Prima Secundae
48. Aquinas on Command: Command and Its Act as One, and Commanding the Will, Reason and the Passions (ST I-II Q.17 a.4–7)
Class of 2012-01-05
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/048-aquinas-on-command-command-and-its-act-as-one-and-commanding/

[0:00] We have to article four here, huh? To the fourth one goes forward. Thus, huh? It seems that the act command is not one act with the what command, huh? Okay. For of diverse powers there are diverse acts, but of another power is the act commanded, and of another power the command itself, huh?

[0:34] Because other is the power which commands, and other the one to whom that is commanded. Let me say. Therefore, is not the same act commanded with the command, huh? Unless the reason is commanding the reason. Unless the reason is commanding the reason is reason. commanded each other. Okay. Moreover, whatever are able to be separated from each other are diverse, right? For nothing is separated from what itself.

[1:14] It can't be before or after. Can you be separated from yourself? See, soul can be separated from the body, right? Can't separate the soul from itself. But sometimes the act commanded is separated from the command. For sometimes there goes before a command, and it does not follow an act commanded. Therefore, another act is the command from the act commanded.

[1:48] Moreover, whatever have themselves by before and after are diverse, right? That's the axiom of before and after, right? Nothing is before or after itself, huh? But the command naturally precedes the act commanded, right? Therefore, they are diverse, huh? Okay. Obviously, Thomas is going to see some distinction that the objector has not seen, right?

[2:17] But against this is what the philosopher says: that where one is an account of another, there there is one only, right? Huh? But the commanded act is not except an account of the command. Therefore, they are what one.

[2:43] Well, I answer. Thomas says it should be said that nothing prevents some things from being secundum quid, right, in some perfect way many, and in some way one, right?

[3:02] Moreover, or besides this, all things that are many are in some sense what one. However, as Dionysius says in the last chapter the Divine Names, but there is nevertheless a difference to be noted in this: that whatever things are simply speaking many, right, and secundum quid one, right, right, and some things are the what reverse, right? Now that's kind of distinction that we meet in other things, right?

[3:40] Some things could be said to be simply good, but in some imperfect way, bad, and vice versa, right? For one, in this way is said just as what being, right? For being simply is substance, but being secundum quid is what accident huh, or also a being of reason, right? Being in some, not simply. Okay,

[4:23] so did I come to be today here in this room. What'd you say? Did I come to be? here? I came to be here, right? But did I come to be. Not something.

[4:41] Yeah, you have to add, right? See. If you get up, you will cease to be what. Yeah, I would say if you if you get up, you will cease to be sitting. You won't cease to be. I don't think. That was something strange.

[5:06] Therefore, whatever things are one by substance secundum substantia, are one what simply, right? In many secundum what quid? So I'm a geometer and I'm white and so on. So am I many, Some way I'm many, multiple, but simply I'm one, right?

[5:32] Just as the whole in the genus of substance, put together from its parts, right? Either its integral parts or its essential parts, body and soul, right? Integral parts,

[5:47] heart and lungs and so on, is one what simply, right? For the whole is one in substance simply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But whatever are diverse in substance, and one secundum accidens, are diverse simply, right? And one secundum quid. Just as many men are one people, right? And many stones are one pile, right? Which is a unity of putting together or of order, right?

[6:32] Likewise, many individuals who are one in genus or species are simply what many, right? And secundum quid unum, right? Because to be one in genus or species is to be one secundum rationem, right? So what are we here? We're one. Yeah, yeah, but we're not one simply, are we? Simply, we're many.

[7:05] But just as in the genus of natural things, some whole is put together from matter and form, as man, for example, from soul and body, who is one natural being, right? Huh? Even though he has a multitude of what parts. So also in human acts, the act of a lower power has itself, like matter, right, to the act of the what superior. In so far as the inferior power acts in virtue of the superior moving it, huh?

[7:43] Thus also the act of the mover, the first mover, has itself as a form to the act of the what instrument, huh? Whence it is clear that command and the act commanded are one human act, as some whole is what one, but according to their parts they are what many.

