Prima Secundae
42. Summa I-II Q.13 Art. 3-6: Choice Is of Means, of Human Acts, of Possible Things, and Is Free
Class of 2011-12-01
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/042-summa-i-ii-q-13-art-3-6-choice-is-of-means-of-human-acts/

[0:00] To the third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that choice is not only of those things which are for the end. For the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics that virtue makes for what right choice. So Aristotle defines what moral virtue. He puts what choice in the definition, right? It's a habit with, choice, right, existing in the middle towards us, as determined by right reason and so on.

[0:36] So if you have the virtue of what temperance, right, you choose to eat and drink moderately, right, enough to sustain you, but not have to get drunk, etc.

[0:57] So whatever things are what apt to be what come about for the sake of something, right, are not of virtue but of a what another power, right?

[1:38] But that for the sake of which something comes to be is an end. Therefore, choice is of the end. Maybe come clear at the end.

[2:02] Moreover, second objection: choice implies the what accepting before one thing with respect to another, placing it before. But just as of those things which are what

[2:19] towards one end, one can take one before another, right? So also of diverse what ends. Therefore, choice can be of the end, just as of those things which are for the end. Now

[2:36] I noticed there, when Aristotle's talking there in the Metaphysics, there he's comparing the philosopher, the wise man, with the dialectician, right, and with the sophist, right, and he says he differs from the dialectician by his power, right, because the wise man is certain about things and the dialectician is only probability, right. But he differs from the sophist by his what choice of life, right? See, yeah, but then they have a different end in in mind, you know.

[3:07] So here's a place where Aristotle seems to be saying you can choose what your end, right? Okay. And so when people said all of life, you know, we can do in life, you know, what they choose their end, right? So we're doing aim at in life, huh? So, so I choose to be wealthy, the wealthiest man in the world, or I choose to be the best this or that or something, you know.

[3:34] Yeah, we'll see what Thomas says here. But against this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics that voluntas, right, wills of the end, but choice of those things which are for the end, towards the end.

[4:02] Now, I answer it should be said that as has been said, choice follows upon a what? sententia, or judgment, right? Huh? There were the sentences, Peter Lombard, right? What the sentences were of the church fathers and so on, which is as the conclusion of a what? Operative syllogism, right? Syllogism of the operative. Whence that falls under election, which has itself as a conclusion in a syllogism about things to be done.

[4:44] But now the famous proportion, but the end and things to be done is like the what? Principle or premise, and not as conclusion, as the philosopher says in second book of the Physics. Whence the end, as such, right, does not fall under what? Election, huh? Choice, huh? But now this is the distinction he's going to see here. But just as in speculative TVs, right, nothing prevents that which is the beginning of one demonstration or science, right, to be the conclusion of another demonstration or science, right.

[5:34] Nevertheless, the what? Very first beginning, the demonstrative beginning, cannot be the conclusion of some what? Yeah, so that all right angles are equal, right? Or if equals right, equals results are equal, right? These are not what conclusions, right? So also it happens that what is in one doing an end is ordered to another as to a what enda, and

[6:08] in this way it falls under what? Yeah. Just as in the operating of the medic the doctor, health has itself as an end. Whence this does not fall under the choice of the doctor. right? Let's go to a lot of doctors. But it supposes this as a beginning, right? But the health of the body is ordered to the good of the soul, right? Whence among the man who has cure or the salvation of the soul, right?

[6:46] It can come under election to choose what. Or sick right. As the apostle says, when I am what weak, then I am powerful. But the last end in no way comes under what choice, right? Okay. So just as the same statement can be a premise or a conclusion, right? So the same thing can be what an end of some things and a means of others, right? That's not hard to see, right?

[7:22] See, but in so far as it's an end, it's not the object of what Choice. choice, right? It's always as a means to some further end that it can be choice, right? That reminds me of what Thomas says sometimes. He'll say in logic there that

[7:40] what is defined is always a species, right? You say, well, quadrilateral was defined by Euclid, right? And quadrilateral is a genus of square, oblong, and so on. So sometimes isn't it a genus is defined? It's a species of higher genus. Yeah, yeah. It's in so far as species of a higher genus that's defined, huh? Not in so far as it's a genus, right? And eventually you come to a genus called categories that cannot be defined, right?

[8:13] Huh? In any way, right? Okay. But even those genera that can be defined, like quadrilateral, they're defined in so far as they are the species of some genus, which is the beginning of its definition, right? So you could say then that genera not defined just species.

