Prima Secundae
45. Aquinas on Consent (ST I-II q.15, aa.1-3): Will or Intellect, Animals, End or Means
Class of 2011-12-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/045-aquinas-on-consent-st-i-ii-q-15-aa-1-3-will-or-intellect/

[0:00] Father and Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, your enlightenment, guardian angels, bring the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us and help us to understand what you have written. Father and Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Let's just recall where we are here by looking at the premium there to question thirteen before we look at question fifteen, which we're concerned with today.

[0:46] In the premium to question thirteen, he says, "Consequently, we're not to consider about the acts of the will, which are in comparison to those things which are towards the end, right, as opposed to the end itself. And these are three: to choose, right, to consent, and to what use?

[1:15] But counsel precedes choice. Therefore, first we're not to consider about choice. Secondly, about counsel, which we talked about last time, right? Third, about consent, which we'll start today, and fourth, about what use? So that's the context in which this question comes up. So he says in the premium to this question, then we're not to consider about consent, and about this four things are asked: first, whether consent is an act of the desiring power or of the grasping or knowing power.

[2:04] Secondly, whether it belongs to brute animals, the irrational animals. Does my cat consent to go out? And the dog consent too? Third, whether it is about the end or about those things which are towards the end,

[2:32] and fourth, whether consent in an act pertains only to the higher part of the soul. This distinction goes back to Augustine, right? The higher and lower parts of the soul. Most people don't know they have higher part. Apparently, use that higher part. They don't know them Yeah. Okay. Yeah.

[2:58] To the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that to consent belongs only to the grasping or knowing part of the soul. Right now, what does he use the word apprehensive of? Apprehensive of to name the knowing part. What's the similarity between grasping and knowing? Knowing you bring something into yourself? Yeah. So knowing is a kind of movement from things into the mind. If you can't get something into your mind, you can't but know it.

[3:40] So even Empedocles, right, one of the first philosophers long before Aristotle, right, said that the thing known must be in the what knower. Except he couldn't quite understand in what way the thing known is in the knower. Right. Why in the case? So no, this is taken from the act of the hand, right? Because when the hand grasps something, it's contained in the hand, right? And so he calls the knowing power the grasping part, right?

[4:11] Okay. And that's in contrast to the what desiring power, right? Which is going out to the thing, right? Where your treasure is, right? Yeah. So the heart is in the thing, what more loved, right? Okay. So the emotion of the heart, or the desiring power, is to the thing, right? I left my heart in San Francisco. The song says, right? Okay. That's what I used to say to the students, you know, in college.

[4:46] There, it's always bad if you lose your mind. If you lose your heart, it says it's not always bad. No, it depends about who you lose it to.

[4:59] But notice they used the words there, right? To lose your mind is what the detriment of it, right? But if you lose your your heart to God or someone, right, like that's worth loving, right? Then that's good, right? Okay. Didn't keep your heart all to yourself, did you?

[5:20] Okay. So Thomas often calls the first act of reason simple grasping, grasping what a circle is, or what a stone is, or what a dog is, or so on.

[5:37] Now Augustine, in the twelfth book of the Trinity, attributes consent to higher reason. But reason names a grasping power. Therefore, to consent belongs to the. Grasping power, right? Well, you can't argue much against Augustine, right? It's a dangerous thing to do.

[6:05] You've seen John Paul II's encyclical on Augustine. I actually have it, but I haven't read it. That's that's quite impressive, you know. I mean, Augustine is quite impressive when you read that, huh? Okay, but maybe we haven't understood Augustine correctly, right? In this argument, huh?

[6:28] Moreover, to consent is to what? Made up of cum and sentire together, right? What to sense is of a what grasping or knowing power.

[6:46] Therefore, also consentire, right? Huh? It's taken right from an act of the. That's that's yeah, okay. So the word itself seems to indicate. Moreover, just as to assent, right, which is made up of that same root sentire, names the application of the understanding to something, right? So also to consent, huh? But to assent pertains to intellect, huh? Which is a grasping power, right? Therefore, to consent also pertains to the grasping power, right?

[7:31] So you're all convinced on that side, right? Yeah. Good student is always misled by Thomas first. Okay. But against this is what Damascene says in the second book, huh? That if someone judges and does not love, this is not a what sentence, huh? I don't know about that use of the word sentence there. I can think of as you know when you get tried and you get a sentence.

