Prima Secundae
55. Aquinas on the Will and Erring Conscience (ST I-II q.19 aa.5-7): Must We Follow Mistaken Reason, and Does Intention Make the Will Good?
Class of 2012-02-16
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/055-aquinas-on-the-will-and-erring-conscience-st-i-ii-q-19-aa/

[0:01] Name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios gracias.

[0:13] God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand how that you are written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. So I guess you're up to Article Five. Is that where we are?

[0:38] Yes. To the fifth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that a will that what doesn't agree with reason when it's in error is not what bad, huh?

[0:59] For reason is the rule of the human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law. But reason making a mistake or erring is not derived from the what eternal law. Therefore, reason in error is not the rule of the what human will. Therefore, that is not a bad will that departs from reason. There we go. It's a nice little to think about, huh?

[1:38] Moreover, according to Augustine, the precept of a lower power does not obligate us if it is contrary to the precept precept of a superior power, just as if the proconsul orders something that the emperor prohibits, right? But reason erring sometimes proposes something that is against the precept of the superior to with God, of whom is the highest power. Therefore, the dictate of reason erring does not obligate us.

[2:20] Therefore, it is not a what bad will if it departs from reason what erring, reason discord with. Moreover, every bad will is reduced to some species or particular kind of malice, but reason disagreeing from reason erring cannot be reduced to some species of wickedness. For example, reason erring errs in this that it says what why not to commit fornication, right? The will who does not wish to fornicate cannot be reduced to any what evil, right?

[3:08] What evils can reduce that too? You don't want to do that. Therefore, the will discording or being in discord from reason, mistaken, is not what bad, huh?

[3:24] But against this, as has been said in the first part, conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to some act. But knowledge is in reason. Reason, therefore, which is discordant from a reason that is in error, is against what conscience. But every such what will is bad, huh? For it is said in Romans fourteen, everything that is not from what faith is a sin. That is everything that is against conscience.

[4:05] Don't know exactly how I get that out of there, but anyway. Therefore, the will in discord from reason erring is what bad, huh? Okay, what's your Thomas says here now on the response, huh? Difficult question there. I answered should be said that since conscience is in some way the dictate of reason, for it is, as we have said, a certain what applying of knowledge to an act, huh?

[4:42] The same it's the same thing to ask whether the will in discord from reason in error is bad as to ask whether conscience that is in mistaken obligates us, right, huh?

[5:01] About which some distinguish three genera of acts, huh? Some which are good in their kind, huh, in the genus. Some that are what indifferent, and some that are bad for. from their very what genus, yeah. They say therefore that if reason or conscience says that something should be done that is good in its own kind, there is not there any what error.

[5:39] Likewise, it says something should not be done that is bad from its own what genus. For for the same reason, good things are what commanded, by which bad things are what prohibited, huh? But if reason is or conscience says to something, to someone, that those things which are in themselves bad, a man is held to what, to do from command or from precept, or that those things which are in themselves good are what, prohibited, it will be a reason or conscience that is in what, error.

[6:24] And likewise, if reason or conscience says to someone that that which is in itself indifferent, as to what, raise up a straw, it's easy as every example of this, from the earth, that that is what prohibited, or a precept, reason or conscience in this case will be in what, error.

[6:53] They say therefore that reason or conscience in error about indifferent things, with their commanding them or prohibiting them, obligates us, right? Huh. Also, that will in discord from such a reason in error is bad and a sin. But reason or conscience erring by commanding those things which are per se bad, or prohibiting those things which are per se good and necessary for salvation, does not obligate. Whence, in such cases, the will in discord from reason or conscience in error is not bad.

[7:42] But this is unreasonably said, huh? This is irrational, Thomas says. For in indifferent things, the will in discord from reason or conscience in error is bad in some way on account of the object,

[8:06] from which the goodness or badness of the will depends. Not, however, on account of the object in its what, nature, but according as per accidens it is grasped by reason as bad for doing or what, avoiding.

[8:34] And because the object of the will is that which is proposed by reason, as has been said in the previous article, from this that something is proposed by reason as bad, the will, when it is what, carried into that object, takes on the notion of what, yeah, as opposed to reason, right, which the will should follow.

