Prima Secundae
41. Summa I-II Q.13 Art. 1-2: Is Choice an Act of Will or Reason, and Do Animals Choose?
Class of 2011-12-01
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/041-summa-i-ii-q-13-art-1-2-is-choice-an-act-of-will-or-reason/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias God, our enlightenment. Guardian Angels, open the lights of our minds, ordain luminar images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written.

[0:34] Are we getting a new little division here? In question thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen, which Thomas notes what we're going to transition to now. Consequenter he said. consequently, we're to consider about the acts of the will, which are in comparison to those things which are what towards the end.

[0:59] In English, I think we'd say what for the end, right? Rather than towards the end, not the love of the end. But anyway. And they are three, he says. Right? How does he get these three all the time? It's amazing what he does, huh? Eligere, huh? Which means to what? To choose, I guess. Consentire, which means to what? Consent, I guess. Consentire and what Uti to use right But.

[1:32] And what? Uti to use, right? But counsel goes before what? Choice. So it's going to be divided then into what? Four parts. Question thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen. First, we're not to consider about choice. Secondly, about counsel, which is presupposed to it. Third, about consent. And fourth, about what use? So question thirteen will be about choice, right? And question fourteen about um counsel, and then fifteen and sixteen about consent and use, right?

[2:22] But each question is many questions, huh? Now about choice, six things are asked. First, whether it be an act. No, of what power it is an act. Whether of the will or of what reason? Huh?

[2:48] Secondly, whether choice belongs to the brute animals, huh? What Shakespeare calls a beast, right? Third, whether choice is only of those things which are for an end, or whether it is also of the end itself.

[3:17] Third or fourth, rather, whether choice is only of those things which are done by us. Fifth, whether choice is only of things that are what possible, right?

[3:34] And sixth, whether man of necessity chooses, or freely. Offer, I couldn't refuse. They tell me that. Offer, couldn't refuse. You heard that phrase, business man just leaving, you know? Offer, he got an offer, he couldn't refuse.

[4:00] So, to the first one goes forward. Thus, it seems that choice is not an act of the will, but of what reason, right? Aristotle himself sometimes spoke as if you know, it's both, right, or it's one or the other. For choice implies a certain what? Comparison is certain bringing together, right? I guess collatio has got the idea of what collatio along the side of, right, and collatio put two things alongside for comparison, right?

[4:40] Sometimes you see in Latin there they'll say reason is collativus and discursivus You are bringing together and then you know discoursing, running right from one thing to another, reasoning, right? So it implies a certain collatio by which one thing is preferred to a what another, but to what bring together? See, pharaoh means what to to bring and con is together, right? But to bring together is of what reason?

[5:17] So when reason reasons, it brings together these two premises, right? And reasons out a conclusion. When you define, you bring together the genus and the what differences, right?

[5:33] Therefore, choice is of reason, right? Well, this argument at least shows that choice does involve reason, right? But whether it's an act of reason itself is a little more to be considered.

[5:52] Moreover, it is of the same thing to syllogize and to what conclude. But to syllogize in doable things pertains to what reason? Belongs to reason. Since, therefore, choice is as a conclusion in things to be done, as is said in the seventh book of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, right? It seems that it be that it is a what act of what reason?

[6:27] Moreover, ignorance does not pertain to the will, but to the knowing power. But there is a certain ignorance of choice, right? As is said in the third book of the Ethics. Therefore, it seems that choice does not pertain to the will, but to what reason, right?

[6:51] But against all this is what the philosopher himself says in the third book of the Ethics: that choice is the desire of those things which are in our power, right?

[7:05] But desire is an act of the will. Therefore, choice is a what? Also an act of the will, huh? Now Thomas is saying it involves both, but still it's an act of one rather than the other. I answer: It should be said that in the name of choice, I have to get a word election, right?

[7:36] Is implied something pertaining to reason or the understanding, and something pertaining to the what will? For the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics, this is what I was referring to, that electio all right, huh, is either a what understanding, desiring, or a what understandable desire. He is kind of at that point, right? That involves both, right? Huh? And it doesn't put one in for the other like it does in the in the said contra, right?

[8:23] Now, whenever two things concurrent, one together, right? Huh? To constituting something one, one of them is as it were formal respect to the what other. Whence Gregory of Nyssa, and I guess this is my footnote says this is Nemesius not Nyssa but anyway. I was just talking to the Father before you guys came in there because my son gave me a copy of. Kagan's book there on the Peloponnesian War, right?