[8:07] They're consenting to something, right? To your punishment, huh? But to love pertains to the desiring power. Therefore, also what consent, huh? Okay. Well, let's see what Thomas has to say about this. He says, "I answer. It should be said that to consent implies the applying or the application of the sense to what to something, right? But it is a property of the sense that it knows things that are present, huh?

[8:49] Here and now, huh? Singulars, as opposed to the Imaginating, imagining power, right? Which is grasping of the likenesses of bodies or bodily likenesses, even of what absent things, of which they are what likenesses, huh? And the understanding is apprehensive of universal reasons, huh? Which is able to apprehend indifferently whether the singulars are present or what absent, Absent, huh?

[9:32] So I can't see a cat unless the cat's here, right? But I can make all kinds of statements about cats and dogs and universals. I can imagine them, right, in their absence, right? But the senses know things only here and now, present in front of us.

[9:51] Now he's going to try to explain the word here, right? It'll torture here, but okay. And because the act of the what Desiring... Desiring power is a certain what inclination towards the thing itself. That's just the contrary of knowing, right?

[10:13] According to a certain likeness, right? This application of desiring power to a thing, according as it inheres in that thing, right? It takes over the name of what sense, huh?

[10:36] As it were, taking a certain what experience of the thing, huh? To which it adheres, in so far as it finds what delight in it, huh?

[10:53] Okay. Doesn't mean to say something is to my taste. To see your liking. Yeah. Whence wisdom, one it is said, right? Sentite, he says, in the Latin, of the Lord in what goodness, right? Taste and see how sweet is the Lord, right? Things of that sort, huh? And according to this, to consent is an act of the what?

[11:26] Yeah, yeah. I mean, it's more clear to somebody in Latin, right? The way the word was carried over, right? Now, what about this objection from Augustine? Huh? That's the higher part. Well, it goes back to Aristotle speaking, like Augustine speaks, right? Sometimes. To the first, therefore, it should be said that just as it is said in the third book about the soul, third book by Aristotle there about the soul, the will is in reason.

[11:57] What does it mean by that, right? Does it mean the faculty or power of reason, or does it mean that part of the soul, right, that is rational? What's the second of these two, right? Okay. And sometimes you find, you know, this distinction there when they divide up the soul, and they divide it like in the second book about the soul into five genera, right? The vegetative powers and the sense powers and the desiring powers and the intellectual powers and the moving powers, right?

[12:29] But then sometimes they divide the soul up according to its rising above matter in some way, right? So the animal in a way rises above the animal when he has what sense, huh? And the rational soul rises even more above matter when he understands, huh? So the will is on the plane of the understanding or the reason, right? That most immaterial part of us, huh? And the senses and the emotions on the second part.

[13:00] Then the ability to digest my food is down here, right? Low part of my soul, right? And hardly right reason is much above matter at all, right? Okay.

[13:14] So that's you know common thing you see in Aristotle, right? Okay. So sometimes reason means what that part of the soul, right? Um. Do you know the famous dialogue of Plato there, the Republic? Okay. And in the Republic, Socrates is working out a great analogy between the parts of the soul and the parts of what the city. And he's concerned with those parts of the soul in which there is virtue, moral virtue or moral vice, for that matter, right?

[13:52] And he has three parts of the soul: reason, the irascible appetite, where you have anger and fear and so on, and then the concupiscible appetite, where you have sense desire. And then that corresponds to three parts of the city: the rulers to the reason, the soldiers to the irascible, and then the common people down here to the what? Yeah, and that's very nice division, right? It's very common division, right?

[14:24] But when you compare that to the division of the so-called four cardinal virtues, right? How do you fit the four cardinal virtues into three? Well, temperance fits in the concupiscible, courage in irascible, foresight or prudence obviously fits in reason, but where do you put justice, right? Because justice is not in the emotions; it's in the will. So Plato doesn't, at that point, right, distinguish reason and will.

[15:01] He doesn't distinguish will from reason, but it's could possibly be understood in that part, right? And in the dialogue called the Protagoras, Sun, where he takes up you know the main virtues, he has the four cardinal virtues plus piety, right? And so you could ask, well, then how do these fit into the the three that are there, right? Huh? But there, using the word, it seems to me, reason more for what is.

