Prima Secundae
46. Consent and Higher Reason (q.15 a.4), then Use (q.16, aa.1-2): Is Use an Act of the Will, and Do Animals Use?
Class of 2011-12-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/046-consent-and-higher-reason-q-15-a-4-then-use-q-16-aa-1-2-is/

[0:00] To the fourth article here. To the fourth one proceeds thus: It seems that consent to acting or doing does not always pertain to upper, higher reason, huh?

[0:21] For, pleasure follows upon operation and perfects it, as beauty in youth. It's Aristotle's famous comparison there, in the tenth book of the Ethics, huh?

[0:37] But the consent in pleasure, or to pleasure, pertains to lower reason, huh? As Augustine says in the twelfth book about the Trinity. Therefore, consent in act does not pertain to only what higher reason, huh?

[0:58] Moreover, the action in which we consent is said to be what voluntary, but it pertains to many powers to produce what Voluntary acts. voluntary acts. Therefore, not only does higher reason consent in the act. Moreover, superior reason looks towards the eternal, right, things to be looked upon and consulted, right? As Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity. Some people say a lot of people don't know if they have a superior reason then, right?

[1:37] Because they don't consult these things. But many times man consents to some act not on account of the eternal reasons, right? But account of some temporal reasons, huh? Or even on account of some passions of the soul, right?

[1:57] Therefore, to consent in the act does not pertain to only huh the higher what reason, huh? Well, consensus me, right? You know, for the time being, anyway, right?

[2:15] But against this is what Augustine says in the twelfth book about the Trinity, huh? It's not possible, right, that for a sin to be efficaciously perpetuated, I mean, perform

[2:34] to what to be discerned by the mind, right? Unless that intention of the mind is according to what it's going to something other than its higher power, right?

[2:52] Ah. Moving the what members to what the work, or prohibiting it from the work, right? Unless it cedes and gives way to or serves the what the action. I answer. It should be said. Thomas says that the final what sentence always pertains to that what which is above, to which it pertains to judge about others.

[3:41] For as long as what It remains, what what's proposed to be judged. Yeah. There is not yet given the final what. Yeah. It is manifest, however, that it is the superior reason which is To which it belongs to judge about all things, right? Because about sensible things we judge through what reason, and about those things which pertain to what human reasons, we judge according to the divine reason, right?

[4:20] Which pertain to superior reason, and therefore it is uncertain, huh? Whether according to the divine reasons one resists or not, right? So and therefore, so long as it is uncertain, right? Whether according to the divine reasons one resists or not, no judgment or reason has the notion of a final what sentence. Yeah. But the final sentence about things to be done is the consent in the act, and therefore the consent in the act pertains to higher reason, according as in reason the will's included.

[5:05] We saw that distinction before, right? Reminds me of my point I used to say, huh? It always belongs to the higher power, right? To distinguish between it and the lower power, and to determine what the order of the two should be, right?

[5:37] Well, I kind of showed it kind of inductively, right? There's a distinction between reason and the senses, right? And does that belong to the senses to make that distinction.

[5:52] The senses can't do it, right? So it's reason that distinguishes between the reason and the senses. And reason that what determines the order that the senses have to reason, right? the road from the senses to memory to experience, right, to the universal.

[6:11] And take the second example I take is what imagination, right? Is it the same thing to imagine and to understand? But to whom does it belong? You imagine the difference between no, but you can understand the difference between understanding and imagining, right? And therefore the order of the two, right? And how false imagination deceives us and so on. But all that is something that reason knows, right?

[6:45] Okay. Now, you get into reason, does it belong to practical reason or looking reason to distinguish between the two? Yeah, yeah. I get into the first looking science there. That's not a tool, and that's geometry, right? Arithmetic, right? And where does Aristotle distinguish between geometry and natural philosophy?

[7:22] What's in the second book of natural philosophy, the physics, right? Euclid doesn't distinguish between geometry and, but natural philosophy is something higher than what geometry, right? Okay. He doesn't distinguish between wisdom and natural philosophy and and geometry there, right? But it's in the sixth book of wisdom that he does, right? Okay.

[7:54] It's nice to say, you know, to whom does it belong to distinguish between philosophy and theology? Theology. Yeah, yeah. And therefore, to show the order too of the two, right? So the modern philosophers who don't have any what theology, right, huh? They can't really distinguish between the two and show they're what order, right, huh? But necessarily it's a corruption of the whole. Like the senses trying to know the difference between senses and reason, right?

