Prima Secundae
52. Summa I-II Q.18 a.7–9: Species from the End and from the Object; Indifferent Acts in Species and in the Individual
Class of 2012-01-26
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[0:00] Seventh one proceeds thus. I don't know if Thomas has that, you know. The part they say whether the species which is from the end is contained under the species which is from the object as under a genus or the reverse. Did Thomas actually write that? or they stick that in, you know. See, when I read the Summa Contra Gentiles, you got a little heading at the tenth chapter.

[0:24] I don't know if that's really Thomas. I don't think it is, but sometimes it's not exactly right, you know. But but. You know, sometimes you find it. I find they don't correspond very well. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think it's a editorial license, you know. So sometimes I almost skip it and go right to the the uh, to the seventh one proceeds thus, right? Yeah, yeah. And the same idea, you know they they print the answer to the question on in bold there, So you don't have to read the whole thing.

[0:58] Oh, that's the- they have that in your edition. Yeah, yeah, in my edition. we had that one. We had that one English Conclusion Oh, conclusion. Oh that's that well, that's yeah, that's the Marietti yeah, Yeah, We had we had that one in English translation. Somebody wrote yes or no in the margin.

[1:15] Yes, no, yes, no. Just give me the answer. Just give me the answer. Don't be around the point, you know. The cliff notes. The seventh one proceeds thus. It seems that the species of goodness which is from the end is contained under the species of goodness which is from the object, as a species is under a what genus, huh? As when someone wishes to steal that he might give what alms.

[2:02] Robin Hood, Robin Hood, yeah. The corrupted grandchildren, Robin Hood series that they made in the early days. Yeah, just kind of a lot of fun, though.

[2:13] But they're always waylaying somebody coming through the forest, you know, some rich merchant or official of some sort, and, they take so much, you know, they give them a meal, you know. So they're okay, you know. And it's something about the you have to allow the poets and the royalty, right? huh? I know the ones where the guy wants to marry the girl, the English comedies, and you know they kinda you know w where they feel and they're gonna play that, And he sends it to another girl, right?

[2:49] He ends up marrying the ugly girl rather than the beautiful girl, but is he really married? You know, he's getting married, but but for the sake of the play, you got to accept it, right? And and the way the other actor says about the guy who's now end up this. homely girl, rather than one, you know, he's trying to get, he's trying to get between me and heaven.

[3:10] He says, huh? And and the, you know, divine providence. or it was, you know, seemed to put a purgatory. in between Well, you gotta accept that, you know, that he really is married to this holy girl. You know, that's strictly speaking possible, you know. And some people get very upset about, you know, Hamlet's reasons for not killing the king, right? When he has an opportunity to do right, he knows.

[3:39] him. And say that, you know, he's kind of you know, trying to repent in a sense, you know, get him in a time when he's drinking and living it up and so on, and then you know, they'll kick his heels in heaven. You know, go down to Yeah. What a monster Homer I mean, uh, Hamlet is, Yeah. But you have to kind of, you know, take that a little bit.

[3:59] uh... Grain of salt. Yeah, yeah. If you want to have Hamlet be a monster? you know, It's the, he wants to damn somebody, but that's the. The seventh one proceeds thus: It seems that the species of goodness which is from the end is contained under the species of good which is from the object as a species under genus. Okay, that's right. As when someone wants to what steal that he could give what also, for the acts have their species from the object as has been said.

[4:43] But it's impossible that something be contained in some other species, right? Which is not contained under its what proper species, because the same thing cannot be in diverse species, non subalternis. So I can be in the in the species what man, and species of living body called animal, species of body called living body, and species of substance called body, right? But there are what one is under the other, right?

[5:18] Okay. Same to students from Monday last night. There, you know, uh, where I was speaking of the definition as having what a genus and differences, right? So why is genus singular, and differences plural, right? Like in the definition of square as an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, you have one genus quadrilateral, and two differences: they're equilateral and right-angled. Why can you have many differences but not many genera in the definition?

[6:01] Yeah, I mean, it would be superfluous if you had one genus above the other, right? To say that a dog is is a quadruped and he's an animal and he's, you know. But so if they're not one under the other, then you really have what two things, right? Okay. Well, the differences don't make it to be two things, right? But they make distinct, right? What's left indetermined in the genus, huh?