[15:29] Yeah. And so, just as reason kind of rules the emotions, if you're good. So too, you might say, at the will, kind of what commands the emotions to, or refuses to go along with them in some cases, and so on, right? Okay. So this is not as artificial. It might might seem to some he doesn't know these texts, right? But if you're familiar with that text in the third book of the soul.

[15:57] You know what Aristotle means by saying the will is in reason. It's in that rational part of man, right? Follows upon reason. Man has will because he has reason. He's got emotions because he's got sensation. So the animals have emotion, but they don't have have will. So it makes sense to put them right. That level, huh?

[16:29] Whence Augustine attributes consent to reason, or when he does that, he takes reason according as in it is included what? Will, right? And that's how in Scripture sometimes you know what does heart mean? What does heart mean? So usually you apply heart more to the will, right? But sometimes heart includes what? Yeah, you see it sometimes in prayers and so on. And sometimes in mind you include what?

[17:08] Will, right? That's something similar to this, right? So these ways of speaking are not that. People use ways of speaking they never reflect upon them. They say, "Well, gee, yeah, I guess I do speak that way, don't I? " I don't know why I speak that way, but I do, right? Yeah, kind of strange, huh?

[17:38] Now the second objection was in some ways stronger, right? Because you seem to have the very word there, sentire, right? Which means to sense, right? And Thomas admits, huh? To the second, it should be said that sentire, properly said, pertains to the what? Grasping power, right? But according to the likeness of a certain experience, right? Or one is what pleased by something, right? It's a reason why.

[18:08] It pertains to the what? Appetite, right? It's kind of carried over based on likeness. That often happens, huh? You want to see God as He is, right? Is that the eye?

[18:31] No, it was carried over to what the reason to understanding, right? By what certain what likeness, huh? I mentioned that in the famous text of Aristotle. It's usually translated all men by nature want to what know they'll say, right? But the Greek word he actually uses there is eidenai, right? Which means to see, and therefore probably would be more accurately translated to understand, right? Not that the other translation doesn't make sense too, but but we tend to use that way, right?

[19:10] When Hamlet says, "I see my father now," and they're looking around, you know, he says, "In my mind's eye," right? Well, then mind there is is is what more the imagination, right? The memory, he can picture his father and see him now, right? So even there, the mind's eye is not yet the the mind's eye in the sense of reason, right? But but I often ask the students, you know, the first meaning of the word to see is the act of the eye, right?

[19:42] What's the second meaning? And they'll try to say to understand, but say no, no. There's something in between seeing and understanding that is more like seeing than understanding is, right? And that's to what imagine, Imagine right? That's what Hamlet says. I see my father now, right? Right, I can see him now. Right, you know. So you think you got to go tell somebody something, you know, that they're going to react well to.

[20:08] Right, I can see right now. Yeah, I can see. My wife was talking. My wife was talking about this this lady, you know, who got a little accident with her car, you know, and she's fighting to step to her husband, you know.

[20:28] So I'm not my day. You know, I've got a little experience like this. So much, you know, I don't know. I care, you know. It's no big thing to me, you know, but the fairy is fighting step, right? But yet, imagine. So, and I say the fact that in a dream you think you're seeing with your eyes, and you're actually imagining, is a sign of how much alike they are.

[20:54] And but even in a dream, you don't confuse understanding with seeing with the idea. No, but you do confuse imagining with seeing, right? So that's kind of the second sense, right? And you're carried over by another likeness.

[21:17] Now the third objection talks about the other word assentire, right? Which has the same root as sentire, but the other part is ad, right?

[21:33] So the third should be said that assentire is quasi ad aliud sentire, and thus it implies a certain distance to that to which it assents huh

[21:51] But consentire is to sense what together, and thus it implies a certain conjunction to that to which it consents. And therefore, the will of which it is is to tend towards the thing itself more properly is said to what consent, huh? But the understanding whose operation is not according to a motion to the thing, but from the motion of from the thing to the mind, yeah. But potius e conversio, but the reverse, right?

[22:32] As has been said in the first part of Summa, more properly said to what ascent. Although he says one for the other, one is accustomed to place, right? But there's a little difference in the word, right? So one is a little more appropriate to the reason and its act because of the way that it goes, right?

