Prima Secundae
38. Aquinas, Summa I-II Q.11: Fruition (Enjoyment) and the Last End
Class of 2011-11-03
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/038-aquinas-summa-i-ii-q-11-fruition-enjoyment-and-the-last-end/

[0:00] Now we get to question eleven, right? Then one ought to consider about fruition, enjoyment, right? Is that where we get the word fruit? I suppose Yeah. Yeah. And Thomas he talks about you know the fruits of the Holy Spirit, right? And the idea of fruit has got the idea of something that is what ultimate or last, right? And indelectable, right? No. But here it's a what? Another act of the will with respect to the what?

[0:36] End. Okay. And I guess that's in the sentences, right? Where kind of the fundamental thing there from Augustine, you know, you should enjoy the things that should be enjoyed, and and use the things should be used, and don't make the mix them up, yeah.

[1:01] I was looking at the Catena Aurea there in John, right? And one of the church fathers Thomas is quoting there. He's talking about jactantia and any glory and all these terrible things they are, right? And then he's a quote from another church father. He said the only way to probably to avoid this, right, which is so terrible, is to realize anything good in you comes from God, right?

[1:28] And so I was thinking, you know, the the conversation between my grandfather and my mother, right? My mother told me this. Kind of interesting, he says. Now when I'm gone, and he says, right, you're going to think, you know, gee, I didn't thank my father for all he did for me, you know. He says, but don't don't don't be too, you know, disturbed by that. He says because I thought the same thing when my father died, right?

[1:56] That I had not thanked him, you know, huh? Okay. And so it's kind of interesting conversations you have with your father there, right? That you never really thank your father or your mother for that matter. Enough, right? You know what they've done for you, right? I remember Brother Richard, you know, he was a young parent there and saying, no, you don't realize how much your parents did for you until you're a parent yourself, right?

[2:21] No, but you know. Lifelong. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But then you realize this thing, right? Okay. It goes back to what Cicero says so well, right? The son is always in debt to his what? Father. And part of debt is you always owe him thanks more than you can thank him, right? Okay. Isn't that a beautiful thing when you stop and think though? If that's true, which it is, right?

[2:51] Well then, don't you have to thank even more God, right, for giving you this mother and father, right? You know. Or you know how Plato thanked the gods that he had had met Socrates, right? You know, well we all teach you to say you can't thank you teach you too much, right? Take some of my candy, but it was I had my candy bar, something else after, but you can't you can't thank it, you can't you know.

[3:22] I'm also here, sweet tooth. And I just look good when I was anywhere else, you know. But but and the two you can't you know, or I can say you know I can't thank Thomas enough for what he's enlightened me on, right? You see, but thank even more God for what giving us Thomas and Augustine and so on, right? I mean, did you thank Mozart for his music?

[3:55] Well, I can't. I haven't met the man, but but I try to express my thanks to him sometimes, right? You know, I should thank God even more than Mozart for giving us Mozart, right? In one year. Yeah, and have you thanked you know Shakespeare for his plays, right? He probably worked on these plays, right? Mozart worked on his music, right? Yeah, I think you should, you know.

[4:19] So far you can, but you can't really thank the man too much. But you should thank even more God for having given us Shakespeare and Mozart and Homer, Socrates, right?

[4:34] I'm just speaking to my nephew about that, saying, you know, he wants to do well in school because he owes his parents so much, and I said, all the more you owe God. Yeah. What he's given you, I just say finally, what he's given you, what he's forgiven you, and what he's promised you. Yeah. Yeah. No end.

[4:55] So let's go on and begin legend here by Thomas, and about this four things are what. Considered or asked. Asked, right? Okay. First, whether fruit is an act of the desiring power, right?

[5:16] Secondly, whether it belongs only to the what rational creature, to the rational creature alone, or also to the brute what animals, huh? It's important because you're having steak. I'd say to Tabitha and the cat, you know, You're, having steak tonight. I don't know if if she got to know what that meant, you know. You know, hang around, you get a, you know, I used to give tidbits on the my play all the time.