[8:22] So it's doing something for somebody loved. I'm doing something bad to somebody hate. Formally speaking, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that if the powers were diverse and not ordered to each other, right, huh?

[8:49] The acts of them would be simply what diverse, right? But when one power is moving another, then the acts of them are. In some way, what one? For the same is the act of the mover and the moved, as is said in the third book of the what physics? Huh. So when I'm hammering the nail, is the act of my hand and of my hammer? this one.

[9:21] quo modo he said right? If I'm kicking you, as, you're being kicked. Am I kicking you the same? Now, to the second, it should be said that from the fact that the command and the act Commanded can be separated from each other, right? You can have that they are many in their what parts. For the parts of man are able to be separated from them, right? When you die, your soul and body say goodbye for a while, anyway.

[10:15] Which nevertheless are one in the what? Hole. To the third, it should be said that nothing prevents, in those things which are much, are many in parts, and one in a whole, for one to be what before the other, just as the soul, in some ways, before the body, and the heart is before the other what members, huh? I thought that the heart was the first part generated, right?

[10:53] Yeah. the first is the heart and the eye the heart is the first thing to start, and the eyes are the last to be perfected. He says, but death is the other way around. The eyes are the first thing to go, and the heart is the last. And he uses that. He uses it very well. It's very interesting. I thought the something you wanted was not the heart.

[11:19] I thought it was the first. It's one of the one of the first things. Thomas is very strong about that, isn't he? Very interesting man. Now, whether the act of the will is commanded, right?

[11:41] To the fifth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the act of the will is not commanded. For Augustine says in the eighth book of the Confessions, the what soul commands that the what wills, but nevertheless it does what

[12:07] doesn't make it do that, right? Yeah. For to will is an act of what the will. Therefore, the act of the will is not commanded, right? Or

[12:29] to that it belongs to be commanded, to which it belongs to what? Understand the command. But the will is not of the will to understand the what command. For the will differs from the understanding of whom it belongs to understand. Therefore, the act of the will. Yeah. How can you command something that doesn't understand it? Here, but the command is. It

[13:01] could be a good argument. He's on his bed, there rolling and laughing. You know, just think him down to the centuries, people will be scratching their head at this one.

[13:23] Moreover, if some act of the wills commanded? For like reason, all would be what commanded. But if all acts of the will are commanded, it is necessary to proceed ad infinitum, because the act of the will precedes the act of reason. What commanding has been said? Which act of the will, if it again is commanded, that in command will again precede another act of the reason, right?

[13:53] And thus forever, but this is unsuitable and inconvenient that it proceed in infinitum. Therefore, the act of the will is not commanded. But against this can be said that everything that is in our power lies under our what command? But the acts of the will are most of all in our power. For all our acts are said to be what to that extent in our power, in so far as they are voluntary, right?

[14:32] Therefore, the act of the will wills are commanded by us. Let's see what the master says here. I answer: It should be said that this has been said. Command is nothing other than an act of reason ordering, right? But they should in motion, something to be done.

[14:59] Now it is manifest that reason is able to order about the act of the will. Just as is able to judge that it is good. is something to will. Yeah. It's

[15:14] good to will something, right? So is able to what order by commanding that man what will. From which it is clear that the act of the will is able to be commanded, right? So, to command the will to love God, or could it do that?

[15:52] To the first paragraph, it should be said that as Augustine says there, right in the Confessions. The soul, when it perfectly commands to itself that it will write, then already it what wills. But sometimes it commands and does not will. This happens from the fact that it does not perfectly what command. The imperfect command happens from this, that the reason from diverse parts is moved to commanding or not commanding, whence it fluctuates between two and does not perfectly what.

[16:35] Yeah. Well, someone asked Thomas what's necessary to be a saint? He. Says well, yeah, I want to be one. I mean, a lot of people could have that, but in kind of a distracted way, right? Yeah. Yeah, I want this, but I want that too. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's caused by what's the cause of that? The passions, or the poorly formed mind, or both. Ignorant. Ignorant. Pride.