[6:28] Okay. So it seems like like something like that. It's impossible that something be contained in another species, which is not contained under its own species, because the same thing is not able to be in diverse species that one which is not under the other, right?

[6:52] Therefore, the species which is from the end must be contained under the species which is from the object. So this guy was a logician among other things, this Thomas, huh?

[7:10] My favorite book there the Summa Contra Gentiles You know, Thomas taught me something about the predicables, right, huh? Because he argues that no name is said univocally of God and creatures. One of the arguments he gives there is that no name is said of God and creatures as a genus or as a species or as a difference or a property or an accident, right? And what he's pointing out there is that that distinction of those five by Porphyry, right?

[7:40] It's really a distinction of names said univocally of many things, huh? And it has to be exhaustive if they're going to be good, right? Huh? So he's teaching me something that Porphyry neglected to point out. So I said to Monsignor Dionne, I said, he should have said that Porphyry. He says yes. But Thomas you know, oftentimes, you know, even in those books we don't have a commentary from Thomas in logic.

[8:10] All he commented on was the Posterior Analytics, right? And and incomplete there in the Peri Hermeneias, right? But you you see things that illuminate, you know, logic, huh? You have to kind of you know go through Thomas's works and find things.

[8:30] So moreover, always the last difference, huh? Ultima difference constitutes the what most special species, huh? And it can't be divided anymore. But the difference which is from the end seems to be after the difference which is from the object, because the end has the notion of what is last, right? Therefore, the species which is from the end is contained under the species which is from the what object, just as a species specialissima, right?

[9:11] Okay. So it seems to be making it more particular, right? I am giving alms, right? Well, what are you giving alms for? Then you specify it more further. I'm giving alms to praise God or something, right? Okay.

[9:34] I'm giving alms to relieve my neighbor, right? huh? Okay. Or relieve my conscience. That's called restitution. right? I was reading in the Cantina Oria there in Matthew there. Where Christ is saying, you know, don't you know, you know, give some some alms, right? You don't tell him to think. And but he gives the thing about alms before he gives the thing about prayer, right? And then he prays, let's go into your room and so on, pray.

[10:18] And one of the fathers says that that's because you have to be good in your deeds, right? By giving alms before you can be good in your prayers, right? So it's kind of interesting. He gives kind of a reason for that in order, you know.

[10:42] Interesting things, yeah. Okay. Moreover, the more some difference is what more formal, the more it is special or particular, right? Why? Because the difference is compared to the genus, the form to matter, as Porphyry says, right? That's a go game, but it's as Aristotle said beforehand, right?

[11:13] And therefore, the difference in the genus forms something one, just like form and matter do. But the species which is from the end is more formal than that which is from the what object, right? We saw that because it tied up with the more the act of the will itself, the interior act. Therefore, the species which is from the end is contained under the species which is from the object, just as the species most special or particular, right, is under the subalternate genus, huh?

[11:51] But against all this, of any genus there are determined differences, huh? But acts of the same species on the side of the what object are able to be ordered to what infinity of different ends, huh?

[12:10] Yes, theft to infinity of goods or evils, right? Therefore, the species which is from the end is not contained under the species which is from the object, as under a what genus, huh? Because of the infinity of those things, huh?

[12:35] Well, that's what Thomas makes sense out of all this stuff, you know. We certainly can't, huh? Anyone that can figure out this theory by myself? I wonder, if you are willing to learn from those who already know something, right? You know, it's better to discover something by yourself than to learn from another, right? It's any more worthy of honor and praise, right? But if I tried to serve all these theories by myself, how far would I get in my life?

[13:07] You know, I wouldn't get too far. Wouldn't get very far. Yeah, yeah. So if you, you know, I remember, you know, this. I know it's in even high school. You know, get interested in philosophy. You know, my friend here, Rodney, there wanted to do his own philosophy. You know, but he didn't get very far with his own philosophy. You know, that's fine. I mean, you're going to go be Aristotle or Thomas, and somebody says, you know, but you know, that's that's.

[13:40] This is kind of you know the attitude people have. You know, you read I read descriptions of people in their so-called introduction to philosophy course. You know, and you get these these things in the mail all the time. You know, professor, you know, for ancient philosophy, and it's you know the business of professor the introduction to philosophy is to get everybody started on their own philosophy, but to not

[14:01] communicate some body of doctrine, you know, that it's going to force down their throats. That's kind of that's kind of a commonplace, you know, in the academic world. But

[14:18] when the great Plato said, you know, he thanked what gods? The gods were three things. He was born a Greek and not a barbarian, right? He was born a man and not a woman, and that he had met what Socrates, right?