[9:01] Now this happens not only in indifferent things, but also in things that are per se good or per se bad. For not only that which is indifferent can take on the notion of being or the aspect of being good or bad per accidens, but also that which is good can be taken as what having the aspect of bad, or that which is bad, the what good good on account of the way that reason grasps it.

[9:38] For example, to abstain from fornication is a certain good. Nevertheless, in this good, the reason is not what carried, except according as it is what proposed by reason.

[10:00] If Therefore, is proposed as bad by reason and error, then the will is carried towards it under the aspect of what bad. Whence the will will be bad because it wills something what Bad. Not that it is bad per se, but that it is bad what Per accidens on account of the way that reason has grasped it.

[10:33] And likewise, to believe in Christ is per se good and necessary for salvation. But the will is not carried into this except according as it is proposed by what reason. Whence, if is proposed by reason as something bad, the will is carried towards it as something bad, not because it is bad in itself, but because it is bad per accidens from the what grasping of reason. And therefore, the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics that per se, speaking per se, the incontinent man is the one who does not what follow right reason.

[11:30] Per accidens, however, is incontinent who does not follow also what false reason. Whence it should be said simpliciter that every will in disagreement with from reason, whether reason is what correct or in error, is always what.

[11:58] So does that shock you or scandalize you, huh? Yeah. Incredible. You're saying it's parachutons, huh? That is bad, but it is bad because you're not what following reason, right?

[12:20] Just like Aristotle says, right? The bad for man is to be not in accordance with reason, huh? So he says to reply now to the first objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the judgment of reason in error, although it is not derived from God, right? Huh. Nevertheless, reason in error proposes its judgment as true, and consequently proposes it as being derived from God, huh?

[13:00] From whom is all what truth? And then he gives the what? apply to the objection of Augustine. He says to the second, it should be said Augustine's saying you can't what. Shouldn't follow the command of the lower when it's in what opposition to that of the higher.

[13:30] But you have to know that this is so, right? Okay. To the second, therefore, it should be said that the word of Augustine has place when it is known that the lower power commands something against the precept of the higher power, right? But if one falsely, right, believed that the precept of the proconsul was in fact the command of the what emperor, right? In in condemning the precept of the proconsul, one would condemn the what?

[14:04] Precept of the emperor. The emperor, yeah. Likewise, if someone knows that human reason dictates something against the precept of God, he would not be what held to following reason, right? He knows now that reason is in opposition to God, right? But then reason would not be entirely in error, right?

[14:36] But when reason in error proposes something as a precept of God, then it is the what same thing to condemn the what? dictate of reason and the precept of God, right? Okay.

[14:59] Of course, a person may be in the position there of what? He should know this against the law of God, right? Huh? And that would change things again, right? huh?

[15:12] Who could know it but doesn't? Yeah. But certainly if he should have known it, right? Huh? He had not informed himself, right? Huh? Okay. I didn't know it was against God's law to murder somebody. But you should have known that, right? Huh? You know.

[15:47] But if you could say that reason was in position of not what? Not knowing what. Yeah. Or thinking that what he thinks is what God wants. Yeah. Like you have some terrorists who might, might think they're doing the will of God. Now, you got to wait for the Article Six here to, you know, clear up some of your lurking doubts about this teaching, huh? Okay. Okay.

[16:31] Now, to the third, it should be said that reason, when it grasps something as bad, always grasps it under some what reason for being bad, right? That it is contrary to divine precept, or because it's a scandal, and a kind of something else. And then, to such a species of badness, is reduced such a bad will, right? Huh?

[16:57] Thomas follows up with Article Six now, right? Huh? Okay. Okay. And this is is cited. To the sixth. One proceeds thus. It seems that the will, in agreement with reason, error, erring is what good. That's what you might think that he's saying in the previous article, right? Huh?

[17:26] He's saying no. In the previous article, he's saying that reason what? Agreeing. Going against, huh? I mean, excuse me. The will going against reason and error, right? Is bad, right? Huh? Now he's asking reason agreeing, right? Excuse me. With the will going along with, right? A reason and error, right? Is that good, right? I think that's that follows from what he said before, right? No, we didn't see what the master says, huh?

