Prima Secundae
39. Summa I-II Q.12, Arts. 1-2: Intention as an Act of the Will, and Intending the Last End and Intermediate Ends
Class of 2011-11-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/039-summa-i-ii-q-12-arts-1-2-intention-as-an-act-of-the-will/

[0:02] Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

[0:32] amen. I was reading across some texts there, Thomas, the other day. they were always talking about the bad angels, you know, the demons, right? And they don't strengthen the light of our mind, right? But they do act on our images, right? Images. And suggest things, right? Huh? Yes, sir. But the good angel, there, guardian angels, right? They strengthen the light of our mind, so we can judge better, right?

[0:56] What judge means to separate the true from the false. Makes some beginning in our knowledge, so that's not what the devil wants to do. Wants to deceive us, huh?

[1:10] I mean, there's two sermons there. I just got to reading them and Bernard Clairvaux there about the little foxes, you know, cats of little foxes. The second sermon, I guess, is really kind of addressed to the heretics in his time. I guess they'd be the Albigensians and people like that, huh? You know, for marriage is forbidden, right? And certain foods are forbidden, and so on. And he says, "How come they don't have a name like the Nestorians or the you know the usually you know the sect of heretics named after the founder, right?"

[1:41] I said, "They don't have a name because it probably came from the devil, right?" It's like being an apostle. Really interesting to read, huh? Okay, let's just for a second look at the premium to eight here. Question eight, just so we can recall where we are, right?

[2:01] Look at the premium to question eight. He says, "Then we ought to consider about the acts of the will in special, in particular, and first about the acts which are immediately of the will itself, right? As elicited by the will itself. Secondly, about the acts commanded by the will, which might not be acts of the will, right? That's the first division into two. The will, however, is moved both towards the end and towards those things which are to the end.

[2:38] Huh? First, therefore, we ought to consider about the acts of the will, but which it is moved to the end, and then about the acts which is moved to those things which are towards the end, huh? And then the acts of the will towards the end. Seem to be three, to it, to will, to enjoy, right, and to what? Intend. Intend, yeah. And now we're up to question twelve, which is the third of those, right?

[3:10] Last time we were talking about fruition, right, huh? Now we're going to talk about intention. So then we ought to consider, he says, about intention at the beginning of chapter twelve there. And about this fourth or five things are asked. First, whether intention is an act of the understanding or of the what? Will. Secondly, whether it is only of the last end.

[3:44] Third, whether someone is able at the same time to intend two things. Well, you're distracted. You are. Fourth, whether the intention of the end is the same act with the will of that which is what towards the end, huh? And fifth, whether intention belongs to the brute what animals, huh? Okay, so we go now to the first article. To the first, one proceeds thus: It seems that intention is an act of the understanding and not of the what will.

[4:28] For it is said in the Gospel of Saint Matthew, chapter six, if your eye is what simple, just what you say, pure, right, huh? Your whole body will be lucid, huh?

[4:46] Whereby eye is signified intention, as Augustine says in the book on the Sermon of Our Lord on the Mountain, huh? That's in what chapters? Five, seven, something like that in Matthew, Sermon on the Mount. That's all you need to know is in there. I guess Augustine tells you to live. But the eye, since it is a tool of sight, signifies a grasping power, right, huh?

[5:19] Thomas often calls that first act of reason the simple grasping, right? Grasping what something is. It's a very what interesting. It's taken from the hand, right, and applied to knowing power. But when you grasp something, it is contained in the what hand, right? And so, when the mind grasps something, it's contained in another way in the mind.

[5:49] So we say that knowing takes place by the thing known being in the knower. Why love is the heart being and the thing loved, right? Kind of reverse.

[6:09] Therefore, intention is not an act of the desiring power, but of the grasping power, the knowing power. Moreover, Augustine there says that intention is called a light by the Lord. Where he says, "If the light which is in you are darknesses] , and so on, " but light pertains to knowledge, right? Therefore, intention, huh? So two quotes here from Augustine, huh?