[8:30] Yeah. Modern philosophers don't even know the distinction between philosophy and geometry. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that consent in the pleasure of a doing right pertains to what the higher reason, just as consent in what, Work.

[9:17] But consent in the pleasure of the thought pertains to what lower reason, just as to it it pertains to what to think. To think.

[9:35] But nevertheless, about this which is to think or not think, right? In so far as it is considered to be a certain action, superior reason has what judgment, huh? And likewise about the pleasure following upon it, huh?

[9:56] But in so far as it is taken as ordered to what? Another action, then it pertains to what lower reason? Because what is ordered to another pertains to a lower art or power, right? And then the end to which is ordered. Whence the art which is about the end is called the architectonic, right? Or the chief art, it is called, right? Now, arche means what? Chief. Greek for beginning.

[10:34] Beginning. So that's a text of Augustine there, right? Consent and the pleasure pertains to the lower reason, huh? So you explain Augustine's text there, right? Now, but in so far as it is taken as ordered to some action, thus it pertains to lower reason. For what is ordered to another pertains to a lower art or power, right? Huh? And the end to which it is ordered, right?

[11:31] Huh? It belongs to geometer to decide whether the triangle has its interior angles good two right angles, right? Wants a natural philosopher to decide that.

[11:45] No, but the order of geometry to natural philosophy pertains to the natural philosopher to determine, right? Huh? Okay. To the second, it should be said that actions are called voluntary from this that we consent to them, right? But it's not necessary that consent be of any power, but of the will itself by which it is called what voluntary, which is in reason, right? So the other ones are, you know, commanded by the will, right?

[12:26] To the third, it should be said that higher reason is said to consent, not only because according to the eternal reason this always moves to acting, but also because by the eternal reason it does not dissent, huh? Okay, that's a little obscure to us because we don't quite know higher and lower reason yet, huh? So let's leave it at that. Now we can look at a little bit. The sixteenth article.

[12:59] Okay Then, one ought to consider about use. What's use of this? And about this, four things are what asked, right? First, whether to use is an act of the will, right?

[13:22] Secondly, whether it belongs to brute animals, huh? Third, whether it is only of those things which are towards the end, or also of the end.

[13:36] And then about the order of use to what? Choice. Choice, huh? To the first, one proceeds thus: It seems that to use is not an act of the will.

[13:56] For Augustine says in the first book on Christian doctrine that uti, use, huh, is that which comes in what? Use. Yeah, uti. And refers to what? Obtaining.

[14:18] For another, yeah. But to refer something to another is a reason, of which it is to what? Confer, bring together, into order, right? Therefore, uti is an act of reason, right? Therefore, not of the will, right? I didn't know all these crazy acts were in my practical life, you know. You ever get mixed mixed up with that practical life, you know, because you've got to help.

[14:49] Anyway, my wife was always asking why I don't apply logic to my practical life. It resists logic for some reason the practical life. You know,

[15:09] you realize how much money they say Obama's raised what a billion dollars for his campaign, right? And all these people are spending millions of dollars, you know, and and they're running around, you know, here and there, and no wonder they, they... all their time and energy is taken up with getting elected, right, and reelected, and so on. Don't have any time to think what's good for the country or what they should do for the country, and all the thinking about what they should do that would help them get reelected.

[15:37] And to think he thinks it's going to take that much. Yeah, yeah. The thing that makes me I hope that you know people can see that there's something more. to electing a man, than how much money he spends on his campaign? Yeah, yeah. Super advertisements. That's supposed to be the party of the poor and common person, too. I said the king would not have to worry about getting elected, right?

[16:02] Yeah. So he could devote his his serious thinking to what's good for the country, right? Huh? Maybe we should have a king. Maybe we're on the wrong track. Yeah, yeah. I realize that's kind of a thing that's inherent now in democracy, right? Huh? Yeah. It's amazing how much money they raise, millions of dollars. Yeah. There is that I mentioned that thing with President Garfield. That he it was at that time where the the White House, anyone, everyone could come to the White House and ask for jobs.

[16:38] Yeah. So Garfield mentioned he says I don't have time to run the country. I have to deal with all these people that are begging for jobs. Yeah. Getting nickel-dime jobs. Yeah, that's usually what the local, either the unions or the the party bosses, whoever they are, that's what they. I mean, that's what I told you before. The friend of my family, my mother's family, Jim Quigley was one of the party guys, one of the party bosses in St.

