Prima Secundae
44. What We Take Counsel About, Resolution, and Why Counsel Is Not Endless (Summa I-II, Q.14, Articles 3–6)
Class of 2011-12-15
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/044-what-we-take-counsel-about-resolution-and-why-counsel-is/

[0:00] Take the second one there. Did we? What I say? So I was talking about once if some operation about operations there is counsel insofar as they're ordered to some end. Once some operation, human operation, is an end about it as such, there is not counsel. Okay. I guess we didn't take it up officially, but just touching upon the idea.

[0:38] Okay. Article Three. Whether counsel is about those things only about those things that are done by us. To the third one proceeds us. It seems that counsel is not only about those things which are done by us. For counsel implies a certain what bringing together, collatio But collatio, among many things, is what can come about even immobile things, which do not come to be by us, as about the natures of things, right?

[1:16] For example. Therefore, counsel is not only about those things which are done by us. However, men sometimes seek counsel about those things which are established by law. We talked about that earlier. Whence what? There are. Consulting. Yeah. Council of law. Yeah. Council of lawyers Legal counsel. Nevertheless,

[1:57] of those who what seek this counsel, it does not pertain to make laws. Therefore, counsel is not only about those things which are what done by us, right?

[2:11] Moreover, some are even said to make counsels about future events, which are nevertheless not in our power, right? Therefore, counsel is not only about those things which come to be by us. Going to that. Horoscopes. Which palm readers? Moreover, if consul is only about those things which come to be by us, no one would take consul about those things which are to be done right to another.

[2:46] But this is what false, right? Let me have these paid these guys big salaries, counselors, and all the high schools. Okay. Therefore, consul is not only about those things which are done by us.

[3:03] But against this is what some Gregory says. Well, he's obviously not infallible on this one. We consul about those things which are in us, and able to come about through us, right?

[3:21] I answer: It should be said that counsel properly implies a bringing together, had among many things, right? Which also the name itself designates, right? It signifies. For counsel is said as it were what? Concilium, huh, alongside, I guess. In that many what? Sit together. Oh yeah. To bring together together, right? At once. At once, yeah.

[3:58] It should be considered, huh, that in particular contingent things, to this that something certain to be known, many what conditions or circumstances are necessarily to be considered. Which by one person alone is not easily what to consider, right?

[4:21] But by many, it is more what. Certainly perceived. When one considers something, others what? Then occur to somebody else, yeah. But in necessary and universal things, there is a more absolute and a simpler what consideration, right?

[4:45] Thus, that more to the consideration of this sort, one is able to be more by himself sufficient, right? As he always is, but. And therefore, the inquiry of consul properly pertains to singular things that are what contingent, right?

[5:11] Now the knowledge of truth in such things does not have anything great about it, that through itself or by itself or for itself it should be desirable, right? As is the knowledge of universal and necessary theorems in geometry, for example. Yeah, everybody can. Yeah. But it is desired according as it is useful for operation, right? Because actions are about singular contingents, right? So it might be useful to know if the stock is going to go up, right?

[5:49] But in itself, for its own sake, it's good to know this. No, just so we can put money in or take money out or something, right?

[6:03] Of course, he is in trouble there, you know. Didn't where a billion dollars disappeared or? Yeah. Can investment company there? Used to be governor of New New Jersey. Oh yeah. He was senator from New Jersey too. Corzine. Oh yes. Yeah, he's the guy that Obama's trying to get back in the office there, you know, and he ran against the which is he? Christie, yeah, Christie, beat him.

[6:32] He's in deep trouble. It's coming in Surprise. Okay. And therefore it should be said that properly speaking, strictly speaking, right, consul is about those things which are done what by us.

[6:56] So to the first objection from collatio, right? Well, Thomas says well, collatio can be said in other things too, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that consul implies not just any collatio, right? but the collatio about what the singular circumstances and so on about things to be done, right? For the reason. So in Albert's talking logic, he'll speak of reason as being what collativus and discursivus, right?

[7:26] Bringing together and discursing, right? And that's not consul, right? But consul is this collatio about, you know, everything surrounding this that seems relevant to this one thing, right? Yeah. You see, in the Middle East, there, you know, where the knocking off of these dictators, you know, has made things worse for the Christians, right? Yeah. You know, I wonder whether the church kind of saw that, you know, from the beginning that this.