[22:55] Okay. It's also possible or able to be said that the intellect ascents insofar as it's moved by the will, right? Especially in faith, right?

[23:14] Okay. Now, second article. Whether consent belongs to the brute animals, the bestial animals, right? What the beasts? So the woman says, "to the man, you brute! That's not a compliment." obviously.

[23:44] To the second, he proceeds that; one proceeds thus. It seems that consent belongs to the brute what animals? For consent implies the determination of the appetite to one thing, but the appetite of brute animals are determined to something one. Therefore, therefore, consent is found in the brute what animals, right?

[24:16] There's a likeness there certainly, right? But are you overlooking a difference? Moreover, take away the before, you remove the after. But consent goes before the carrying out of the deed. If therefore there's no consent in the brutes, there'd be no carrying out of the deed in them, right?

[24:44] Which is clearly false, right? I'd like to debate Thomas. I just raise my handkerchief. I give up. See, his fellow students called Thomas the what? Dumb Ox, right? So Albert the Great arranged for a debate between himself and Thomas, right? And guess who won? And then he said, "This guy you call the dumb ox. I tell you, his bellow will be heard around the world, huh?" So

[25:22] it shows a marvelous what humility of Albert, right? The Great. He's just known in those even those days, huh? Albert the Great. The student surpasses him.

[25:35] There's a story told of Plato coming into the school of the academy there, and it's just Aristotle sitting there, right? He said, "Well, go ahead." He says, "He's a whole school by himself, right?" There's no jealousy, right? You know, or like Haydn coming over to Mozart's father, you know, and saying, "There's an honest man before God." He says, "Your son is the greatest composer," you know. You know, just don't question that.

[26:02] That's kind of marvelous to see, you know, the the older man and the one from whom the younger man, to some extent, has been a student, right, or underling, right, admitting the greatness of the other guy, huh?

[26:16] That story about Plato and Aristotle is true, right? And it's one of Augustine, I mean, about. Albert and yeah, and Haydn and Mozart, you know, that's great stuff.

[26:38] Pride is a great impediment to the life of the mind, right? Talking on the phone to Warren Murray, I said to him today, "I said, I was asking you a different question." He said, "What is the greatest impediment to the love of God?

[26:53] Would you answer? What most of all prevents you from loving God? Love of self, yeah, yeah, in the sense of pride, you know, pride, you know, more more so than than being irascible or being, you know, a glutton or something, right, or a drunkard, right? I mean, you know, that's going to impede you too. I mean, being too much attached to these material things, but nothing impedes you from loving God as much as what pride.

[27:25] That even impeded the the created, greats to the angels, perhaps. That's that's you know Augustine, Amor sui usque ad contemptum. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Thomas in his commentaries and Peter's, I mean, on St Paul's epistles, speaks of how pride is the main cause and the sight of the will, anyway, of error, right? Because he says in two ways, partly because you don't listen to those who know the matter better than you do, and they would, you know, prevent you from making all these errors, or they would call you back from the errors you've already made, right?

[28:09] And then the other thing is that pride makes you overestimate your own ability, and therefore you attempt something beyond your powers, and therefore you easily fall into error when you attempt to judge something beyond your powers. So pride is is the main cause of error, right? I was looking at Pius X's encyclical on the modernists, right? And he's talking about the remote causes of their making all these errors and so on.

[28:39] He says, "Well, first thing he mentions there is is curiosity, right? But then he goes to pride as having much more the cause, right? That's the main thing, you know, this tremendous pride of the modernists, and so it's a good example again of what Thomas is talking about. What's

[29:06] Thomas say about the Latin barbarous? You know, they speak as if wisdom began with them. I was reading this, rereading the the treatise of Thomas. You know, they didn't quite complete, but. That twenty chapters, right? The treatise on the separated substances, written for his original, right? Is his his confessor, so on. He's always asking for some little tidbits on, and you know, showing the excellence of Aristotle and Plato over the other philosophers before, right?

[29:39] He calls them the philosophi praecipui, right? The chief philosophers, are Plato, and Aristotle. And nobody had said that before him, you know. Anybody wants to be a philosopher, has got to know Plato and Aristotle. That's that's the key guys. When I read the modern philosophers, often we see them, you know, saying just the opposite of what Aristotle said, without noting that he said the opposite, without recalling that he said the opposite, let alone without recalling why he said it, giving no reason why what he said was not, you know, a good answer, you know.