[8:36] Yet someone could say, well, yeah, well, but the same thing can be, right? Yeah, until you come to the highest genus which cannot be species, right? But the genus that is also species can be defined, but. Not. Yeah. Yeah.

[8:55] Can the father be generated? Huh? Not as father. Yeah, you see what I mean? And. Maybe there is some father like Adam or somebody, right? Who's not generated, right? He's created, but not generated, right? Is the premise proved? Proved.

[9:22] Yeah, but is it as a premise then that it's proven? No. But insofar as itself as a conclusion, right, that it's proven, right? It's not hard to see, right. So it's the same kind of distinction he's making here, right? That the what is chosen is chosen as a means, not an end, right? So I am having a lot of fun now. That one of my grandchild children, her name is Sophia, right?

[9:55] So I say, I'm a philosopher, so I'm a lover of Sophia. I was kind of playing the the equivocation of this, right now, okay. But anyway, you might say that I chose to be a philosopher, right? Um. But you see, that's my end in life to be a philosopher, right? You see. But no, when I chose to be a philosopher, is I thought that this would lead to my happiness, right?

[10:26] See, so I didn't choose to be happy, right? Huh. But I didn't think I could be happy by being a politician. Nobody thinks, right?

[10:41] And I didn't think I'd be happy by being a businessman, right? I didn't think I'd be happy by being a lawyer or a medical doctor, right? That could be happy. So, but then you could say that then, if this is my end, you know, then I do things the sake of it, right? Went to Laval, so right. Um. So, if I chose to be a philosopher, it's insofar as to be a philosopher is a means to my being what happy, right?

[11:16] What's insofar as is. As my end in life to be a philosopher, right? Okay. The little girl is a few feet. Sure, about this stuff. Because of.

[11:48] So, actually, you look at the type of objections here. Yeah, so the ends of the proper ends of the virtues are ordered to beatitude as to a what? Last end, and in this way, there can be choice of them, right? So Thomas sometimes says that virtue is the road to what? Happiness, right? Vice is the road to what? Misery, right? Okay. So if you want to be miserable, you you choose to do these vices, right?

[12:35] But you can't choose beatitude, huh? Can't choose. You know, does a man choose between happiness and misery? Right? Probably the existentialist would think. He could, you know, but can he really do that? huh? The existentialist would always choose to be miserable. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[12:53] Because it'd be more noble. Yeah, the priest out there in Kansas there was saying, talking about the little joke there about the Sadducees, right? And because the Sadducees didn't believe in the yeah, and so on, yeah. So that's why they're sad, you see.

[13:19] The priest was from Wisconsin. You know, he's kind of a fan of the Green Bay Packers. You know, but he's always making some allusion. you know, in a humorous way to the Packers, You know, huh?

[13:40] Okay. And to the second, right? It should be said, as had above, that the last end is one thing only, right? Huh? beatitude or happiness.

[13:59] Whence, wherever there occur many ends, right? Among whom there is able to be choice, according as they are ordered to a what? A further end, right? Let's go ahead and take a little break, don't we? Come on.

[14:24] How old is Sophia now? How old? Let's look at Article 4 right now. To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that choice is not only with respect to human acts, for choice is of those things which are for the end, right?

[14:47] But those things which are for the end are not only acts, right? But also what tools, right? This is said in the second book of the physics. Therefore, choices are not only of human acts. And the dummy Brother Bruce was saying, you know, they chose medicine, right? That's not a human act, right? Moreover, action is distinguished from contemplation,

[15:18] but choice also has place in contemplation, in so far as one opinion is what chosen over another, right? That equivocation, now what is that?

[15:33] Therefore, choice is not only of what human acts, huh? Us choosing Homer, right? He's the the poet, huh? Moreover, men are chosen for some offices, huh? Either secular offices or ecclesiastical offices, from what? By those who do nothing with reference to them, right?

[16:03] Therefore, choice is not only of what human acts, huh? So when they elect the president, right? There you go. That I'm not to tell you that.

[16:16] But against all this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics, that no one chooses except those things which he what estimates can come about through what himself.

[16:32] Let's see what the master says here. I answer: It should be said that just as intention is of the end, so choice is of those things which are for the end, huh?

[16:47] But the end is either what an action or something, right? And when something w was the end, right? It is necessary that some human action what intervene. Either in so far as man does what something which is the end, just as the physician makes what health, which is what his end, right? Whence to make health is said to be the end of the physician, right?