[6:47] Moreover, intention designates a certain ordering towards the end. But to order is a reason. Now Shakespeare taught us that, right? Looking before and after its order.

[7:07] Now Homer has almost the same phrase as Shakespeare has, but the one Homer has is to look before and behind yourself. And this comes in the key points, right? Like in the beginning of the Iliad, there when when there's this fight between Agamemnon and Achilles, right? Achilles is going to, you know, withdraw from the battle, right, and so on. And he says, you know, Agamemnon doesn't realize how he's insulted me, right?

[7:31] He can't look before and behind himself, right? Of course, everything goes eventually against him, right? Until Patroclus, the best friend of Achilles, is killed, and then Achilles comes back, right? But you know, the Trojans are encamped out there in the open field, right? And they know that Achilles is coming back tomorrow, right? And Polydamas, who alone looks before and after himself, right, says, "Let's get back inside the city.

[7:58] " Then, of course, they they're so confident, you know, that they've been beating the Achaeans, the Greeks, that they don't listen to him, right? But fools, now Zeus had taken away their mind, you know. But he uses that phrase, you know, looking before and behind yourself, right? So that when Theobald, one of the editors of Shakespeare in the early centuries, seventeenth century, I guess, when he sees this phrase "looking before and after, " he says the phrase almost what Homeric.

[8:27] But Shakespeare's phrase, I think, is is better than Homer's, right? Because you can extend the meanings of before and after to all the different ways that reason looks before and after. But it shows you that the the two greatest poets, right, huh? Homer and Shakespeare both see what characterizes reason, huh? It's marvelous to see those two, the two greatest poets in harmony, right? Is.

[8:56] I just learned too that the etymology for wit, yeah, comes. It actually traces itself to videre in Latin in one way, but it's a common root between Latin and Sanskrit, the Veda or Vedan or something, and it refers to see. I didn't know that before.

[9:18] I just learned that. That's why that first sentence in the metaphysics, right, should be translated, didn't I, to understand that? No more precise than to know.

[9:31] So to order is an act of reason, right? So intending, you're ordering one thing to another, aren't you? So that's an act of reason. Moreover, the act of the will is not except of either the end or those things which are toward the end. But the act of the will with respect to the end is called voluntas or fruition, right? respect to those things which are towards the end. And there is what choice, which intention differs from, right?

[10:06] Therefore, intention is not the act of the will, right? Obviously, Thomas has forgotten he's spoken of these three acts, right? In the frame of the question,

[10:20] but against this is what Augustine says in the eleventh book about the Trinity. That the intention of the will joins the what body seen to vision, right? And likewise, the species or form existing in memory to the sharpness of the soul, inwardly thinking about it, huh? Cogitare huh? To agitate to think together.

[10:53] Therefore, intention is an act of the what will, huh? Obviously, Augustine is in contradiction with himself, right? No, Thomas all things feel straightened out.

[11:12] I answer. It should be said that intention, just as the name itself sounds, right, signifies to tend in something, right, huh? I'm interested. Either way, in there all the time, huh? Because you didn't intend to say tend towards something, wouldn't you? You could. someone might translate that as into or unto something. Yeah. Yeah. To be into you. To be closer to us, yeah.

[11:43] Now, towards something or into something, right, tends both the action of the mover and the action of the moved, huh? But that the motion of the movable tends in something proceeds from the action of the what mover, right? So I bring the water up to me, right?

[12:14] And the mover, the glass, right? Responsible for the glass tending towards my mouth, huh? Whence intention first and chiefly pertains to that which moves something towards an end, huh?

[12:34] Whence we say that the architect and everyone what command commanding moves by his command others to that which he himself intends, huh? But the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as has been said above, right? Whence it is manifest that intention properly is an act of the what will, huh?

[13:05] So the object of the will is the good, right? And the good is basically the same thing as the end. Aristotle brings out there in the what second book of the metaphysics, right?