[30:13] While Aristotle disagrees with Plato, or he disagrees with Empedocles, or some other philosopher before him, he recalls what the other guy said, and he recalls the reason why he said it, right? And he argues both against what he said and the reason, you know. And

[30:33] that seems, you know, what you ought to do, right? You know, and I believe speakers, if you know, wisdom began with them, you know, all of a sudden, you know, when a flash of lightning, they they became saw it all their predecessors had not seen, right? Huh? Berkeley discovered there was no matter, right? No material world, right? Yeah. Yeah. You heard how Samuel Johnson, you know, kicked a stone and said, "I refute him."

[31:06] Thus, But I used to say that Bishop Barclay opens the door of a study before he attempts to leave it. I'm sure he enjoyed a good steak as well. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. He came over to that station

[31:33] for a while, you know, doing some charitable stuff, and we go down swimming down a lot in Rhode Island. There, you know, down by Newport, and go by his place, you know. Yeah, I've never got over it. I think I have to pilgrimage over there, you know. I say, "Well, we got to go over there sometime," you know, and look at whatever they got there, you know.

[31:51] Someplace he was staying when he was. Can't be there, Coris. I've got to be faithful to that, right, and not not look for a feeling that isn't there.

[32:12] Moreover, men sometimes are said to consent to some to doing something from some passion. Well, that's quite a lot of examples of that, right? Has concupiscence, right? Since desire, or what, anger, right? Now, every time, every day, you pick up the newspaper, there's somebody's done something terrible by anger, or concupiscence. Two other cases, but, but there's, it's quite a few examples of that, right? You read the police problem.

[32:46] When I was a bachelor, I lived in the house there, and Mister there, and another guy lived in the house there, an old gent there. He used to listen to the police problem all the time. So sometimes I'd go by his place and hear what's going on in town, you know. And one town was right across the street. Oh, please, I'm sorry, They're arriving so. It's constant all day long, right?

[33:09] There's somebody doing something they shouldn't be doing. Those are just the ones reported. But against this is what Damascene says that after. judgment, right? Man disposes in amata he loves. What has been judged from what? Consul, right? And this is called what? Sentencia, right? It has consensus, right? That's even more direct. Sentencia, right?

[33:46] But consul is not in brute animals, right? Therefore, neither is consent. Okay. Thomas says, "I answer: It should be said that consent, properly speaking, is not in brute animals, right?

[34:06] So does the dog consent to go with you? Would you speak that way? I don't think I would speak that way in English. Would you? The dog consents to go with you. Would you say that? Yeah, sometimes the other wife told me. He agrees to go with you. So he has to be either affirming or consenting or not consenting. Because if he denies me, goes the other way.

[34:37] That's interesting word agreement, huh? It's almost like consent, huh? I agree to something, right? And that seems to implies more the the appetite, huh? Agreement, huh? Because it agrees with me, right? You know, it doesn't agree with me, right? Salmon doesn't agree with me. Fletcher doesn't agree with my wife, and so.

[35:06] So. Okay. So he says, properly speaking, it's not in brute animals. Now, why does he say this? Well, the reason for this is because consent implies the application of the what motion, the appetitive motion, To something to be done To doing something, right? That word application here is a key word now. But of that it is, or to that it belongs, to apply the appetitive movement to doing something.

[35:44] In whose power is the what? The appetitive motion, yeah. Just as to touch a stone belongs to the what staff, but to apply the staff to the touching of the stone, it belongs to the one who has in his power to move the staff, right? But the brute animals do not have in their power the appetitive motion, but such a motion is in them from the instinct of what nature, whence the brute animal desires something, huh?

[36:23] To be sure. But he does not apply his appetitive motion to something. He can apply it or not, right? So they say some animals. Depends on some dogs. Even well, if you keep feeding them, they'll eat themselves to death. They overeat till they die. Not all dogs will do that. Some of them have a little more sense than that. But but some animals, if you just keep feeding them, they'll just keep eating till they die.

[36:52] Yeah, yeah. I sometimes do your piano like this, you know, and they they act, you know, just kind of like attacking them, right? They can't help themselves, but.

