Prima Secundae
50. Aquinas, Summa I-II Q.18 a.2–4: Goodness and Badness from the Object, the Circumstances and the End
Class of 2012-01-19
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[0:00] Article 2 here. It seems the second one precedes this It seems that action does not have good or badness from the object, right? For the object of action is a what? Thing, huh? But in things there is not the bad, but in the use of them by sinners, right? As Augustine says in the third book of, yeah. Therefore, human action does not have goodness or badness from the object, right?

[0:46] That discussion in what is it? A fellow there, right? Huh? With the the lieutenant there, what he called of? A fellow gets drunk and causes a trouble, right? And then then he talks about what a curse, the wine is, and so on. And then Iago says, "well, it's a good thing, you know, if you use it in moderation." So

[1:16] some of you, you know, want to have prohibition, right? These things are evil, right? Moreover, the object is compared to the action as what? Matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from what the matter, but more from the form, which is an act. Therefore, good and bad are not an acts from the what object, huh?

[1:54] Moreover, the object of an active power is compared to the action as an effect to what? The cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend on the effect, but more the reverse. Therefore, human action does not have goodness or badness from the object, huh?

[2:23] Can you imagine being a debater? Somebody could rattle these objections off, you know. Right. Right. That little ear thing, you know. Yeah. But one of my favorite quotes here now from Osee I'm really fond of this guy. But against this is what is said in Osee. Chapter nine. They were made abominable just as the things which they loved, huh? I used to always quote that in class.

[2:54] So I say, if you love disgusting things, you are disgusting yourself. But man becomes abominable to God on account of the malice of his operation, right? But the malice of an operation is according to the evil objects which a man what loves, and therefore there is the same reason about the goodness also of an action.

[3:23] I answer: It should be said that, as has been said, the good and bad of action, just as of other things, should be noted from the fullness of what being or the defect of it.

[3:40] No, so more abstract, Thomas, in some ways than Aristotle is in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He talks about human acts. Now, what first seems to pertain to the fullness of being is that which gives what the species to the thing, right? Determines its nature, just as a excuse me a natural thing has its species from its what form, so an action has its species from its object, just as motion from its what.

[4:22] From its term. So my movement was to the monastery today, right? Yeah, there'll be a movement to my house. Okay, so it's not the same movement, is it? Huh? Because the term is not the same, right? What's the same rule? Yeah,

[4:57] I know where that thumb is going, man. And just as the first goodness of a natural thing is to be observed from its form, right, which gives its species, right, so also the first goodness of a moral act is to be observed from a suitable what object, ah, whence from some this is called good ex genere, right, from its genus, right,

[5:41] as to use what. His own thing. His own thing. Yeah. And just as in natural things, the first evil is that the thing generated does not achieve the what specific form.

[6:06] As if not a man is generated, but something in place of a man, right? Sounds like these modern experiments, right? Um. So the first evil in moral acts is that which is what, from the object, as to take what? Yeah. And this is said to be bad from its genus, huh? Genus taken for what? Species. In that way of speaking, in which we say that the what?

[6:44] Human race, people say, human genus. Yeah, the whole human what? Species. That's interesting. You can say genus when you mean species. Hmm. Well, I think about that the English word kind. What kind of thing that is, you know?

[7:17] I don't know if it's an example of that way of naming. You know, where you have a name set of two, right, and that's kept, but one is its own, and the other gets a new name, right?

[7:32] The species get the new name, right? It adds something to the genus. I'm not sure. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said, following Augustine, that although exterior things are in themselves good, right? Huh. Nevertheless, they do not always have a suitable what ratio or proportion to this or that action, right? And therefore, in so far as they are considered as objects of such actions, they do not have the what?

[8:14] Yeah. So I'm going to take your pen home. I think. Is it because I took home that is is bad my act? Not what you took home. No, I I took home your pen. Got asking for it.

[8:44] Pen is good. But here he's trying he's trying to maintain that it's bad from the object, right? Huh? Yeah. But the object there includes disproportionate such a wrong. Yeah, but your pen is not something I should take home.

[9:07] But if I had a pen, I'd give it to you. I only got a pencil. You know, I had met my brother Richard and his wife. You know, first moved to St. Paul again when he got a job at the at at the old alma mater, right? now. And there's staying at at the family house, but looking for an apartment, right? Well, they didn't have much money to to go to fancy apartments.