[9:04] Oh yeah. So I'm reading about it and the generals and so on, and I was struck by one general's name, Sophocles, right? I says was just just a you know equivocal name, you know, for the thing where he said the Sophocles that is a playwright, huh? I got kind of curious about Sophocles, so I was looking up some little biographical detail in him, right? And he served as a general, right?

[9:26] Well. With Pericles, huh? And he served on the board, you know, that was in charge of the generals and so on, right? Huh? He also served as head of the, the in charge of the, the, the confederacy, you know, the the treasury of the, like a, secretary of the treasury or something, and all kind of interesting things about the man, right? Huh? See. And there's another dialogue called Laches huh Where Socrates talks to an old general named Laches join. Well he's in the Peloponnesian War too, and he's associated with Nicias, who also appears in the dialogue, right?

[10:07] So these are real guys, you know. So you got to be careful, you know, sometimes, huh? I know with Winston Churchill, there's a novelist named Winston Churchill, right? Oh. But Winston Churchill himself wrote a novel. And so right now it's kind of interesting in Churchill, you know, and Chris, and then there's some correspondence between Churchill and this guy, you know, how he can, you know, write our names to help people distinguish us, you know.

[10:38] It's kind of kind of a funny little letter, you know, and so you got to you got to be careful about some of these things, you know.

[10:50] Who is it? Who is it? Isn't it a philosopher? Is it Euclid of Megara, I think? But he's nothing to do with the Euclid of the Elements, right? You got to be careful with these these names, right? Huh? I know Gertrude the Great, huh? They thought she was an abbess, but her her her abbess was Gertrude of Hackeborn, right? And so the two were confused, right? So, and some of the old editions, like my edition of some of her works, there she's represented in you know the abbess costume, you know, so so here's Thomas with two Gregories, maybe, huh?

[11:29] So what can you do, huh? So, whence Gregory, huh? Some Gregory, anyway, says that choice is neither desire by itself, huh? Nor counsel solely alone, right? It involves both of these, huh? But something put together from these, right?

[11:58] Just as we say that the animal is put together from the soul and the body, huh? And it's neither a body by itself nor just a soul, right? But both, so also what? Choice, right? Okay.

[12:24] So notice, when we first see this act called choice in a somewhat what confused way, right? Not very distinctly. It's either what intellect desiring or intellectual desiring, right? You know, which kind of indicates that it's what involves both, right? Now, okay, and and Gregory saying something like that, huh? So both Gregory and Aristotle are saying that, right? Now, okay, but now we go on to be a little more distinct, right?

[12:57] Okay. But it should be considered that in the acts of the soul. That acts which are what essentially of one power, right, or of one what habit, right? They receive sometimes their form, right, and their species from a higher power or habit, according as the lower is ordered by the what superior, right? Sometimes they say charity, for example, is the form of the virtues, right? Okay, and forms the other virtues, right?

[13:37] It believes all things, you know, hopes all things, as Saint Paul says. For if some act of fortitude, right, is exercised in account of the love of God, right, the act is materially speaking an act of what fortitude, right? But formally of what charity, yeah.

[14:05] Thomas talks about that when he talks about you monks, right? You know, and he says, well, if you're abstaining from food or something like that, right,

[14:22] is it an act of abstinence or temperance, or is an act of what obedience, right? You see, well, if you're acting under your vow, well, then it's formally that, right? Even though it's materially an act of what temperance or something of this sort, huh?

[14:43] Now, it is manifest that reason, in some way, right, comes before the will, because the object of the will is the good, is known by what reason, right? And it also what orders its what act, right? So as Aristotle says, it belongs to the wise man to order things, right? And that's because it's the highest perfection of reason, which is proper to look before and after, as Shakespeare says, right?

[15:14] So if there's a before and act and after and order in the act of the will, you'd expect it would come from what reason, right?

[15:24] So it's manifest that reason, in a certain way, precedes the will and orders its what act, huh? In so far as the will tends toward its object by the order of what reason, right?

[15:45] In that the grasping power, and that's the what knowing power, right? This apprehensiva. Sometimes they call the first act of reason what simple grasping, huh? So the act of reason is named from what the act of the hand, right? And so you see that term in Thomas and logic, you know, simplex apprehensio, right? Okay. And that is interesting now because the knowing power, right? Knowing takes place by getting the thing known in the know, right?