[13:22] So it seems that the will then is going to move things to their end because that's its object, the end of the good. Now, what about the first objection, or oculus, it seemed to be, you know?

[13:41] As Hamlet said, you know, I see my father, and he said, "Where?" Looking around for the ghost, right? In my mind's eye, right? So, to the first, therefore, it should be said that intention is what name the eye metaphorically, huh?

[14:01] Not because it pertains to knowledge, right? There's not because it pertains to an act of knowledge, right? But because it presupposes what knowledge, huh?

[14:20] Through which is proposed to the will the end to which it what moves, huh? I mean, a lot of these objections can be solved by pointing out that the act of reason is presupposed to the the act of the will, right? Just as by the eye we foresee what where to tend bodily and where not to tend bodily, right? Towards something.

[14:47] So we solve that, huh? What do we do about Thomas, huh? Aristotle says here, huh? Young poets are better at tying the knot than untying it. Same thing you said about the young philosophers, or even the old philosophers, for the most part. they're better at tying than not than they are untying it, right?

[15:22] Now, to the second, it should be said that intention is called light because it is what made known to right, or is manifest to the one intending, right?

[15:38] Whence also deeds are said to be what darkness, huh? Because the man knows what he intends, but he does not know what is going to follow from the deed,

[15:53] as Augustine himself there expounds, huh? Okay, well Augustine after. To the third, it should be said that the will, to be sure, does not order, right? But nevertheless, it tends towards something by the order of what? Reason, huh? Whence this name intention names the act of the will, but presupposing the ordering of reason, ordering something in what? It's in. When

[16:36] Thomas is explaining the the word order, he says something like that: that the first thing involved in the meaning of order is distinction, because nothing is before or after itself, right? So there has to be some distinction, right? But then he kind of corrects himself and says, "But that's not really what order means. Order means a before and after. That's what it means. But that presupposes some distinction between what is before and what is after, right?

[17:08] So we could say distinction is presupposed to order, but it's not the meaning of order, right? So you find that a lot, right? Someone sent me an email and they wanted me to help them investigate this idea that false imagination is the cause of deception, right? Well, if you want to understand why false imagination is the cause of deception, you've got to begin by realizing that our reason depends upon images, huh?

[17:40] That images are to our reason like the color outside the eye is to the eye, right? And I can't see the redness of the apple or the greenness of the apple without the apple there, right? And so our reason has kind of for its proper object the what it is is something you can sense or imagine in a a proximate sense, huh? But that doesn't show you why the imagination deceives you, right?

[18:12] But it's presupposed to understanding, right? If reason didn't depend upon the imagination for thinking, then you wouldn't have what? False imagination, huh? Yeah, yeah. So, but then you have to go to what's peculiar, right, to the imagination that, as Thomas says there in one text, that it knows the likeness of things absent. And then you say, well, he's touching upon two causes there of deception, huh? Because likeness is very much the cause of deception, huh?

[18:46] And I was giving him this text from the Sophist there where Plato says that likeness is a slippery thing, right? And you've got to be on your guard, most of all, against likeness. that's going to lead you astray, right? Aristotle talks about likeness at the beginning of the book on sophisticated refutations, these bad arguments, huh? And

[19:10] it's funny how how likeness deceives, but you might say seeing likeness but not seeing the what difference, huh? I just got through reading the my favorite book, the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, and there's a likeness between reasons knowing and the loving and the wills willing, right? And the likeness is that in the divine mind, the divine understanding, by knowing his very substance, right, he knows other things.

[19:48] His chief object is his own substance, huh? By knowing his own substance, he knows other things as effects of his own substance and like it in some way, etc., etc., right? Then you go to the will and you say, what does God will? But chiefly, what He wills, what He loves chiefly, is His own substance, huh? And that's because His own substance is goodness itself, right? But in loving His own substance, then He loves what other things, right?

