Prima Secundae
40. Summa I-II Q.12, Arts. 3-5: Intending Several Things at Once, One Act Toward End and Means, and Whether Animals Intend
Class of 2011-11-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/040-summa-i-ii-q-12-arts-3-5-intending-several-things-at-once/

[0:00] One can at the same time intend two things, right? Where does Aristotle talk about simul or hama in Greek? In physics, right? Yeah, but even before that, in the categories, right? Because in the chapter after the chapter and before and after, right? Then he takes one in simul right? Because simul is known by negation of before and after. Two events are simul hama together when one is neither before nor after the other.

[0:37] Okay. So, actually, actually, where Aristotle, you know, it's kind of difficult thing to understand, but in the tenth book, there he says that we know equal through more and less. It's if you negate more and less, right?

[1:07] You and I have the of equal height as if I am either taller or shorter than you. If you have a couple negations, it's like that with this before and after, right? And and hama in Greek or simul I don't know. It's kind of fun the way you speak of it in English, though. I mean, use the word together, right? But isn't that I don't know how else you translate simul.

[1:33] I didn't say simultaneous, but I mean you kinda Yeah. yeah. Oh at once, yeah. Sometimes even together. It may be the eternity, right? The all at once and perfect possession, totum simul, right? All at once, at once. Yeah, but even that doesn't capture it exactly. Before and after at the same time.

[2:04] So you can't serve two masters, right? Huh? What'd you say? Before and after at the same time. For Augustine says in the book on the sermons of the Lord, Sermon of the Lord on the Mountain, Sermon on the Mount, we call it in English, that a man is not able at the same time, right, to intend God and a bodily what commodity, right? Therefore, for like reason, neither any other two things.

[2:41] Can't serve two masters, right? That's what I just read in Saint Elizabeth Seton when she first got married. She very wealthy, she was happy, had a lot of goods of this world, and she she feared. She wrote that she says like, well, it's like it's one or the other. She kind of she had a fear of that.

[3:02] Moreover, intention names the motion of the will to its what end. But of one motion, there cannot be many what terms from one side. One side. Therefore, the will cannot, at the same time, what intend many things. The same line of action has two ends.

[3:31] I mean, deceive everybody like this. Moreover, intention presupposes an active reason or the understanding. But one cannot, at the same time, understand many things. According to the philosopher, right? Yeah, I don't know.

[3:52] Therefore, also, neither is it possible at the same time to intend many things. No, this time is going to do it. This, but against this is that art imitates nature.

[4:11] But nature, from one tool, intends two what utilities. Just as the tongue is ordered to taste and to what speech, so we teach a Kasurik you know to say, you know, we're talking all day long, you know, using his tongue. Now I'm going to have a good dinner. I can reward you know with a goose, you know.

[4:38] And she had a wife around there to make sure she had a good dinner. And she can't make a good dinner, then she's got to work and go out and have a good meal in the restaurant.

[4:52] Therefore, for a like reason, art or reason which imitates nature, right, is able at the same time to order something one to two what ends, huh? And thus it is able at the same time to what intend. Yeah, the same many things. Yeah. Okay. Can you help to bridge with one stone? Okay. These

[5:27] terrorists, right, to blow up two people. They intend to blow up everybody in this room or something, you know. Make a double plane. That's

[5:36] not all at once. No. Answer should be said. Some two things can be taken in two ways, right? Either as ordered to each other, right, or as not ordered to each other. And if they are ordered to each other. It is manifest from what has been said that man is able at the same time to intend many things, for his intention is not only of the what last end, but also of the what.

[6:15] Yeah. For at the same time, he someone intends the proximate end and the last end, just as the making of the medicine right and what health, right. So, am I intending to perfect myself in logic, or am I intending wisdom?

[6:38] Yeah, because one is one is a means to the other, right? If our one takes two things, not word to each other, right? As he contradicting himself. So also together, man is able to what?

[7:03] Many things. Which is clear from this that a man what prefers one to the other, right? Because it is better than the other, right? Huh. But among what other conditions by which one is better than the other, one is that it is what valuable for many things, huh? Whence he is able to what put before another from the fact that it is what useful to many other ends.

[7:39] How do you translate valet valet Wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another because of the great number of purposes for which it is it is available. Okay. So that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time. Yeah. Yeah.

