Prima Secundae
47. Aquinas on Use and Command: Whether Use Comes Before Choice, Whether Command Belongs to Reason, and Whether Animals Command (ST I-II Q.16 a.3–4, Q.17 a.1–3)
Class of 2012-01-05
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/047-aquinas-on-use-and-command-whether-use-comes-before-choice/

[0:00] Name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias God, your enlightenment. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit.

[0:36] Amen. Okay, we're up to Article Three there? I guess of Question Sixteen. Okay, we're still talking about usus. To the third, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that usus is able to be also of the last end. For Augustine says in the tenth book about the Trinity, everyone who what enjoys uses right,

[1:14] but the last end someone enjoys. Therefore, the last end. Therefore, someone uses the last end. Some. There's ambiguity there. The word "use" some. Moreover, to use is to take something in the power of the will, as is said there. But nothing is more taken by the will than the last end.

[1:44] We taken up with it. Therefore, the use can be of the last end. More Hilary, huh? Says in the second book about the Trinity that eternity is in the Father, species or beauty in the image, huh? That is in the Son, and use in the gift, huh? That is in the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit, since he is God, is the last end. Therefore, it can happen to use the what?

[2:22] Last end. Against all this is what Augustine says in the famous book on the eighty-three questions. That no one rightly uses God, huh? But he enjoys God, huh? But God alone is the last end. Therefore, the last end should not be used, huh?

[2:53] Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that." Use or uti, as has been said, implies the applying of something to something. So you're applying something to something. So it's something that's not the end, then, right?

[3:11] But what is applied to another has itself in the ratio of what is towards an end. Has the reason of what is towards an end,

[3:27] and therefore use always is of that which is towards the end. On account of which, also those things which are accommodated to the end or suitable to the end are called useful. And therefore, usefulness is sometimes called use.

[3:52] But it should be considered that the last end is said in two ways: in one way simply, and another way toward someone. For since the end, as has been said above, is said sometimes the what thing itself, sometimes the attaining or the possession of it, right? Just as to the avaricious man, the end could be said to be either what the thing money, right, or the possession of money, right.

[4:28] It is manifest that simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself, but not the what possession of. For not the possession of money is good, right? Except on account of the good that money itself is. But as regards this one, the attaining of money is the last end.

[4:58] For the avaricious man does not seek or would not seek money except he might what have it. Therefore, simply speaking and properly, a man what some man enjoys money, right? Because in it he places or constitutes his last end. But in so far as he refers it to possession, he is said to what use it? So that's the equivocation there, right?

[5:35] Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you. So you're seeking God so that you your heart could come to rest. In Him, right? Okay. Is God the end, or is it seeing God the end? Loving God.

[5:55] Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, but in this way of speaking, could you say you use God to know and love? But then knowing loving would be the end Yeah, yeah. So it says simply, God is the end, right? But in some way, you might say, you know, the end is eternal life. Eternal life is to know Him in whom He sent, right? So Christ's ...

[6:36] Yeah. Thomas's prayer, you mean? Yeah, by the yeah, by the sight of His glory. Yeah. Blessed. Now, to the first, he says, Augustine speaks of use community, right? Huh? As opposed to what? Properly, right? According as it implies the order of the end to the what enjoyment itself of the end, huh? Which someone seeks of the what end, huh?

[7:21] And to the second, it should be said that the end is taken up in the what power of the will that the will might what rest in it, right? Whence the rest in the end, which is enjoyment, is said in this way to be a use of the what end, huh?

[7:47] But that which is towards the end, huh, is taken up in the power of the will, not only in what order to the use of that which is to the end, but in order to a what another thing, right? That other thing is to what the will is going to rest.

[8:09] And to the third, huh? The words of Hilary. Thomas seems to quote Hilary after Augustine, right? About the Trinity, huh? The most, it seems, huh? Hilary of Poitiers I guess Well this feast is next week Maybe so? For you, I don't. Do we have him on our calendar? John Hume on today for us. Yeah, he was teaching yesterday.