[14:38] Aristotle, you know, put up a plaque, you know, to the memory of Plato. You know, this is the first man who showed both by word and deed that the virtuous life is a happy life, right? Other men had done one or the other, right? But he had done both, by the life he led, right? But also by his dialogues and so on, that the virtuous life is a happy life, huh?

[15:05] But what a beautiful testimony to to his master there. Aristotle spent almost twenty years in school. Plato there, right? And Christian left because Plato died. You know, he was Plato the last part of his life. But

[15:24] Saint Alphonsus often says to the ones he's writing for, he says, "How grateful we should be for having been born after Christianity." Yeah, yeah. And he actually compares it to the barbarians that lived in I mean the Americas in the New World. He said, "Those poor slobs over there, they were not born with this with the other way."

[15:51] I answer, he says, "It should be said that the object of the exterior act." Can have itself in two ways to the end of the what will

[16:07] in one way as per se ordered to it just as to fight well is per se ordered to what victory right in war there's no substitute for victories in MacArthur

[16:26] in another way per accidens right just as to take another's thing per accidens is ordered to giving what alms yeah okay now it's necessary as the philosopher says in the seventh book of wisdom there that the differences dividing some genus and constituting a species of that genus right is necessary that they what per se divide that

[17:03] if our per accidens huh then the division does not proceed what rightly huh as if one said of animals one is rational and another is what irrational right

[17:23] and then of irrational animals one is has wings I guess huh and the other is unwinged winged and not winged are not per se determinative of that which is what irrational okay

[17:44] now remember there when Aristotle divides up some philosophy there looking philosophy in the sixth book of wisdom partly in the second book of the physics right um how does he divide this huh to make the division be what per se not per accidens right huh Well in some way Thomas' explanation at the beginning of his commentary in the physics is very clear right huh he says

[18:18] what you're dividing here is the knowledge of reason that is certain right huh so something has to be what taken out of matter to get into the mind right huh and it's got to be what necessary right to have certitude right and so that's the way you're going to have to divide the sciences right by their diverse what immateriality right huh and so you get a division that is actually what per se and not what per accidens you know it's a very very subtle thing though right to see that huh okay

[19:04] But notice in this example here, winged and not winged are not what two ways of being irrational, right? But now he takes another example here, a very simple example Aristotle uses. It is necessary to divide thus of animals. Some have feet, others do not have feet, right? And then of those having feet, some have two, some four, right? Because that's a division that is what per se of what having feet, right?

[19:34] Why winged is not a way of being irrational? because birds are kind of irrational. Sometimes you know, birds get kind of you know reputation of being kind of bird brain. I mean it's not a

[19:55] compliment. I don't think What are you speaking? But that's the point. he's trying to emphasize. there, huh? For these per se, right? Determine a prior what? Difference, right? Huh? Okay.

[20:16] So you know, when Euclid defines, you know, plane figure and then plane figure, right? And then what they call rectilineal plane figure, right, And then you get, you know, triangle, which is often called the trilateral, right? The quadrilateral, the pentagon, then kind of per se, right? of rectilineal, right? because rectilineal means what? Contained by straight lines, and then well, by three lines or four lines or five lines, or you can see that that's like the one here with feet, you know.

[20:51] Okay. So do you see that? What are you saying there, right? Thus, therefore, when the object is not per se ordered to the end, huh? That's an example of the stealing, right? The specific difference, which is from the object, huh? Is not per se determinative, determining of that which is from the end, nor diverse, huh? Okay. Robbing right? Is an example of this, right? Okay.

[21:41] Whence one of these species is not under the what other, right? Huh? But then the moral act is under two species, as the word disparate, huh? Whence, huh?

[21:59] Whence we say that the one who steals that he might what commit adultery commits two evils, huh? In one act, huh? Okay. So the man who's, I guess, the reason why they're they're, I saw the Nathanson, yeah, I think it was an interview with Nathanson, right? And they're talking about this abortion, I guess. Um, he was pretty

[22:34] lucrative, huh? Committing these abortions, right? And this is probably the reason why men went into this, huh? He's talking about how when a man gets out of medical school, how he has all these debts, you know, and the idea is to get established as quickly as possible and start taking some money and paying this back. But he said it's very hard to get your practice, you know, well established, right?