[18:05] I'm hoping that hearing confession, you're trying to figure out this. thing Just a minute. Did you think it was bad? To bring the Curé d'Ars in here, right? To know how to hear these things. I

[18:28] saw the place there where the Curé d'Ars heard great confessions, isn't it? Yeah. And you know, there was a different place for men and women, right? The men was just like there's a chair, there's a little a little piece of wood, you like that, you know? It's not really a box, didn't you know? But for the ladies, there's there's a little you know going to the box and so on, like we used to do, you know.

[18:50] But for the men, you just kind of come up and sit, sit down next to him. Yeah. Yeah. Picked up one of his little things there, but it was more on the faith, you know, rather than on the confession, you know. People would come from all over Europe, you know, to go to his confession. He had to build new railroad tracks, right? Trains to take people in there to ours.

[19:22] You would start at one in the morning or something. A long time. Well, Padre Pio did a long time the confession too. He spent a long time in the confession. Padre Pio.

[19:40] I remember Father Baumgartner there at the Saint Paul Seminary. He's a pretty good philosopher, you know. Sometimes I would teach a subject, didn't know the answer, he'd call Father Baumgartner on the phone, and so he said, "You are the see Father Baumgartner, you know." And so, and I remember Father Baumgartner there talking to his friend, Father Dulac, you know. Oh, I got to hear the nuns' confessions this weekend.

[20:04] I guess a lot of these nuns were kind of scrupulous, you know, and they didn't drive you crazy in the confession. I had nothing an experience, but just the way they talked, it always would turn, you know.

[20:20] I did it last week. Yeah, yeah. Okay. So, to sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that the will in agreement with reason and error is good, huh?

[20:42] For just as the will in discord, huh, with reason, huh, tends to that which reason judges to be what bad, right? So also the will, agree with reason, tends towards that which reason judges to be good. But the will in discord from reason, even erring, is bad, right? Therefore, the will agreeing with reason, even erring, is good, huh? That's what you would think, right? There it is.

[21:17] Yeah. Oh, why isn't that so? Okay. Moreover, the will in agreement with the precept of God and the eternal law always is good. But the eternal law and the precept of God is proposed to us through the grasping of reason, even that of reason in what Error. Therefore, the will in agreement with reason and error is good.

[21:57] Moreover, the will being in discord from reason, erring, is what bad, huh? If therefore the will agreeing with reason and error is also bad, it seems that every will of one having a reason and error is bad. Either way, you're caught. If you object to it, you're that's bad. You sin the previous article, right? And now if you go along with it. You don't say that's you say that's bad too.

[22:35] Then you you closed all doors here for me, right? My gosh. And thus, such a man is what perplexed, huh? Baffled, right? You might say, and of necessity he sins, right? Which is unfitting, right? That yet in that in that composition, huh? Therefore, the will in accord with reason and error must be good, right? So you all convinced now?

[23:14] I won't let you out of the room until you see the what the master says. And but against this, he takes his example. The will of those killing the apostles was what bad, bad. But nevertheless, it agreed with reason. What in error of them, right? According to that, John chapter sixteen, verse two. There comes an hour. There will come an hour that every one who kills you will think that he renders what service to God, right?

[23:53] Sacrament, huh? Therefore, the will in accord with reason, and error can be in fact what bad, right? So what about Saint Paul? You know, he was before he's converted, right? Was he doing something bad or not? But he acted ignorance, he says, right? Huh? But this all together, excusing himself as saying, "I didn't do anything bad." I don't think he says that. No, there is some reason for to have mercy on him, right?

[24:38] So he says, "I answer. It should be said that just as the foregoing question is the same as with that question by which it is asked whether an erroneous mistaken conscience binds, right? "

[24:58] So also this question could be said to be the same with that by which is sought or asked whether an erroneous conscience what excuses one, right?

[25:13] What is the erroneous conscience of the great Saint Paul there before he was Saint Paul? Saint, did that excuse what he's doing, right? Well, Thomas says this question depends on that which has been said above about ignorance, huh?