[5:48] And third, whether fruition is only of the last end, right? And fourth, whether it is what. Only of the end when it has happened.

[6:06] Okay, this is fascinating stuff here. To the first end, one proceeds thus. It seems that frui. Now, how does your translation? To enjoy, to enjoy. I guess that's the way. That's all I can think of. You know,

[6:31] but the word fruit is derived from that too, right? I suppose fruits are used for dessert, right? It seems that frui is not only of the what? Appetitive power, right?

[6:50] What? Desiring power. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. For to enjoy seems to be nothing other than what? The fruit. The fruit, yeah. But the fruit of human life, which is beatitude, right?

[7:15] The intellect, what? Grass. In whose act beatitude consists on seeing God as He is, face to face, as has been shown above when he took up what beatitude is.

[7:30] Therefore, to enjoy is not only of the appetitive power, but also of the understanding. So, do my ears enjoy Mozart's music? My eyes enjoy, you know, Titian's paintings and so on. Da Vinci's paintings.

[7:57] Do I enjoy Thomas? Right. Feast of reason, as as as Socrates calls it. I enjoy a feast of reason now. Moreover, each power has its own end, which is its what? Perfection. Just as the end of sight is to know the visible, of the ear to perceive the sounds of Mozart, and thus about the others, right? But the end of a thing is its what? Fruit.

[8:38] Therefore, to enjoy is of each power, right, and not only of the desiring power. Moreover, fruition implies a certain what? Delight, yeah, some pleasure. But sensible pleasure pertains to sense, which delights in its own what? Object, right?

[9:06] And for the same reason, intellectual delight to the what? Yeah, to the understanding. Therefore, fruition pertains to the apprehensive power and not to the what? Desiring power.

[9:31] Now, what is this? Is this our equivocation here, or what is there? Right. We were reading the the book of places of Aristotle there last night there in my Wednesday night class there, and some of them had the English text there. You know, of course, the Greek word was synonyma, right? And they were translating the English text synonym. What what would be the correct translation Would be you know we used the. Latin, word univocal, right?

[10:01] Because The genus has said, you know, it's not a synonym of the species, because animals say, "and dog" doesn't mean the same thing, not synonyms. But animal is said univocally of dog, cat, horse, and so on, right? But Aristotle uses the word in both senses, right? But like in the categories, he's talking about univocal predication when you say it in Latin. He's the word, you know.

[10:29] But then synonym might be when he's talking rhetoric, you know, when he's talking about using a synonym in poetry, right? But how's this going to have this? Okay.

[10:43] But against this is what Augustine says in the first book on Christian teaching, right? And in the tenth book about the Trinity. Those two two central works of Augustine, right? Constitutions, as they'd say. Frui what by love, right? To adhere, right? In something, propter ipsum in a kind of itself, right?

[11:13] It's like Bernard Claros says. The reason to love God is God. But love pertains to the what? This desiring power, right? Therefore, to enjoy is an act of the what? Desiring power, right? It's a beautiful quote there from Augustine.

[11:41] Thomas says, "Huh? I answer. It should be said that fruition and fructus, right? Enjoyment and fruit. How you translate this, huh? How they translate these two words, Enjoyment and fruit. What? Enjoyment and fruit. Yeah, yeah. Seem to pertain to the same thing, right? Huh? And one to be derived from the other, right? Huh?

[12:12] Now, which from which, right? That's nothing to do with the thing proposed, right? Huh? Except that this seems probable, right? That that which is more manifest was first what? Yeah. All right,

[12:36] teacher Kosterich, there would say the word "manifest" means what? You got the hand right in the act, right? I got my hand, let's say, in your your money box, right? And you know, you know. I'm a manifest thief, right? That was very clever. Yeah, yeah, I mentioned that to her a lot, but but it seemed like at the time, you know, you catch the guy, you know.

[13:03] His money in the till, right? In the hand of the cookie jar. Yeah, yeah, it's manifest. High crime. So it's probable that that which is what more manifest was before what named, huh? In order of naming. huh? It's a fruit. More manifest.