[22:59] You know how sometimes you know a younger doctor will buy the practice of an older doctor, you know, and kind of move in there and. And get these people, so abortion seems like a quick way to make money and pay off your your debts, right? So you might say there's, you know, there's avarice here, you know, there's several evil acts, right? There are several kinds of badness in the same what act, okay?

[23:27] It's murder, and it's it's also an act of avarice, right? Seeking money, you know, where it's not appropriate to seek it and so on,

[23:37] okay? But if the object is per se ordered to the end, one of the what said differences is per se determinative of the other, whence one of these species is contained under the what other, right? Now it remains to be considered which under what, okay?

[24:08] To the evidence of which first it ought to be considered that the more some difference is taken from a form, more what particular, the more it is what specific, right?

[24:26] Secondly, that the more an agent is more what universal, to that extent the more from it is the form more what universal, huh? Third, that the more some end is what posterior, the more it corresponds to a more universal what agent, just as victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end intended by the highest leader, right?

[25:04] But the ordering of this what army regiment, yeah, or that is the end intended by one of the lower leaders, right? And from these it falls follows that the specific difference, which is from the end, is more what general, and the difference which is from the object per se ordered to such an end is more specific with respect to it, right? So the will, whose own object is the end, is the universal mover of respect to all the powers of soul, whose proper objects are the objects of what, yeah?

[25:50] So he's saying that the what the the the end is giving him more of the what the genus, right? And the object of the act, he what particular, right? Okay.

[26:27] So God is the cause of what being is being, we say, right? More universal, and he's the last in things, right? So that's going to be something more universal, right? Okay. Just same right here.

[26:52] Now, how about the first objection here? Putting something in in two different species, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that by its own substance, something is not able to be in what two species, one of which is not ordered under the other, right? Okay.

[27:19] But according to those what things that come to a thing, right? Something can be contained under diverse what species, huh? Just as this what apple, by its color, is contained under this species of white, huh? Under the flesh of the apple. Oh, I see.

[27:47] Yeah. And according to its odor, right, smell, under this species of what is smells well, right? Yeah. Sure. Okay. You have a smell apple cider. Well, cider not apples. Well, where does cider come from?

[28:07] Why is it not making you get it? What from apples? You're distinguishing a solid from a liquid. The liquids in the solid. And likewise, the act which, in its substance, is in one species of nature, right? Like, like the reproductive act they gave as an example for, according to the moral conditions, what super, coming upon it, right? Can refer to what two different species, right? Huh? So one is adultery, right, and the other is the marital act, right?

[28:38] Okay. Now, to the second, it should be said that the end is after in what carrying out, but it's first in the intention of reason, huh? By which one takes these species of what moralia, huh?

[29:06] Now to the third objection, that the difference is compared to the genus as form to matter, in so far as it makes the genus enact.

[29:21] But also the genus is considered as more formal than the what species, according as it is more absolute and less what contracted. Whence the parts of the definition are reduced to the genus of what formal cause, as is said in the book of physics. And according to this, the genus is the formal cause of species, and to that extent, it's more formal as being more what common.

[30:01] There's a lot to be thought about there. Get article eight here now. In question 18 to the 8th one proceeds thus: It seems that there is not any act that's indifferent in its what species.

[30:30] For the bad is the privation or lack of the good, according to Augustine. But lack and habit are opposed immediately, huh? Down the middle, according to the philosopher.

[30:49] Therefore, there is not some act which, in its species, is indifferent, as were being in middle between good and bad, right? When you think of privation, like say, like blindness, right? You have sight or you're blind, right? You seem to be, you know, you hear or you're deaf, right? Okay.

[31:15] Moreover, human acts have their species from the end or the object, as has been said, huh? But every object and every end has the notion of good or bad. Therefore, every human act in its species is either good or what bad, huh? None, therefore, is indifferent in its what species, huh?