[20:17] As ordered to His own goodness, huh? Well, when you take up now the divine understanding, knowing other things, He necessarily understands all other things and understands Himself. Then you might say, well, then He's going to what necessarily will other things in willing His own, you know? Well, they're not alike in that way, right? You see.

[20:49] And then you have to see the difference, right? Because this end, which is the divine goodness, in no way depends upon other things, and they in no way what add anything to His goodness. The addition of creatures to God, Thomas, is like adding a point to a line. It's no longer than it was, and so then you see start to see the difference between the two, right?

[21:20] Huh? Now, in the part of logic that is about dialectic, on the book of places, huh, which is not translated with the title in English of Topics, right? It's not Topics, but it comes from the Greek word "topos," meaning place, right? So we call the book of places, right? Huh? Um, but when you get to the four tools of the dialectician, Aristotle gives as a third tool the tool of finding differences, and then the fourth tool is the tool of consideration of likeness, huh?

[21:59] And it's interesting both the words he uses there and the order, right? But he puts the tool of finding differences before the consideration of likeness, huh? Because to what see the likeness of things without first seeing their difference is apt to what deceive you, yeah. And you see this especially in these things that are far apart. You know, we have a likeness of ratios, huh? You've heard me use a simple example there, you know.

[22:32] I say four is to six as two is to three. I say, well, two and three are what prime numbers, so four and six are as a ratio of prime numbers. That's not for likeness consistent, right? Or two and three, one is an even number, one's an odd number, so four and six, one's even, one's odd, right? Well, what way? What way is four to six like two to three?

[23:00] What would you say? Not in those two ways, right? But where are they alike? Um in the quantity and the relation of parts. What what you could say is that four is the same parts of six that two is of three, right? If you imagine, you know, six as being three twos, four is two of those three parts, just as two is obviously two of the three parts of of three, right?

[23:28] Huh? So, but Aristotle in the Greek, I think the word is skepsis right? The word skeptic doesn't mean you know, let's say skeptic, right? But mean you got to stop and consider exactly what way are these two alike, right? Because things that are alike may be unlike in other ways, right? And this proportion, right? You know that the knowing himself to knowing other things and loving himself to loving other things, there's a certain what likeness there, right?

[24:01] And and Thomas would even argue from the fact that God knows other things, knowing himself, that he can love other things in loving himself, right? But then you got to realize this great difference, right? That there'd be an imperfection in God if in knowing himself he didn't know everything else. Not only the things that are, but the things that could be, right? But there'd be no imperfection in God if in loving himself he didn't love anything else.

[24:26] To be nothing but selfish, right? That somehow the world is is better, right? Huh? As Thomas says, you know, God in pictures is no better than playing breakfast and the armor playing breakfast, you know, because God contains all the goodness these things, right? Okay. And so likeness is is something apt to deceive you. I kind of reminded that you know we had the turn your clocks back, right?

[25:03] Okay. And if you take the average guy in the street, right, and you ask them, now if you move your clock back, right, to an earlier time, will you be getting up earlier than you were before? Probably say yes, right? You think that guy, you know, sure, you know, and actually going to be getting up what later, yeah. See, how can that be if I move the clock back to an earlier time?

[25:34] Shouldn't I, you know? But you're being deceived by imagination, right? Yeah. And then the spring when when you spring forward, as they say, right huh? Mm-hmm. They're going to be what Getting up later, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You see, how easily likeness deceives you, right? Huh? It's kind of strange. I don't know why they do this. Something to do with the lights, you know. But it getting more light at the beginning of the day or at the beginning of the day.

[26:03] It's got to have to do with money. That's all I know, right? It's got to have to do with it. Otherwise, nobody would do it. It's kind of audacious, you know, They should do this. When I was a bachelor, I'd always go to St. Paul's Cathedral. That was my parish, and every time they had that time change, I show up for the usual mass. I go to.