[9:28] So whenever they saw some apartment that looked, you know, halfway decent but you know, a good price, they drop everything and rush off, you know, huh? Leave me with the little little child that I had, and but they always brought one of our pens, right? And you know, and we're

[9:49] going into into a department store, what it was, and they run up run up run up some uh that was the wrong. Price price on the thing. and then they had to fill out a form. You know, I had to sign to get my money back, and so the pen that they gave me, to sign it, I put it in my pocket." So I'm thinking I'll go back in and get it off there, so I'll go to the forms.

[10:17] I don't know how many pins we lost. You know, people are always doing that. You know, that's one of the most common things. Huh?

[10:26] But the thing is not proportioned to my act, which is that of taking it home, right? Because it's your pen, right? Huh? It's not the sort of thing that I should take home. You know, so that's what he's saying, huh? You know, if you just take the pen by itself, you don't consider that it's your pen or your possession, right? Huh? You know, the pen in itself is not bad.

[10:47] I mean, it could be a good pen. It could write write well, right? The goodness of the pen as pen would be that it writes well, right? You know, but if you consider the fact that this pen is is your possession, right, then it's not an object suitable for to take home or put in my my pocket, right? But is the pen actually the object of the action?

[11:09] In other words, when we speak about the object of a moral act, can the object of a moral act be a physical thing? Well, he's saying here aliena. What does that mean there? You know, isn't that isn't that a a material object, right? Accipere aliena what does that mean Take something that belongs to another, right? But yeah, is the object of the taking of the thing that belongs to, another or the what you're saying in the reply to first objection, right?

[11:43] Although the exterior things are in themselves good, right? That's a good ballpoint pen. That's why I took it. Nevertheless, it does not always have a suitable what proportion to this or that action, right? So to the action of taking it home, right, it's not suitable for such an action. That's what that disproportion is repugnant to reason.

[12:10] Yeah, yeah, yeah. And therefore, he says, although in itself it's good, right? And therefore, insofar as they're considered as objects of such actions, they do not have what? Yeah.

[12:30] Because it's belonging to another belongs to that other, and that other is a physical thing, belongs to somebody else. Yeah, it's the same thing in in terms of let's say adultery, right? Huh? I'm not a woman. I mean, she's she's good in herself, right? You see, but but she's not didn't have proportion to my use, right? Okay.

[12:56] Yeah. To second, it should be said that the object is not matter from which, right? But matter about which, and it has in some way the notion of form in so far as it gives the what species, right? So how do you distinguish between, you know, geometry and arithmetic, right? Well, geometry is about lines and angles and figures, right? And arithmetic is about numbers, right? That's the matter circle.

[13:38] So it gives the what species of the science, right? Which is geometry or arithmetic, right? Theology is about God, right? He's pretty formal, but it specifies this this science, huh?

[13:59] Ethics is about human acts or something like this, right? Now to the third objection, it should be said that not always is the object of human action the object of an act of power, for the desiring power, right, is in some way what passive, yeah, in so far as it's moved by the what desirable, right, huh? And nevertheless, the desiring power is a principle beginning of human what acts, huh?

[14:44] Nor do the objects of active powers always have the notion of effect, but when they are what? Already in some way changed. Yeah, just as food changed is the effect of the what nourishing power, right, huh?

[15:06] But the food not yet changed is compared to the nourishing power as a matter about which it what operates, huh? From this that the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the end of its action, and consequently it gives to it form and species, right? For motion has its species from its what ends, huh? And although the goodness of the action is not caused from the goodness of the effect, nevertheless from this the action is said to be good that is able to induce a good what effect, huh?

[15:54] And thus the proportion of the action to the effect is the reason of its what goodness, huh? So if I love murder, the object of my love is what makes my love bad.

[16:45] I love the ugly. Okay. Article three. To the third one proceeds thus: It seems that an action is not good or bad from what circumstance, huh?

[17:21] So if you love God, we say that's good. If you love the devil, that's what bad, yeah. You love mayhem, that's bad, right? Okay. Now, what about circumstances? though? they're not the object, right?

[17:39] For circumstances stand around the act, right? As it were, existing outside of it, as has been said. But good and bad are in the things themselves, as is said in the sixth book of metaphysics. That's a famous text of Aristotle there, where he distinguishes between true and false, right? Where they are primarily in the mind, right, in the statements that the mind makes. Why good and bad are primarily in what things, right?

[18:08] That corresponds to that difference, you know. That knowing is getting the thing into the knower, and love is going out to the thing. So good and bad are in things.

[18:24] That's interesting, you know, in the Prima Pars, right? You take up the goodness of God and the truth of God. Where? You take up the goodness of God, right? In the in the excuse me in the treatment of the substance of God, right? Say before you've taken up the will of God, right? Okay. But he doesn't take up the truth of God. That God is truth itself.