[16:21] So when I grasp something with my hand, it's contained in my hand, right? When I grasp something with my mind or reason, it's in my what? Reason, right? Why love is more in the thing loved, right? Okay. So there is kind of this kind of contrariety there in the way the reason and the will work, right? Huh? Reason is trying to get the thing into itself, right?

[16:49] Huh? Why the will goes out to the object and rests in the object itself, right? I left my heart in San Francisco, right? Okay. Or Christ says, "Where your treasure is, there your what? " Yeah. So your heart's in in heaven, not here, right?

[17:10] So it's kind of contrast there, right? I used to use a simple example, you know. You can jump into the ocean, but you can't put it in you. And that's the way it is with God, right? Now you can more your your will is more proportioned to God than your what? Yeah, yeah. Especially in this life, right? Huh?

[17:34] So charity remains after what? Death, right? Huh? But faith, you know, gives way to vision, right? So you often, you know, use this kind of synonym for the knowing power, the vis apprehensiva, right? Huh? Okay.

[18:01] For the vis apprehensiva, the grasping power, huh? Represents its object to the what? Desiring power, the appetitivam, the wanting power. If therefore that act by which the will tends towards something that is proposed to it as good is from this that through reason it is ordered to an end. In a material way, it's an act of the will, right? But formally of what? Act of reason. Of reason, yeah.

[18:44] In what? In things of this sort, right? The substance of the act materially has itself to the order which is placed upon it by a superior what? Power, yeah. And therefore, choice substantially is not an act of reason, but of the will. Right. In other words, substantial goes from standing under, right? Huh. So the act of the will here stands under reason in the sense that it what it stands under this order that reason has imposed upon it.

[19:28] Okay. But choice is perfected in a certain motion of the soul towards the good. Right. That's going out to the good. Right. That is chosen. Right. Hence, manifestly, it is an act of the what? Desiring power.

[19:57] So I'm desiring the medicine. For the sake of what health, right? I guess I desire to take the medicine every day, you know, little box and all these things laying down.

[20:14] So this is an act of my will to desire to take the medicine, right? But I'm desiring to take the medicine because my reason has what seen the order of medicine to health, or the reason of the doctor has seen the order of this medicine to my what health, right? So it's materially, substantially, an act of my what will desire to take medicine, but it's formally, right?

[20:44] It's an act of my will under the order which reason has what given that, right? So it's reason that sees the order of medicine to health, right? And therefore the will depends upon reason, right, to desire health for what?

[21:09] Desire medicine for health, yeah. Now if the medicine tasted good, that might be a different thing. I just, you know, when I was a kid, I had some little medicine for something, and it was kind of cinnamon flavored, and I had those little red cinnamon things, you know. Yeah. It tasted pretty good. And one day, took and I sucked it for a while, you know, too long.

[21:32] Sucked right through the thing, and oh, what an awful taste. It's a it's a dangerous way to get little kids around the house, right? You have medicine that tastes like candy, you know, huh?

[21:49] But my medicine doesn't taste too good, you know. So the medicine I take now is not the cinnamon coated and that. So it's only by reason that I want to take that medicine, right? Okay.

[22:05] To the first, therefore, it should be said that choice does imply a what bringing together, right? Comparison. A certain one that is preceding it, right? Not that it is essentially, or as he said in the in the thing, substantially. Right? Here he's using a what essentially as kind of synonym for substantially, right? Not that it is essentially the what bringing together, right? The ordering, huh? How do they translate collatio there?

[22:38] Just kind of give you kind of. So we have an English text there. How do they translate collatio I don't know the English At the end of at the end of the reply to the first, something about like gathering and putting together or something. Comparison and comparison. Sometimes it turns as comparison, right? Bring alongside, actually, you have to bring alongside, you know, latus collatus bring, bring alongside, you know.

[23:08] Which is called comparison, right? Yeah. I see that in Albert the Great. Sometimes you know, speak of, and Thomas too, that reason is collativus and discursivus right? Okay. Instead, I always think of the syllogism. You know, you bring together two premises, and then you discourse to the conclusion, right? You you run to the conclusion. Discourse comes from running.

[23:42] To the second it should be said that the conclusion, also the syllogism, which comes about in things to be done, pertains to reason, right?

[23:55] And is called a what? sententia right? Or judicium, which the choice what follows, huh? And on account of this, the conclusion seems to pertain to choice, right? As it were to something that follows upon it, right?