[7:57] Our patriarch got in the hard water. Supposedly, he got in the hard water with Obama. Yeah. Because that was his opinion, expressed publicly and so the White House. basically said Well we're not gonna meet Yeah, I guess used to be like a million Iraqis or Christians, or I don't know if they're all Catholic, just Christian, but down to like two hundred thousand now, you know. But a lot of them are fleeing up to the north to the Kurds, and they're a little, feel a little bit better there, you know.

[8:23] But but we about these things really bad, you know. Yeah, yeah. To be about the poor Filipino woman that worked there in the in Jordan, right? They really have a rough time. It's just

[8:49] okay. To the first, okay, we had that first. To the second, then that that which is laid down by law, although what is not from the doing of the one seeking. counsel, nevertheless, it is what directing one to operating, right? Because this is one reason of doing something, the command of the what law.

[9:22] So stop for the red red sign, you know, that sort of stuff. More sophisticated. These laws are so complicated, you know. Yeah. Nobody's read these, you know, huh? Yeah. Seems like the Constitution was probably written to avoid exactly what they're doing now. Yeah. Yeah. That's why, that's why you talk with that's why they. Yeah. The laws have to be small, that's why also people can know. Now, to the third about the argument, the third should be said that counsel is not only about those things which are done, but also about those things which are ordered to operations.

[10:08] An account to this consultation is said to come about about future events, in so far as man to what known future events is directed to doing something or avoiding something, right? What's going to happen if we move our troops out of, you know, Pakistan? I mean Afghanistan right now. Okay.

[10:39] Now, what about this counsel and? Others. To the fourth, it should be said that we seek counsel about the doings of others, right? In so far as they're in some way one with us, right? Either through the union of affection, as a friend is solicitous about those things which pertain to his friend, right? Just as about his own, right? Parents and children, right now. Or by way as a way of as by way of being a tool, right now, for the chief agent and the instrument are in a way one cause, right?

[11:21] Since one is done through what the other, and thus the master, dominus. That's what they translate in Latin there. The Latin text was talking about dominus, I mean dominus and magister. So here we go. Yeah, that's what it says

[11:42] in Latin there. In my Latin, I got Latin and Greek at home, and dominus and magister, you know. But the Greek is kurios we had the kurios and then didaskalos okay. Which is very much teacher. right They seem as it were to be one cause, since the one acts of the other, and thus the. Lord, takes counsel about those things which are to be done.

[12:14] Take a little. Break here at the halfway point here. Right. It seems that counsel is about all things which are done by us, right? For choice is the desire of what has been taken counsel on, but choice is about all those things which are done by us. Therefore, also what counsel, right? Moreover, counsel implies the inquiry of reason, but in all the things which are what which we do through the impetus of passion, we proceed by the what inquiry of reason.

[12:57] Therefore, about all things that are done by us, there is counsel. Did you counsel about having breakfast this morning? No, me. Moreover, the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics that if something can come about through many things, counsel inquires through which most easily and best it comes about. If, however, through one thing, in what way do that come about? But everything that comes to be comes to be through either one or many.

[13:37] Either or so just and excuse me. Therefore, about all things which come to be by us, there is counsel, right? Ah, that can be mixed up there. Okay.

[13:57] Okay, but against this is what St. Gregory says that about those things which are what by discipline or art, or art those works there is no what counsel, right? Okay.

[14:17] Did I take counsel this morning? That I'm going to make tea for my wife and I in four minutes. Timing. Was that? Did I take counsel? No. Hence, it should be said that counsel is a certain inquiry, but about those things we are accustomed, I guess, Salimos, to inquire which come into doubt. Whence the reason inquiring, which is called what an argumentum, is making what faith about a dubious thing, right?

[15:01] But that something in human things to be done is not doubtful can happen from two things. In one way, because through determine what ways roads one proceeds to determine ends. Just as happens in the arts, which have certain what ways of operating, right? As the writer does not take counsel in how he ought to what? Yeah. For this is determined by the art, right?

[15:37] Another way, because it does not much matter whether it be done thus or thus, and these right are are small things which little aid or impede respect to achieving the end,

[15:56] and therefore about two things do not take counsel, although they are ordered to the end, as the philosopher says, either about small things to about small things, and about those things which are already determined in what way they ought to come about, just as in the works of the arts, on account apart from what.

[16:23] Things, yeah, as Gregory, some Gregory says, right? As medicinal, negotiative, and so on, right? Gregory the Impostor. Some conjectural things, I suppose, right? Medicine in its place there, right? Yeah.