[8:06] That's interesting. So in the political season, right? Intend to say something that will what amuse my friends and annoy my enemies while we vote. Why do you do both

[8:32] One in order to the other Right Rather something that just does one, right? Huh. If I can accomplish both of my ends with this one biting remark.

[8:55] That was what Reagan did when Geraldine Ferraro said Because some policy or proposition he made that that he just wasn't Christian and they asked him where did you think of that when she said that and he said I just turned the other cheek. That's

[9:16] pretty good. The first effort should be said that Augustine right in his what book on the Sermon on the Mount understands man cannot at the same time intend both God and a bodily what. Yeah, As last ends right Because this has been shown above there cannot be many last ends of what one man right huh.

[9:57] Now what about a one motion. To second, it should be said that of one motion there can be, from one side, right, many limits if one is ordered to the other, right. But two terms to each other, not ordered, right,

[10:21] is not possible, right, to be of one motion, right. But nevertheless, it should be considered that that which is not one secundum rem, right, is able to be taken as one secundum ratione.

[10:53] For intention is a motion of the will, already what ordered to something in reason. as has been said, and therefore those things which are many secundum rem can be taken as one term of intention, in so far as they are one secundum what ratione, right.

[11:22] Or because some two things run together to what integrating something one as what hot and cold measured well together, right, run together for what health, huh?

[11:42] Or that some two under one common thing are contained is able to be intended, huh? As the acquisition of wine, yeah, it's no reviewing there, Thomas. And a what vestment, right, is contained under what filthy lucre, huh? As under a certain what thing that is common, right, huh? Whence nothing prevents the one who intends to make money that he the same thing intends these two things, right?

[12:20] You get in the car and you get out of the car and you go to work and all that to make money. Yeah, yeah, but a whole bunch of things you want the money for. You're going to use it for.

[12:33] Now can one understand many things? He says, well, in so far as they are in some way what one. So if you look at Aristotle there, you'd say, you know, can you understand what a dog is and what a cat is by one act? Not the reason, generically. Yeah, you can understand quadruped or animal by one act, right? But if you're understanding what a dog is and what a cat is, it's going to be two different acts.

[13:05] Understanding what a dog is is not understanding what a cat is. Understanding what a cat is not. But now, if I go to the second act of reason, I say a dog is not a cat. Then dog and cat are being understood together, right? If you didn't understand the subject and the predicate or whatever it is at the same time, right, you wouldn't understand any statement, right?

[13:29] So, if I can understand a dog is not a cat, now I can understand to some extent dog and cat together, right? Square is not a circle.

[13:42] It's just in superiority in the second act, right? But I made them in some way, what one, right? Or when you compare two things, right? You're comparing

[13:54] Sophocles and Aeschylus, or Sophocles and Euripides, right? Or Shakespeare and Ben Johnson, or something like that, you know. Then you're, in a sense, knowing two things at once, right? Or comparing two students, right, together, right? You know.

[14:13] Okay, read two these essays. They're the grade school kids, you know, for the award for their best essay, you know, on abortion or euthanasia, you know. So, I'm always got to read them. Ask other people read them, you know. See if you agree about who's the best. It's kind of hard to judge between these little one-page essays.

[14:38] Yeah, but in a sense, you're considering both at the same time, right? Kind of hard to do, though. Keep in mind. Okay, so take a little break now before we do Article Four. The fourth one proceeds thus: It seems that there is not one and the same motion, the intention of the end, right, and the will of that which is to the end, right. For Augustine says in the eleventh book of the Trinity that the will of what seeing the window is it has as an end the vision of the what window, and other is the will what of seeing through the window those going by.

[15:39] But this pertains to intention that I wish to see those passing by through the window, right? Huh. But this is the what will of that which is towards the end that I wish to see the window. Therefore, other is the motion of the will which is the intention of the end, and other the will of that which is towards the end. Huh.

[16:07] Moreover, acts are distinguished by their objects, but the end and that which is towards the end are diverse objects. Huh. That seems to be the division he he gave right back in question eight, right, in the proemium huh? And therefore, other is the motion of the will which is the intention of the end, and the will which is towards the end. Take

[16:32] the distinction there between the acts of the will towards the end and choice, which is of the means, right? But the will, moreover, the third objection: the will is of that which is towards the end the will, which is that which is towards the end, is called electio, huh? Which is choice again, election, right? But the election or choice and intention are not the same. Therefore, there is not the same motion which is the intention of the end with the will of that which is towards the end.