[31:48] Moreover, it's either in accordance with the reason, or it's not in accordance the reason, right? Moreover, as has been said, an act is called good which has the suitable or the owed perfection of goodness, huh? Bad, which to which something of this is lacking or failing. But it is necessary that every act either has the whole fullness of its goodness or something is what lacking, huh? Therefore, necessarily every act in its species is either good or bad, and none indifferent.

[32:29] But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the Sermon of Our Lord on the Mountain, huh? That there some facta are media, right, huh? Which are able with a good or a bad soul to come about, about which it is what dangerous to judge, huh?

[32:55] Why did the building fall down? Judge, unless I'm mistaken, Augustine says there are therefore some acts which, in their species, are indifferent, huh? Well, I answer. Thomas says that as has been said, every act has its species from its object, and a human act, which is called a moral act, has its species from the object related to the beginning of human acts, which is nothing other than reason.

[33:31] Whence, if the object of the act includes something that is suitable to the order of reason, the act will be good in its species, as to give what alms to the needy. If, however, includes something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it will be a bad act in its species, as to steal, which is taking another's the alien that belongs to another. Now it happens that the object of an act does not include something pertaining to the order of reason, as to lift up a what, A what, Straw, straw from the earth, to go to the field, field, I guess, and things of this sort.

[34:27] And such acts, in their species, are what indifferent huh I'm going to use an example. Another place to scratch your beard. Well, of course, that might not be a human act. That right.

[34:45] He's considering acts universally, right? Not this particular act, right? Because if it's going to be a particular act, there's going to be a reason why you're doing it. You're going to add something that's going to make it good or bad. Maybe just come out and apply this here. But anyway, now to the first, therefore, should be said that twofold is privation, right?

[35:14] And one consists in what in being lacking or what, right? And this leaves nothing, right, but takes away the whole, as blindness totally takes away sight, and darkness light, and death life.

[35:40] And between such a lack and the opposite having, there cannot be some middle about the what thing that is the proper one susceptible of these.

[35:56] But there is another privation which consists in privari, whatever that means, privari. As sickness is a what depriving of Health. You know, of health. Not that the whole of health is taken away, right? But it's as were a certain way to the total taking away of what health, right? Which comes about through death. And therefore, such a lack, when it leaves something, right, or since it leaves something, is not always immediate with its what opposite habit, right?

[36:41] And in this way, bad is the lack of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the book of the Categories, because it does not take away the whole good, right? But it leaves what something that is good. huh? Whence is able to be some middle between good and what bad. How

[37:20] strange he says that, because even to be a little sick is kind of bad. Even to be a little sick is is bad, isn't it? I'm thinking my mother's hearing. She can't hear very well. She hardly. She's almost deaf. Yeah. But not quite. Yeah. Oh. So I mean, sometimes it. Sometimes I can't talk to her on the phone. I think she doesn't know how to. Because her dementia, she gets confused.

[37:47] Like one thing hurts, she thinks her hearing aids are in. All right. She thinks they're on, they're off. She thinks the batteries are good, but they're not. So sometimes I talk to her on the phone. Everything I say to her, I can't understand what she's saying. And then she says, "There's no point in talking."

[38:04] I wouldn't consider that any different. Yeah. It's kind of fun to answer this question. Do you think in the moral life it's either according to reason or not for the reason? It's going to be one or the other, or you can just not, or if you don't consider it as it's related to reason, then are you not the species of morals anymore? Aren't you talking about the acts in the species of nature rather than the species of law?

[38:55] We're going to watch and see you picking up these straws. Yeah. They're all game there to get straws in there, huh? Yeah. No, that's that's um. Let's put that on the shelf there. Puzzle that yeah Yeah you picked the puzzle that, yeah. Yeah.

[39:15] There's something between, you know, a full privation, right, and and the having. how that solves the problem is not altogether clear. Now, to the second one, to the second, it should be said that every object or end has some goodness or what, badness, at least what, the one that has by nature, right.

[39:48] But not always does it imply some goodness or badness, moral goodness or badness, which is considered in comparison to reason, huh? And about this, now one is treating, right? So you whistle something? Whistle too? Whistle while you work? Is that morally good or bad, whistling? Whistling, yeah. Depends on why you're doing it. my grandchildren say, "No whistling in the house now." They've been taught. No whistling Good. That's good.

[40:58] Third objection. To third, it should be said that not whatever an act has pertains to its what species. Whence, although in the notion of its species are not contained whatever pertains to the what fullness of its goodness, right? Not on account of this is it from its species what bad, nor also what good. Just as man in his species is neither what virtuous nor vicious, huh?