[8:36] Saint Paul the First Hermit. today too No forget St Paul at first You hear those things called hermits? Wife used to make them. I kind of know Oh a little cooking Yeah, yeah, kind of good. Yeah, ginger, yeah, something like that.

[8:55] To the third, then, it should be said that use is taken in the words of Hilary for rest in the what last end. In that way in which communiter loquendo rather than properly, right, is said to use the end to what obtain it, right? It's kind of strangely speaking, but we do speak that way, right?

[9:22] Whence Augustine says in the sixth book about the Trinity that that love, that pleasure, that happiness or beatitude is called use by him, right?

[9:39] Okay, just one more article to go before I get get out of this. Okay. To the fourth, one proceeds thus: It seems that use comes before what choice.

[9:59] For he says, after choice. Choice, nothing follows except carrying out execution. But use, since it pertains to the will, precedes what? Execution. Therefore, it precedes also what? Election. I guess it's saying that choice is followed right away by carrying out, right? So then, maybe I suppose. So, but use has to be before because it's an act of the will. Execution is by some other faculty of us, right?

[10:29] Therefore, the only place for it is before choice. Okay. Moreover, the absolute is before the what? Yeah. Relative. Relative, yeah. So Thomas often uses the word "absolute," right? In that sense, huh? Like he's dividing up the categories, right? And he distinguishes quantity and quality from towards something relation, right? Yes. The first is something absolute, and the other is towards another, right? Sometimes they'll say, "I'd say," you know, to oneself, "very absolute," right?

[11:11] That's kind of a funny way of speaking, but so the absolute is before the relative, huh? Therefore, the less relative is before the more relative. But choice implies two relations: one of that which is chosen towards the end; another of that in preference for which, right, is chosen, right?

[11:43] But use implies only relation to the what? End. So it's less related then. Okay. Whoever thinks up these objections should be shot, right? Yeah, I don't know who's smarter. The guy thought the objection is the guy that answered the question. Therefore, use is before choice, huh? Moreover, the will uses other powers in so far as it moves them, right? But the will moves also itself. Therefore, it also what uses itself by applying itself to acting, right?

[12:26] But it does this when it consents. Therefore, in consent itself is a use, but consent precedes choice. Ergo. Must have been hard to go through these medieval things, huh? They say when Cajetan was defending himself, right, at the thing you know he did so well, right? At the end, it was customary for the guy. If he's passed, right, to invite out for a beer, everybody around there, right?

[13:02] But instead, they took him on their shoulders and carried him off, treated him to the to the beer, you know. He did so well, at the responses, huh?

[13:14] But you know, one of these guys being brought back and talked to one of our modern philosophers, he'd he'd be to give my guy a rough time, I think.

[13:25] But against this is what Damascene says, that the will, after what choice, makes say what impetus to operation, and afterwards it what uses, huh? Therefore, use follows choice. Okay. Let's see if we can

[13:54] sort out this mess, huh? I answer. It should be said that the will has a twofold what relation to the willed, right? One, as the willed is in some way in the one what willing. This is an not in itself a transitive act. It's an act that remains in the doer

[14:20] through a certain what proportion or order to the thing what willed, huh? Whence those things which are nat naturally proportioned to some end, we are said to what desire them naturally, right? But in this way, to have the end is to have the end obviously imperfectly, right? But everything imperfect tends towards its own what perfection, right? And therefore, both natural desire as well as voluntary desire tends that it might have the end itself really, right?

[15:06] Which is to perfectly what have it, right? And this is the second relation of the will to the what Willed, huh? But the willed is not only the end, but also that which is towards the end, huh?

[15:27] Now, the last thing that pertains to the first relation of the will with respect to that which is towards the end is what choice. Choice, for there is complete the proportion of the will that it completely or fully wills that which is towards the end, right?

[15:49] But use already pertains to the second relation of the will by which it tends to obtaining the very thing willed. Whence it is manifest that use follows election or choice. If nevertheless one takes what use according as the will uses the what executive power by what moving it.