[24:23] To the third, this phrase now, ignorantia what? electionis, ignorance of choice. To the third, it should be said that ignorance is said to be of choice, not that the what choice itself is knowledge, but because one is ignorant of what should be chosen. Okay. That's a perfect phrase. Now, what about our beastly, beastly friends? Okay. Grandchildren were getting on top of the cows there and riding them.

[25:01] Of course, my son's, you know, his daughters, they had lessons riding horses, you know, so there's nothing to get on top of the cow. I don't know how the cows liked it, but.

[25:13] The young ones are trying to imitate the older ones getting on top of the cows, so they know cows don't work out there, I think. How many cows do you have? Oh, I don't know how many now. It's keeps changing, you know, because some are being born. So we had some steak too from the cows, you know. So.

[25:34] Great, great. We're discussing whether this farming life is a, you know, good honest life, you know. It goes on in some of the sections of the economy. To the second one proceeds thus: it seems that choice belongs to the what? Brute animals.

[26:03] For choice is a desire of those things, of some things, on account of an end, as is said in the third book of the Ethics. But the what brute animals desire something on account of an end, for the act, for the sake of an end, and from what desire. Therefore, in brute animals, there is what choice.

[26:31] Do they compare right, or is it by nature that this is in them? Moreover, the very name of choice signifies that something is taken what before others, right?

[26:53] But the brute animals take something before what others, right? Huh? Just as manifestly the what sheep, I guess it is, eats one what herb, right? Huh? And refuses another one, right?

[27:14] Therefore, in brute animals, there is what. Yeah. I remember in the book about cats how to get a cat a pill you know. And they recommend you put the pill inside a little meatball, right? And you have a nice little meatball. You toss it with a cat. You toss it with the pill. and the cat takes it. Very hard. otherwise, to give the cat a pill, right?

[27:36] You might have one all the time and give the cat a pill. My son, they came up. he brought a cat that had been hanging around their house down there, you know. In Texas, they brought it up to the farm because my daughter wanted to get something to get the mice that are trying to get into the feed, you know. So the cat didn't know what's going on, but seems to be settling down now to the new life on the farm.

[28:08] Okay. But I guess you you know you get these animals that come in, you know, to try to get at the chickens, you know, and they they actually you know tear at the screens and so on, you know. So.

[28:22] I guess there's a thing you give these things that they'll go eat and 5 minutes afterwards they'll be dead. Yeah. But you gotta watch out for the kids, you know. Potent things, huh?

[28:37] Okay. So the animals desire something for the sake of an end, right? And they prefer, right, one thing to another, right? Huh? They got some class, those, you know. When I catch a little piece of little pork, you know, some piece of pork, you know. And of course steak you know and that's the stuff Moreover, as is said, in, the sixth book of the Ethics, to prudence belongs or pertains that some one well choose those things which are for the end.

[29:16] But prudence belongs to the brute animals, whence it is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics that they are prudent without what learning, whichever ones do not what, not able to hear right, As the what,

[29:37] bees, bees, yeah, apis, yeah, forget the word apiaries isn't it? You know, yeah. And this also is manifest in sense, huh? For there appears marvelous sagacities, right, in the works of animals, as of the bees and the what, spiders, huh? And even the dogs, right? For the dog in following the what?

[30:10] The deer, I guess, huh? If it what comes to a what? Yeah, trivial, huh? Three ways. By what smell it explores whether this tiger has passed by within the first or the second way, right? Once that if it finds it is not, it securely goes what into the third way, right, huh? Not exploring, but it says we're using a what? Syllogismo divisivo, right? Okay. I used to call it in class an either-or a syllogism, right?

[30:54] Either went this road or this road this way, well. So yeah, you know how they go with you know the police use these dogs, right? Now the dog and of course right one follow, right? So I guess what you do is you get that hot pepper there and you spread there and get the dog off and stuff.

[31:17] Okay. Okay, as if using a divisive, divisive syllogism, huh? By which it concludes that the stag has gone through that way, right? From the fact that it did not go through the other two ones, right? Since there, there are no more. Therefore, it seems that choice belongs to the brute animals.

[31:49] But against all this is what that Gregory, whoever he is, can see the footnote here. You see, Nemesis, huh? De natura hominis Okay. He says that boys and what irrational animals voluntarily do something, right? But not, however, choosing, right, huh?

[32:16] So the little baby doesn't choose to cry, does he? But at some point they kind of you know realize this is kind of a tool, you know, to get attention, you know, and then then they start to choose to cry, right, huh? I thought on the grandchildren, the older one, correct the younger one, you know, that the younger one was, you know, she was doing that, you know, to get attention or to get the thing that she wanted, right?