[16:48] To the first, therefore, it should be said that choice presupposes counsel by reason of the judgment or position, right? Whence, when the judgment is manifest without inquiry, there is not required the what investigation of counsel, right?

[17:11] The second should be said that reason in manifest things does not inquire but judges at once, and therefore it is not necessary in all things which are done by reason for there to be an inquiry of what counsel, right? Did I put the wine bottle away, or should I continue? The clerk, the clerk, counsel. They get certain types, and they they want to discern the Holy Spirit and everything.

[17:39] Yeah. I always I always kind of run it up between go to the go to the fill up station and say, well, should I get leaded or super unleaded? You know, oh, I got to pray about that. You know, it doesn't matter. It's one of those small things.

[17:56] To third, it should be said that when something is able to come about through one thing, but in diverse ways, there can be somewhat doubt, right? Just as when it comes to be about too many, and therefore there is need for counsel, right? But when not only is the thing determined, but the way, right? Then there is no need for what. Counsel, right now.

[18:25] So the the loaf was was hard as a rock this morning, right? It's a hard time cutting them. But then I put in the microwave for about twenty seconds, thirty seconds, and then softens up. And I was like, "You can eat the damn thing." Was there was any counsel there? As reading this is really beautiful.

[18:47] The fathers had this thing about in the creation story where it says that God said, "Let us make man in our image and after our likeness." And they they talked about how you see here. This was only done before man was made. Yeah. Than anything else, it's like God, sort of image of God, taking counsel because man is special. It's kind of beautiful thing. John Chrysostom I guess They didn't take counsel.

[19:19] But it's in the world. Yeah. It's like when in the scripture you have to explain those ways of saying, you know, now I know you love me. Yeah. You know. Yeah. You know you know right.

[19:35] Thomas has to explain those things. Okay. And we had these very nice rolls too that we also got the place there. But the rolls they get kind of soft, you know, and they lose their flavor, right? You put those in the microwave to heat them; they get even softer. So you got to start the oven and put it at two hundred. Put them in there. But but the the baguette you've got to put in the microwave because that gets hard as a rock.

[20:07] You got to soften it, right? The moment I put that in the oven at two hundred, it just it would be even harder, right? Be crumbling. Somebody pointed it out once that same atmospheric conditions means one kind of gets soft and the other kind hard. Yeah. Yeah. You know, crackers leave them out. Yeah. Soft. Yeah. Bake

[20:28] hard. Now, this is what a philosopher wants to know about. To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems that counsel does not go forward in a motor residential, right? So that interests me not a bit. Let's see what you talk about in logic, dear Thomas.

[20:50] Well, counsel is about those things which are done by us, but our doings do not proceed in a what? But more in a compositive mode, right? So in the resolution, you're going from the composed to the simple, right? But in the composite one, you're going from the simple to the composed.

[21:12] When Thomas explains why Aristotle says that ethics proceeds roughly, right? And Thomas says in Latin there, it is by aptitando, right? Universalia et suplicia ad singularia et composita, right?

[21:32] So, therefore, counsel does not always proceed in a particular way. Moreover, counsel is a inquiry of reason, but reason begins from things that come before and arises those things that come afterwards, according to a what? More suitable order, yeah. Since when, therefore, the past things are before the what present, and the present things before the future, it seems that in counsel, taking counsel, one ought to what?

[22:11] Proceed from the present and the past to the what? Future, right? Which does not pertain to the order of resolution. Therefore, counsel one does not serve the order of resolution. So, example is an argument in what? In rhetorical rhetoric, right? In what they call political rhetoric, right? But it's you know about action, right? So you take something in the past and you go to the future, right?

[22:39] So that's that resolving. The last time you did, the woman got upset, so don't do that again. Cut my fingers burnt the last time. Okay. Moreover, counsel is not except

[23:09] about those things which are possible for us, as is said in the third of ethics. But whether something is possible for us hangs upon what that which we're able to do, right? What we're not able to do, that we might arrive at it. Therefore, in the inquiry, counsel. Why not to begin from things that are present?

[23:33] Can you put? Can you build the cat? Right? Who's going to build the cat? Not me. Said the mouse. But again, this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics: that the one who takes counsel seems to what seek and to resolve.

[23:58] I answer: It should be said that in every inquiry it is necessary to begin from some beginning, which, just as it is before in knowledge, so also it is before in being. He says, "If right, just as it is before in knowledge, so also if it is before in being, right, it is not the what processus resolutoris, but more the what compositivus, for it proceeds from what causes to effects.

