apparently for reversal of Roe versus Wade, and so, so got some good things here. I don't know how strong he is, but coming out, but.

[14:11] It's it's natural to live not to know that we live the things like that, rather natural well-being, then how can you explain people who will not to live? Yeah, well, that's a good question, you know, but I mean, they do so under the aspect of what? The parents. Yeah. Well, unlike the martyrs. Yeah, to escape misery, right, huh? Are you talking about suicide? No, martyrs. I was thinking in terms of martyrs.

[14:36] Well, that's what Saint Paul, Saint Paul says that, for me, the better thing is to die and be with Christ, but it's more necessary for you that I stay here. So the better thing is obviously to die and be with Christ. Yeah. He doesn't want to die, even, you know. No, no. Even, even, uh, uh...

[14:57] Thomas More, right? So he doesn't want to die since that chair that maybe he's putting him quit or something. It seems like... Well, that's... like, in some way, that's what Saint Bonaventure, I remember reading something, kind of vague memory, and he's talking about comparing these things that we will in different ways we will them. He says something we will least of all, sort of like he compared it in some ways, um, to die when he saw the souls of her, do they want to be there, do they not want to be there?

[15:27] Well, they want to do what God wants, but they really want to get to heaven, so they kind of, the least amount of willing possible, they want to stay there, but they really want to be with God. So, and he, I think he said something like that sometimes with the martyrs. I forget.

[15:49] Because it seems to be a difference with happiness, you can't not want to be happy. Yeah, yeah. These other things that seem to be kind of lower, um.

[16:02] No, I was thinking of the case of suicide there, you know, which is a more difficult case, but he's trying to escape misery. He thinks he's seeing suicide as a way of escaping misery, you know.

[16:14] The story the other day, they're out there trying to get people to sign this petition, you know, to get the... Mercy. Yeah, yeah. Giving the guy a rough time, but, but, uh... Yeah. They wanna see, get into New England, you know. They got on Washington out there in Oregon, you know, and want to get in New England here, and I guess they chose Massachusetts as the one to work on.

[16:36] Yeah, why not? We got came here. Yeah, yeah. That's bad enough. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh, that when the will is divided against nature, right, as one cause against another, right, huh, some things come to be naturally and some things come to be, what, voluntarily, right? And there is a different way of causing proper to the will, which is to be the lord of its own acts, right?

[17:12] Which is, other than the mode or way which is suitable to nature, which is determined to what? One thing. To one thing, yeah. What did Shakespeare say, nature not being able to be more than one?

[17:30] Speculating there is the causes of Coriolanus's downfall. Nature not being able to be more than one. Now, this is what Thomas will say sometimes. And because the will is founded, right, has a foundation in some nature, right, is necessary that the motion which is proper to nature in regard to what? Yeah, in some way is partaken of in the what? Will. Just as what is of the before cause is partaken of in the after cause.

[18:10] For what is before in each thing, uh, is its what? Being, which it is, which is through its nature, right? Then to will, which is through the what? Will. And hence it is that the will naturally wills something, right? Okay. But sometimes Thomas says that the nature of the will itself requires this, right? Rather than talking about the prior cause, right? Being the nature of man or whatever it is.

[18:52] Sometimes you'll point out, you know, that distinguish between will and nature, you're not denying that the will has a nature, So what it is, right, that makes it to be what it is, but you're dividing against what is only nature, right? Okay. Do you see that kind of distinction elsewhere, huh?

[19:23] Knowledge and wisdom. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So sometimes Aristotle will divide wisdom against science, right? Or in Greek, there's Sophia against episteme, right? Like in the ethics, right? In the sixth book, where there are different virtues, right? Episteme and Sophia, but in the metaphysics, right, which is about Sophia, he speaks of This as this. episteme, right? Okay. So you're distinguishing what is what

[20:13] just this, right, from something that is that is something more, right? It's a distinction that that's important to see, right? Give you another example, like dividing cat from a kitten.

[20:31] Yeah, that's that's different. It's a different distinction, I think, different kind of distinction. But like you speak a distinction between two and two plus one. I mean, we might give two plus one a new name and call it what three. Three, yeah.