[17:17] Pride. And a weakness, ignorance, malice, and then what's the other one? Just four conditions in the fall. Those are those three. I guess the cupidity is the other one. It's just excessive love of creatures, and then the weakness, ignorance, and malice.

[17:40] Think of it in terms of: we turn away from God the creatures because we love them too much. That's concupiscence. Then, if you turn away from God, whose power is the goodness, you end up being weak and malicious. Romeo takes poison, right? and he thinks that Juliet has died, right? Juliet stabs herself when she realized that Romeo has killed himself over her. That's loving her even too much.

[18:10] Yeah. Pretty simple. To the second second should be said that just as in our body members, each member acts not for itself alone, but for the whole body. Right? Because Saint Paul makes of that, right? That the eye sees for the whole body, right? Huh. So also it is in the powers of the what soul. For the understanding understands not only for itself, but for all the powers.

[19:01] That beautifully said. And the will wills not only for itself, but for all the what powers. And therefore, man commands to him for himself the act of the will, in so far as he is both understanding and what willing.

[19:33] Now, to the third, it should be said that since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded, which is what subject to reason. But the first act of the will is not from the what ordering of reason, but from the instinct of what nature or of. A higher cause, and therefore is not necessary that one proceed forever.

[20:32] So do I command myself to to will happiness, to desire happiness. I was just naturally moved, right? Do want happiness? The same way to know, I think, naturally moved. You know the truth because that's what I guess the but the desire to know the truth. Yeah, because St. Augustine says a man doesn't love the truth. He like, ask him if he likes to be deceived.

[21:05] Well, certain things I kind of like to deceive. There's a lot of self deception going on. You deceived yourself, right? Okay. To the sixth, then one proceeds thus. It seems that the act of reason is not able to be what commanded, right? For it is inconvenient. It seems not fitting. if. Something commands itself, but reason is what commands. As has been said above, it's an act of reason, right?

[21:48] Therefore, the act of reason is not what commanded. Moreover, that which is through what essence, essentially, is diverse from that which is by partaking. But the power whose act is commanded by reason is reason by what partaking, right? So Aristotle says the ethics there, right? The will and the emotions are commanded by reason, right? So they partake of reason, right? So there can be a reasonable love, right?

[22:27] But it's not an act of reason. It partakes of reason, right? Can be a reasonable anger, right? Our Lord gets angry once in a while, right? Okay, can be a reasonable fear.

[22:41] Fools rush in where angels fear to tread to tread. But therefore. Is not commanded, which is reason, what essentially, right? Okay. Moreover, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and to judge the true, which is an act of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore,

[23:18] not therefore is the act of reason able to be what commanded, right? I notice here in going back to the previous article in the footnote here, I remember Monsignor Dionne using this text, you know, where one member is a member of the other.

[23:55] Each member of the body, right, has its own act and virtue, right. In so far, therefore, as one member by its power and act benefits another, it is said in Romans twelve five, huh? It's a member of the other. I remember Dian using this text in class one time. Just as the foot is said to be a member of the eye, in so far as it carries the eye around, and the eye is said to be a member of the foot, in so far as it directs the foot, huh?

[24:27] Look up that in Romans chapter twelve. Actually, I think that's the text to use. You understand. So, but against this is that what we do by free judgment, right? Huh? We're able to do by our what command. But the act of reason, the act of reason, are exercised by free judgment. For Damascene says that by libero arbitrio, right, man searches out, yeah, and scrutinizes, right, and judges and disposes.

[25:14] Therefore, the act of reason able to be what commanded, huh? Well, he says, answer. It should be said that because reason reflects upon itself, just as it orders the acts of other powers, so is also able to order its own what act. Thomas calls you know logic the art of arts, right? Because reason is ordering its own acts, right? Huh? And from reason comes the ordering of all the other ones, huh?