[18:53] He's the first truth until after he's taken up what the understanding, right? That's very significant, right? Even though they're both transcendentals, as we say, right? Okay. But because the good is primarily in things, right? Then the goodness of God is attached to consideration of the perfection of the divine substance, huh? But the truth of uh that is I am truth itself. He tells us, right? But the truth of God and his being truth itself is taken up after you take up his what?

[19:28] Yeah, that's really very Aristotelian, right? Well, you can see why Thomas is doing that. That's really really profound the order that he has there. Now

[19:46] I was mentioning how how I was studying the the things on the angels there in the second part of the sentences, huh? I notice that Thomas there again. He takes up the angels first, then he takes up the material world, and then he takes up the soul. Right, the same order, right? And you had that same thing in in the in the songs, you know, where you are praising God, where you are praising with the higher things, and then the then the the earth, and so on, and then finally get men to praise.

[20:20] You know, he follows that same order that you have in the sentences, right? But you find in Scripture itself, it's beautiful, you know, beautiful. It prepares the way for understanding, you know, how how in a sense by becoming man he's bringing the whole creation back to him because man is a minor mundus, as he says it, right? The Greek philosophers even before Aristotle had seen that. I think was Democritus.

[20:45] That even follows the order it's created. Yeah. First, they created matter, then they created man. Yeah, yeah. I found that the order. I haven't resolved all the questions myself, but we speak of the vows: poverty, chastity, obedience. Sometimes we say obedience, poverty, chastity, poverty, which is basically the same order, but backward to forward. But then I discovered that John Paul and his Vita Consagrata talks about chastity first, and then poverty, and then obedience.

[21:20] Where do you get that? That's all mixed up. So then I went and looked at Vatican II. That's the order they treat it. And I was reading Francis de Sales, Treatise on the Love of God, and he treats it in that order too. What did I miss all these years? Why are they treated this order? Everybody says that's the order of the gospel. Christ talks about marriage first, chapter nineteen of Matthew.

[21:39] Then he talks about poverty, leave everything following, and the following him is kind of like that's the order of the gospel. Now, why Christ ordered it that way, I don't know. Maybe because chastity, the matter that is more known to adults, about might say it's the phenomenon of it. But like, see, in the so-called secular priest, you know, they take chastity, right? I mean, our priesthood does anyway, but they don't have poverty.

[22:05] They have kind of obedience, submission. They may be poor, but they have about the bench of the vow. The vow. I remember though that you know the priests that I knew, you know, for the College of St. Thomas, that they were diocesan priests, right? doing that thing, you know, but they used to joke about it because you know when they'd go off to one of these conferences, you know, the the monks, you know, would have this their their purse, you know.

[22:33] So they were better off than they were, you know, financially. These things, although they had taken them off, poverty, but they were given money by the abbot, whatever it is. And they're on the cheap salaries that we pay them. Docents and priests. It was a joke for them, you know. In Brazil the seminarians always sort of tell us you know the difference between. You and the religious are, and us.

[23:00] You take the vow of poverty, but we live it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. yeah. That in Brazil is true. Yeah, yeah. They say the same thing for obedience. They take the vow of obedience, but they live it. Yeah.

[23:26] That's a famous thing. It's very brief the text of Aristotle, you know, of course Thomas unfolded you know just what a master he is Moreover goodness and badness of an act are most of all considered in the doctrine of what morals. Morals, huh?

[23:53] I guess you have that broad sense of morum again. But circumstances, since there are certain what Accidensia, accidents of acts, seem to lie outside consideration of art, because no art considers that which is per accidens, right? As is said in the sixth book of the metaphysics,

[24:18] and therefore goodness and badness of action are not from what circumstances, Moreover, that which belongs to something, according to its substance, is not attributed to it through some accident. But good and bad belong to an action according to its very substance, because action, from its very genus, is able to be good or what bad, as has been said. Therefore, does not belong to action from circumstances that it be good or what bad.

[24:58] But according, but against all this is what the philosopher says, right? Who's he? You better know by now. De Koninck said, Aristotle is somebody, he said.

[25:21] True. Thomas says that Plato and Aristotle are the chief philosophers. for the Sophie No one can be a philosopher without knowing Plato and Aristotle since Albert the Great.

[25:39] But against this is what the philosopher says in the book of the Nicomachean Ethics, I suppose, that the virtuous man acts according as he ought, and when he ought, and according to the other circumstances.

[25:58] And contrariwise, the vicious man, right? According to one of the vices, huh? He acts when he ought not to, where he ought not to, and so in other circumstances, huh? Therefore, human acts, according to circumstances, are good or what bad, huh?