[41:45] Child, I suppose, huh? But nothing virtuous or vicious, huh? Well, at least you got Thomas's position. on the subject, how we understood it. So is it indifferent whether you have your your main meal at noontime like you guys do, and or in the evening like I do? No. it's not different.

[42:26] Obviously better than. Yeah, it's it's good, in comparison to having it in the evening is better. Would that be considered by Thomas indifferent? I wonder. Maybe so. I'm just thinking. Well, there are certain customs that you choose, right? Are they moral? Are they I mean, th they're moral I don't think it's moral acts, but I would think of them. Is it good? More than good to have a new meal, your main mail Or if you speak, you speak French or or or or English, or is that is that uh...

[43:15] Morally good? Yeah, I mean, is it? Well, if I start speaking French to him, so that he can't understand. But maybe that's good because you snub him. No, no, if you do it because you have national secrets, and I am a terrorist. Well, when we went down, we go down to on the bus down to the March for Life, right? We see the rosary, right? One rosary, and then coming back, we see another rosary, right?

[43:43] So the the new priest in the parish there was from Poland, right now. So he said, "Does anybody you know speak Spanish, right? " And somebody you know suddenly spoke Spanish, right? New Spanish. Anybody French or something in French, right? So on. And so they said one decade in English, and then they said one in Spanish. They say one in French, and then

[44:12] we got a woman who is from Hungary originally. So they said one decade in Hungary, first part, and then and then Father Marcin said, "you know, in Polish, one decade." So I don't know how he did this. So you saw kind of the universality of the church, right? So they just said the first part of the Hail Mary, everyone was dancing, and the second part in English.

[44:36] Oh, I see. But one person, one you know, kids there speaking Spanish, right? And then one gave it in French, one gave it in Hungarian, one gave it in English, one gave it in in Polish at the end there. So, was that different? You know. Can't you pray?

[45:03] I say some prayers in Latin and some prayers in in English, you know. Most of them in English, but say some in Latin. What's the meaning of English Say some English Latin. Now, this is what you're talking about this next act

[45:36] here, right? Whether some act is indifferent in the individual right Let me clear up our confusion here, right? Up to Article 9 here. Because the first one was whether some act is indifferent secundum suam speciem, right? According to its species, right?

[45:52] And now whether some act is indifferent secundum individuum, right? In the individual act. What the first objection says: there is no species which, under itself, does not contain, or is not able to contain, some individual. But some act is indifferent in its what species? Therefore, some individual act can be indifferent. But Thomas is going to take the other side? These all mixed up. Moreover, from individual acts there are caused habits that are conformed to them, as is said in the second book of the Ethics.

[46:41] But some habit is indifferent. For the philosopher says in the fourth book of the Ethics about some, as about what? What the complacent or something? Yeah. Like was that peaceful or tranquil or something? It's it's the translation is that those who are of an even temper and probable disposition are not evil.

[47:10] And nevertheless, it stands that they are not good, since they receive from what virtue. And thus they are indifferent in habit. Therefore, some individual acts are indifferent. Moreover,

[47:26] the moral good pertains to virtue, moral evil to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man, an act which is from its species indifferent, right, does not order to any end either of what vice or virtue. Therefore, it happens for some individual act to be what indifferent. huh? I mean, that's unconscious, as we'd say, right? Huh? Okay.

[47:57] Well, there we go. But again, this is what Gregory says, huh? In a certain homily, huh? In one of the Gospels. Otiosum verbum, an idle word, right? Huh? We're going to be punished for all these idle words. Is what is what lacking, right? The usefulness of rectitude. Either by reason of some what, just necessity or some pious usefulness,

[48:31] but about an idle word, but an idle word is is bad because about it, men must render a reason on the day of what judgment, huh? Chattering classes as they call. it.

[48:47] If however, it does not lack the reason of what, just necessity or some pious usefulness, it is good, right? Therefore, every word is either good or what bad, huh? For a like reason, therefore, any other act is either good or bad. Therefore, no individual act is what indifferent, huh? Huh So we have distinction? I told you that time. Think about John Paul II again. What he said to President of Assumption College.