[32:43] You know, then she then she was choosing to cry, right? So it shows it increases the you know the reason, right? Yeah, grandchildren. Okay.

[33:05] Actually, it should be said that since choice is the what taking of one with respect to another, right, is necessary that choice be what with respect to many things which are able to be what chosen, Chosen, right? And therefore, in those things which are entirely determined to one, choice has no what place, huh?

[33:41] Now, there's this difference between sense desire and will, as as clear from the four said things, that sense desire is determined to something what one particular thing by the order of what nature, huh? But the will is a what by the order of nature determined to something one common which is the good, but it has itself what indeterminately with respect to what? Yeah. So, when the person goes to restaurant and they give them menu, right, he might be determined by nature to eat something, right?

[34:30] But now he's got to make what choice among these things, huh? And therefore, it's proper to the will what to choose, but not for the sense desire to choose, right? Which is the only kind of what choice that is found in the what

[34:55] Brute animals, right? And account of this, choice does not belong to the what food animals, huh? he says, "No, apply to the first objection. The first, therefore, it should be said that not every desire of something in account of an end is called what choice, but when there's a certain what discrimination, ah, discretion, yeah, of one from the what other, huh? " Interesting is the word "discretion Where in the categories does that word come in Come up that word come in?

[35:46] Come up, discrete. Yeah, continuous and discrete quantity. Yeah, discretion. Which has no place, he says, except where the desire can be what carried towards what. Many, right?

[36:14] To second it should be said that the brute animal takes one before another because his what desire is naturally determined to what to it.

[36:35] Whence, at once, when through the senses or through the imagination, there is represented something to it, to which it is naturally, it's to which naturally is inclined its appetite. Without choice, it is moved towards that.

[36:57] Just as without choice, fire is moved upwards and not what downwards. So he's saying when something is proposed to him that is in accord with his natural what inclination, he goes for it, right? A choice.

[37:28] I suppose there could be individual differences. I mean, these two cats of the house there, you know, Tabitha and Moppet, and after breakfast, you know, Tabitha went right to the front door, wanted to go out. Down the a couple of blocks there was an empty lot there with honey, I guess, or something. She did every morning, and Moppet would go and jump in the window sill there, you know, a nice board there in front of the window, you know, and watch the world go by, a little more investigative.

[38:01] But they did every morning. The two of them. The other just did it. I must say something. You know, I don't know why, but I don't think it was was a choice. You know, should I go hunting, nor should I sit in the window and watch the world go by.

[38:20] One is contemplative and the other is active. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Remember the cat we had back home when I was a kid, and the they had a you know little cupboard, a little place in the kitchen there where you could there was a table there and you'd sit there, and the cat would get up in that thing and go look out the window, right? And then a couple of dogs in the backyard had a fight, and she got so excited, she went, "Oh, come on!"

[38:50] So there are some individual differences, right? These animals, right? But is it a matter of choice? My wife, my wife doesn't like licorice. I like licorice. My wife doesn't like licorice. My daughter likes licorice, but my wife doesn't. I know. Why are you killing me with this? And then salmon. Oh my God! I can't stand that. I feel real about this. You know, in Christ people, you know, they find people confessing, you know, sometimes, you know, that you know they really enjoy their Friday meal, even though it wasn't meat, because they really like that stuff.

[39:22] Like for me, I was eating all tendons, you know, all that stuff tonight. It's a real tendons. We eat this stuff. I mean, there might be individual differences like that, I suppose, in the animals. I don't know. Some animals might be more attracted to one food than another. I don't know. But do they choose? Do you choose to to like licorice, or you choose to like salmon?

[39:50] You know, partly, you know, with nationalities, you know, they have their favorite foods, as they say, right? And that that's probably custom rather than nature, right? But there's probably something too. About nature, I mean, you know, some like one of my grandchildren can't eat peanuts, right? They're allergic to the sort of nuts, you know. And you know, my my son, one of my sons, is allergic to hazelnuts and that sort of stuff, you know.

[40:14] And you know, it's carried me sometimes, you know, and you get reaction from it, huh? So, but that's something natural. There's not a choice; didn't choose to not like hazelnuts or something like that, right?

[40:32] So, could be something in us, you know, whereby you you just never like licorice, you never liked salmon or. anything You were in the maybe the 60s or 70s, a plate company came out with a plastic plate. Yeah. And they thought they were going to make lots of money, but all of a sudden, complaints started coming in that food tasted terrible on those plates. But not everybody who had a plate thought that way.