[17:02] Louis. And she said at the Quigley's house, it was a steady stream. Yeah. Irish and Italian and Polish and whoever else German Catholic immigrant mothers, tears in their eyes because their sons in jail, and he said that he needs a job to get them out of jail, and and Jim Quigley was just constantly making appeals to politicians for favors. That's his whole job. That's all he did.

[17:23] My barber back home in St. Paul's told me one time, I guess he used to work in the Capitol barber shop, right? So he, oh, some of these big shots, you know, he he would cut their hair, right? And the one big shot said, "You know, if you ever need a job, just you know, call me up." You know. Well, being a barber, I guess in those days the nice job for barber was on the trains, right?

[17:44] Oh. So he wanted to get a job as a barber on the trains. So he says, "Well, what the heck? I'll go see a guy. See if you know, you know." He goes up and tells the guy, "What? he's interested?" in. He says, "Okay." So he gets on the phone, calls two or three calls. You know, he got the job for him. So he says, "It worked."

[18:02] He says. So now that we've done the haircut, he had to take the train. Yeah. Okay, Moreover Damascene says that man what makes some impetus is it to doing, and he's called what. Impelled. Impelled, yeah. Then he what uses as called use? Huh. Seems very obscure, aren't they? But the operation pertains to the what. Carrying out power, right? The executive power. You still call that president on the executive, right?

[18:56] The executive branch, you know. Getting things done, but anyway, the act of the will does not follow. But the act, however, the will does not follow the act of the executive power, but the executing power, the execution, the act of execution is ultimate, right? Execution is ultimate. I think that translation's pretty good, doesn't it? That to the guys on death row, anything. Yeah. Yeah.

[19:24] Yeah, Aristotle actually has a thing in the fifth book of the metaphysics there on the word mutilate, right? Mutilate, and of course, it's got to have a member of your your arm or leg or something removed, right? But it can't, you know, kill you, right? Because then would not be you'd not be mutilated. So if a man's head is chopped off, Thomas says this is not mutilate.

[19:47] This is ultimate, huh? Well, that's capital. Yeah. Taking a head and cutting. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So Damascene seems to be saying that usus is after operation, right, and therefore it's after the executive power. That doesn't make any sense for the will, right? So this is an argument against it being an act of the will, right? Moreover, Augustine says in the book of the eighty-three questions. I wonder what those eighty-three questions were.

[20:30] It's a little bit like the quaestio quodlibetalis that you have in Thomas, right? Can be about anything you know, and all kinds of odd little things show up there and get interesting, huh? Right, the book you know, attributed to Aristotle, there about marvelous things. You want one little thing, you know, so like like. uh what's that thing used to be. Ripley's, you know, believe it or not.

[20:53] Oh yeah. Ripley. Oh yeah. All things which are what done are done for the use of man, right? Because he uses all things in judging, right? The reason which is given to what men, huh? Uses all things in what judging, right? But to judge about things created by God pertains to looking reason, huh? Speculative reason, theoretical reason, which is altogether separated from the will, which is the principle of human acts.

[21:39] No, it's not as Monsignor Dion informs us. Therefore, UT is not an act of the will, right? Okay. It's fine. I used to think that, you know, myself, you know that. The against this is what Augustine says in the tenth book about the Trinity. To use is to take something in the what faculty of the will.

[22:16] What Thomas says? I answer. It should be said that the use of something implies what an application, an application of that thing to some operation. Use a hammer. Is that what he means? Use a knife.

[22:37] Use a knife to cut the meat or something. I understand that. That's part of my practical life. Just as what to ride a horse, equitari I guess. Is a use. of The horse and to strike is the use of the what staff yeah

[23:06] now to operation however we apply both the inward interior inward principles of acting to wit those what powers themselves of the soul right or the what members of our body right the arm the leg right

[23:32] um as the we use the what understanding to what understand and the eye to see right huh I use my eyes to see my ears to hear my tongue to taste and also what we use exterior things as the what staff to striking right huh Striking children when they get out of line Yeah Thomas it's been a little bit of anger when you wrote this so there's examples that come to you right

[24:07] but it is manifest that exterior things we do not apply to some operation except through what intrinsic principles huh which are the powers of the soul or the habits of these powers right or the organs which are the members of the what body right huh

[24:34] that's why Thomas you know gives this principle that we acquire what is not natural through what is what natural right huh so all these tools that we have right hammers and saws and knives we ultimately acquire through what the hand right huh and

[24:55] you know man's by nature the most imitative animals right and so that natural inclination to imitate is how we acquire all kinds of things huh to the natural road of reason right we acquire the roads that are not natural

[25:17] but has been shown however above that the will is what moves the powers of the soul to what its acts right and this is to apply them to what some operation whence it is manifest that to use is first and chiefly what of the will as of the first what mover right

[25:48] so to use my ballpoint pen It's originally something of my will, right? Wanting. Yeah, but to use my hand or to use my eye, something, right? Okay.