[25:34] Now, what is that? What is said above that ignorance, quandoque, sometimes, huh, causes the involuntary. Sometimes it does not cause the involuntary, huh? And because good and bad, moral good or bad, consists in an act, in so far as it's voluntary,

[26:06] it is manifest that that ignorance which causes something to be involuntary takes away the notion of what, good or bad, moral good or bad. Not, however, that ignorance which does not cause the involuntary, right?

[26:28] Now it has been said above that the ignorance which is in some way willed, right? Whether it be willed directly, right, or indirectly, does not cause the what? Involuntary. Involuntary, right?

[26:58] Now sometimes you're talking about morality there, and the young people don't hear it. You don't want to hear this, do you? Because it's on the spot, right? Huh? As they say, no, I don't hear it. Then they're kind of saying that they're what, choosing to be ignorant, right? Of what the church teaches about these matters, right? Don't hear it.

[27:36] And I call ignorance directly voluntary, in which an act of the will is what responsible for it, right? Indirectly, on account of what? Negligence. Negligence, right? In this, that someone does not wish to know that that he is held to what to know, right?

[28:07] So there's a lot of people out there like that. I think in the church today, right? Huh? They don't want to what? To know what the church teaches about these things, right? Sometimes too, they don't get a sermon on either, huh? So a lot of blame to go around, right? Huh? If their

[28:38] reason, if therefore Thomas says, reason or conscience errors by a voluntary error, right? Huh? Either directly. Or an account of what neglect, huh? Because it is a mistake about that which someone is held to what, no?

[29:03] Then such an error of reason or or conscience does not excuse, huh? But that the will agreeing with a reason or a conscience thus error, right, the voluntary error, right is what bad, huh? If, however, it is an error which causes the what involuntary right coming from ignorance of some circumstance without any what negligence, right? Like you can't know what all the circumstances of your acts you never do, right?

[29:45] That's why there's incertitude in these things, right? Then such an error of reason or of conscience excuses, right? So that the will in agreeing Agreement with erring reason is not what bad, right?

[30:07] For example, if reason and error says that man is held to what approach the wife of another, right? The will in agreement with reason so erring is bad, right? In that this error comes from ignorance of the what law of God, right? Which one is held to what to know, right?

[30:39] If our reason errs in this that it believes some woman in submission to be his own what wife, and she asks him for the debt of marriage, which is to know him, right? Then his will is excused that it not be what bad, huh? Because this error is from ignorance of circumstances, which excuses, right, and causes the what involuntary kind of a hard case to imagine, right?

[31:14] Although you know it's been cases, you know we have twin girls, right, and they change dates, right, and so the guy doesn't know he thinks he's caught the same girl, but he's not, right? But presumably, by the time they're married, he would be able to to tell his wife, huh? Okay. Old Testament stories about the veiled women. Yeah. Oh yeah. Leia and Rachel.

[31:44] Don't think they're married. No, it's very, very, very specific. To the first, therefore, it should be said, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names, that good is caused from a what integral cause, huh? But bad from what singular defects, huh?

[32:23] And therefore, in order that something be said to be bad, in which what the will is carried, it suffices whether it is in its very nature bad, right, huh? Or that it be apprehended as bad, right?

[32:43] But in order that might be good, it required this integrity, right? That in both ways it be what good, right? Which is why it's a lot harder to do a good act than to do a. Yeah, it's got to be a good act, and you've got to know that it's good, right? To

[33:11] the second, it should be said that the eternal law is not able to be an error, but human reason is able to be an error, and therefore the will, in agreement with human reason, is not always right, nor is it always in agreement with what, eternal law, huh?

[33:39] Okay, now the famous thing here probably do a tertium quid there. To the third, it should be said that just as in what syllogisms, right, one inconveniente dato, right, one unfitting thing being given, is necessary for other things to what follow, right?

[34:08] So if I say that a horse is four-footed, that's true, right? And then I say man is a horse, then it follows that man is what four-footed, right? So from uno inconveniente datto, right, Necessary for another defollow, right? So also in moral matters, huh? One unsuitable thing laid down, of necessity, others what follow.