[25:44] All the other arts, huh? So you know you learn how to drive a car, right? You're ordering the hands and the feet, and how to use them to stop and make it go and so on. it goes that way. But, whence also its own act can be what commanded, right? But it should be noted that the act of reason can be considered in two ways. In one way, as far as the exercise of the act itself, and thus the act of reason is always able to be commanded, right?

[26:22] Just as when it is indicated to someone that he pay attention, right, and uses reason. That's Shakespeare. Shakespeare's exhortation. In another way, as regards the object, with respect to which two acts of reason are to be noted, first that he grasps the truth about something, right, and this is not in our power, right, for this happens through the power of some light, either a natural light or a supernatural light.

[26:58] And as regards this thing, the act of reason is not in our power, nor can be what commanded. You turn off the light. Yeah. To say to self, you know, I command you to understand this. I tried to calculate this more. Yeah, yeah, yeah. What's the what? Those guys, those comics, there were. I said that. Did you think about it? Yeah, nothing happened.

[27:29] That's like that's like the modern world, right? Yeah. That's not what it really happened. Another act of reason is when to those things which it grasps, right, it ascends, right. Now, if they were such the things grasped to which the intellect what naturally ascends, right, as the first what beginnings, first principles, the ascent to such things or the descent from them is not in our power, but in the order of what nature, right.

[28:13] And therefore, properly speaking, nor are they subject to command. Quantity is equal to the same. We could to each other, right? I can't command myself to ascent to that. I naturally ascent to it.

[28:33] Um. There are, however, some things apprehended which do not, to that extent, right, convince the understanding, right, but that it is able to either ascent to them or to what Ascent to them. Or at least to suspend, assent or dissent on account of some cause. And in such things, assent or dissent is in our power and falls under what command? huh?

[29:09] Rome has spoken. To the first, therefore, it should be said that reason, in this way, commands itself, just as the will moves itself. Right. In so far as both powers reflect upon what their own act, and from one it tends towards another, from one act to another. Right.

[29:36] To the second, it should be said, on account of the diversity of the objects which are subject to the act of reason, nothing prevents reason from partaking of what itself. Right. Just as in the knowledge of the conclusion, the knowledge of the principles, premises are. Partaken, right?

[30:02] We know the effect. I know the cause and the effect. Yeah. So the conclusion partakes of the knowledge of the premises, right? And to the third is clear the response from what has been said.

[30:25] Okay, he admits in some cases, huh? It's not in the power, right? Because you can't help but know the thing, huh? Time for another article. Sure. Okay.

[30:37] Now, whether the acts of the sense desire can be commanded, right, huh? One time I was giving a talk there at the University of California, there, you know, and this guy comes up to me afterwards, right? He said, "I'd be frightened to get up and talk in front of a group," you know. I get talking to him. He had been a guy jumped out of airplanes. He'd done in the army or something.

[31:01] Why be afraid to jump out of an airplane? So sometimes a person is nervous about getting up and speaking or something, you know, and that's why people sometimes, you know, join these clubs where they, you know, should turn and talk the night's on in front of the the dinner thing and so on. But can you command yourself not to be afraid, right? To be nervous. Yeah, yeah.

[31:24] So this is the question, right? Or sometimes when people get angry, they can't seem to control their anger, right, huh? So can they command themselves to be? Milder. Can get angry about getting angry. As soon as

[31:47] I was driving up to Quebec one time, they had kind of a new car or something, and I was going up through Maine, you know, and they had the route to President Kennedy, right, huh? But the route to President Kennedy was no honor to President Kennedy because there's all kinds of potholes. So I was driving fairly, you know, slowly with this mad Frenchman behind me, you know, didn't like my sort of thing, so he speeds up like this, you know, and he picked up the rocks on the on the thing and bang against the side.

[32:11] Well, I knew there was going to be a nice thing there, you know, but they said, "I'm a philosopher. " What turns this thing, you know?