[49:25] I told you that joke. Huh? Huh? He said, "Hagen, President Hagen, the former president, who's a you know gentleman waiting to Paul Pontifical, and he came out after one of these big ceremonies. " And he says to Hagen, "John Paul II, do you tell Polish jokes at your school? "

[49:53] No, no, no. The public are smiling. They don't tell them around here much anymore either. I was just saying you really have a sense of humor, the guy, huh? What a marvelous thing! See, a college president, right? Yeah, yeah. Ever since your election your, Holiness, they've been forbidden. I answer it

[50:32] should be said that it happens sometimes that some act to be indifferent in its what species, huh? Which nevertheless is good or bad considered in the what individual, and this because a moral act, as has been said, not only has goodness from the object from which it has what its species, huh? But also from circumstances, right? Those trusty, those you know, those trusty circumstances, yeah. Just sitting around and and and cause all this trouble, yeah.

[51:16] Which are as it were what some accidentia, like accidents, that's what they call circumstances. Just as something belongs to an individual man according to his individual accidents, right? That does not belong to man by reason of his what species, right? Okay. So when you descend to the individual man, then you get something that what belongs to him, but not to man in general, right?

[51:51] And there, and is necessary that each individual act has some circumstance through which or by which it is drawn either to the what good or bad, at least from the side of the intention of the end, right? So what was John Paul II's end in mind? Discomfit the educated, sort Yeah.

[52:25] Maybe it's just to relax the president, huh? Yeah Maybe just the opposite. That would have been my intention. Make the guy squeamish, uncomfortable, make him sweat. Since, however, it is racionis est ordinare, right? That sounds like Shakespeare, right? The act, what proceeding by reason,

[52:53] deliberative, right? Proceeding, if it is not ordered to a suitable end, is from this very fact repugnant to what reason, and has a notion of what bad.

[53:08] So, is this question important to us? Debitum, suitable end. If, however, it is ordered to a suitable end, it what comes together with the order of what reason. Once it has the notion of what good, good.

[53:33] Now, it's necessary? however, that it be either ordered or not ordered to a suitable end, right? Whence every act of man proceeding from what deliberative reason, right? Huh? Considered in the individual is either good or what bad. Augustine said this before Thomas, right?

[53:59] Um, but if it does not proceed from reason deliberating, but from a certain imagination, as when some Yeah Yeah see This is a beard I knew it was coming up or moves his his his hand or his foot, right? Huh? Okay, that's why people you know how you know if you hum a melody or something like that, someone will pick it up automatically, you know. You know, without even thinking about it, said my wife.

[54:28] You're humming Mozart. I am. I play Mozart's works around the house. you know She's gone to pick it up." soon Without knowing it, she picks up, and I find her. your humming or whistling is maybe one of Mozart's things you know, I reckon it's right she didn't recognize that it is. 227. Such an act is not, properly speaking, right, moral or human, right? It's not human when you, when you, when you, yeah, yeah.

[54:59] Okay. Since it does not have what, yeah, I mean, for reason, yeah, and thus it will be indifferent as it were outside the genus of moral acts. It's a distinction he's making. Huh? It makes sense, huh? We'll take that as. As explaining the the uh trouble we had in previous. Yeah, yeah. It's interesting that he takes the end as a circumstance, because early on he says that the moral act is one act, and it derives its substance from both the object and the end.

[55:37] So the object and the end make up substance of the act. Now he's taking the end as a circumstance, which is accidental, accidental, as outside. Yeah. You know what I'm saying? Yeah. Yeah. So why does he say the end is a circumstance? Well, it's outside the the substance of the act in some way, right? The end is the extrinsic cause. The end is the mover and the end are extrinsic causes.

[56:07] But when he said, you know, when I give give alms for the sake of vain glory, when he asked earlier, is that one act or two acts? He says, no, that's one moral act. Considered. When he says when I give alms for the sake of vain glory, he said that's one act.

[56:27] So giving the alms, which derives species from the object and the vain glory, which is the end, it seems to belong to the substance of the act. Yeah, but he said even before that, the circumstance can be changed into it, what? Yeah. Something essential. Yeah. Yeah. If it changed that from being good to bad or something like that. Yeah. Yeah,

[56:59] that would be. It's like when you're speaking to an audience and so on. You see somebody kind of smiling, you know, you wonder what are they smiling about.