[21:00] Then two is just two, right? But two plus one is not just two, so it gets a new name, right? But still, there's a two in what in three in a way, right? Okay.

[21:22] So that's a little bit like what you're saying, right? That in the will there is a the nature, but it's not just a nature, right? Okay. The same thing we said about reason, right? So sometimes you see Thomas make a distinction between nature considered, I mean, will or reason considered as a nature, right? And then considered as what reason or will, right? And then considered as reason or will that's open to opposites and so on, right?

[21:56] Whereas the nature is determined to one. But it's the idea that nature is always before, in a sense, what a thing is. We often say Thomas says that the nature of a thing is what's what is first in it, huh?

[22:21] The nature of a thing. It got to be what you are before it can be anything else. A thing has to be what it is before it can be anything else. It's almost obvious. At least I've been thinking about it, right? I guess it is kind of obvious, huh? Amazing

[22:43] how many people don't know that. Yeah. Yeah. Thomas says, even in God, which is secundum rationem, right? Is God's nature or His being first?

[23:16] I guess he is. Hmm? No, Thomas says it's nature, yeah, yeah. Okay. And you kind of see that the way you perceive theology, because when you take up the the substance of God, as we say, right, that that part of theology, you show that the nature of God is the same as God, right? Huh? Then you show that the nature of God is the same as His being, right?

[23:43] Huh? That's kind of like a conclusion, right? You know, it's the beginning with the consideration of the nature of God, and you find out that it's not a body. You know, take the order and the summa there; it's not a body, pure act, and so on, right? Then eventually you see that it's just being, yeah.

[24:30] So even in God, you see the nature of God is first. Secundum rationem. I was thinking maybe confused by it, but because we speak of a thing acts through its nature, something. Okay, well, then what's before that? That's what I was. I guess in Hindi, can't say that.

[24:52] But in our way of thinking, right, we'd say now that we know God exists, right? After question two, I guess in the Summa, right? Huh? Now we're going to take up what God is, right?

[25:07] And we take up what God is, the substance of God, before we take up His operation, right? Even though I mean, they're the same thing, right? Huh? You know, but in our way of thinking, right, we take up the substance of God before His operation,

[25:24] and we take up the simplicity and perfection of His substance and infinity of it, and so on, right? But it's under the genus of what the divine substance, right?

[25:41] Coming back, consubstantial, right? Not one in being, but consubstantial. It's going back to the new, the new uh common parlance, come advent, I guess, yeah, consubstantial, homoousion right? Homoousion. Now, to the second objection there about the will not always being in its act, right? To the second, it should be said that in natural things, that which is natural as a word following form only, right, is always in act, right?

[26:28] As hot in fire, right? But what is natural as falling upon matter is not always in act in it, but sometimes according to what potency only, right? For form is act, and matter is what ability, potency. And motion however is the act of what exists in what ability, according to definition. There.

[27:02] Hence, those things which pertain to motion, which follow upon motion, are not always existing in natural things, right? So the stone is not always falling to the ground, right? Just as fire is not always moved up, right? But only when is outside its own place.

[27:26] And likewise, it is not necessary that the will, which from potency is reduced to act when it wills something, right, which is like motion in that sense, right, is not necessary that it always what it always wills an act, right? But only when it is in some what determined disposition. But the will of God, who is pure act, always is in the act of what willing, right?

[28:02] No potency there to be actualized. So sometimes you want to get somebody to love us, you know. So can we get God to love us? Don't forget about me. He won't be around too long if he does. It's you know. Just can't get him to love me. He said, "Initially, oh God."

[29:03] Stranger, Shakespeare says, "Stranger, give welcome." To the third, it should be said, huh? To nature always responds something one proportion, nevertheless, to the what nature? To nature in general responds something one in genus, right? And to nature taken in species, there corresponds the one in species. To the individual nature, there responds something one individual. But since, since therefore, the will is a immaterial power, just as the understanding is an immaterial power, there corresponds to it naturally something what?

[30:03] Common. Something one common, right? To wit, the good, right? Huh? Just as to the understanding, something one common has the true or being or the quod quid est. I don't know what it is.