[32:23] So even the apostle, now no less a person than Saint Paul himself, who's by antonomasia, called the apostle, right? Romans seven. Not the good that I wish, this do I do, right? But the the bad. And the gloss expounds that man wishes not to lust, concupiscere, and nevertheless he does, right, huh? Okay. But concupiscere, its sense desire, is an act of the sensitive, desiring power. Therefore, the act of the sensitive, desiring power is not subject to our what command?

[33:05] We can boss all that, right? Moreover, bodily matter obeys God alone, right? As regards its formal transmutation or change, as is shown in the first book. But the act of the appetitive, sensitive, desiring power has a certain what formal transmutation of the body, namely, cold when you are hot and angry, and cold when you are afraid. I guess. Therefore, the act of the sensitive power is not subject to what human command.

[33:48] Can't command myself to be hot or cold, right? No. These days here. Moreover, the proper mover of the sense desire is something grasped by the senses or the imagination, right? But it's not always in our power that we apprehend something by sense or what imagination. Therefore, the act of the sense appetite is not subject to our command.

[34:21] Go enjoy yourself tonight. My mother's the one I always like. My mother told me to tell you I had a nice time. But against this is what Saint Gregory says, this is Nemesius, they say in the footnote, not Nyssa, that

[34:51] that obeying reason is divided into two, right? And this is the what they call in Latin the concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite, epithumia and thumos in Greek, and these pertain to the what sense appetite. Therefore, the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, right?

[35:21] So, I ask whether the dog is can be commanded by us, right? Not always. Sometimes the dog bites. I had the mailman. You know, the mailman used to carry these, you know, scrit thing, you know, to protect themselves from the dog, you know. There's quite a few dogs in those days, and they weren't chained up like they are now with all these laws. But even nowadays, you know, you get these dogs sometimes maul children and so even adults.

[35:52] I answer: It should be said that according to this, some act is subject to our command in so far as it is in our what power, right? And therefore, to understanding in what way the act of the sense-desiring power is subject to the command of reason, is necessary to consider in what way it is in our what power, right?

[36:21] Now it should be known that the sense appetite, and this differs from the intellectual appetite of the will, which is called the will, that the sense appetite is the power of a bodily what organ, not over the will, right? Aristotle talks about this being a power of a, is very premium to the anima. But every act of a power using a bodily what organ, depends not only on the power of the soul, but also on the disposition of the what bodily organ, right?

[36:59] Just as sight from the what seeing power and also the what quality of the eye, through which it is either aided or impeded. Hence, the act of the sense appetite not only depends upon the desiring power, but also on the disposition of the what body, right?

[37:25] But that which is on the side of the power of the soul follows apprehension, huh? Some grasping. But the apprehension of the imagination, since it is particular, is ruled by the apprehension of reason, which is universal, just as the particular act of power by universal act of power. And therefore, on this side, the act of the act, the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of what reason.

[38:00] But the quality and disposition of the body is not subject to the command of the reason. And therefore, on this side, is impeded some, but that sometimes the emotion of the sense desire is not wholly subject to the command of what reason. That must be why they jump in the in the in the bush, right? Benedict, huh?

[38:27] Oh, oh, Francis Benedict, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Because the body was not acting properly. Yeah, the body was not maybe subject to the to the to the will of reason, right? So they kind of changed disposition of the body and they jumped the needle in the yeah.

[38:50] No, I don't know if it is there any example of them jumping in the fire. I don't know. Man, the body. Joe, yeah. Do some other thing. It happens sometimes, right, that the motion of the sensitive what power or desireing power is what subito, I mean suddenly, I guess, huh? Consciently roused at the what grasping or apprehension of the imagination or the what sense, and then that motion is outside the command of reason, right?

[39:43] Although it would be able to be impeded by reason if it were what foreseen, right? Huh? Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the Politics that reason um uh oversees. the irascible not by despotic principality, uh which is of a lord to his servant, but of a political or royal principatu ruling, which is to what? Free. Yeah, and not totally subject to the what? Yeah, yeah.