[40:57] Yeah. It turned out that there was a component in the plastic that some people can taste and others can't. Wow. And I did an anthropology course in college, and the professor had little slips of paper with this compound on it. and so each of us tried it to see if we could taste it or not. And it's kind of interesting chemical. Yeah. Yeah. But now the difference between you know nations and their food is probably custom rather than nature, but custom is a called a second nature, right?

[41:31] Maybe it's inbred after generations. Yeah. After generations. Yeah. Same from Minnesota, you know, and so we're used to what lake food, you know. So I mean, to me, the best thing in fish is walleye pike, you know, and you know rather than this this ocean things, you know. And by some, it goes up in in the coast or in the ocean. It's going to be attached to that, you know.

[42:02] That's that's custom, it seems to me, you know. You know, except when it comes to salmon that's something, something, something about that. Unpardonable, you know. Okay.

[42:20] So he says the brute animal it takes one before another because his desire or appetite is naturally determined to it, right? Whence at once, this is the second objection now. Whence at once, when through the sense of the imagination is represented to it, something to which it is naturally to which his appetite is naturally inclined, without choice he is moved to that alone, right? And just as without choice, fire is moved upwards and not downwards.

[42:52] Now the third objection, huh? That again, the third objection. It's a longer one, right? Aristotle seems to attribute to them a certain prudence, right? That's kind of metaphorically said, huh? To the third, it should be said, that is said in the third book of the Physics, motion is the act of the mobile from the what, mover, and therefore the power of the mover appears in the motion of the what, mobile, right?

[43:34] So the football thrown by the great player, right? You see the power of the mover, right? The quarterback, right? In the motion of the football, right?

[43:49] And an account of this, in all things which are moved by reason, there appears the order of the reason of the what mover, right? Even though they themselves do not have what, reason, huh? For thus the what, arrow tends directly towards the target, right? The signal from the motion of the what, Archer. archer, yeah. As if they themselves had what, a reason what, directing them, right? I mentioned that all the way Aristotle in the second book of the Physics there he says that so much does action for an end appear in the bees and the ants and so on that people wonder whether they have a reason or not, right?

[44:39] He's not asserting that they do have a reason, right? But he says so much does action for an end appear, the reason seems to be involved, right? Then do they have reason, right? Or if they don't, then they're going to be moved by something that has reason. And therefore in the motions of what, that word for clock horologium huh? Or horologiorum that's the genitive plural there It's quite a word for a clock huh We plural there.

[45:10] It's quite a word for a clock, huh? We hear that word the horological. You're an English sometimes, huh? Natural clocks, but things. Should be a chronological, right? Um. So just as all artificial things are compared to human art, so also all natural things are compared to the what, divine art, right? And therefore order appears in those things which are moved what, by nature, just as in those things which are moved by reason, as is said in the second book of Natural Hearing, the Physics.

[45:59] And from this it happens that in the works of the brood animals There appears certain what. Wise things, right? Sagacious, yeah. Insofar as they have a natural inclination to some what most ordered, ordinatissimos processes, As it were ordered by a what highest art, right? The divine art. In account of this, also some animals are called what prudent or sagacious, not that there is in them some reason or choice.

[46:39] Which appears from this that all which are one nature operate in the same way, right? Unlike men, right? So they speak. The bees all make their hives in the same way, right? But you know, around you see different way people make houses and so on, right?

[47:00] Aristotle or De Koninck used to talk about how kind of second definition of nature, right? Something in the divine art in things. So they say, if the art of building a ship could be put into the wood, so it built itself into a ship. You have something like nature, right? We can see how what you know, which I do with our computers and so on, right? Put something of our art into the thing, you know.

[47:23] So I told you about the who's it? The Charlie Rose there, you know, is one of these computer guys, and he was talking about you know, he's actually telling when the computer is going to excel the human mind. Charlie's, you know, you know, finding all this stuff up, you know. I think the deadline is passed, you know. I mean, it was increasing it like this exponentially. So eventually, it's going to, you know, be ahead of the human mind.

[47:55] So this is a horror, you know. We'll be obeying them, you know. But there you can see it was more like nature, though, right? Putting more of your art in there, right? Maybe not quite as much as this guy thought, but there is something of the human art there in these machines, right? Intelligence and the artists. Oh. Now, where the choice is only of those things which are for the end, or also sometimes of the end itself.