[16:19] But because the will also in some way moves reason right and uses it right, one can understand use of that which is towards the end according as in the consideration of reason right, referring it in the end and in this way use what Receive choice. I'm using the will, or the reason rather. Okay. Got all that done, absorbed, huh? Okay.

[16:56] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the motion by which the will moves to carrying out something right precedes the carrying out of the work.

[17:12] But it follows what choice, and therefore, since use pertains to the foresaid motion of the will, it is a middle between what choice and carrying out.

[17:29] The will is moving to what start the execution, right? That comes after it's already chosen. This means, huh? Okay. Now to the second, this absolute and relative stuff here. To the second, it should be said that that which is in its very nature related, right, is after what is what absolute there.

[18:01] But that to which relations are attributed is not necessary that it be what posterior, right? So that's using the word what. Was that distinction of the categories? I guess, huh? In the famous chapter on relation, they're in the categories, huh? For some things are relative secundum esse and some secundum dici, right? So knowledge, for example, is what not fundamentally a relation; it's a quality, right? But there's certain relation falling upon it, knowledge of something, right?

[18:37] He's saying something is relative in that way; doesn't have to be, you know, after, right? Because it's something absolute fundamentally, right? Okay. It's kind of surprised here in the categories the order, right? Aristotle when he enumerates the categories, he gets substance, quantity, quality, towards something a relation, right? But then he takes them up: your substance, quantity, and then he takes up relation before quality. Now, why does he do that?

[19:07] Right? Was because Plato had defined the relative as what is said to be of another or towards another in some way, right? And that would include knowledge, right? And so, until you make that distinction between the two kinds of relative, one whose whole being, Aristotle says, is to be towards another, right? Double is nothing by itself. How much is double? It's at four or six or ten, right?

[19:37] You know, it's nothing by itself, right? You see, it's only towards another, right? Why knowledge is something, you know, in itself, right? I suppose love is something in itself too, right? Okay, but never does he speak of love of something, right? So in the in Latin there, they they cause. Distinction between relativa secundum dici right, which are said to be of another right, but their fundamental nature is not to be of another right, like knowledge.

[20:12] And then relativa secundum esse, one whose sole esse, whose very being, very nature, is to be what towards another, like double or half right.

[20:26] So Thomas is saying, in the sense that something, quod est per essentiam right, whose very nature, relative right, that's posterior to the what absolute right. But that to which are attributed relations right, it's not by its very nature relations like knowledge. It's not necessary that that be what posterior right.

[20:58] And of course he says, immo, quanta the more a cause is before, the more it has relation to more effects, but it's still before right. Okay, because that's something that follows what upon it right.

[21:19] That's why when when power is defined as a beginning right, you know, you kind of defining it by the relation that follows upon it right.

[21:33] Oh, that's a subtle distinction there, right? To the third, it should be said, huh? That choice precedes what use if they refer to the same thing, right? Nothing prevents the use of one thing to precede the choice of another. So that's the kind of distinction we've met before, right?

[22:02] And because the acts of the will reflect upon themselves, right? In every act of the will, there can be taken both consent and choice and use, right? Then,

[22:21] does it be said that the will consents, right, to choose and consents to consent and uses itself to consent and to what? Yeah. And always these acts are ordered to that which is before, right?

[22:40] They are what before, right? Okay. So what comes first, Tom? The premise or the conclusion? Yeah, but you can use the conclusion of one theorem to as a premise. So sometimes the conclusion comes before a premise, right? What would you say to that? Depends. When the conclusion is being used as a premise, it's not as a conclusion. Yeah, yeah. And as a conclusion, it's after the premises that are used to prove it, right?

[23:15] You know. But you can have this series like this, right? Premises, conclusion, and then this is a premise for another conclusion, and you know. But always the premise comes before the conclusion, I think. Or I could say, which comes before the genus or the species? We say, well, quadrilateral is the genus of what squares, so there the genus comes before the species, right? But the, you know, rectilineal plane figure, right?

[23:45] The species of plane figure comes before the genus. Yeah, but then it's not as a. Yeah. We're talking before how Thomas says what's defined is always a what. Species, right? Because something is defined by its genus and its differences, so it's always defined as a species, right? Well, then can a genus be defined? Well, yes, but not as genus, but insofar as it is a species of a higher genus, right?