[26:06] But of reason as something, what directing, right? But of the other powers as were carrying out, which are compared to the will by which they are applied to acting, as tools to the what? Yeah.

[26:33] But action is not properly attributed to the tool, but to the what chief agent, right? Just as building to the builder, not however to a tool. Yeah. Yeah. So it was Michelangelo who made the Pietà, right? Not the chisel. Except in a very it's a secundum quid sense. Whence is manifest that to use is properly an act of the will, right? Okay.

[27:09] That's what somebody had visited here, and he, I guess, had not learned much about the inspiration of Scripture, and he read read someone of the Pope talking about how God is the one who is the author of Scripture. Yeah. God didn't write those books. Oh. And I said, well, who built the house out here? The hammer and the saw, or the man? And he said, Oh, oh, not bad He started just like that Yeah.

[27:41] He said the teacher is one who enlightens To the first, therefore, it should be said that reason, to be sure, refers to another, right? But the will tends in that which is in another related through what reason? Reason directs it, right? And according to this, it is said that to use is to refer something to another, right? Because you're being directed by reason there, right? Okay.

[28:17] To the second, it should be said. Then this text from Damascene, back huh He's talking about the use that, according as it pertains to the what executive powers, right? No, that's not the origin of it all, right? Okay. Now the one here from Antidione, right? To the third, it should be said that also what that speculative reason, right, Ipsa ratio speculativa, is applied to the work of what understanding or judging by the what will.

[28:55] So that's what Monsignor Dionne was lecturing on the last time I was adamant to Laval, right? Okay. So there's certain dependence there upon the will to philosophize, what? Will, right? Before it's already theology, right? And that's why you know Thomas says that Aristotle talks about it too. That pride is a cause of deception, right?

[29:19] And therefore, the speculative intellect, right, is said to be used as it were, what? Moved by the will, right? Just as the other powers that carry out things, right? Yeah, he said something like that. in his previous Yeah. Yeah, that's. Father Hardon makes that point again. It made a big impression. on me. The most important use of your will is to direct your mind what to think about.

[29:46] Yeah, yeah. When Thomas talks to you about docility there in the great prudence, right? But can take in a broader sense there. But you know, listening to or reading carefully, frequently, and with reverence, the words of those greater than yourself, right? And so, out of pride, I don't read carefully, frequently, and with reverence. The words of those wiser than me in some subject, right? And therefore, I make many mistakes I wouldn't make otherwise.

[30:22] And I'm not called back from mistakes I have made already by their words, huh? Or overestimate my ability, right? Just? Out of pride, and therefore I apply my mind to judging something I'm not yet ready to to judge, huh?

[30:56] So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? But wonder is in the will. Okay. Whether to use belongs to brute animals, huh? The second one proceeds thus: it seems that to use belongs to the brute animals.

[31:26] For frui is more noble than uti, huh? To enjoy, huh? What is Augustine's famous thing? You know, don't don't enjoy the things you should use, and don't use the things you should enjoy, right? Because as Augustine says in the tenth book about the Trinity, we use those things which we refer to another, right?

[31:48] By which it should be enjoyed, right? To the other thing which should be enjoyed. But to enjoy belongs to the brute animals, huh? Therefore, much more it belongs to them to use if they have the higher act, right?

[32:05] I have something like that, right? Likeness is a cause of deception, right? The book of the Sophist, I think it is, where Plato says, "likeness is a slippery thing to deceive you." Similitudo Interesting in rhetoric the argument called the enthymeme. It's an argument from likelihood, or from signs, right? That's how it's defined, huh? And Aristotle has some interesting things to say about likelihood, right? It's almost outside of reason, right?