[24:39] It's a process compositivus. For the causes are simpler than the effects. That's why God is the most simple thing of all, right? You know how I was talking about? I was paraphrasing Aristotle, a fragment that comes down to us from his lost dialogue in philosophy. You heard that fragment, didn't you? Talking about it before, he says either you ought to philosophize or you ought not to philosophize.

[25:12] What do you say? If you say you ought to philosophize, then you better do so. If you say you ought not to philosophize, going to have to philosophize to show why not. So in either case, you must philosophize, right? So I was imitating that, and I saying it's necessary to understand. Is it necessary to understand the word necessary? Now, if you say it is, you better understand that word, right?

[25:38] If you say it's not necessary, going to have to understand the word necessary to show why it's not necessary. So in either case, you must what? Yeah. So of course Aristotle takes up the word necessary there in the fifth book of wisdom, but after he goes through the four senses of necessary, right? Then he has some very interesting, and reduces it to the chief one, right? And then he has some very interesting things, right?

[26:03] And then he's touching upon the argument for the existence of God, that the contingent depends upon the necessary, right? And something can necessary, but be necessary through something else. And Aristotle is pointing out in demonstration the conclusion is necessary. It's necessary because of the premises, and therefore the first thing is not only necessary, but it's necessary through itself, right? And then he argues that the thing that is necessary to itself must be necessary.

[26:32] Be altogether simple. It's beautiful, right? He's touching upon that third way in the Suma, right? The argument for necessity, and then the first thing you take up about God in the Suma is to be altogether what? Simple, right? See, so the cause tends to be simpler than the what? Effect.

[26:55] That's true, as as the father of modern physics says, right? Max Planck, right? He discovered the quantum. He believed then, as he does now, he says that the what more universal a theory is, the simpler it is, huh?

[27:09] So you go from cause to effect. That's said to be what compositive, right? It's going from simple to more composed. But if that which is before in knowledge is after in being, right, which is more common, right? It is a yeah. So go from water to hydrogen oxygen, right?

[27:33] As when from most manifest effects we judge resolving to their what simple causes. But the beginning in inquiry of the inquired counsel, that is to say, is the end, which is what before in intention, but after in what being. And according to this, is necessary that the inquired counsel be what resolutiva, beginning from that which is what intended in the future, until one arrives to that which can be done right now.

[28:14] Stated. To the first, therefore, it should be said that counsel, to be sure, is about operations, but the reason of the operations is taken from the end. And therefore, the order of reasoning about things to be done is contrary to the order of what doing. doing.

[28:51] So I got a headache. I want to get rid of the headache. Therefore, I want to take aspirin. Don't have any aspirin. Therefore, I want to go to the drugstore. Ah, no, that's something I can do is go to the drugstore. So the end of the inquiry is the beginning of the doing, right?

[29:15] Reason begins. To second, should be said that reason begins from that which is before by reason, but not all, not always, from that which is before in what time. None of these senses of before, right?

[29:37] To the third, should be said that about that which should be done, on account of the end, we do not what, if it were not what suitable to the end,

[29:51] and therefore before one considers whether it is what, yeah, they want to consider whether it be possible, right? So the mice arrived at the idea that the bell was what was needed to avoid the danger from the cat, right? Sudden appearance, and then they realized that that was impossible for them because no one is willing to to bell the cat, huh?

[30:27] Okay. We don't have the money Whatever it is you know Okay. Now, whether the inquiry of counsel proceeds. Ad infinitum, right? in infinitum. counsel is an inquiry about particulars in which there is what operation, but singular is infinite. Therefore, the inquiry of counsel is what infinite.

[30:56] Moreover, under the inquiry of counsel, there follows to consider not only what should be done, but also in what way what impediments should be taken away, right? It's one of the parts of prudence, right? So what's it called? Caution, you know. I'm going to remove this tyrant, right? They're actually worse, you know. Yeah. But any human action can be impeded, right?

[31:30] And the impediment can be taken away through some what human reasoning. Therefore, it remains to what seek to. Yeah. Okay. I think we get annoyed with this, right? I think

[31:48] I have an accident, right? Coming up here, right? Going home or going to the grocery store, right? Moreover, the inquiry of the demonstrative science does not proceed forever, because it arrives at some principles per se what nota, which altogether has certitude, right? But such certitude cannot be found in singular contingent things, which are variable and uncertain. Therefore, the inquisition of counsel proceeds in infinitum. right? Yeah. What's that?