[30:23] But under the good in general, many particular goods are contained. To none of which the will is what determined naturally, huh? So what is he saying there? And he's applied to that third objection.

[31:00] It goes back to the beginning, sentence there, right? To nature, there always corresponds something one proportioned, nevertheless, to the nature, right? So the one that corresponds to the the will might be something like good in general, right? So you can't will something except under the aspect of being good, right? Maybe in a true good, maybe an apparent good, It's gotta be seen as as good in some way, right?

[31:29] Some people it seems to be good to be contrary, right? I read the novel there, one of those English novels there, where the Scotsman, you know, he always contradicts you whatever you say, right? He's pretty good, pretty good at you know taking the opposite side no matter what you say, you know. Yeah. It was almost like the sophist in a sense, right? No matter what you say, you gotta contradict yourself, right?

[31:54] You know, make your period contradict yourself. Yeah. Okay. So we're time for one more article, I believe. Okay. Whether the move, the will is moved of necessity by its object by its own object,

[32:16] to second one proceeds thus: it seems that the will of necessity is moved by its own what object? For the object of the will is compared to it as the mover to the mobile, right? As is clear in the third book about the soul, right? Aristotle's trying to talk in the third book about the soul there about the locomotive power of animals, right? And he says that it goes back in a way to what both knowledge in some way, right, and to desire, right?

[32:55] But these two are united in the object, right? Because the object is known and desired, right? So the object is the first mover, but that object moves the the knowing power and the desiring power, right? And maybe the desiring part, the knowing part, but the way there's one mover, which is the object, right? Okay.

[33:23] So is it what moves me to go into the restaurant? Is it knowledge of this place, what it's all about, or is it the desire to go into the restaurant? Or is it food that's moving? Both my knowing power. Your sense, that smells good in there. Yeah, yeah. Used to go by a bakery, you know something. Yeah. Oh, I gotta go in there, you know. Like a kid, yeah.

[33:51] Like a kid, huh? Yeah, I was gonna say kids' relatives. Yeah. Yeah. There was a guy worked at the package store there. He's talking about going down south there, I guess, and it was kind of like a parkway like that, and all the the blacks were out there making their fried chicken, you know. Oh yeah. So the chicken, one after another, you know. The smell is just, you know, you know.

[34:20] He says it's just overpowering. Okay. But the mover, if it is sufficient, if it is sufficient of necessity, moves the movable, right? Therefore, the will of necessity can be moved by its what? Object, huh?

[34:53] Moreover, as the will is an immaterial power, so is the understanding, and both power are ordered to a universal object. But the understanding of necessity is moved by its what? Object, huh? And therefore, the will from its.

[35:18] Moreover, everything that someone wills is either the end or something ordered to the end. But the end, someone of necessity wills as so it seems, right? Because it is just like a what? Beginning in looking things, huh? speculative matters, right? To which we necessity assent, right? The whole is more than the part.

[35:49] But the end is the reason for willing those things that are for the end. And thus it seems also that those things are for the end that we will them of what? Necessity, right? The will, therefore, of necessity is moved by its what? Object, huh?

[36:11] Of course, you could go back and say, but the reason doesn't what? Isn't moved necessarily to the conclusions, right? Some of these amazing theorems in Euclid, you know, you don't see how they follow yet from what's gone before. Yeah. You're not moved to necessarily to assent to these things until it's shown, yeah. Don't. Okay. If we can look at the last theorems there in the odd-even number theorems, right?

[36:37] And he's determining what even numbers are even even only, and what even numbers are even odd only, and what even numbers are both even even and odd even, right? Even odd. And of course, what he shows is that every even number that is doubled from two, two, four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two, they'll be even even only, right? And he proves that, right? By an earlier theorem, it's beautiful.

[37:16] He proves it. And then, what even numbers are even odd only? Well, all even numbers whose half is odd. It's like six, huh? Half of six is three, so it's going to be even odd only. Okay. Now, what even numbers are both even even and even odd? Well, those which are neither doubled from the dyad, from the two, and whose half is not what? Yeah. So, for example, that would be twelve, right?