[17:06] Huh. But against this is that what is towards the end has itself to the end as a middle to its what end or limit, but the same motion is the one which what through the middle, right, passes over to the end in natural things. Huh. Therefore, also will be in voluntary things the same motion which is the intention of the end and the will of that which is what towards the end.

[17:40] Huh. Now Thomas says, I answer: It should be said that the motion of the will in the end and in that which is towards the end can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as the will is born towards both, absolutely and what, by itself, right.

[18:11] Thus, simply, there are two what motions of the will in both, right? In another way, it can be considered according as the will is what carried towards that which is towards the end, on account of the end, right? And thus there is one and the same in subject the motion of the will tending towards the end, and in that which is towards the end.

[18:42] I'm tending towards the the means as a way of getting to the end, right? So it's part of my intending the end. For when I say I will or wish medicine on account of health, I do not designate except one motion of the will. I think he's going to make this comparison to the reasons he often does, right? The reason for which is because the end is the reason for willing the means, right?

[19:18] Those things which are for the end. But the same act falls upon the object and upon the reason of the object, just as is the same vision of color and what light which makes the color something visible. And in this comparison, and this is like what takes place in the case of the understanding, because if absolutely the premise or the principle and the conclusion are considered, diverse is consideration of both, right?

[19:54] Thomas will say that you know in the word discourse, right, you're you're running from the beginning to the conclusion, right? Okay, so you're not in both at the same time, right? But when you see the conclusion as following from the premises, then it seems to be one and the same act.

[20:12] So if absolutely one considers the conclusion, right, and the premise, there's different act. But in this that one ascends to the conclusion on account of the beginnings, right? There is one act of the understanding only. To

[20:34] mark the act that God would have, right? You see that difference, huh? You read that there. To first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine speaks of the vision of the window and the vision of those passing through the window. According as the will in both is what born absolutely right. To the second, it should be said that the end, insofar as it is a certain thing, is another object of the will than that which is what towards the end.

[21:18] So the the means and the end are not the same object, right? But in so far as the reason for willing the means, that which is towards the end, there is one and the same what object, right?

[21:38] To the third, it should be said that the motion which is one in what subject can differ by reason according to the beginning and the end, as going up and what coming down. Famous example of Aristotle. Used to explain the difference between acting upon and undergoing upon and undergoing through. And thus, therefore, in so far as the motion of the will is born towards that which is for the end, in so far as it is what ordered to the end, there is what choice.

[22:17] But the motion of the will, which is born towards the or carried towards the end, according as it is acquired through those things which are for the end, is called what intention.

[22:33] A sign of which is that the intention of the end can be even not yet determined those things which are what for the end of which there is election, right? So we we already intend this end, but we don't yet know the means for it, right? But when we intend the means as the way of getting to the end, then it's one what one motion of the will One act, yeah, yeah.

[23:09] A lot of times when you're reading, you know, Thomas expounding the text of Aristotle, you know, you kind of tell us what he's trying to conclude, right? Now, and then first he's going to take out the things necessary for drawing his conclusion, right? So you kind of see the end conclusion by itself, right? Absolutely, and what you're going to use to it, and then only later on you see how this premise here does really imply this conclusion, right?

[23:40] So you see the conclusion as as following from the premises, then you've got to see it and the premises at the same time by on the same act, right? So when you intend the the means as the way of getting to the end. Then you must be intending the end at the same time that you're.

[24:03] I suppose you know when men deliberate. You know, and some guy says, "Well, this is the way to get there," and you get another way of getting there, and trying to decide your way or, you know, we're not, you know, intending what you propose or what you propose yet as a way of getting there, right? But then I mean, I I think about you know which is probably a better way getting there, your way or his way, you know.

[24:27] And if I say it's his way, right, then choose. Yeah, but but then I'm starting to what, not just consider your in your means by itself, but as the way I intend to get to that end. right

[24:53] Got to be careful. That's. Kind of a subtle difference there, right? But he makes that same comparison to what you have in the case of the mind.

[25:09] Aristotle makes that the end as apportion there that the end is to what is for the sake of the end, like the premises are to the conclusion, right? And so sometimes you see one is implying the other, right, necessarily.