[17:30] It's interesting we use the word physician now, right? We use the word physician that comes from nature, right? So when a doctor starts getting involved in abortion and other unnatural things, is he a physician anymore? In fact, Father Owen Bennett used to always insist on that for a doctor, or a physician. Yeah. Because a doctor is a teacher. He may or may not teach. Yeah. He's a physician.

[17:56] Yeah. Whence to make health is said to be the what end of the medical doctor? Or in so far as a man in some way uses or enjoys the thing which is the what end, as the avaricious man, his end is what money, right? Or the possession of money, right? And in the same way, it should be said about that which is for the end, because it is necessary that that which is for the end is either a what action, right?

[18:40] Or some thing, which what the intervention of some action, by which it is what. Towards the end. Or uses it, right? And in this way, choice is always of what Human acts, huh?

[18:59] So in regard to the objection then from the tools, huh? To the fourth, to the first, therefore it should be said that tools are ordered to the end, in so far as the man uses them for the end, right?

[19:15] So do I choose the medicine, or do I choose to take the medicine? What do I what do I choose? Choose to use it or take it. I choose to take the medicine, right? But it's a human act, don't miss taking medicine. Sometimes I. Yeah, it's a different. Yeah, hesitating.

[19:36] Purgatory goes between. To second, it should be said that in contemplation itself, there is some act of the understanding assenting to this opinion or that, right?

[20:03] But it's the exterior action that is divided against contemplation, right? huh? So he doesn't deny that, huh? be careful about that Thomasian reply, huh?

[20:29] Because I'd be kind of careful about saying, you know, that you choose, but you want the affirmation of the negation, right? But anyway, maybe it's an opinion. Well, yeah, like say choose. Yeah, yeah, choose, you know, choose what you want. Yeah. Like a menu, you know, philosophical menu, you know. Well, that's that's what they teach, you know, introduction philosophy in most colleges and universities, right? You give them a menu, right?

[21:06] You know, and this is what Aristotle says, this what Descartes says, you know, and then you, you know, the student decides to what he wants for his meal, you know. We'll choose Descartes on a card. Now, to the third, it, should be said that the man who chooses a bishop, right, or the prince of the city, chooses to what name him for such a dignity, right? Huh.

[21:36] Otherwise, if there were no what. Acting to establish him. Yeah, to the constituting of a bishop or a prince, there would not be any what choice, right? And likewise, it should be said whenever something is what chosen before another, right? One joins to it some operation of one choosing, right? So if I choose steak over a salmon, huh? It's I want to eat the steak. I don't eat the.

[22:05] It's got to be an action involved in there, right? Can't time for any more here, right? Well, there are choices only. Things that are possible. To the fifth, one proceeds thus: it seems that choice is not only of possible things, for choice is an act of the will, as has been said. But the will is of what impossible things, as Aristotle says in the third book of the Ethics.

[22:42] Moreover, choices of those things which are done by us, but in no way does it differ, as far as the choice is concerned, whether one chooses that which is what, Impossible. simply, or that which is impossible to the one choosing. But often those things that we what choose, we cannot what perfect, and thus they are impossible for us. Therefore, choice is of impossible things.

[23:23] Moreover, nothing does man what attempt to do except by choosing. But the Blessed Benedict says, "Huh? This is, I guess, the one that is regular. That if the prelate commands something impossible, it must be tried. Therefore, choice is of impossible things. There you go, Proof from the pudding, right there. I think it was Benedict. Mother Superior says, 'You know, you're going to teach calculus, then Sister's going to.

[24:04] That's it. Might be impossible for Sister to teach it, but it's possible for me to learn it. But against this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, right? That choice is not of what. Impossible.

[24:29] Okay. I answer: It should be said that, as has been said, our what choices refer always to our what actions. But those things which are done by us are possible what for us. Whence it is necessary to say that choice is not except of things possible. So simple, Thomas. huh De Koninck used to say, "we've got to get back to the simple understanding of Thomas, right? "

[25:08] Likewise, the reason for choosing something is from this that it leads to the what end, huh? But to that which is impossible, one cannot what achieve the end.

[25:24] A sign of which is that in taking counsel, men arrive at that which is what impossible for them, right? They cease, right? As if not being able to proceed further, right? We're going to hang a bell on the cat, right? That's who's going to do that, right?