[32:48] You know, there's a discussion of that in the Poetics too, you know, about likelihood, huh? And it's more important what the poet represents as likely than the. As an example, they're describing, you know, Cicero talking about his client there in the court, you know, is a bit delayed because his wife wasn't quite ready yet, you know. Because well, oh yeah, it's like my wife, you know.

[33:28] Yeah, yeah. But you know, I always tell the story about. I think I told the story before here, but about on April Fool's Day, right? Um,

[33:42] one of the priests there, that's staying up at the wall, there comes to me and he says, "My old teacher, Kasurik, right? Kasurik is going to Russia."

[33:51] I said, "Yes, yeah." I said, "He says I told De Koninck you know, that Kasurik was going, huh?" And De Koninck said, "I hope he keeps his mouth shut over there more than he does here, and never get back."

[34:04] Well, then I walked away, and all sudden it dawned me it's Epu Fool's Day, right? And I thought he must have set me up, you know, with this thing, you know. But it was so likely what De Koninck would say because they're always, you know, they're kind of back and forth, you know, kidding each other all the time. you know, It's very likely De Koninck would have said that, right?

[34:22] Yes. And I just take the example in class. Suppose you wanted to convince somebody that so and so had funked the exam, right? And well, if he's the sort of guy who hit the bottle after he didn't funk the exam, you know, yeah, he's already started drinking, you know. It seems so real, right? Huh? You know. And so these things that are not true but are likely, you know, they tend to get us, you know, going along with it, you know.

[34:53] Was Casiric a student of Deccanic, or? Yeah, yeah. Yeah. See, see, what's interesting was that Casiric had given up philosophy because he didn't think the teachers down were ever really good, right? And that even if they, you know, Inspector Thomas, you know, they did kind of like, you know, authoritative rather than any reasoning. Then he heard about De Koninck, right? So he decided to try once more, right?

[35:20] So went up to study under De Koninck, and he said to De Koninck when our, first day, if you teach philosophy the way it's been taught to me in the states, you say, I can leave your class." De Koninck said fine. He became very devoted of course, to De Koninck, because De Koninck, you know gave reasons and you know appealed to his reasons and so on. And when De Koninck would come down on his, you know lecture tours because he had ten children, De Koninck Kasurik would arrange you know a lot of his talks and maybe stay at Kasurik's house, you know.

[35:52] But if De Koninck got up to talk and the microphone wasn't right, Kasurik could jump out of the audience and up there, fix the microphone, you know, give him the facility, you know. So the kids going up there older, you know, when he went up there than most people would be. It was you know a different relation, with De Koninck and so. on. So there's a lot of you know back and forth kidding

[36:15] between them, you know, but you know, would tell some of the vulgar jokes. I heard them saying, you know. But this actually happened. De Koninck actually said, you know, I hope he keeps his mouth shut over there. He doesn't get back, you know. And I thought that he'd set this up to make it appear like, you know, that sounds pretty clever of him. And I said, that's exactly what De Koninck would say.

[36:32] Of course, De Koninck had actually said it in this case. So you gotta watch out for likelihood, right? But it's taken from the word likeness, right? And so you see in Shakespeare's plays a lot just oh very like, you know, you hear that expression. Counting members. Moreover, to apply members to acting is to use those members. But the brute animals apply their members to doing something: their feet to walking, and their horns to striking, and so on.

[37:08] Teeth, to biting you. Therefore, it belongs to the brute animals to use, right? Okay. But against all this is what the great Augustine says in the book on the eighty-three questions,

[37:24] that to use something is not what possible except the animal that is what partaking of reason, huh? So to use something is not possible except for the animal that partakes of what reason, huh? Again, it might be the word that has some equivocation, right, or some you know. breadth of use We'll see what the great Thomas says, huh? Let's be very short here. I answer: It should be said that as has been said, to use is to apply some principle of action to the action, right?

[38:06] Just as to consent is to apply the appetitive motion to what, siring something, as has been said. But to apply something is going back to that idea. What to apply means to apply something to another is not except of that which has judgment over that, huh? Which is not except of that which is able to refer one thing towards another, which pertains to reason, which looks before and after, as Shakespeare says.

[38:39] And therefore, only the what rational animal both consents and uses, right? Now, what does he say about the animals enjoying things, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that to enjoy implies the absolute motion of the appetite, as opposed to the ordered motion, right? In the desirable, right? But to use implies the motion of the appetite to something in order to what another, right? Okay.