[40:20] Aristotle says something like that about the father and the son too, right? Should the father rule the son as? Yeah, or as when he was a free man, right? You know, because a free man is not entirely subject, right? And something to say about this this thing, right?

[40:44] That's kind of the reason why they have the fine arts, you know, why good music, right? It's very important. You know, Aristotle talks about music at the end of the politics, right? Now, it's very important the kind of music you allow the kids to listen to, right? Remember, my cousin Don was in the the navy there, you know, and they still have the big base down there in Newport was it?

[41:06] And this when rock and roll was coming in, you know, they did be rioting and throwing these these collapsible chairs in. That's a pretty mean thing, you know, to get hit by one of those chairs flying. But they go wild with this music, right? You know, and

[41:25] so there's a certain kind of music, the music of the 18th century, like like Ostley points out in that essay towards the evaluation of music, right? The music of the Baroque period and Mozart, you know, they represent the emotions in a state that is in what harmony with reason, right? I notice myself, if you've been studying something like that, and and you know, some rock and roll, something comes in, just just totally contrary to your state of mind, right?

[41:55] But if you're tired, you know, philosophizing or reading theology and so on, put a little bit Mozart or something like that, you know, say it harmonizes, right? Because they're representing emotions in a reasonable state, right? And then your own emotions move in what harmony with that, right? If you listen to that kind of music.

[42:17] The Serf used to say to me, you know, you know, do you find you can control your emotions better listening to this kind of music, right? You know, this other stuff is really really perverse.

[42:34] He doesn't. He doesn't here at least he doesn't touch on why it is that some of these emotions are not subject to reason. Well, I mean, he's saying that they can be moved suddenly, right, by the senses, right? Ah. Without what reason for seeing it, right? Yeah. But I'm I'm. I'm thinking in terms of what

[43:05] in without the fall, yeah, would not even the first motion be subject to reason? Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's true. That's true. This is, I know Francis. He talks about the fall earlier in the first Prima Pars, but but the but the it's not necessary to go into that here, I suppose. But Francis de Sales often does that by way of counsel because people are often confused why they have certain emotion.

[43:31] You say, well, it's not it's not in your power to control that, but in your power to stop that from occurring. A fair example is that I guess the guy was waiting in line, you know, and the guy who's serving some people up front. He's very patient with those people in their complaints and so on. Find this guy got up to you know, and thought he'd come with the guy in his patience, right?

[43:53] And then the guy blew up. That's kind of funny, though, the way that something like that, you know, you know, if somebody is getting a little bit hot to him, he said, "Now keep calm," and then that that's like an insult, right? And then they're getting worse, you know.

[44:18] But some people are, you know, more quickly, you know, moved to anger than others, and and sometimes, you know, they they subsides more quickly too, you know. But I myself, I'm slowly moved to anger, but I think, you know, once it gets going, you know, I'm about to destroy you, you know. Other people, you know, it kind of blows over quickly, you know, and their self smiles, you know,

[44:44] like my my dad, one one time we kept interrupting my mom and I were talking, yeah, trying to interject something, we kept cutting him off like ten times at that. Finally, he goes, "Please, man, I got something to say." And we said, Okay, what? I forgot. And then he then he said he got over his anger real fast. He said, and it was vital.

[45:12] I was watching one of the football games there. I was a pro at the games, and the two guys really kept going. They were out there. No, no, that's none. They threw both out of the game. You know,

[45:22] the guy. What's he? What's he? Start you know, sluggy. You know, out of the game. That's it. They don't bother with eating That's one more hockey. than football Yeah, well, hockey is geared to this. But this is more the reality of hockey as far as bumping at people. So I mean, people come to see that, you know. Yeah, yeah. Hockey's ordered to that. They say the best of hockey is an Indian word that means "ouch" or something.