[57:19] The uh... Remember Brother Mark tells the story. that he's over at the other professor's house there, you know, huh? And the kids are watching on TV Batman, right, huh? And there, there is not not the big bat, but the kids' Batman, kind of, you know. And the the lines that they say are directed to make the adults laugh, right? But the kids passes them right by, right?

[57:49] Yeah. And so they're kind of watching it, you know, with the kids there in front of it, and they're kind of, you know, chuckling, you know, and so on. Stop the nitcher on, you know. Thank you, Mark. you're making fun of our feet you know.

[57:59] I know. I began to appreciate that when I was in high school. I started to appreciate that Batman was much more intelligent, than the program, The original TV show. Yeah. There was a lot of humor. in it Yeah, yeah. That the kids didn't get it. Yeah. It's addressed to both, right? You know. Like Mozart said, you know, about some of his music, you know, only a true connoisseur can appreciate it.

[58:21] It was written in such a way that everybody will like it, right? It becomes a double audience, right? Same way Scripture is in some ways, right?

[58:32] I think Thomas's, you know, appeals to all audiences the way Scripture does. That was a fellow I know. Sam Rosen. he's a physician. He's from he's from Lebanon, but he knows he's a physician. He knows speaks English all the time. He's been in this country for many, many years. speaks perfect English, understands. And he said, you know, because I was talking about something Saint Thomas said. He says, Father, you got to understand.

[58:57] I bought Saint Thomas's Summa Theology in English. I can read English, and I read those words. I don't know what the heck he's talking about. I don't know what he's talking. about They're simple words. I don't get it. Now I have to decide now. to. See what I'm going to have them read the Summa Contra Gentiles stuff I just did, or the Gospel of Saint John, you know, it's all that.

[59:23] I should give him one of those autographed, manuscripts of Thomas. It looks like Arabic. Yeah, it's all crazy. Yeah, it's like Ratzinger's handwriting. Oh really? Oh, he's got crazy handwriting. He just signs. They have some some things that he wrote down. No autograph. it means what he wrote, is right. He wrote it himself Autograph. Oh. He himself, wrote it. But it's, it's a, he can sign in photos.

[59:53] At the release of the second edition of the Summa. Saint Thomas at Barnes Noble. Bookseller. Starbucks, you get a free coffee. Okay, so let's look at the reply to objections, now. Mm-hmm.

[1:00:13] To the first, therefore, it should be said that some act is what to be indifferent according to its species. This can be in many ways, right? In one way, thus that from its species is owed to it that it be what indifferent, right? And thus proceeds what reason.

[1:00:41] But nevertheless, in this way, no act from its species is what indifferent. For there is not any object of what a human act that cannot be ordered either to something good or to bad through the end. Yeah, Another way it can be what Called indifferent. From its species because it does not have from its species that it be good or what bad, right? Whence, through something else, it can come to to be good or bad.

[1:01:18] Just as man does not have from his own what species that he be white or black, but nevertheless he has from his species. Nor nor does he have from his species that he be not white or black.

[1:01:40] For whiteness or blackness can come upon a man in another way than from the principles of species that make him to be a man.

[1:01:52] The second should be said that the philosopher calls that bad properly, which is harmful to what other men. It's kind of like we do sometimes. And according to this, he says to be what Prodigal means to be prodigal. to be very generous with your money, right? It's not bad because it harms nobody else except the man himself, right? He's too generous, right? And likewise about all other things which are not harmful to one's what neighbors, huh?

[1:02:32] Okay. But we here call bad in common all everything that is what repugnant to right reason, right? And according to this, every individual act that's deliberative, right, is either good or what bad.

[1:02:55] And the third, it should be said, that every end intended by deliberating reason pertains to the good of some virtue, or to the bad of some what Vice Vice, huh? for this that someone what acts orderly to the sustaining or the rest of his body um is ordered to the good of virtue in the one who orders his body to what, And the same in others. When Thomas gets down to talk about uh eutrapelia right?

[1:03:41] Easily turning, right? Mhm It's the one that's concerned with with humorous humorous things and so on. And then he quotes John supposed to say, this Apostle John, you know, about you know the if you don't relax sometimes the you're gonna break it, you know. Mhm So even there can be ordered to the good, huh? But most of the time, I suppose it's not, huh? Yeah. So should we stop now before she stops Yeah.