[13:30] Now those are to us first manifest, which are more what sensible, right? Whence from sensible what fruits, Fruits, the name of fruition would seem to be derived. I mean those green apples, used to get when I was a boy off the trees, you know. Or the blueberries off the bushes. Yeah, yeah. Blackberry. Yeah.

[14:03] I was back to St. Paul, Minnesota. There, you know, walking with my wife and my brother Richard and his wife, and I was talking about the green apples they had And there was a little, and then we'd come across this green apples hanging down right on the sidewalk, you know, where they belong to. Oh, is that you know just crisp and sour, you know.

[14:25] So that's manifest, right? You know, it's just this right in front of me. Doesn't Augustine talk about stealing? Yeah, they taste sweeter when somebody over it. Manifest, right?

[14:40] Whence from sensible fruits the name of fruition would seem to be derived. But the sensible fruit, right, is that which is last expected from the what tree, and which is perceived with a certain sweetness, huh? That's such a mouthwater, right? My daughter planted planted a whole bunch of of fruit trees just this last year. I don't know how long it takes these trees to develop before they produce fruit, you know.

[15:13] Depends on how big they were. Yeah. Whence fruition would seem to pertain to the love, right, or the pleasure, right? They're not the same thing, love and pleasure, which someone has about something last that is what expected, right, huh? Which would be therefore the what end, huh? But the end and the good is the object of the appetitive what power, right? That's where Aristotle in the second book of metaphysics, right?

[15:53] He says if you do away at the end, you don't realize you're doing away at the good. So the moderns who don't talk about the end anymore—they don't really have anything good to say. Whence it is manifest that fruition is an act of the appetitive power, right? I got this pester basically from Rome, and I got an email there the other day there, and another question now about talking about how we name things in the sensible first, right?

[16:27] Well, now he's gotten into the fifth book of the metaphysics there, and he's into the being there, you know, and doesn't see that with you know active and I mean proceedens and per se and so on, you know. You know, with this text here, this is a beautiful text, though. Yeah, yeah.

[16:48] It's a beautiful text there. So I suppose the fruit is is a what? The thing the senses know, right? Huh? Right. The interior act there is what? Not so sensible, right? Yeah. So nature loves to hide because it's inward.

[17:10] Now, what's the first objection here, right? But the fruit of human life is beatitude. That's what the intellect does. To the first, therefore, it should be said that nothing prevents one and the same thing, for diverse reasons, right, to pertain to diverse what? Powers, right? Huh? For the vision itself of God, huh? Seeing God as He is, right? Or seeing God what? Face to face, right? In so far as it is a vision, right, is an act of the what?

[18:00] Understanding, right? That's what I was mentioning at the beginning of the metaphysics there, where it's usually translated all men by nature desire to know, right? Huh? But the word to know there in Greek is eidenai, right? Which comes from the idea of what? To see, to understand, right? Huh? And we tend to use the word you know to see for to understand, right? My mother used to say I see to the blind man, but he couldn't see at all, right?

[18:28] Huh? Okay. So the vision itself of God, huh? The sight of God, in so far as it is a vision, is an act of the understanding. But in so far as it is something what? Good, right? And an end, it's the object of the what? The will, right? And in this way is is it's what? Enjoyment. Enjoyment, huh? And thus, this end, the understanding, achieves as were the power acting.

[19:11] But the will, as the power, what Moving. moving towards the end and enjoying the end now attained. So when you see God as He is face to face, you will enjoy this. But that enjoying it will be the act of the what? The will, right? So if we didn't, if we only had intellects but we didn't have wills, we'd see God but we wouldn't have the enjoyment.

[19:39] It's kind of fun to think of that, but don't think. Prohibit it. Prohibit it. Thought. Is is the will like a proper even intellectual creature? You couldn't have an intellectual creature will You couldn't no

[20:04] Because the good is known by the reason is the object of the will, right? So you got the object of the will, there you have the power that addresses that object, right? That is worthy of that object.