[37:10] Whence the brute animal desires to be shared, but does not apply the appetitive motion to something. And on account of this, not properly is it said to consent, right? But only the rational nature, which has in its power. The appetitive motion, and is able to apply it or not apply it to this or to that, right? Stephen Thomas talks about how, you know, the will can what apply reason to this or that, right?

[37:39] To think of this or think of that, think of it or not think about it, right? Which should I apply myself to today? Should I apply myself to a theorem of Euclid, huh? Or should I apply myself to a psalm, or should I apply myself to? The prima Secundae? or what should I do, huh? You can end up in both Yes, yes, yes. Yes, yes.

[38:08] I was listening to some Mozart variations, right? They're very interesting. He's got about twelve, fifteen, you know, variations and different melodies, not necessarily his own, you know. Very interesting when he does these melodies, huh? You see, at a concert, most of them sit down afterwards and just, you know, improvise in the piano, you know, and they enjoy that even more than the concert, you know, because it's a spontaneous thing, you know.

[38:34] Yeah, he would do this. Okay. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said. That in brute animals there is found, of course, a determination of desire to something, right? But it could be said to be a passive thing, right?

[39:04] Sometimes they compare that, you know, to you know, in the old physics there, to a stone falling to the ground, right, huh? Does the stone move itself to the ground? No, it kind of undergoes this motion because of the nature it's been given, right? By whoever made it a stone, so it's kind of passive, right? That determination, right? There's a kind of determination to go down rather than some other ways.

[39:30] So this is like that in the brute animals. There's a determination of the appetite to something in a passive sense only, right? But consent implies a determination of appetite that's only passive, but more active, right? huh? Or in control.

[39:49] To the second, it should be said that the before removed, the after is removed. That what properly follows from it only, right? If ever something can follow from many things, not on account of this is the after removed when one of the what before is removed. Just as if hardening can come from both what cold and hot, for the the bricks I suppose are hardened by fire and the water is congealed or hardened by cold.

[40:33] It's not necessary that heat being removed one removes all what hardening, right? But the execution of the work not only follows from consent, but also from the impetuous motion, right? Such as is found in the brute animals, huh? Someone's describing of C. S. Lewis describes you know the emotions of the animals, you know, what a kind of fantastic world is compared to our emotions, which are kind of you know half stopped and half, you know, but they're just

[41:09] kind of real, yeah, yeah, full emotional life, right? But that's it. Now, men who act from passion are able what to not follow the passion. I blacked out.

[41:31] But the brute animals are not able right And so there's not the same reason in saying that they're both influenced by emotion. Go on to Article Three here now. Whether consent is about the end or about those things, which are towards the end.

[41:57] To the third, one goes forward thus. It seems that consent is about the end. Wonder what our Chris, Chris, coming in, Thomas says. You know, this guy's got the strangest way of proceeding, right? He always argues, you know, about three times against what he thinks, right? Why does he do that? I mean, you know, why does he do that? He likes to torment people.

[42:29] Well, I was saying to Warren Murray this morning. I was saying, you know, I went from the other day. They just finished the treatise on the separated substances, right? And come back to Summa. I said, "This is really for beginners, though. This is really, you know, a release, you know, for me. " Easy Or really, just good questions on the separated substances, you know. And there you have about you know twenty arguments against what he's got to hold, you know, and maybe ten on the other side or something like that.

[43:01] So, you know, he's very brief, right? But to someone who's not used to this at all, I mean, why doesn't he come to the point? By the way, why does he have to argue against it? You know, it's kind of funny though. I was first teaching college in California, there at Saint Mary's. I had a good student, you know, and every just class about every class he came with an nice objection, you know.

[43:29] Not because I heard these all the time, Thomas or else, you know. So I just relax and solve his objection, you know. And he's a bright guy, you know, and and he could see how to solve it, you know. And I could just see him go, he'd say this, you know, he'd like this, and relax, and and never objects in the class. Well, anyway, after after the course, one time we were talking, you know, and he said, you know, I always thought I was I was going to have him, you know.

[43:52] Today I'll get him, you know. This is one he won't be able to answer, you know. But I'd already heard all these ones, you know. It was because Thomas, you know, you always hear all these objections, and and more sol objections they come up with you, and so they, but it's all new to them, right? Yeah. But makes you think, you know. To the third, then one goes forward thus.