[37:55] Huh? See, it wouldn't be ten because ten is half is an odd number, so it's going to be even odd only. And the only thing that multiplies to ten is two times what? Five. But now twelve is not doubled from two because that's two, four, eight, sixteen, and it's not; its half is not odd, but it's six, which is even, right? So it's both three, four, and two and six, right?

[38:26] You can go through all the way. Beautiful, you know. Oh, yes, these stunning, stunning these things, huh? Yeah. Never get even with him, huh? Yeah. At odds with him. Yeah, it's beautiful. Beautiful.

[38:51] I think that kind of way that you have to kind of introduce into these things, you know, is to give examples, you know, huh? You say, you know, tablet four, you know, you know, you figure out find examples. Even by even, right? Two times two, huh? Eight, huh? Well, two and four is all you can get to get, yeah, ten. Two five only, right? And twelve, you see, it has both, right?

[39:22] Then you want to see, you want to see, well, what's the rule here? Is there a rule, right? You know. How about sixty-four? Two, eight, ten, eight. Yeah, but sixty-four is is is two times thirty-two. So it's when the one is doubled from, you know. So it's going to be only what? Yeah. So it can be eight times eight, I guess, huh? Two times thirty-two, uh, four times sixteen, huh?

[39:56] You know, but but no matter how you do it, how you cut it, it's still the same old two even numbers, right? You know, it's kind of marvelous, you know. How about one hundred twenty-eight? You know, that's the one from the die, right? They see the die instead of two, but that was sixty-four. Yeah, yeah. So you know. When I was a little boy, these stories, the sixty-four dollar question, you know, was kind of on TV or something like that.

[40:22] You know, I don't know how they write sixty-four, but it was interesting about sixty-four. You first get attached to it because it's both a a square number and a what cube number, right? Four times four times four is sixty-four. And eight times eight, you know. So the same number can be both square and like cube. Now, which numbers are both?

[40:49] Just just give us a little teaser there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Lead us in, unaware. Now you realize it's an even even number only, sixty four. There's kind of a lot a lot of things to. Wondering.

[41:08] Yeah. I don't know why your wife always sends you to us. Can't you go there more often? Just stay a week. Don't forget your hat. It's very expressive. Put your thinking hat on, you know. Yeah, yeah. I used to go back to the fact that they lectured in the Middle Ages with the hat on, right? Oh. And so the the peasants thought, you know, that that's where.

[41:47] thinking with the hat. I have to leave my hat on. Yeah, I used to get expressions as well. I don't know if when you're still in your family. Put on your thinking, hat Some of these, some of these, yeah, some of these little expressions, you know, were were were more circulating around in those days.

[42:07] Um. So where are we? After we set to the speculative things by necessity. Where did we finish? No, no, we're starting the objection now. Are we at the objection? Do we finish the objection? No. I think we're in the third.

[42:26] Yeah, third one. Yeah. Okay. Okay, now I was kind of turning hard against that, right? But against this is that the rational powers, according to the philosopher, are two opposites. Now that's what comes up in the beginning of the first part of the of the ninth book, right? Aristotle's taking up ability before act, right? And then he'll distinguish between the rational ability and the what natural ability.

[42:55] The natural ability is determined to one, it seems, right? So the fire burns but doesn't cool, right? No. By the rational ability, like the doctors, he can eat you or or kill you, right? I mean, you know, cure you or you know, you know, if I possess logic, logic, I can reason well and badly, and I can teach and deceive, right? And if I know grammar, I can say, "I is your professor," and and you know, know that it's capable of opposites, right?

[43:26] The fire can only burn, right? Heat the thing that's in front of it. Okay. But the will is a voluntary power, right? A rational power, rather. For it is in reason, as is said in the third book about the soul, right? Therefore, the will has itself to opposites. Therefore, not of necessity is it moved to either of the what opposites, huh?

[43:56] That's why you know you can say that that dialectic and rhetoric, you know, are very much seem to correspond to the ability of reason, right? to go to opposites, huh? Dialectical reasoning, sometimes Aristotle says, is reasoning from probable things even to contradictory what conclusions, you know, like you do in the case of this disputate, or like you do in rhetoric, you know, where you know these debate teams too, you know, we have to defend opposites, right?