[20:20] Which reminds me of Chesterton's saying the chief demonstration of the immortality of the soul is you can't get enough of a good thing. To second it should be said that the perfection and the end of any other power, right, is contained under the object of the desiring power, as the private particular under the common right.

[20:48] Whence the perfection and the end of each power, in so far as it is a certain good, pertains to what the desiring power, on account of which the desiring power moves the other powers to their ends, right? And it itself what follows the end, right?

[21:16] When each of the others arrives at its end, right? It obtains its end. So I guess my will is moving my ear to hear Mozart, right?

[21:34] Yeah, to listen to different hearing, I guess. Now, in pleasure, he says there are two things. One is the perception of the thing being what suitable, and this pertains to the grasping power, which I guess is the knowing power, right? We call the first act of the mind simple what grasping, right? And the what? It's complacent or it's being pleased, I guess. Yeah. Which is offered as fitting or suitable, coming together, convenience.

[22:24] And this pertains to the desiring power, in which the ratio of pleasure is what. Completed, yeah, yeah. Aristotle argues, you know, that that pleasure accompanies the perfection of the operation of these other powers, right?

[22:49] And there almost seems to set up it's attached to the what the the other power, right? But Thomas speaks here as it's being completed in the will, right? Pleasure, delight.

[23:17] Should we take a little break now? Here. To the second one proceeds thus: It seems that frui is only of what men, right? Sorry, it's a thing that Descartes would say, right? That is automatons or machines, you know, the the other animals. For Augustine says in the first book of the Christian Doctrine

[23:47] that it's us men who what enjoy and use, right? Therefore, the other animals are not able to enjoy, right? Moreover, to enjoy is of the last end, right? But to the last end, the brute animals are not able to arrive. Therefore, it's not of them to what enjoy, right? Moreover, just as the sense-desiring power is under the intellectual one, so natural appetite is under the what sense.

[24:27] So that's when he's talking about the what you know the plant wants sunlight or it wants you know a lot of food. You know, it's a big eater You're talking about the natural appetite there, right? If therefore to enjoy belongs to the sense desire, it would seem for like reason it would pertain to the natural one, right? Okay, so the plants would be,

[24:56] which is clearly what false, huh? Because it is not of them to be what. Yeah. You require knowledge to to enjoy, right? Therefore, the sense desire it doesn't belong to it to enjoy, right? And thus it does not belong to brute animals, huh? Got to stop it somewhere, right?

[25:26] Can't have the whole universe enjoying itself. But against this is what Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-Three Questions: to enjoy what food, huh? And every what bodily pleasure is not absurdly estimated to be so what for the beasts, right? Okay. So Augustine there is been quoted on both sides, right? He's a great man, Augustine. You see that that one encyclical of John Paul II and Augustine?

[26:06] I know. Yeah, Augustinum Hipponensem something like that. It's Augustine of Hippo but it's really you know impressive, and you see that you know already. I mean, laying it out, you know, and very. Very complete and authoritative. It's really very impressive, you know. I think I'm impressed already with Augustine. If I'm reading what I mean, but you can see it's a Thomas, you know. How much he drew from Augustine.

[26:38] Answer should be said that as as it had from the foresaid things, to enjoy is not an act of the power arriving at the end as what, carrying it out, right? But of the power commanding the carrying out, right? Execution, huh? It's carrying out the sentence, right?

[27:02] Okay. In things lacking knowledge, right? There is found the power arriving at the end by way of what? Carrying it out. Carrying it out.

[27:26] Ah, just as by which the heavy tends downward and the light upwards, right? But the power to which pertains the end by way of commanding is not found in them, right? But in some higher nature, right? Which thus moves the whole nature by command, just as in those having knowledge, the desiring power moves the other powers to their what? Acts, huh? Whence it is manifest that in those things which lack knowledge, although they do arrive at the end, there is not found in them an enjoyment of the what?

[28:13] End, huh? But only in those things which have what? Knowledge, huh? But the knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect, by which is not only known what is the end and the good, but the universal what? Notion, you might say, of the end and the good, right? And such a knowledge is of the rational nature alone, right?