[39:23] If therefore one compares uti et frui to use and enjoy as regards their objects, then frui to enjoy is more noble than what? To use. Yeah. So you're enjoying your success, huh? Because that which is absolutely desirable is better than that which is desirable only in order to another, right? Propter quod unumquodque tale is what Augustine says. But if one compares as regards the what grasping power preceding, more nobility is required in the part of what use.

[40:10] Because to order one thing to another is a reason. I knew Shakespeare was right, huh? That's the end of the definition of reason, right? Its ability for a large discourse, looking before and what after, right? And order is defined by before and after, right? But one can absolutely apprehend something, even the what the senses, right? The senses don't know the order of one thing to another, right?

[40:41] To reason, that's the second. It should be said that animals, through their what parts, their members, do something by the instinct of what nature, not through the fact that they know the order of the members to those what operations. Hence, they are not said to properly apply their members to acting, nor to use their members right? Remember, I said an example of that insect, right? That would squeeze the head of its victim, yeah.

[41:17] And squeeze the head of its victim enough to what paralyze it, but not enough to kill it. And then it would what dig a hole, and when it had apparently measured one big enough for its victim, it would drag the victim by the what antenna and drop it into the hole, and then deposit its eggs upon the victim, right? And then cover up the thing. And so the young hatched.

[41:43] They had what? yeah. the head okay. Now, if he had squeezed the head to kill it, the animal, the victim, would have decayed and therefore not been suitable food for the young, right? Very considerate, right? So, did he use his what pinchers, right? To what squeeze the head just the right amount, and then used his pinchers to what drag him by the antenna, right? Well, Fabre, the French entomologist, saw that he always grabbed him by the antenna, right?

[42:20] So one time, when he was over there with his hole working on that, he snapped off antenna. So now the thing is ready for the victim, but he comes back and

[42:32] and then in frustration he went back and filled up the hole with the dirt, but didn't have the victim in there at all, right? Now, what does that indicate? No reason. Yeah. If he could figure out the order of squeezing this much to paralyze, you know, he could figure out there's some other place to drag the victim by, then the what? Antenna. Antenna, yeah. So that's what Thomas is saying, right?

[42:59] If you put in the definition I've used, I could use, I suppose, in a in a broader sense, you could say that the others use their eyes to see, right, and use their legs to run, right. But if you put in the idea that you are what seeing the order of one to the other, right? Well, then they don't, right? It's by natural instinct that he squeezes the head in just this amount, right?

[43:24] Like he's programmed to do that, right? But he doesn't see the order, right? Because only the order, the squeezing to its effect is much more what subtle and and hard to do, because even Fabre tried, you know, taking that same insect and squeezing the head just the right amount, and he's always killing it instead of you know. So he lacked that, you know. I mean, it's not easy to to do that, right?

[43:48] To see the order of the pressure to to the effect and so on, right? And that takes much more than than to see that you know you can pull something else, right? So it's like he doesn't see the order of one to the other with the insect, huh? If he did, he would see the the lesser one, right, rather than the more difficult one, which is squeezing the head, huh?

[44:13] Yeah, I always think of the example of a monkey who's you know got some obstacle in the way of the banana, but he's got a stick, so he uses a stick to bring the banana. Yeah, yeah. That's what I always think. That seems to be an example of of using a tool or something. Yeah, seems to be that one. Yeah, yeah. Well, you know, they've been these psychologists who raise a monkey with their kid.

[44:37] You know, huh? And the monkey is ahead of the kid, right? Doing things until he gets into words, right? And then all of a sudden, the monkey is left behind. You know, is an F student. You know, but but the kid can see the order of the the words to the things. That's what. Well, yeah. There's many examples like that. An example of showing a monkey's screen, TV screen, or computer screen with numbers.

[45:05] Yeah. But there is they're scattered around. Now I don't. This may this supposedly some kind of hokey thing. Yeah. Because the monkey, if they flash the screen with the numbers and then they just go into boxes, he will press the orders in the number in the order they were. Yeah. Faster than any human can do it. Yeah. Can remember the order. Yeah. By his imagination and memory.

[45:26] Yeah. And get it right every time, whereas the humans you go ah. Make sure the order. They used to have a commercial on television for a particular motor oil showing the chimp, the monkey, the art changing the oil in the car. And suddenly find that you can't change your own oil. This can be done than a monkey. But gives new meaning to grease monkey. Yeah.

[45:53] So we'll stop here then. Yeah.