[44:31] I answer. It should be said that the will is moved in two ways, huh? In one way, as regards the exercise of the act, huh? And that means what? To will or not to will, right? Another way, as regards the specification of the act, which is on the object. In the first way, will is moved of necessity by no object, huh? For a man is able about any object not to what think, and consequently neither in act to will that, right, huh?

[45:13] So you're always thinking about God. I shouldn't be. That's Father Hardin saying that Hmm? The most important use of your will is to determine what you're going to think about. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm. Nothing better to think about than God, really. Okay. But as regards the second way of motion, right? The will, by some object, of necessity is moved, and from some not, right?

[45:52] For in the motion of any power by its what object, there is considered the reason by which the object moves the will. For example, the visible moves sight under the what notion of color in act, right? That is what visible. Whence, if color is proposed to sight, of necessity it moves what sight, right, huh? Unless someone averts his what sight, right, okay? Which pertains to that other thing, the other mode, the exercise of the act, right, huh?

[46:36] Okay. The same thing could be said about the ear, right? And you know that if you're in some place where some noises interfere with your your better thinking, right? Now, De Koninck used to complain about that. You know, some people act as they own the ear you know, De Koninck you know, his office there, the door was soundproofed, right? And so the question was, if you were going to go visit De Koninck and you knocked on the door and you couldn't hear what he's saying, you know, so what would we just do?

[47:08] We'd knock on the door and then. open it and walk in. Hopefully he he he. It would. it would be that perpetual motion machine. You would forever be knocking. Yeah, but can see how like silence, right? But then in the winter time, sometimes they want to set up the skating rink down somewhere down outside the building that his office is in, you know, and then they have this you know blaring machine there that's playing this awful music, you know, and so it's kind of can't escape this, you know.

[47:35] And De Koninck you know, still feels, you know, acts as they own the air, you know, and they can, you know, and and so if you go out, you know, on the beach or something like that, they have someone on these stupid little radios, you know, so Maria's pretty good though. You know, I said go over and tell them to shut that radio off." And Maria would, would not afraid She said go over there, you know turn it down and tell them, you know, and they'd actually turn it down."

[47:59] But you might not if I were over there. probably, you know, I'd probably get a fight or something. I did that when I used to go to the doctor's office once in a while. Yeah. They got they got the rock and roll playing on the stereo at the same time they got the TV blaring. Yeah. And I said, if anybody wants to have a nervous breakdown, go to a doctor's office, go to the waiting room.

[48:18] But so so at least I would turn off the TV. Yeah. I can't do anything with the music, but at least I turn off the TV. Yeah. I know I go one. Rio come into a restaurant. They got this awful music playing. Just walk out, you know. But they tell the one story of this: Father Boulay was in the restaurant, right? And they had these guys up there playing this stuff, you know.

[48:39] Oh. And so he sent some money up for them to stop. So they were so insulted that they did stop. They could eat a dinner in peace, you know.

[48:53] Father Boulay was a good friend of the conductor, you know, of the Quebec Symphony Orchestra, you know, and so he could appreciate the music. We we always got a kick out of that, you know. It actually happened, I guess. You know, he just sent money up. Did what did they keep the money? or did they give it back. No, they they kept the money, but but they decided, you know, they were insulted.

[49:19] Probably the only time in their life that they sent money to stop playing, you know. Yeah. Usually the guy who pays it, you see, calls the tune, you know, as they say. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Um.

[49:37] If I were to propose something to the to sight that was not in in all ways a color and act right, but but in some respect right, not simply was such right. Then, according to this,

[49:59] something not such right. secundum quid non tale huh. That means, as opposed to simpliciter right? Secundum quid, right? Not of necessity would sight see such a what object, right? Kind of skewed everything. For it is able to what tend towards it from that what part in which it is not colored in what act right, and thus he would not see it right. It was like a magic trick, right?

[50:37] The hand is quicker than the eye. He wouldn't see it, right? So just as the coloured and act is the object of sight, so the good is the object of the what? Will. Whence, if there is proposed some object to the will that is what universally good, and according to every consideration, of necessity the will would tend towards it, right? If it wills something, right? So if you saw God as He is, right?