[28:53] So does the dog know what an end is? No, it has an end. He knows his own end, right? But he doesn't know what it is to be an end. Okay, on the rational nature. Okay, the imperfect knowledge is by which is known particularly the end and the good, and such a knowledge is in the. brute animals, whose desiring powers are not commanding freely, but by a natural instinct to those things which are what grasped, they are moved.

[29:36] Whence to the rational nature belongs enjoyment in its perfect what meaning, but to brute animals according to a what, but to other creatures no way. So the apple tree doesn't what enjoy its apples at all, right?

[30:03] But the worm does, and I do. Okay, so the worm detracts from my enjoyment of the apple That's right considerably. As they say, especially if you eat an apple and have a worm. Yes. So, to the first objection then from Augustine, that was speaking about perfect fruition, right? But in the other quotes, Augustine is imperfect.

[30:32] That's a nice way to get out of things. Okay. Convenient escape. Now, to the second, it should be said that is not necessary that fruition be of the last end simply, but of that which is had by each for its what last end.

[30:58] So when the cat gets a nice meal and a nice warm bed, huh? He's surprised. That's right. I'm sure they'll laugh when part of this. I can picture the dog after he has a good meal and lays down and burps. He's happy. He's happy.

[31:17] To third, it should be said that the sense desire follows upon what some knowledge, huh? But the natural appetite does not follow upon some knowledge,

[31:33] especially in those things which what lack knowledge, right? Huh? We have some natural desire too, right? You know that we digest our food, not.

[31:46] To the fourth, that's the implied aside, right? Augustine there speaks of imperfect fruition, which, from his way of speaking, appears. For he says that fui non audio absurde existimenter and this just as what uti. Would be said most, but yeah, but we haven't got to you yet, so right. That'd be most absurdissime, time for one more. Whether fruition is only of the last end, to the third one proceeds thus.

[32:43] It seems that fruition is not only of the last end. For the apostle says to Philemon, "Thus, fathers, brother, I enjoy you in the Lord, right?

[33:00] I enjoy your company. But it is manifest that Paul does not place his last end in man, even for a curious woman. Therefore, enjoyment is not only of the last end, right?

[33:25] Just remember this is recorded. Moreover, fruit is by which someone enjoys. But the apostle says to Galatians, the fruits of the Holy Spirit are caritas, charity, gaudium, joy, peace, and others of this sort, which do not have the notion of the last end. Therefore, fruition is not only of the last end, right?

[34:01] Moreover, the acts of the will reflect upon themselves, right? For I will myself to will, and I love myself to what? Love, huh? I like that. I like Mozart, huh? I like that. like. Shakespeare Yeah, I like. that like Shakespeare and so on. Therefore, someone enjoys what his own enjoyment, huh?

[34:37] But enjoyment is not the last end of man, but only the uncreated good, which is God. Therefore, fruition is not only of the last end. Enjoy that you're enjoying.

[35:00] Against is what Augustine says in the tenth book of the Trinity. One does not enjoy that which one what takes for the use of the will, right? The facultatem, propter aliud appetitur Just desire for some other thing. Yeah, something. Yeah, that's for the sake of something other than itself, right? But only the last end is the thing that is not desired in the account of something else, right?

[35:37] Therefore, of the last end alone, is what. Okay, let's go back and see what Thomas Census. I answer: It should be said that as has been said to the knowledge, I mean, to the notion of fruit, two things pertain, to wit, that it be last, right, and that it what quiets the appetite, puts to rest the appetite by a certain sweetness, right, or.

[36:21] pleasure, yeah. Um, but the last is twofold, simply right, and secundum quid, right? This is the distinction we so often. Simply, what is not referred to another, right? But secundum quid, what is the last of what? Some things, right? Okay.

[36:57] So the last theorem, in Book One, of Euclid, right? Last also thanked. So what is therefore simply last, in which something what delights as in its last end? This is properly called what fruit, fruit, and one is properly said to what enjoy.

[37:31] But what, however, in itself is not delectable, but is only desired in order to another, as a bitter potion for health, right? In no way can be called what enjoyment, right? Or fruit, yeah.