[25:47] And this appears also manifestly from the proceeding of reason that precedes. For thus they have themselves to the end of which there is choice to the end, just as a conclusion to the what beginning or the premise. But it is manifest, however, that a what impossible conclusion does not follow from a what possible end. Whence is not possible that the end be what, Possible unless that which is for the end was what possible.

[26:38] But to that which is impossible, no one is what. Moved, huh? Whence no one tends towards an end except to that which appears that what. Possible to that end. Yeah.

[26:58] Whence that which is impossible does not fall under election. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that voluntas is what in between the understanding and the exterior operation, right? For the will proposes to the will its object, right, and the will itself causes the exterior action. Thus, therefore, the beginning of the motion of the will is considered on the side of the what understanding, which grasps something as good in general, right?

[28:00] But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is to be noted according to its order to operation, through which someone tends to the what achievement achievement of the end of the thing, right. For the motion of the will is from the soul to the thing, right? By the knowing, it's from the thing to the knowing. And therefore, the perfection of the act of the will is to be noted according to what?

[28:33] According to this, that there is what something good. to be done By someone By someone else There's something good to someone for doing, right? But this is what possible. And therefore, the complete will is not except about the possible, which is good to the one willing. But the incomplete will is of the what? Possible. Which, according to some, is called what? Wishful. Wishing, because someone wishes that, right?

[29:17] If it were what possible, right now. So man wishes to marry some woman if it were possible, right? But it's not possible, so does he choose to marry her? No, it's not possible, right? Huh? So he won't have him, right?

[29:40] So if he chooses to marry a woman, he won't have him. But if he wishes to, right? But not by choice, huh? Okay. Okay.

[29:56] But choice names an act of the will already determined to that which is what. Begun. Yeah. By this person. And therefore, in no way is it except of things that are what possible, right now.

[30:15] Now the second objection here. That meantime, you choose things unable to perfect, right? To the second, it should be said that since the object of the will is a good grasped, in this way we're not to judge about the object of the will according as it comes under what grasping, right? And therefore, just as sometimes the will is of something that is grasped as good, nevertheless is not what truly good, right?

[30:54] Huh? So sometimes there is choice of what is apprehended as possible to the one what choosing, which nevertheless is not what possible to him, right? So we say, you can choose something impossible because it seems to be possible to your your reason, right?

[31:22] I guess people do that sometimes. I'm going to be on the Olympic team this year. It seems possible to me. Now the thing from a Benedict right, to the third should be said that this therefore is said because whether something is possible, right? Ought not to be what

[31:56] the subordinate ought not by his own judgment to define, right? Okay. But in each thing to what stand with the judgment of the superior, right? Or it's not to question why, or it's what to do and die, right? What do I get in this last article here? Shall we? Sure.

[32:26] To the sixth, one proceeds thus: It seems that man of necessity chooses. For if the end has itself to things choosable, as premises to those things which follow from the premises, right? As is clear in the seventh book of the ethics. But from principles or premises of necessity are deduced the what conclusions. Therefore, from the end of necessity, one is moved to what choosing, right?

[33:00] So, what do they say? Likeness is a cause of deception, right? We're talking about this in God, right? Huh? By knowing himself, he knows other things. By loving himself, he loves other things. Therefore, just as he necessarily knows other things, he necessarily loves others. So, you're not seeing some distinction there between the two.

[33:27] Often the mind is deceived because it doesn't see some distinction, distinction the life of reason. Moreover, choice follows the judgment of reason about things to be done. But reason of necessity judges about some things on account of the necessity of the what premises. Therefore, it seems also the choice of necessity what follows.

[33:57] Moreover, two things are wholly equal. Man is not moved more to one than to the other, right? Huh? Just as the what? Starving man. Yeah, if he has food equally desirable in diverse places or parts, and according to equal what distance, he's not more moved to one than to the other. As Plato says, assigning a reason for the rest of the earth in the middle, as is said in the second book on the universe, huh?

[34:33] But much more or less is he able to choose what he what takes as being what less, huh? When then what is taken as what equal, right? Therefore, if there are proposed two or more of among which one appears more, right? Huh? It is impossible to choose right one of the others. Therefore, necessity chooses that which appears more what eminent. But all choices of all that which seems in some way to be what better, right?

[35:13] Huh? Therefore, every choice is a necessity. I'm not convinced now, huh? You had to choose to be monks, huh? And had to choose to be a philosopher. Just couldn't resist. Couldn't resist. no?

[35:31] Yeah. There was always a copious discussion. You get a guy who's not really got the mind to be a philosopher, but he's convinced that this is the best thing, you know. And he definitely seems to be making a foolish choice of necessity, right?