[25:26] In the case, you kind of consider it separately, right? That's a hard distinction to see, though I suppose. Okay. For the intention belongs to the brute animals.

[26:08] To the fifth, then, one perceives thus: it seems that brute animals do intend the end. For nature, in those things which lack knowledge, it more is distant from rational nature than the what sensitive nature, the nature that has sensation, which is in the brute animals, right?

[26:37] But nature intends the end also in those things which lack knowledge, as is proven in the second book of the physics. Therefore, much more do the brute animals intend the end? Moreover, as intention is what of the end, so is fruition of the end, right? Two different acts. But fruition belongs to the brute animals, as has been said, right? Therefore, intention.

[27:31] So I can tabitha there enjoy my steak, but not intended, right? Moreover, it belongs to the one who intends the end. It belongs to that one to intend the end, whose doing is an account of an end. For to intend is nothing other than to tend towards something. But brute animals act for some end, right? For the animal is moved either to acquiring food or something else, right?

[28:12] Therefore, brute animals intend the what end? So I mentioned our two cats there. You know that Tabitha meant she had her breakfast. She wanted to go outside that way and head down a few doors. We had a vacant lot there, you know, kind of a wooded lot, you know, to begin their hunting of the day. My Muppet wanted to jump up in the ledge in front of the window there and watch the world go by.

[28:38] So they had different. It's fun to watch them do that. And they both get fed at the same time, you know. And they mount the stairs and go do their dishes. You know, they're not upstairs and downstairs. And after they eat, there one wants to go there, one wants to go the other. So it's

[28:54] kind of funny. Like our two cats, yeah. One lounges all day and one hunts. Yeah. All day and all night, you know. But against this, the intention of the end implies the ordering of something an end, right? And that's an act of what? Reason, huh? Looking before and after. Since, therefore, the brute animals don't have reason, it seems that they don't what intend the end, huh? Thomas is going to make a little distinction here.

[29:34] The answer, it should be said, as has been said above, that to intend is to tend towards another, right? Which is both of the mover and the what moved, right?

[29:53] According, therefore, as what that is said to intend an end that is moved to the end by another, thus nature is said to intend an end.

[30:06] That's probably you know that people don't see that distinction. They they act nature acting for an end, right? As it were, moved towards its end by God, as the arrow by the archer, yeah. And in this way also, brute animals intend the end, in so far as they are moved by natural instinct to what something, huh?

[30:38] In another way, to intend the end is of the what one moving, in so far as he orders his motion, the motion of something either of himself or of another, right? To an end, but it's a reason only to do that. So you see, important Shakespeare's definition: the reason is, right? He defines it by, by order, right?

[31:07] Whence, in this way, the brutes do not intend the end, which is properly and chiefly to intend, as has been said, right? So they intend the end in the sense that they are moved by another, right? Who intends in the full sense, right? The end.

[31:27] It's funny, you know. I hear these huge flocks of birds flying over, and they make as much noise. I first, when I heard it, I said, "Is that the dogs? " You know, because I saw this one dog, and they would start barking. You know, another dog down the way does barking in front of it. You know, every dog and they would bark. You know, and it kind of sounded like, like barking.

[31:47] You know, and I went off to back there and said, "Bark! " And they go by, you know, then the whole flock of them, you know, and they make a sound when they can. Dog bark is kind of deceptive, right? Huh? But they are, be moved or something, right? But more by natural instinct, right, than by, by, by, ordering this themselves. It's

[32:14] really one of the most fascinating things, though, to read about birds and how they they migrate and they come back to the same spot and they go they go miles and miles, you know. And just have a flock cooperating in unison, almost as if they had radio communication.

[32:30] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. The one goes to the front, and the other one fall back. You know, one goes to the front sometimes, and they keep on doing that. You know, it's it's kind of amazing to read about these birds.

[32:47] Now, the first objections from what did Aristotle mean when he argued in physics there, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that that argument proceeds according as to intend is of that which is moved to an end, right?

[33:09] I have to always insist with the students there. You know, you look at the text of Aristotle. One of the things he he talks about the the bees doing these intelligent things, right, or the other insects, and the Aristotle says so clearly there's in action for an end appearing these insects, right? That people wonder whether they have a mind. I say that's what Aristotle says. He doesn't say that they have a mind.