[37:52] Yeah. But what, however, in itself has a certain what pleasure, pleasure, to which some things preceding it are referred, is able in some way to be called a what fruit, right? But not properly, and according to the complete what notion of what fruit, right? Um.

[38:26] In it, who is said to what enjoy? Once Augustine, the tenth book, of the Trinity, says that we what. Things known in which the will pleased rests, right? But it does not rest simply, except in the last. Our hearts are restless, right?

[38:51] Because as long as something is expected, the motion of the will remains suspended, right? Although it has arrived at something, right? Just as in locomotion, that which is middle in the magnitude is both a what beginning and an end. But is not taken as an end in act, except when it someone rests. It goes back to the physics there. Don't take too much time. Okay.

[39:33] Not the first one about enjoying you, right? In the Lord, right? He says. To the first, therefore, should be said that, as Augustine says in the first book on Christian doctrine, if he said, "I enjoy you," and did not add "in Domino," right, in the Lord, he would seem to place the end of his love in the in in him, right? But because he adds that in Domino,

[40:03] he places it in God, right, or in the Lord, and signifies in him that he enjoys, right. And thus the brother, this is himself to enjoy, right? Not as the as the end or the terminus, but as were a what middle. So I don't come to rest in you, right? But I love you in the Lord, or I enjoy you in the Lord, right? So he's kind of like a middle.

[40:43] I enjoy you, but but it terminates in in God, right? Enjoy you in the Lord. Don't enjoy you in yourself. Enjoy you in the Lord, right? It's an interesting way of speaking, huh? So we're going to enjoy all the saints and angels in heaven. In the Lord.

[41:20] I guess that might explain to some extent. That's what I always thought of when in morals, at least in Latin, when they speak about marriage, they always speak about the use of marriage. Most people enjoy, even though it may have much happiness, but they always speak of its use, and I think we. But that's the sense that it's a means to an end, because our focus, at least nowadays, is always like it's an end in itself, Yeah.

[41:48] Thomas says in one of those works, which one is it now? in the little works where he quotes one of the sapiential books: "Run into your house and play with your thoughts." And he's saying, "Well, what way is his you know contemplation like play, right?" And of course, part is because it's what, yeah, and it's kind of for its own sake to some extent, right? You know, but it's not. Fully for its own sake, right?

[42:38] Because we play so we can do something more serious later on. Don't like don't like playboy, right? They play the the the end of life, right?

[42:51] Okay, drinking this beer and playing this video games, right? Shut that kid up! That's just terrible. To the second, it should be said that fruit is in a different way compared to the what But tree producing it, right? Another way to man what enjoying it. To the tree producing it is compared as an effect to a cause, right? But to the one enjoying it as something last expected in delighting, right?

[43:42] Seems not between the trees fair, right? He puts all the work of producing these fruit, and we expect the tree to produce the fruit, and we enjoy it, yeah.

[43:59] Those things, therefore, which are enumerated by the apostle, right, are called fruits, right, because they are effects of the Holy Spirit in us, right. Whence they are what called fruits of the Spirit, right? Not, however, thus that we enjoy them as as last end in.

[44:28] Or, in another way, it should be said that they are called what fruits, according to Ambrose, right? Because for themselves they should be what sought, sought, yeah, Or asked for, yeah. Not, however, that they are not referred to Beatitude, right? But because in themselves they have, whence they ought to what please us, right? One of the fruits of the Spirit is faith, you know, but it means something different than the theological virtue of faith.

[45:04] But it's kind of a intensity of belief, right? You know, right? It's delightful, right, to have this certitude, right, in a in a way, right.

[45:18] So the in seipsis have it, unde debeant placere. They have in themselves, whence they should please us, right. Interesting. We use the word "play" there for Shakespeare's dramas, right? Do you know that we have the English word "play" rather than "drama"? Drama is kind of a Greek word, I guess. Play.