[24:16] And of course, you get the highest genus that can't be, strictly speaking, defined, right? It has no. It has no genus, right? Deo gratias. So now we're up to question 18, right? And this is the division now we had between the acts of the will itself, right? Which we've been taking up to this point. Now the acts of the will with regard to the end and with regard to the what the means, right?

[24:55] What is towards the end? But now he's going to talk about the acts commanded as were by the the will, huh? Okay. Then we're not to consider about the acts commanded by the what will, huh? Let's get the word emperor, I guess. Huh? He's the one who commands, huh? You better obey too. And about this, nine things are asked.

[25:29] First, whether to command is an act of the will or of reason, huh? Okay. So that one of those things that seems to be kind of ambiguous, you know.

[25:42] Second, whether to command belongs to what good animals, huh? Shakespeare makes fun of the guy obeying the the dog, right? Okay, I'll obey. I won't go stiff-posing though. He's on a chain or something, you know. Not going to get him into his his territory, huh?

[26:08] Third, about the order of command to use. Oh, heck, see, that's going to come a little bit more. I'm. Not completely free of that, possibly. It kind of sticks to you, bringing all that.

[26:22] Four, whether command and the act commanded are one act or diverse things, huh? Now, whether the act of the will itself is commanded, huh?

[26:42] No, we're commanded to love God. We had it all. Yeah. aren't we Love our neighbor. Love our enemy. Yeah, St. John is. They've been reading St. John there. Yeah, new commandment. Yeah, yeah. And then John says, "But it's an old commandment too."

[27:01] Whether the act of reason is commanded, right? Whether the act of the sense desire, that is, the emotions, right? Command you to be angry. I command you to be afraid. Command you to be sad. Command you to love me, and so on. Okay. And whether the act of the plant soul, right, the vegetable soul, right, grow. Yeah. It's a crazy state, you know. What man thinking about it can.

[27:40] I know I can't. And then with the acts of the exterior members, right? Command my arm, my leg, huh? Okay, so going to find out about command, huh?

[28:04] To the first one goes forward. Thus, it seems that to command is not an act of reason, but of the what? Will. For to command is to move something, right?

[28:26] But Avicenna says that fourfold is the what? Mover. The one perfecting the thing, the one disposing it to be perfected, the one commanding, right, and the one what giving counsel. They're all moving you in some way, right?

[28:51] But to the will it pertains to move all the other powers of the soul. This has been said above, huh? Therefore, to command is the act of the what? Will.

[29:11] Moreover, just as to be commanded pertains to that which is subject, so to command pertains or seems to pertain to that which is most what? Free, huh? So the free man commands the slave, right? But the root of liberty is most of all the will.

[29:39] I free to think that two is half of five. Aristotle speaks sometimes, you know, of the being chorused by the truth, you know. Sometimes even against your will Moreover, act follows at once upon command, right? But to the act of reason does not at once follow action, huh? For not the one who judges something to be done at once does that, huh? Not now yet, as Augustine says, right?

[30:28] Yeah. He's not the only one. I was waiting for someone to ask me, "What's your New Year resolution?" Right, and I say to say it with your spirit.

[30:52] Well, if priests were to say it in Latin, if everybody would think differently, he said, "Pax will be school whatever they say." Pax, Pax, September be school. Then they could say in Latin, and then they could transition back to English.

[31:10] Therefore, the command is not an act of reason, not because nothing follows, but of the will. But against this is what some Gregory says, right? And also the philosopher that the desiring power, right, obeys what reason. Therefore, it belongs to reason to what command?

[31:40] That's why I mentioned command, woman, right? Because reason commands. Now, what does Thomas answer? The answer, it should be said, that to command is an act of reason, but it presupposes, nevertheless, an act of what the will, right?

[32:03] Now, to the evidence of all this, huh? It should be considered that because the act of the will and of reason are able to be what.