[26:19] Thomas says I answer that in natural things there is not found the whole fullness of perfection, which is owed to a thing from its what substantial form, right? Which gives a species, but much is added above this from the coming upon accidents, huh? As in man, from his what shape, figure, color, and things of the sort, huh? Of which is one if something is lacking to a what decent uh con condition, there. Follows something bad, right?

[27:03] So also an action, for the fullness of its goodness does not wholly consist in its what species, but something is added from those things which come as certain what accidents, and of this sort are suitable what circumstances. When something is lacking that is required for the suitable circumstances, the action will be what Bad, To the first therefore, it should be said that circumstances are outside the action in so far as they are not at the very essence of the action, but nevertheless they are in the action as certain what actions, accidents of it.

[27:52] So they are in the thing, right? Huh? And they might not be in the very essence of it. Just as accidents which are in natural substances are something outside their what essence,

[28:06] yeah. So they are in Rebus, right? My geometry is in Rebus, right? In things, in this thing here, yes, yes, yes. My logic and my geometry, right? They're in this thing over here. Okay.

[28:30] The second should be said that not all accidents have themselves per accidens to their subject, but some are what we call properties, or they call them per se accidentia, right? Which in each art are considered, right? Huh? Those are like the properties, huh? But notice the expression there, per se accidentia, right? Huh? I suppose accidentia could be taken, you know, and divided by per se accidentia and the other ones, and the per se accidentia given a new name sometimes that they're properties, right?

[29:05] And the other ones keep the name accidents, right? So you got to be aware of that kind of what equivocal by reason, huh? And they are considered in the chart, right? So the geometry shows that the interior angles of a triangle equal to right angles, right? This is a per se accidentia. and in this way are considered circumstances of acts in moral what doctrine, right? The

[29:56] third it should be said that since good is convertible with being, right? Just as being is said according to substance and according to accident, so also good is attributed to something, both according to its essential being and according to its what? Accidental being, both in natural things as well as in what? Moral actions. Same is true about the other division of being into act and ability, right?

[30:28] Act is good simply, but ability is good because it's capable of acting. It's ordered to it. Okay. So from the object you get more of the essential goodness or badness of the act, and from the circumstances, kind of a what? Accidental goodness, but nevertheless, per se, huh? Per se accident. Okay. You studied the various senses of per se, huh? Categories. To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that good and bad in human acts are not from the what end.

[31:20] For Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names that nothing looking towards the what evil or the bad acts right. In other words, everybody's acting for something good.

[31:36] Good is what all want. If, therefore, from the end is derived operation good or bad, then no action would be what bad, which is clearly what false.

[31:58] So, when I murdered you, I wanted to get rid of the annoyance in my life, right? So, I was aiming at something good. Therefore, it's good for me to have what murdered you, right? You know, they ask the bank robber, you know, why do you rob banks? Money's good. That's what the money is, he said. Obviously, that's the way he's thinking.

[32:24] Moreover, the goodness of an act is something existing in that thing, right? But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore, an act is not said to be good or bad according to the end, right? You see how he's kind of ordered these things, right? Because Article three there is about something that is an accident of the thing, right? And therefore, it seems to be in the thing, right?

[32:53] And therefore, has more reason to be thought to be what determining the goodness something about the goodness or badness of the act, or maybe increasing it or not, right? Decreasing it, and but the end that's even seems more extrinsic than the circumstances, right?

[33:15] Um. Moreover, it can happen that some good operation is ordered to a bad what end, just as when someone gives alms on account of inane glory, right? Sound a trumpet for you? You did. I don't if they actually did that or not. They say there's that way of speaking, you know.

[33:53] That's kind of what they do when they have fundraisers. They make a great big check and they hand it to the guy. They take pictures and see where getting sick What nice people! In a converso, some bad. Doing right can be ordered to a good end, as Robin Hood, who steals that he can give to the poor. He didn't steal from everybody, right? But these fat guys coming through, just like Obama.

[34:25] Therefore, not from the end is the action good or bad. I wonder if anybody's calling President Robin Hood. That's typical. I'd be cut away though, running the campaign, right? President Robin Hood steals

[34:47] from and gives to the poor. Chicago Hood. Yeah, that's more like it. Against this is what Boethius says in his Topics, right? That whose end is good, it also is good, right? And whose end is what bad, it also is what bad, huh?

[35:14] Thomas says, "Answer. It should be said that the same is the disposition of things in goodness and in what being. Now there are some things whose being does not depend upon what another, and in these it's enough to consider their being what absolutely, right? But some things there are whose being depends from another or upon another. Whence it's necessary that be considered by the consideration of the cause of which it depends.