[44:15] It seems that consent is about the end, and this is the old principle, because on account of which each thing that more, right? And that's the way they stated. Quod propter quod unum, quodque tale illud magis account of which each that more. I had to expand in class, and how did I expand? Remember, that's the principle. If one thing is said of two things, the one because of the other, more of the cause than the effect.

[44:46] Yeah, yeah. If the same belongs to two things, right? But to one of them because of the other, to which does it belong more, right? Well, the cause, yeah. And then I take these very simple examples, and I say, if sweet is said of sugar and of my coffee, but it's said of the coffee because of the sugar, which is sweeter. Sugar. And if wet is said of water and of the dishcloth, for the dishcloth because of the water, which is wetter.

[45:22] Yeah. And if salt is said, if salty is said of salt and French fries, but of the French fries because of the salt, which is saltier.

[45:35] So if good is said of the end and the means, right? Good or desirable is said of the end and of the means, but of the means because of the end, which is gooder, which is more desirable. The end, yeah. Yeah.

[45:55] Aristotle, in the second book of the wisdom, there he says that if the cause is true, right, and the effect is true, right, but the effect is true because of the cause, which is more true.

[46:14] Yeah. Yeah. Now, if Saint Augustine had come to Aristotle and said, "You know what Christ says? He says, 'I am the way, the truth, and the life. ' Right? " And I said, "Well, that makes sense that he would say he's truth itself, right? Because he's the first cause, and the first cause would have to be what most true, right? Yeah, that makes sense. Yeah, so being reasonable about what you're saying, Augustine, huh?

[46:48] I've read a little dialogue, you know, Augustine and Aristotle have had a talk, right? But this is the famous principle, right? So if the premises and the conclusion are known in syllogism, right? But the conclusion is known because of the premises, which is more known. Yeah.

[47:20] Now they abbreviated, huh? Propter quod unum quodque tale et illud magis, right? On account of which each that more. But those things, right, that are for the end, we consent to them on account of the end, right? Okay. So I consent to take the what medicine.

[47:48] Because of medicine itself, right? I mean, because of health, right? Yeah. I consent more than to that. Okay. I mean, it would seem kind of strange enough for me to say that I consent to being healthy, right? Yeah. But I have to consent to medicine, right? We have a discussion of doctor, which had this medicine or had this operation or whatever it is. Consent to the treatment.

[48:10] Yeah, yeah. Okay. More the action of the what? Intemperate. Yeah, is his end. Just as the action of the virtuous man is his end, right?

[48:30] But the intemperate man consents in his own what? Act. And therefore, consent can be about the what end? But is it as in that he's doing it right? Remember that distinction before. Moreover, desire is of those things which the desire which is of those things which are for the end is choice, as has been said, right? If therefore consent was only about those things which are towards the end, in no way would it seem to differ from choice, right?

[49:05] Okay. Likeness is a slippery thing, as Thomas, as Plato says, right? And so you might say that seeing the likeness but not the difference is what leads to mistake, right?

[49:24] So if I put salt in the sugar bowl, right? You might put salt in your coffee or something, right? Yeah. And then I made him make a cake and she put salt instead of sugar. Yeah. Weighed a ton and tasted terrible.

[49:48] Which is false, through Damascene, right? Who says that after disposition, which is called what? Sentencia. There comes to be choice, right? Therefore, consent is not only about those things which are towards what an end.

[50:10] But against this is what Damascene says there that sententia scilicet the consensus, right? Is when a man disposes and loves what he has judged from counsel. But consul is not except about those things which are towards the end. Therefore, neither what consent.

[50:37] How long did it take Thomas to write these things? I wonder. Yeah. Answer should be said that consent names the application of the what, desiring motion to something what preexisting that is in the what power of the one applying it. Right.

[51:12] Now, in the order of things to be done, first is necessary to have or to take a grasp of the what end. Then comes desire for the end.

[51:30] Then consult about those things which are for the end or towards the end. Then desire of those things which are what towards the end.

[51:44] But desire in the last. end tends what? Naturally naturally, right? Whence the application of the appetitive motion to an end grasped does not have the notion of what consent, but of what yeah. Did you consent to be happy?

[52:12] Huh? No. So you naturally want to be happy, right? Okay. Did you consent to study Thomas Aquinas? Yes, because the means of the end.