[32:17] They help each other. Yeah, can be what causing each other, right? Insofar as reason, the reason is about willing, right? And the will wills to what reason? Yeah.

[32:35] It happens that the act of the what will is what preceded by the act of reason and the what reverse, huh? And because the power of the act before remains in the act following, it happens sometimes that what that there is somewhat act of the will, that what is an act of the will, according as it remains in what

[33:09] power is power. In it, something of the what? Yeah, yeah. I'm not pretending very good. It happens sometimes that there is some act of the will, according as there remains in power in it something of the act of reason, as has been said about use and about what choice, huh? Okay, so I mean, like the will chooses between these because reason has seen some reason why this is better than that.

[33:39] let's say, right. And e converso, there is some uh the act of reason, according as there remains in power in it something of the act of the what, the will. Right? That makes sense, right? Okay.

[34:00] But he says to command is essentially an act of reason, right? Because the one commanding orders that one to whom he commands to doing something, right? Huh? By intimating this or denunciando, how do you translate that? Denouncing it. Telling it the way it is.

[34:27] But thus to order by way of a certain what, intimation is a reason. That goes back to reason is the ability to look. before. and after right? So, insofar as commanding is ordering something, right? It's essentially an act of what? Reason, yeah. But reason is able to what? Intimate or to announce something. How do you translate "nuntiare in English translation? Intimating or declaring. Declaring, okay. Okay. I don't think it's denounced.

[35:05] That's not exactly a proper translation here. If you notice, warn, foretell, declare, intend. Declare, okay. In one way, absolutely, which intimation is expressed by a word of an indicative mode, as if someone says to someone, "This is what To be done. done by you, right? " Sometimes reason intimates something to someone by moving it to what? To this, huh? Okay. And such intimation is expressed by a word of the imperative mode.

[35:45] Well, named on the imperative mode, as one says to someone, "Do this, " right? Okay. Now, the first mover in the powers of the soul to the exercise of some act is the will, right? It's the mover. Since, therefore, the second mover does not move except in the power of the first mover, right? It follows that this very thing that the reason moves by commanding is from the power of the what?

[36:24] Once it remains that to command is an act of reason, but an act of reason that presupposes an act of the what? Will, right?

[36:35] In whose power, right? Reason moves through command to the exercise of an act. That makes sense, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that to command is not to move in just any way, but with a certain what? Intimation, I suppose. That's informing, right? Yeah. Which involves this use of what? Ordering, right? That's proper to reason, right? Which is of reason, right?

[37:17] To the second, it should be said that the root of liberty is the will as the subject of the liberty, right? But as a cause, it is what? Reason. That's why they have that word in Latin, "librium arbitrium," right? It implies that there is what? Yeah, and that reason has a kind of universality in its ability to judge, right? Because it knows good in general, right? Okay.

[37:49] So there's nothing in this life that can't be considered by reason as good or what bad, right? Because anything you might do is going to prevent you from doing something else, which might be good, and therefore in some way can be considered at least secundum quid as bad, right?

[38:12] Even murdering somebody who annoys you, you know, can be considered in some way good, right? Get rid of annoyance in your life, huh? So. you're free. of it. Yeah, Yeah. So he says the root of liberty is the will as a subject, but as a cause it is reason, right?

[38:34] From this the will can move freely to what? Yeah, because reason is able to have diverse conceptions of the good, right? If you talk to somebody about things, you can see this, right?

[38:50] And therefore philosophers define liberum arbitrium. Right? It's kind of. Arbitrium means judgment, right? Which is free judgment from what? Reason, right? As if reason is the cause of what? Liberty, right? That's why the other animals don't have any liberty, right? Not free judgment anyway.

[39:17] The third objection. It should be said that argument concludes that command is not an act of reason absolutely, but with a certain motion, huh? That is moved by the will, right?

[39:36] Now, what about the animals here, right? Being the dog, right? Yeah. Well, you see, the cat, you know, decides how you're going to live with the cat, right?

[39:53] You obey your cat, much more than you obey the dog. The dog is a lot more forgiving. The second one proceeds thus: it seems that to command belongs to brute what? Animals, huh?