[26:24] Oh yeah, this is the day. I got hanging around for an hour for another mass or something. We we cheat in the spring. What we do is we decide we're going to lose an hour in the morning. Yeah. So we just get up at the regular time the day before, and then we just turn our

[26:45] clocks an hour ahead, and we just have everything an hour later. Now the fourth objection, right? This is the one that's arguing as if the only acts of the will and the character to the end were Willing it and enjoying it, right? huh? And then you have choice with respect to the means. And Thomas says To the third, it should be or the fourth, it should be said that intention is an act of the will with respect to the end.

[27:34] huh? But the will regards the what end in three ways. This is a beautiful example of how what three is the first number about which we say all right now. Okay.

[27:51] So when Mary and Joseph went up to Bethlehem, did they all go there, or just both of them went there? Both went. there. You've got to watch that. Seven, seven ways ticking. Sometimes, right? They both went, right? You wouldn't say they they all went, would you? See. Yeah, went too. See, but then when they fled down to Egypt, there, right? They all went, right? So three is the first number about which we say all, right?

[28:18] It's often true, and this is the example here, right? That's a beautiful thing there. But the will regards the end in three ways. Think about that. That's really something. In one way, absolutely, as and that's what is called what voluntas, willing, I guess, right? Insofar as absolutely we will either what health or something else of the sort, huh?

[28:54] Another way, the end is considered according as in it one what Rests, Rests, huh? and in this way fruition regards the what end. Third way, he considers the end according as it is the term right or end of something that is ordered to it right, and thus intention regards the end right. What were your intentions in doing that? What were you intending? I don't know.

[29:33] What were you trying to accomplish? Whatever anyone else does. For not only from this are we said to intend health right because we will it right, but because we will to what arrive at it through something else right. So you're intending something. You were trying to arrive at that through something that you did, right?

[30:09] And kind of see the order of these, because didn't you take up voluntas first, and then fruition, and then intention? you can kind of see the order, there, right? Especially the way voluntas would come before the other two, right? Because they seem more to be adding something to the idea of willing it, right? And these would be specifically different kinds of acts of the will. Yeah, yeah.

[30:31] So their objects would be formally different. There's a little distinction there, yeah, yeah, yeah. Kind of hard to see. Yeah. So what is the philosopher? what's what's the philosopher's end?

[30:51] Knowledge. Or wisdom, right? Well, knowledge, in general, but wisdom, right? So he's named for that, right? But he's named from what? The love of wisdom. So if wisdom is the end, what act of the will is this love of wisdom?

[31:18] His intention? No, I mean that would be just his. Absolute act. Absolutely. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Now I was reading Thomas this morning, which is wisdom even higher sense there. I was enjoying this wisdom, right? I've been through many times, right? Because I still see something I didn't see before, right? Huh? Okay.

[31:41] But I was talking to these guys last night. There, they're doing this logic, right? huh? See? What's that got to do with wisdom? That would be their intention I guess. Yeah, I was intending wisdom, right? You gotta go through logic, right? Huh?

[32:00] Gee, Thomas is clarifying my thought, huh? Three, right? Huh? See these pictures of Thomas. he's got his hand out there with the points he he's making, right?

[32:23] Because he was explaining a beautiful text there of the beatitude of God, you know. But you could take from there principles for man's own beatitude, right? He says beatitude has got to be the most perfect thing, and the most perfect thing is an operation of some sort. Okay.

[32:46] Now, the most perfect operation is four things you got to take into account. Doesn't always say three, right? Says four. He says the first thing is from the what? The genus of the act. He refers to what. Aristotle does in the ninth book of wisdom, where Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of acts, one that remains within the doer, right, like sensing or understanding or even loving, right, and then one that proceeds to something outside of you, like making or you know directing or ruling, you know, that sort of thing, right.

[33:28] And he says, well, is the most perfect act that's going to be the beatitude, which genus is going to be in? The one that stays inside. Yeah, because that's the perfection of the doer, right? By making a table is a perfecting of the table, not of the maker, right? Contrary to Marx, right? Okay. And you know, directing the army, right, is a perfection of the the battle, the army that it conducts, right?