[45:44] But it's kind of funny, though, the Patriots, you know, watching the last two games because. The enemy started scoring first. I didn't even watch last Sunday. They're playing the Buffalo Bills, right? And the first quarter, you know, they kicked off, you know, to the Buffalo Bills to start the game, and they brought back and scored a touchdown, right? And then they came back and scored another touchdown, and they come beyond and scored another touchdown.

[46:13] So by the end of the first quarter, it was twenty-one to nothing with the Buffalo Bills. That's going to have to be on. Rosie gets nervous if it already was.

[46:23] But I'd seen the week before the same had happened, you know, and they were like way, way behind, you know. Of course, they it finally ended up the game and the final score was forty-nine to twenty-one,

[46:36] so they kept on, you know. So, so they're they're concerned about the defense, you know, the Patriots. So it's going to happen to them when they get to the playoffs, you know, for the thing, you know, because. They're slow starters, but it's kind of kind of funny. It's just twice in a row, you know. I haven't followed all the games. The last two games, the other guys were, you know, ahead by a good deal.

[46:57] And I think that the game before they did something. It's almost halftime, you know, before they scored. I think a field goal, twenty-eight to three, or something like that. They came back and won forty-eight to, you know. Wow. They just sit and say, "They don't score something for the halftime. They're going to lose this game. " Really? You know, you think they're going to, but maybe they can give them a little talk there, Pep talk for sure.

[47:22] Yeah. Their salaries are getting cut in half. Now, what about Saint Paul? I can defend the poor man? here. The first, therefore, it, should be said that this—that a man does not wishes not to desire sense desire, and nevertheless, does have sense desire, right? This happens from the disposition of the what body,

[47:54] to which is impeded the that the sense desire, lest it wholly follow the command of what reason, right? Whence the apostle there says, "I see another law in my members, right, repugnant to the law of my what mind, who is going to free me from this body?" As he says, right. Okay, and this happens on account of the sudden motion of concupiscence, as has been said, right?

[48:24] Okay, or it could be one of anger too, right? Sudden fear of Hector on the field there with Achilles, right? All of a sudden he starts to run, you know. This is terrible. The second should be said. That the quality, the bodily quality, has itself in two ways to the act of the sense desire, right? In one way as going before, right, preceding. In so far as someone is in some way disposed according to the body to this or that, what passion, right?

[49:15] In another way as what following, huh? Just as when from what anger, right, someone heats up, huh? incalescit, okay. Now the quality preceding is not subject to the command of what reason, right? Because it is either from nature or from some preceding what motion, huh? Which is not able at once to what come to a rest, huh? But the quality following follows the command of reason, huh?

[49:57] Because It follows the locomotion of the heart, which is moved in diverse ways according to the diverse acts of the sense. What appetite? Your heart expands or contracts or things. Of course, you know? They talk about the the white fear and the red fear. The red fear being shame, right? And Thomas explains, you know, the the blood comes out in your face and you get red, right?

[50:30] Because the evil here is outside, right? Other people are thinking this, you know. So your blood rushes out here, you know, you know, to to so as to drive away the disgrace in in other people's eyes, right? But if you're you're feared death, then your your blood contracts, you know, to your vital organs, you know, to protect you, you know, because your life is being threatened, you turn cold, you know.

[50:55] These jibbering people there in Homer, you know, about to be slain by the invincible warriors. Um. Now, to the third, should be said that because for the grasping of the sense, right, is required somewhat sensible thing exterior. It is not in our power to apprehend something by the sense unless the sensible thing itself is what present, and his presence is not always in our what power, right?

[51:38] Then a man is able to use his sense when he what, unless there be an impediment on the side of the organ, right? But the apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, according to the what mode of power or weakness of the imaginative power.

[52:04] That man is not able to imagine what reason considers happens either from this that they are what not imaginable, like you're trying to imagine what your soul's going to be like when it leaves your body, right? You can't imagine what it's going to be like, huh? Or an account of the weakness of the imaginative power, which is from some indisposition of the organ, right? You go into solid geometry from plain geometry.

[52:31] huh? Imagination up isn't up to the task. Okay, we better stop now? I guess, huh?