[40:13] Because, according to Avicenna, the power commanding motion is what? The appetitive one, right? And the power carrying out the motion is in the muscles and in the what? Nerves, huh? But both power is in what? Brute animals, right?

[40:34] Therefore, command is found in the brute animals, right? It's not simply an act of the appetite, is it? Yeah. Involves reason, right? So I mean, if the command is an act of reason, how can it be in the beast, right?

[40:56] Moreover, it is of the the notion of a servant or slave that he be what? Commanded, right? But the body is compared to the soul as a servant to his what? Lord or master, right? As the philosopher says in the first book of the Politics. Therefore,

[41:25] to the body that is commanded by the soul, right? Even in brutes, right? Which are composed from soul and body, right? The soul commands the body, right? Huh?

[41:48] Moreover, through command, a man makes impetus. Got a funny way of speaking here. To a work, right? But impetus to some work, right, is found in brute animals, huh? As Damascene himself says. Therefore, in brute animals is found what? Command. But against all this, it's what we saw before in the first article that imperium, command, is an act of reason, right? But in brutes, there is not reason.

[42:25] Therefore, neither is there what? Command. I answer: It should be said that to command is nothing other than to order something. To what? Doing something. With a certain intimativa How do they translate intimativa Intimate, but a certain motion of intimation. Intimation. Indicating what the thing should be, right? But to order is a act of reason itself, right? See how good it is to know Shakespeare's definition, right?

[43:05] of reason, whence it is impossible that in in in brute animals, in whom there is no what reason, that there be in some way what command, huh? Okay, so the body of the article and the sed contra are almost the same, aren't they really huh The arguments aren't really the same. huh It's that the body is no more explicit. that's all. Okay.

[43:43] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the desiring power is said to command the motion, insofar as it moves reason commanding, right? But this is only in men.

[43:59] In brute animals, the desiring power is not properly speaking commanding, right? Unless what command is taken in a broad sense for the what mover, right?

[44:19] When I get up in the morning, I command my body to get up, right? Time to get up there. and start Reading Thomas there, and so say your prayers, But uh, the brute animals don't command themselves to get up, right?

[44:37] Now, what about the soul moving the body, right, commanding the body? To second, it should be said that in brute animals, the body, to be sure, has whence it obeys, right? But the soul doesn't have whence it commands, because it does not have whence it orders, right? Because that's proper to what reason. And therefore, there is not there the notion of command and commanded, but only of mover and moved, huh?

[45:12] So the dog moves himself to get up. He doesn't command himself to get up, right? Now, to the to the third, to third, it should be said that in another way is found the impetus to the doing of something in the brute animals and other in men, huh? For in men, men make this impetus to some work through the ordering of reason, right? Whence they have in themselves,

[45:52] whence the impetus has in them, right? The notion of a what? Command. Yeah, but in brutes there comes about impetus to work through the instinct of what? Nature, right? I'm watching the birds there in the trees there today, and it's just I was watching the squirrels. You know, by saying, I guess there's some birds stay around here the winter, right? Yeah, yeah, no one's you know flies south.

[46:17] Yeah, when we saw yesterday in Boston, who was that over there? Where I was in Boston, somewhere else, and there's a little park there. Whole flock of geese flew right over. Yeah. Oh, he's are they flying south for the winter? I said no, they stay here. Canada geese, yeah. Canada geese, they're around here. They're here year round. But like robins stay here, don't they? Robins do. Yeah, they some robins across the street.

[46:43] Blue jays, and chicken chickadees, and nuthatches crows, raven, crows starlings, which are rats with wings Some, somebody wishes Be nice, if the crows went south and didn't come back. Crows, Crows are nice. Those are lovely ravens and crows. Ravens fed Elijah and Saint Benedict. Don't complain. But in the brute's, animals, there comes about an impetus to some work through the instinct of what nature? Because their desire at once, when the what convenient or suitable thing is apprehended, or something unsuitable, right?