[36:02] Now, just as the being of a thing depends upon both the agent and the form, so also the goodness of a thing depends also upon the what end. Whence, in the divine persons, who do not have what a goodness depending upon other, there is not considered any what reason of goodness from the what end.

[36:34] That argument they have there, you know, sometimes about the Trinity, you know, where some people argue, you know, well, why do you need three persons? Right, one person is sufficient, enough, right? And it's kind of applying the principle of simplicity, you know, that we have in natural philosophy to God, right? Huh? But Thomas will say, you know, well,

[37:00] that principle of simplicity says what that's my goal, right? And you don't use more than is necessary to reach the goal, right? But this is not to reach some goal that there. are three persons in the best of Trinity, right? You know, that you you need three of them, you know, to reach some goal, right? It's kind of a what natural necessity, right? The father generates the son, right?

[37:27] He doesn't choose to. It's not by his will. This would be a good thing to do. Yeah. And they don't choose to to have that Holy Spirit proceed from them, right?

[37:41] Okay. So human acts and other things whose, another things whose goodness. Depends upon another, right? Have the reason of their goodness from the end for which they depend. There's more water here, yes. I have a coffee. But human acts and other things whose goodness depends upon another have some reason of their goodness from the end for which they depend, right?

[38:46] In addition or besides the absolute goodness which exists in them. Thus, therefore, in human acts, a fourfold what goodness is able to be considered.

[39:06] One by their what genus, in so far as it is a what action. Because as much action has of being, right? So much it has of goodness as has been said, huh? Another, according to its what species, which is taken according to a suitable what object. Third, according to circumstances, as according to some what accidents. Fourth, according to the end, as it were, according to its relation to the what cause of goodness.

[39:53] So there is a fourfold goodness to be considered in human act. The generic there, the acting action. Its species coming from its what? Object. Its accidents, right? Circumstances, and its what? Dependence upon a cause, right? Goodness, huh? The genus is speaking of whether or not it's a good or bad action. Is that what? What a quality? No, he's talking about it simply as an action, right? Huh?

[40:39] As some kind of being. Something that exists. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So I mean, the outside of the realm of morals, right? Well, it's it's some goodness, though, nevertheless, huh? Because he's talking about a fourfold division of them, huh?

[41:03] That kind of takes into account the 2 3 and.4 and something beyond that. Okay. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said, in answer to this objection from Dionysius, that the good to which someone looking operates is not always a true good, huh? But sometimes it is a true good, and sometimes it's an apparent good, right? And it's Aristotle says too, right?

[41:39] And according to this, from an end can follow a what? Yeah. And blow these people up, you know, it's going all the time over there in Afghanistan and Iraq, still, and so on, up fifty people the other day, and

[41:59] get those Christians at their Christmas thing, and so on, terrible things. But Christ says that you know they'll persecute you, thinking they're doing honor to God, right? Yeah. That is a thing to do, that right? How he wants them to do this. So here you is that to the first Jewish concept of God. You thought you were serving God. Yeah. Yeah.

[42:35] The second should be said that although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless a suitable what? Proportion. To the end, in relation to it, right, inheres in the action, right, huh? It's fitted to suit an end, huh?

[43:01] To the third, huh? Was the third objection again? That was something more particularly. No good after bad. Oh, oh, yeah. Okay. Yeah. To the third, should be said that nothing prevents an action having one of the four said goodnesses, those four that he distinguished, right? But to be lacking another one, right? And according to this, it can happen that an action which is good, according to its species, right, or according to its what?

[43:33] Circumstances, right, can be ordered to a bad what? End. And a converso, right, where a what bad act can be ordered to a good end, right? Okay.

[43:52] That was a question, moral question, coming up the other day about the the assassination of that nuclear scientist there in in Iran, right? They blew up

[44:06] on him, you know. Somebody somebody can buy in with a with a magnet bomb or. Stuck it on his car as he was going to work and blew up him. And was that moral? Be it justified or not? See. Stop the war from cooperation. Milk your balls. Yeah. Yeah. It's got these moral questions. They're very. They're very difficult.

[44:32] So nothing prevents an action from having one of the four said goodnesses, but to be lacking another, right? And according to this, can happen an action which is good in its species or according to circumstances is ordered to a bad end and the reverse, right? A good act, and a bad act, and a good end.

[44:56] Not, however, is an action good simply unless what? All goodness. Run together, yeah. Because any individual defect causes the bad, but the good is caused from an integral cause, right? Now, that's what's very hard to good, right? Many ways to go wrong. As Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names.