[34:41] Thus, supposing that someone seeks what empty glory, whether on account of empty glory he does what he's held to do, or whether he what doesn't do it, right? In either case, he what sins, huh? But nevertheless, he is not what perplexed, baffled, right? Huh? No way out, because he can what dismiss his bad intention of seeking what. Empty glory. Yeah, yeah. So if I want to, you know, get praise for my charitable giving, right?

[35:22] I stall my horn. Well, whether I give or don't give, I'm going to be what. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But I can give up the intention of seeking, being glory, right?

[35:42] And likewise, supposing the error of reason or conscience, which proceeds from what, an ignorance that does not excuse. It is necessary that there follows something bad in the will, but nevertheless, the man is not perplexed, he's not baffled, the doors aren't closed to him, right? Because he can what recede from his error, since ignorance is in fact conquerable and what voluntary, right?

[36:27] They tell these girls, these young girls, you know, they go in to have their abortion, you know, that just you know, blob of tissue or something, you know. I'm not hugging. They can be sacred, but you know. General sin against stupidity. The very gods themselves contend in vain. They

[37:07] didn't know how difficult it was to be good, yeah. So, someone asks you, "Should you ever act against your conscience?" You say, "What if your conscience now is an error, right? It's an error due to ignorance that is voluntary, right?" What beast! But

[37:55] you have to form your conscience before acting on or against it. See, what about these people in the pews there? You know, they've never been told that this or that is wrong. You know, they've been told it's

[38:40] your decision to make. You know, principles that are wrong. It's not your decision to make in the absolute sense. What about the objective? It seems it almost seems too subjective.

[39:20] It is Yeah I'm surprised he doesn't really make that distinction. What between? Well, I guess he did earlier. I'm sorry. This text from from Titus uses a lot, right? The bad takes place in what? To the defect, right? And the good requires what? Everything to be right. Yeah. Yeah. No wonder they say, "Malum in specie humana ut in pluribus evil for the most part in the human race."

[40:08] One of these big debates you'd have when I was a professor out at St. Mary's College there, and and end up you know these arguments about government whether you thought most people are bad or not. You've got to take a much different view as to what the government should be. you know, if you think that most men are bad, huh?

[40:41] See, they say that that the Thomas will say you know that kingship is the best government, right? Of course, it's most like the what the rule of God, right? Because God is King, right? Huh? The Lord is King in splendor robed is the Lord. and girded with strength it says in the Psalms, so he's a king, right? Huh?

[41:06] But of course, the worst government is is the tyranny, right? Huh? So the corruption of the best is the worst, You know, if the chances of one man rule being more to be a tyrant than a king, maybe you should you know spread around the evil a little bit, right? And let the evil hurt itself a bit, you know, rather than concentrate the evil in a man like Hitler, or Stalin, or Mao Tse Tung, or somebody, you know.

[41:49] So Aristotle says, "Virtue is about the good and difficult." So there's another special difficulty. There's another kind of virtue required, huh? Do another article here before we take a little break. Article seven here.

[42:15] Whether the goodness of the what will depends upon the what intention of the end. To the seventh end, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the goodness of the will does not depend upon the intention of the end.

[42:36] So some of the writers speak of the purity of what intention, right? Huh? For it's been said above that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But in those things which are for an end. Other is the object of the will, and other the end what intended. Therefore, in such things, the goodness of the will does not depend upon the what intention of the end.

[43:18] Moreover, to will to observe the command of God belongs to the what good will, or pertains to a good will. But this can be referred to what a bad end, to wit, to the end of empty glory, or cupidity, right? When someone wants to obey God for achieving what temporal things.

[43:56] Therefore, the goodness of the will does not depend upon the intention of the what end. Moreover, good and bad, just as they diversify the will, so also they diversify the end, right?

[44:20] But the badness of the will does not depend upon the badness of the end intended. For who wants to steal that he might give? um

[44:41] what's the word there? Alms. Alms. Alms that were to me. He has a bad will, right? Even though he intends a good what end. So I've been corrupting my grandchildren with, you know, gifts. With, you know, with the Robin Hood, you know.