[47:22] They're naturally moved to pursuit or what? Flight. Flight. I guess that would explain then their, their migrations and everything. if all the conditions are right. they just go. Yeah.

[47:36] Once they are ordered by another to acting, right? But they do not order themselves to their action. And therefore, in them there's impetus, but not command. That's what Bob discovered. so many times. It's amazing. Father John Murray told us about the birds. Sometimes when they migrate, they track, you know, individual birds in various flocks. And sometimes from year to year, they not only stop in the same locations, they stop in the same tree, the same bird stops in the same branch every single year.

[48:08] Wow. Over a thousand miles. Over a thousand miles, and every stop is exactly what it was last year. Wow. That's kind of fascinating. I see in this one bush in the side of the house there, you know the cardinal. You know more than once. You know, and I wonder whether they come to that bush for some reason. I don't know what.

[48:32] It's a convenient lookout. Yeah. Once that hatch from this this little corner out back, they return back over there. Every year they nest there. Another generation is hatched there. They come back.

[48:49] Yeah. Okay. To the third one proceeds thus: it seems that use precedes what? Command, right? For command is an act of reason presupposing some act of the what? Will. as has been said above. But use is an act of the will, right? As has been said above. Therefore, use precedes what? Command, huh? Might be free of use, but I guess we're not. We can't quite get out that.

[49:29] Endless. Trance. Moreover, command is something of those things which are ordered to an end, right? But of those things which are towards an end is what? Use. That's more formal that argument, right? Therefore, it seems that use is before what? Command. Yeah. imperium. Command. Moreover, every act of a power moved by the will is called use, because the will uses the other powers. as has been said.

[50:11] But command is an act of reason in so far as it is moved by the will. Therefore, command is a certain what? Use. But the common is before the private, the proper. Therefore, use is before what? Imperium, huh?

[50:35] But against this is what Damascene says that the impetus to operation precedes what use? But the impetus to operation comes about through command. Therefore, command precedes what? Use. Well, I got

[50:58] to sort out this mess. Okay. The mind would be left in a mess, huh? Without Thomas to sort things out, huh? The answer should be said that use is of that which is what towards the end, according as in reason referring it in the end, right?

[51:26] Precedes what? It precedes choice, huh? As has been said above. Whence much more does it precede what? Command, huh? But the use of that which is towards the end. According as it is subject to the what executive power follows upon command,

[52:00] in that the use of the one what using it is joined with the act of the one who what which he uses it. For one does not use the what stick, I guess, before in some way he acts through the stick, huh? But command is not together with the act of which

[52:32] of that to which he commands, right? But naturally before is the command, then one obeys the command, and sometimes it is even before in what time. Hence, it is manifest that command is before what use.

[52:57] It seems to be saying though in some way it's still with there's a use this before command right insofar as you're using your reason right.

[53:10] To the first therefore it should be said that not every act of the will precedes this act of reason which is command, but some precedes to wit choice, right, and some follows to wit what use. Because after the determination of counsel, which is a judgment of reason, then the will what chooses, and after choice, reason commands that through which is done what is chosen, right? And then the will of someone begins to what use following out the command of what reason.

[53:56] Sometimes the will of what another when someone commands another, right? Sometimes the will of the one commanding when someone commands himself, right? It's going to get me hard to get out of bed tomorrow. I don't know all these things. What I do got to do first? Do it all the right. Make sure you do it the right order. Yeah. Have a nervous breakdown for you, Emperor. Yeah.

[54:32] Now to the second, it should be said that as acts are what in the way before powers, so objects before acts. That sounds like the thing in the dynamis right? We know that powers through the acts and the acts through the objects. But the object of use is that which is towards the end. From this, therefore, that command is towards the end, right? It should be more concluded that command is before the use, than that it be what after, huh?

[55:13] To the third, it should be said that the act of the will, using reason for commanding, precedes the command, right? There he has a use there preceding, right? Command. So it is able also to be said that this what use of the will precedes some command of reason, in that the acts of these powers reflect upon each other, right?

[55:47] Well, no, we should we should take a little break after that, huh? Treat ourselves a little break. We could use one, yes.