[51:13] You would necessarily tend, right, towards Him. You couldn't not will God. You would not be able to will the opposite, huh? But if, however, there is proposed to it some object that is not according to what? Any consideration. Or some consideration. Yeah.

[51:37] I mean, it's not it's not good as such. Yeah. Not of necessity would the will be borne towards that, right? And because the defect of any good has the notion of not good, right?

[51:53] Therefore, that good only that is perfect and to which nothing is lacking, right, is such that the good is such a good that the will is not able not to will it, which is beatitude, right? So that Boethius says: beatitude is a state made perfect by the sum of all goods, right? Okay. I will show you every good, he says to Moses.

[52:23] Other particular goods, in so far as they fall short from some good, can be taken as not good, right? Now, what does that mean? It means you can say, I suppose, that any particular good prevents you from what pursuing some other particular good, right? So in some way it's what. Not good. Yeah. And if you can refuse it, right? Okay.

[53:00] And therefore they can be taken as not good, right? And according to this consideration, they are able to be repudiated or what approved by the will, which can tend towards the same thing according to diverse considerations. huh? It's like I can go to mass this morning? Well, I'm tired, you know. I'm just going to interfere with my sleep and getting a full night's sleep, you know.

[53:27] So that's one way of considering the thing, right? Now. Can't do a theory of Euclid today. Ah, haven't haven't been. uh, burned yet? You know? So.

[53:51] But Euclid would not be as relaxing as Homer, you know. I need to relax, Gubert. Your wife might say, "Yeah," but you wouldn't have time to rake the leaves.

[54:07] That's true. Some things are determined to one. Yeah. Strike a woman is very, you know, like like something like the bed is to be made every day, right? You know, that's kind of a yeah, personality.

[54:33] How can you not? Can we go one day without the bed being made? I mean, that's what's going on. Nobody's coming here to examine the place.

[54:44] Mark your death. It's not going to be done. Just get it done Brother John your mother told us a story about something that just sort of along the same lines. Her mother told her, "You know, it's just not done. Not done. That's it. Italian girls don't do that. That's it. That's what the other girls do, but Italian girls don't do it. That's

[55:11] what Rosie's mother would say." Okay. So, what about a sufficient mover, right? Replied the first objection there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that a sufficient mover of some power is only an object that totally has the what notion of a mover, right? If, however, it defects in some respect in something, right, not of necessity does it move, right? Okay.

[55:58] To the second, it should be said that the understanding of necessity is moved by such an object that is always and of necessity true, but not, however, from that which is able to be true and false, as from the what contingent, contingent, right? Sic et de bono dictum est, right? Who's going to be the nominee of the Republican Party this time?

[56:26] Because he can kind of go up and down, you know, you know the the thing, and something might move you to think it's going to be this guy, you know, but you know, I'm kind of forced to say that, right? Depends on how much good there is in him. He could always be assassinated, you know. He could go down the pole, right? Put his foot in his mouth, right?

[56:47] Doesn't help to get get nominated. Okay. Once they nominate someone, at the foot in his mouth. Okay. Now, the last end of necessity moves the will, right? Because it is a what? Perfect good, right?

[57:10] And likewise, those things which are ordered to this end, without which the end cannot be had, right? Just as to be and to live and things of this sort, right?

[57:25] Others, without which the end can be had, one does not what? Of necessity will when one wills the end. Just as conclusions without which the principles can be true, are not one does not believe a necessity when he believes the what? Principles, right? Okay. So if you see something follows necessarily from the principles, then you'd say, well.

[57:58] So must I will to study logic? Is it necessary? No, necessary. So. Dionne gave a course there, on whether logic is necessary for intellectus, scientia, and Sophia, right? You have to distinguish, right? So if I see logic is necessary for wisdom, and I'm a lover of wisdom, then I'm...

[58:27] Oh. Yeah. But I suppose I could find. reasons for not studying logic tonight. Especially with Albert Albert's fountain. So. We'll see whether it's moved necessarily by my emotions next next next week, yeah.