[32:25] Hamlet, there, right? Remember that time when Paul VI was a bit of a Hamlet, you know according to the idea that the Hamlet is. And that's what John XXIII called him. That's what John XXIII called him. I think it was Amleto he called him

[32:41] Hamlet. I didn't know that. He size sized him up the way, yeah. Yeah. He called him Amleto Against this, no one is moved to that which is impossible to arrive at, right? As is said in the first book about the universe, but it's impossible to go through the infinite, right? If, therefore, the inquisition of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel, which is clearly what false.

[33:15] I answer: It should be said that the inquiry of counsel is limited, huh? Finite, in act, on both sides, huh? From both sides. To wit, from the part of the beginning and from the part of the what end, huh? For there is taken in inquiry of counsel a twofold. Beginning, one which is what proper from the very genus of things to be done, and this is the end about which there is not counsel, right?

[33:50] But as we saw before, it's supposed in counsel as the beginning, right? So it's not infinite in that sense, right? From the beginning of it, another as it were, taken from the genus, just as in what demonstrative science, one science supposes some things from another about which it does not what inquire, right? Now these beginnings which are supposed in the inquiry of counsel, some are those which are taken through what sense, as that this is what bread or it's iron or something, and some are taken through some speculative or practical science known in the universal, just as that to commit adultery, I guess, is prohibited by God, right?

[34:46] And that man is not able to live unless he be nourished by suitable nourishment, suitable food, and about these things the conciliator, the one taking counsel, does not what inquiry, right? Now this inquiry about abortion, right? Yeah. Yeah, I mean it's not. a matter of counsel. It seems that people are being dishonest almost, you know. That's what I always said. It's the if it's possible to think you know what you don't know, yeah, it's possible to think that you don't know what you do know, which is abortion is repugnant in nature.

[35:29] Yeah, yeah, but you hear slogans all the time, so it sounds good. Um. Now the end of the inquisition is that which at once is in our power that we what do it right, huh? Just as the end has the notion of a beginning, so that which is what, for the sake of the end, has the notion of a conclusion. Hence, that which first occurs to be done has the notion of a last conclusion to which the inquisition terminates.

[36:13] But nothing prevents a counsel from being in what potency infinite, right? According as what forever there can occur things to be inquired about. What if it snows? What if what if it rains? What if we have a tornado? What if we have a earthquake? Reminded reading a story one time, saying you know history is always more complicated than we think, right? Sometimes when I read an article about some particular thing and I know about in history, right?

[36:49] You know, you say, "Oh, I didn't realize all this and that." You know, and so you kind of see the mistake of Marx and people have this kind of philosophy of history, right? It is, it is. History is always more complicated than you think, right? That's true. That's like Doctor Carroll used to say: if anybody's bored with history, they're bored with life. Yeah, because human lives are interesting and intriguing, and there's many things that get your attention.

[37:17] Well, there's talking sometimes, you know, in physics there about the principle of simplicity, right? You know, there's no such a good principle in in history, right? I don't think so. Doctor Carroll, I'd say that history is about

[37:37] people, especially that was his famous line: "You know, one man can make a difference." He gives examples of that. Constantine's a famous one, but one man can make a difference. He gives an example of Muhammad. Muhammad was in that battle, the first battle they were in, the skirmish in the desert. He got hit with a rock, knocked one of his teeth out. What if it hit him in the head?

[37:57] He'd been killed. How would history have been different? because of that one man? Yeah. yeah What if Hitler's father didn't have his name changed from Schicklgruber to Hitler Yeah, that would have been very interesting.

[38:13] William Shirer says that you know, imagine millions of people going, "Heil Schicklgruber Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that singulars are not infinite in act, but in what? Potency only, what?

[38:41] That's the kind of unreasonable fear that paralyzes some people, morally speaking. Yeah, because they they have unreasonable fears of what about this? What about that? What? What? There's certain limits to what you can imagine. To the

[38:58] second, it should be said, though human action is able to be impeded, right? Not always. Does it always have a what impediment prepared? Ready at hand.

[39:12] And therefore, it is not always necessary to take counsel about what. Taking away impediment. Yeah. To the third, therefore, it should be said that in singular contingent things, something certain is able to be taken, right? Although not so what simply. Nevertheless, as now as it's taken in the operation, that bread really was dry this morning. Uh, For Socrates to sit is not necessary, but for him to sit when he sits is necessary, and this can be taken with certitude, eh?

[40:07] Okay. Should we stop there. It's a good place to stop at the end of. it.