[34:00] But it's not perfection of the maker, right? So that's the first thing he says. It's got to be in the genus of an act that remains in the doer. That's true for us, right? So maybe it could be my listening to Mozart, right?

[34:22] Did you look at Jupiter last night? You told to? Was it next to the moon? Yeah. Yeah. I noticed the bright star next to the moon. Yeah, that's- It was- I'd never seen Jupiter look so bright in my life, you know. And I just, you know, I came out of the class at about nine o'clock, where you go from seven to nine, and I came on. I said, look up at him, and he said, where is it?

[34:41] And I was just it's brilliant, It's magnificent. huh? So, my seeing that in Jupiter last night, maybe that's my beatitude, right? At least in the genus, right? You look at like that, okay. And what's the second thing you think he said?

[35:01] It's got to be an act of that genus, right? It would be, I would think, an act of higher power. Yeah, of the highest power, right? Which in us is the understanding, right? Okay. Or maybe it's my understanding Pythagorean theorem, maybe then, huh? Could be, you know.

[35:26] But no, that's not my beatitude. It's got to be what? It's got to be understanding God. Yeah. See? So it's got to be understanding God, right? Okay. It's true for God Himself too, is it? Nobody could understand. Okay. And then what's the fourth and last thing?

[35:49] Perpetual or something. Lasting. Because the form of the act, huh? And he says four things that would be perfect the act, right? Huh? It'd be what easy. It'd be firm, right? And it'd be delightful. You know, it's beautiful, right? And so, this is all true about God, right? He perfectly understands Himself. The best thing there is to understand, right? It's easier for Him to understand Himself.

[36:24] It's it's a it's a firm thing in God, right? T here is no change in God, right? And because that perfection is most delightful, right? But you you can apply that and take it down and apply it you know, in your investigation of what our beatitude is, right? There's got to be an act that's a perfection of the doer, right? It's got to be the highest power, the the understanding.

[36:47] It's got to be with regard to the best of all things to understand, which is God Himself. And it's got to be perfect and so on so then you bring in the beatitude vision. huh So, Okay. So

[37:15] it's a beautiful. beautiful. Three is enough. First, you see that you know in the first book of the Physics, where Aristotle is looking for what's found in every change. Everybody thinks that there is what opposites in every change, which is true, right? But then Aristotle said there must be a third thing besides the opposites, and then but then he stops and says that's enough. You know, it's enough to have a change, right?

[37:53] So if that cold becomes hot, can coldness itself become heat? No, there must be a third thing to be the subject. which the contraries are, right? " You know, That's kind of the first place you see this. Three is enough, right? You go to the Poetics there, and you come to the greatest tragedian of all, right? Sophocles, right? He introduced the third actor, right? Once you did that, you got the the most perfect plays ever.

[38:20] You know. Used to say about Sophocles that's Homer writing tragedy, and Homer is Sophocles writing epic. The Greeks had that saying, right? because they saw the excellence of these two guys. you know, It's incredible. They introduced that third actor. Was it Sartre Sartre that played there about the threefold down in hell, wasn't it Yeah no it's it? yeah. Yeah. Oh he used the actors, right? But they're all miserable because.

[38:52] Hell, you know, all fair is given its alter, I guess, with the with the meaning of the play, or if it has any meaning.

[39:04] I thought I thought of him yesterday because it was a doctor's office. They had a sign on a closet for safety purposes. Says not an exit. I said just change the sign. No exit.

[39:19] Okay. So we go to Article II here. To the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that intention is what only of the last end, right?

[39:41] Now, you know, if you know Aristotle, Aristotle will say, you know, that not only is is the last thing the end, but there can be what these intermediary ends, right? I assume Thomas will be responsive to that. For he said in the book of the Sentences of Prosper that clamor ad Deum, that the crying out to God, right, is the intention of the heart.