[35:54] But against this is that choice is the act of a rational power which has itself To what opposites, according to the philosopher, right? I answer: It should be said that man does not of necessity choose, right? And this because what is what possible?

[36:20] Because what is possible to not be right? Is not necessary to what be, huh? That what what is possible to what not choose or to choose. The one can take right. The reason for this from a twofold power of man. For man is able to will and not will, to act and not act, right? He is able also to will this or that, and to do what this or that, huh?

[37:01] The reason for this can be taken from the power itself or reason. For whatever reason is able to apprehend is good. In this, towards this, the will is able to what tend.

[37:19] Reason is able to apprehend is good, not only this which is to will or to do, but also to not will and to what not do, right?

[37:33] And again, in all particular goods, one can consider a reason of some good, right? Or the defect of some good, which has the notion of the what bad. And according to this, one is able to what apprehend each of these goods as choosable or what. Immuneable. Yeah. Okay. I actually do that example of the fallacy of what simply and not simply, right? Huh? Because there's nothing so good in this world.

[38:11] That doing it prevents you from doing something else that is good. So in some way, you can consider anything as bad, right? Huh? Shows you the kind of freedom there, right? Huh? Okay. Only the perfect good, which is beatitude, right? Huh? Which cannot, which reason cannot grasp under the notion of evil or of any what defect, huh? And therefore, of necessity, man wills what beatitude, nor can he will not to be blessed or to be what miserable, Miserable, right?

[38:54] huh? Wretched. I want to be wretched. But I always wanted. Choice, however, since it is not about the end, but about those things which are towards the end, is not of a perfect good which is beatitude, but of other what particular goods, and therefore man does not necessity, but he freely what chooses them.

[39:25] Now, to the first, it should be said that not always from premises or beginnings of necessity the conclusion proceeds, right? Huh. But then only when the beginnings are not able to be true, if the conclusion is not what true. And likewise is what not necessary that always from the end there be in man necessity in choosing those things which are for the end, because not everything that is for the end is such that without it the end cannot be what had, right?

[40:06] Or if it is such, not always. Considering such a notion again. Yeah, yeah. So I can't be happy without reading Homer tonight. Let's get that way. I'm sorry,

[40:27] happiness. I don't read Homer tonight. Throw another book in there. Could make a case for it. I try doing myself to one book a day, you know. I guess enough of a treat, you know. One day.

[40:50] Okay. It's going up to the grandchildren. I said, "Now, how many of these sermons have been one a day of Bernard Clairvaux? How many can I get? so I don't know how many I could get. You know, I got through them. You know, but I could have got a couple more. You know.

[41:14] Okay. The second it should be said that the judgment of reason about things to be done is about things that are what contingent, which able to come about by us.

[41:36] But in conclusions, in in those things in which conclusions do not what of necessity from principles necessary by an absolute necessity, but by what condition? Necessary only by condition. As if he runs, he what he moves. It's kind

[42:09] It's kind of odd the way he expresses himself there right huh Connecting the things that have absolute necessity, right? To the third, should be said that nothing prevents, two equal things are proposed according to one consideration, that about one of them there would be considered some other condition through which it is what Eminent, right? And the will is more moved in one than in the other.

[42:55] So how do you, you know, choose between two equal things? Does coin? Yeah, something affects you. You see one exceeding the other, right? I go to buy a book in the bookstore, something like that. I look at everything, all the pages are there, and and there's not, you know, broken here, you know, like that, you know, you got these things.

[43:27] But the two books are exactly equal, huh? You're not going to see any difference in them, right? Are you going to be able to find books that are really exactly? No, no, I think you look carefully. Something about it. Yeah, explain it. Just be careful. Cover it up. But what's the word exactly equal? Like when you go to the grocery store, and you know packages are exactly equal.

[43:57] I mean, it's like you're not even a choice, really. Do you think sometimes you know they put the fresh ones in the back? I'll go back there, you. Yeah, exactly. Everybody does that with the milk. Everybody does that with the milk Grab one back. Everybody does it. But then, truly, truly or falsely, you're judging it superior, right? You know, that it's fresher. You know, you think it might be fresher.

[44:25] You know, it's a good store. It's a bad store. And they would just keep on putting the new ones at the front, and you get the stuff rotting in the back.

[44:34] Stores often choose a smart guy, right? You know, but he gets with the old, old packages.