[52:32] Yeah. If you think it's going to make you unhappy, hopefully, you might not consent to to read Thomas. I may not agree with you.

[52:50] About those things then, which are after the last end, right? In so far as they are towards the end, right? They fall under what counsel, right? Huh?

[53:04] And therefore, there is able to be about them consent in so far as the appetitive motion is applied to that which is judged from counsel, right?

[53:21] But the appetitive motion in the end is not what applied by counsel, right? But more counsel what? Itself. Is to it? Yeah, is it based upon it? I guess because counsel presupposes the desire of the what end?

[53:45] But the desire of those things which are for the end or towards the end presupposes the determination of counsel, and therefore the applying of the desiring power or motion to the determination of counsel properly is what consent, huh?

[54:11] So after reading you, you know, Pius X encyclical, and the Angelic doctor, you agree to what reading Thomas, huh? Whence, since counsel is not except about those things which are towards the end, but the means, consent properly speaking is not except about those things which are towards the end. You understand

[54:40] now? To the first, therefore, it should be said, propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis that more. To the first, therefore, it should be said that just as we know conclusions through the beginnings, right, through the premises, of these there is not what scientia science, which means reasoned out knowledge in this text, but something greater, to wit, what understanding. Yeah. So when Thomas talks about you'll see this later on, he talks about the virtues of looking reason, right?

[55:25] You put intellectus before scientia, right? Natural understanding before reasoned out understanding, right? It's the source of that. So likewise, we consent to those things which are towards the end, on account of the end. That's the that's the proportion Aristotle uses all the time, right? That the end is like the what premises, right? Yeah. Of which, nevertheless, as to the end, there is not consent, right? But what is more, namely, what simple willing, right?

[56:05] Fundamental act of the will. I naturally will to be happy, right? And therefore, I I consent to the reading Thomas. Yeah. Consent to being baptized, or I didn't consent, I guess. Consent to sense. You didn't put an obstacle in that one. Yeah. Yeah, or the the holy

[56:39] innocents, right? Yeah. Do they consent? To the second, should be said that the intemperate man has for his end or goal the delight of the thing he's doing, right?

[56:55] On account of which he what consents in the work more than on the operation itself, right? He's seeking what pleasure in that. So he he consents to to the doing of it on account of the pleasure, right? Yeah, that's that's his end, right? Yeah, so it doesn't really matter what he does as long as he gets his pleasure. Yeah, yeah. So he's not consenting to the pleasure, but to the act that will be the means to that pleasure, right?

[57:36] Okay. To the third, it should be said, huh? About the difference here now, that choice adds above consent a certain what relation with respect to that to which something is what chosen in preference for, huh?

[58:05] And therefore, after consent, there still remains what choice? For it is possible to happen that through counsel there are found plura media leading to the end, right? Of which what, when each pleases, right? In each of them, one what? Consents, huh? But for many things which please, we take one before another by choosing, right? So I find all these agreeable, right?

[58:42] But if there is found one only that pleases, they what? Do not differ in re, huh? In reality, consent and what? Choice, huh? But in definition only, right?

[59:03] That consent it is called according as it pleases one to do, right? Choice according as it is preferred to those things which do not please, right? Well, that's kind of subtle, right, Thomas? You're getting very subtle for our big minds, huh?

[59:24] Yeah, I tell you, I was thinking, you know, that compared to Aristotle and Thomas, even you could, for that matter, I don't know very much. Have to say that, right? If you compare me to God, right? You, you and say I don't know much. You say I don't know anything, right?

[59:44] So then, to paraphrase, you know, God's words to Catherine Siena, right? He said, God said to Burquist, remember two things, Duane. I am He who knows, and you are He who does not know. That was pretty cleverly, you know. Paraphrase that. We'll put that on your tombstone. Yeah. He said, say Catherine Siena. He said, remember two things: I am who am, and you are she who is not.

[1:00:15] So he said to me, I am He who knows, and you are He who does not know, huh? Yeah, for the rest of her days. Oh, I see that.

[1:00:36] But if all men by nature desire to know, right? You know, then God Himself has put in us, right? That desire to know, and therefore that desire ultimately to really see Him as He is. Yeah.

[1:00:54] Should take a little break now.