[40:08] But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore, intention always regards the last end. Moreover, intention regards the end according as it is the what terminus, the end. Aristotle takes up the word terminus there in the fifth book of Wisdom, right?

[40:34] But terminus has the notion of what is last, and therefore intention always regards the last end. Moreover, just as intention regards the end, so also does what fruition. But fruition is always of the last end, and therefore also intention, right? Must he be deceived by likeness here? Yeah.

[41:06] But against all this, the last end of human what wills is one, to wit, beatitude. If therefore intention was only the last end, there would not be diverse intentions of men, which is clearly what false.

[41:27] Who's that guy who said, you know, I had three intentions: I was going to get married, get rich, and be governor or something. You and me, of all two, I guess.

[41:51] I answer: It should be said. This has been said. Intention regards the end, according as it is the what end of the motion of the will.

[42:05] In motion, however, one can take an end in two ways. In one way, the what last end itself, in which one what one rests, huh? Thou hast made as for thyself, right? Our hearts are rested until they rest in you. So your heart can't really come to complete rest until you achieve that. You

[42:31] went Vanity Fair there, wasn't the model in the Vanity Fair by Thackeray the novel? For who in this life, he says, ever gets what he wants? Or having gotten it, is satisfied? You think if I could get that, you know, I would be satisfied, you know, and you get it, you are not satisfied, right? You know. One purchase away. Yeah, yeah. You are first million, you know.

[42:53] You are going to be happy. Now you got to get another million, huh? A million now, I guess. That's what they asked the Walmart guy. whatever his name? was. In his old days, he made gazillions of dollars. And I said, "You've made gazillions and gazillions of dollars. What do you want? What do you want now? I want to make more." What he said. Yeah. Make more.

[43:19] In another way, something in the what middle, right? Which is the beginning of one part of the motion, but the end or limit of what another.

[43:32] Just as in the motion by which one goes from A to C through B, C is the last limit, right? But B is, however, what? A limit, but not the last. And of both of them, there can be an intention, right? Because both of them are an end.

[43:58] Whence, although it is always an end, right, is not, however, necessary that it always be the what last end. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the intention of the heart is said to be a crying out to God. Not that God is the object of intention always, right? But because He is the what. Intention. Or because that when we pray, we direct our intention to God, huh?

[44:34] Which intention has the strength of a crying out to Him, right? It's kind of beautiful. I was reading, you know, the Catena Aurea on John there was talking about Christ, and he says, you know, I come not to do my will, but the will of the one who sent me. It becomes even more dramatic, of course, in the garden of Gethsemane and so on. But the Church Fathers were remarking upon this shows his what humility, right?

[45:06] Um, and so that when we pray, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. We're in a way praying for what? Humility, huh? I never kinda really thought of it that way, you know, but that's in a sense—that's it's a very beautiful that that text, huh?

[45:27] Beautiful text. Okay. Somebody say, but say, "Hallowed be thy name, and thy kingdom come." Then that's the end, right? Thy will be done as the means, huh? But he who says, "Lord, Lord, he does thy will." I reminded every time. I don't know what you say in your master, but in the part after the consecration there. You say, you know, you know, you want to go to heaven with Mary and so on.

[46:01] And all the saints who have done your will throughout the ages, you know. He's done. How well chosen the words are in that prayer, you know. To hear it over and over again.

[46:15] Okay. To the second should be said that terminus, right, has the notion of something last. That is true, right? But not always with what is last with respect to the whole, right? But sometimes with respect to what? Some part. Some part.

[46:44] To the third, it should be said that fruition implies rest in the end, right? And that pertains only to the last end, huh? Thou hast made us for ourselves, right? For they suffer more in our hearts our rest is still the rest in you.

[47:03] But intention implies motion to the end, not all our what rest, right? Once the reason is not similar right? You're deceived by the likeness there right? It's a? False imagination, huh?

[47:20] Okay. Take another article, or before we take a break. Yeah, sounds good. Okay. When.