[45:58] To the third, it should be said that has been said above. An end is said in two ways. In one way, the thing itself, right? Another way, the what? Obtaining of the thing, huh? Which are not two ends, right? But one end considered in itself and applied to what? Another. God, therefore, is the last end as a thing which is last.

[46:33] But fruition, enjoyment, is as the what obtaining of this last end. Just therefore, there is not another end, God, and the enjoyment of God, right? So, for the same,

[46:54] so also there is the same what? Notion. Notion of enjoyment. And that by which we enjoy God. God, and by which we enjoy the what? Enjoyment. Yeah.

[47:10] And the same reason is about created beatitude, which consists in fruition. You get that? What's he saying now? The objection is kind of strange.

[47:32] Can you can you be pleased that you are pleased? I don't think so So You go in the restaurant and order a meal, and suddenly you're not pleased with it. But if you're pleased with the meal, then you are what? Pleased and you're pleased that you're pleased. Pleased that you're yeah, that you're pleased with the meal.

[47:57] It's just what I hoped for. Yeah, but I'm pleased with music. I'm pleased with it, right? I'm pleased that I'm pleased, right? What a wonderful piece of music this is! So, if you can be pleased, that you're pleased, right?

[48:16] Pick up a theory of your place, and I'm pleased with it. That's for some people. That's for some people. Well, should we do the last article? Okay. Yeah that makes sense It's kind of a short article huh Yeah It seems that fruition is not except of the end what had right, huh?

[48:54] For Augustine says in the tenth book of the Trinity that to enjoy is to use with joy, not of what hope, but of the thing itself, right?

[49:11] But so long as it's not had, it is not a joy in the thing, right? Of the thing, but of the hope. Therefore, fruition is not except of the what end had, right?

[49:27] Moreover, as has been said, fruition is not properly said except of the last end, because only the last end quiets the appetite. Our hearts are restless until they rest in thee, right?

[49:47] But the appetite is not at rest except when the except in the end now had, right? Therefore, I guess the having of it is is kind of reward of hope they say, huh?

[50:05] Therefore, fruition, properly speaking, is not except of the end had. Moreover, to enjoy is to grab the fruit, right? To hold the fruit, but one does not grab the fruit, not capture the fruit, except when the end is had, right? Therefore, fruition is not except of the end had, right?

[50:38] But against this, to enjoy is by love to adhere in something on account of itself, huh? But this can come about with a thing not what had. Therefore, to enjoy can be also of the end not had.

[51:04] It seems to me must be some kind of distinction that Thomas has to see, huh? Answer: It should be said that to enjoy implies a certain comparison of the will to the last end, according as the will has something for what last end. But the end is had in two ways: in one way, perfectly; another way, imperfectly, huh?

[51:36] Perfectly, when it's had not only in intention but also in reality. Imperfectly, when it's had in intention but only. There is therefore perfect fruition of the end when it's had really, but imperfect is of an end not had really, but in intention only.

[52:10] So, to the first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine speaks of perfect fruition. To the second, now which has got to be at rest. That the rest of the will is impeded in two ways. In one way, on the side of the object, which, to it, is not the last end, but is ordered to another, right? Another way, on the side of the one desiring the end, was not yet obtained, I guess.

[52:47] The end. But it's the object that gives the species to the act. But from the agent depends the way of acting that it be either perfect or imperfect, according to the condition of the agent. And therefore, that which is not the last end fruition is spoken of improperly, right? As it were, falling short from the very species of enjoyment.

[53:20] But of an end of the last end not had, there is fruition properly right, but imperfect on account of the imperfect way of having the last end, right? Now there's in the song of songs, there, my teacher, there, Bernard Clairvaux, has a time you know where the bride is what at rest, right? And then now he's he's called out to do some good work, right? And so, but there is a fruition there, right?

[53:57] And he wants the bride not to be disturbed when she's during contemplation. So there's a kind of fruition there, right? But it's imperfect, right? because he doesn't really possess the groom.

[54:14] To the third, it should be said that to to what take up the end or to have it, someone has said not only secundum rem but also according to what intention. Which leads us right into the next question. No, we better stop that, right?