[33:35] He says people what wonder whether they have a mind, as if they see that action for an end does require a mind somewhere, right? Huh? But he's not asserting that they themselves have a mind, right? And then later on, he would he would argue that they don't have a mind, right? But they're a product of mind, huh? It used to be, you know, in Fabre there there was the insect that would

[34:03] paralyze its victim, right, and then it would dig a hole big enough to contain the victim, right, and then it would grab it by its antennas and drop it down into the hole, and then it would deposit its eggs upon it, right, and then cover it up, I guess, and then when the little ones hatched, right, they had this fresh food supply, right. So that's very intelligent because if it had killed the victim, right, it would die and corrupt and be unsuitable food for the young when they were born, so he said.

[34:45] And but if you didn't, actually, what it do is it would squeeze the head of the victim, right, and And enough to put it in a coma, you might say, right? So it's still alive, but not so much that you killed it, right? And so Faber tried to grab that same insect and press the head just the right amount. He's always killing it, rather, you know. So it's like like it had a doctor's hand, you know, that was very adept at these things.

[35:16] He just enough pressure, you know, to leave it in kind of coma, but not enough to what kill it, right? And so you say, well, now does this insect have a mind, right? Is it very intelligent, right? Huh? But then Fabre noticed that when it dragged his victim to the thing had always grabbed him by the antenna, right? So one time he was over there measuring the the size of the grave, shall we say?

[35:40] He cut off the antenna, right? But came back and and then finally back and filled out filled up the hole without the victim, right? Well, now if you're intelligent enough to figure out that you have to squeeze the head so much, so much, soon you figure out there's another way to place to drag the the victim from the antenna, but that gets programmed to do that, right?

[36:06] And so you can kind of see that it doesn't really have a mind, right? But that's kind of beautiful experiment he has, huh? I used to say, you know, even the cavemen, right? You know, they're supposed to, you know, knock the woman on the head and and figure by her hair, right? Now if the hair came out, figure I can drag her by a leg or an arm.

[36:27] Even the cavemen, dumb as he might have been, you know, right, developed to you know to do this, right? But this dumb insect couldn't, you know, you know, even they could, you know, squeeze the head better than Faber could do, right? You know, just the right amount. They couldn't figure out the other way to to grab the victim by, right? So he might conclude, well, then this is intelligent what he does, right?

[36:55] But it's not that the intelligence is his own, right? But he's he's the something of another art put into things, right? Whereby they are moved to their end. So the intended end is being moved towards an end, right? That's kind of beautiful what Aristotle sees there, right? Yeah. When he's when he's first showing that that this that they're they're moved towards an end, though, he doesn't say that they do or not have a mind, right?

[37:23] Huh? So I say the students, you got to see what Aristotle's doing there. He's not reasoning, right, from their having a mind or not having a mind, right? He's reasoning what they do that seems intelligent, right? And that leads one to say, well, then the one to do they have a mind, right? But whether they have a mind or are a product of mind is something that requires further investigation, right?

[37:49] They're still being moved towards an end, right? Whether by their own mind or by the mind, of the superior one, right? He kind of used to speak, you know, this kind of second definition of nature, right? The first definition of nature is a beginning and cause of motion and rest, and that which it is first as such, not by happening. But then later on, he gives the idea that nature is something of an art, right?

[38:15] Put into things, huh? So he says, if you could take the art of building a ship and put it into the woods, so it built itself up into a ship, you know, something like nature, right? Nature is something of an art, not the human art, the art of the divine art, huh? And things, huh? That's why, like you say in the parts of animals, how he talks about, you know, one likes to study the animals to see something of the superior mind.

[38:42] huh? But I I was trying to remember think of that text of Aristotle, because, I know it from the parts of animals, but Thomas is giving us the first reason why we consider the effects of God and not just God alone, right? So we could admire the divine, what, and consider the divine wisdom in making these things. Aristotle was already, you know, delighting in admiring and considering that the wisdom of the one who was designing these things.

[39:12] It's beautiful. Kind of pity that some, you know, modern scientists can't quite sit down and admire these things the same way. Yeah. You know that the way of thinking, but sometimes, you know, the people, I mean, to understand what Aristotle is arguing there, right, in the second book, you talk to most biologists, and they and they'll say they'll deny that nature makes eyes for the sake of seeing, right?

[39:57] They won't deny that you can see with your eyes, but they deny that nature makes eyes for the sake of seeing, right? And ears for the sake of hearing, and you know, teeth for the sake of biting and chewing, and so on. Well, it's kind of obvious to any any simple folk, you know, that nature's making these things, right? Whether it has the mind to make them or it's part of something that has a mind, right?

[40:26] But there, what evidence do the moderns then use to back up this perspective? They don't. It's kind of interesting, you know. Who's that? Some big scientist there. I

[40:37] have to ask more again who it was. He was a bit, you know, but you know that they reject this, you know, argument because it's going to lead to God, and you know, it's kind of showing that you're you're you're not in good faith, might say, right? That the

[41:00] What Aristotle is doing is he really just studying nature and it kind of leads to these conclusions, right? But when they see that that seeing these things is going to lead to this conclusion, then they say they don't see it, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Not very scientific, and it's kind of strange, you know. Yeah, yeah. Now

[41:24] sometimes you get some of the the great physicists and so on, chemists, you know, they'll say that the biologists are, you know, kind of crazy, you know, because they don't admit these things, you know.

[41:40] You know, Heisenberg, you know, because he grew up with quantum physics and so on, and Bohr, and one of the things that Bohr, you know, to apply the quantum to the atom was the stability of the atom, right? And if you just saw the atom as being kind of a miniature solar system, as kind of the original model of the atom, and well, if the solar system was coming into contact with other solar systems all the time, there'd be no regularity in the paths of the planets, so these atoms are always in in contact with each other, no regularity at all, and and so

[42:24] just from mere you know chemical principles, you can't understand the the stability of the atom, and then when they went to biology, how do you explain the stability of the dog or the cat or you know the animal? Just for the point of view of physics and chemistry, it's it's highly highly improbable, right, that there'd be this this stability and the

[42:56] growth of the plants and so on, the animals. Kind of funny to ask people, you know, for something diabolical, you don't want this to lead to God.

[43:21] See, Aristotle is not reasoning that the animals are a product of the divine mind; therefore, they act for an end. He's recognized that they're acting for an end, and therefore either they have a mind or they're a product of mind. If they don't have a mind, they must be a product of mind, and he's kind of being led to God that way, you know. It is kind of a natural way, but the moderns are kind of you know putting the cart before the horse, huh?

[43:48] Because he's saying you know well it can't be a god, it's it's unscientific, it's not what it's not. Therefore, nature can't be acting for an end, right? You know. And therefore, we have to deny, in a sense, what we what we see. You know.

[44:11] There's a story, beautiful story, about young man about fifteen or sixteen, and he was sort of Palestinian, was a Eastern Christian monk. He his bishop sends him to study for the priesthood, but since there's problems at the time, he sends him to France, Paris. So he goes to Céroune, wherever that is. There, he gets, and you know, he's from a village, all this simple things like that.

[44:39] He's in the sewers. So, so he says he's reflecting on, you know, say yes to write this one page, this this paper on how how how modern man should view God. I'm like. We should be more concerned about how God views modern man.

[45:02] So he writes this paper and he gets it back. Totally illogical, you know. He gets his teacher, professor, just blasts him. So we guess he answered objections, right? On prima prima, okay. Second, to second, should be said that fruition does not imply the ordering of something to something as intention does, but an absolute what? Rest in the end. So that's more appropriate for the animal. Rest in the nice warm place under the stove here.

[45:57] To the third, it should be said that brute animals are moved to an end, not as it were considering that through their emotion they're able to achieve the end, which is properly the one intending, but what? By concupiscence, by desire, by desire for a what?

[46:22] End by natural instinct, right? They are moved to an end, as it were, moved by another, just as other things which are moved what? Naturally, huh?

[46:35] That's why the animals are kind of, you know, they're kind of. They could figure out towards an end. They could, you know, pick up a book and start reading it, and so on. You know,

[46:46] try some try some other thing, you know, than just what they do all the time. I got to go to the board of trustees tonight. They're a trivium school. There. There. Meeting at seven o'clock, so I got to take off a little bit earlier today and get on the train before I get there. To Lancaster, there. So you're. So we're going away. I told Father Michael there before that I get first tomorrow, but we're going down to visit the grandchildren.

[47:15] All seventeen.