[45:15] Therefore, also the goodness of the will does not depend upon the goodness of the end intended. But against this is what Augustine says in the ninth book of the Confessions that the intention is what rewarded, I guess, huh, by God, purity of intention, huh? So some of the saints say that. But something is remunerated by God because it is good, right? Therefore, the goodness of the will does depend upon the intention of the end.

[45:54] Thomas says, "I answer." It should be said that intention can be in two ways to the will. In one way, as what preceding, coming before. In another way, as what coming after, yeah, or accompanying.

[46:20] It comes before in a causal way, right? Intention. The will, when we will something, on account of or because of the intention of some what end, right?

[46:37] And then the order to the end is considered as a what reason for the what goodness of the thing willed. As if someone wills to fast on account of what God, right? Huh?

[46:58] For the fasting has the reason of something good. From this, that it is for the sake of what God. When, since the goodness of the will depends upon the goodness of what is willed, as has been said above, is necessary that it depends upon the what intention of the end.

[47:29] But intention what follows the will when it what comes to a will already what preexisting. As if someone wills to do something, and afterwards he refers that thing to what God.

[47:54] And then the goodness of the first will does not depend upon the what subsequent intention, right? Except in so far as the what act of the will is repeated, I guess, with the what following intention, right? Huh? Didn't

[48:20] form a habit. Well, I didn't say he had a habit here, did he? But it's not what that would kind of result in, isn't it? Could, but he's talking about when his first was chosen, right? It was not to give you to that end, right? but then later on on the orders it, right? Okay.

[48:45] Now to the first, there that you know the goodness of the act depends simply upon the object, right? When this takes. On the character of the what object in the sense of the will, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that when the intention is the cause of the willing, that's why it's going before. A cause goes before an effect. The order to the end is taken as a certain reason for the goodness in the object.

[49:13] huh? Because we had the sight of the object, right? To the second, it should be said: the will cannot be called what good if a bad intention is the cause of the what willing, right?

[49:42] For the one who wishes to give alms for the sake of getting some empty glory, right, wishes that which of itself is good, but he wills it under the reason of something bad, And therefore,insofar as it's willed by him, it is what bad.

[50:07] Whence his will is what bad, right? But if the intention is what foully, right, consequent, then the will could be good, right? And by the subsequent intention, one is not what made depraved. That act of the will which preceded, right? But rather the act of the will which is what foully. So if I love wisdom and I desire to pursue wisdom, is that good? Okay. Now suppose I discover people admire me for my wisdom.

[50:59] Okay, I'm going to pursue more. Well, now it's becoming something what bad in glory, right? But my original desire to want to be wise, ah,

[51:13] was a good thing, right? And that doesn't cease cease to be good, right? But the subsequent act then, then does, right? Okay. Guess that's what he's saying. Yeah,

[51:29] what should guys say? What should love is of wisdom, dangerous people. Should we stick to our original intention? Yeah, I remember story used to tell about De Koninck there and some famous philosopher whose name we may not mentioned here. But the kind wanted to discuss with him some philosophical question, right? In his office there, I guess, somewhere was, and he didn't want to do it, right? Next day when there before a crowd, he wanted to do it.

[52:16] Well, if you want to discuss something, especially if people have maybe disagreement, right, huh? And where you would hope that the man who's got the best reasons, right, would would convince the man who doesn't, right? And it's easier for a man to admit his mistake in in private than in front of a crowd, right?

[52:37] So you know, they say, what is this man doing, right? Why would he want to, you know, discuss the question in front of a crowd that's not able to judge? You know these things, and and not do it in private, right? Is he really interested in the truth, or is there empty glory there, right?

[52:59] Sounds a little like into glory, right? Did I get the story right? Socrates and the sophists. You know, he's just in the dialogue. They're the Protagoras, right? Because Protagoras wants to what have an audience there, you know, to see him, you know, the wonderful speeches, right? Whereas Socrates wants short answers and questions and short answers. And Protagoras wants to give a speech, right? You know, and

[53:34] the Protagoras says, "Enough! I'd always fought with the weapons of my opponent, right? Never would the name of Protagoras have spread throughout Greece, famous, you know." It's kind of funny because in the beginning of the dialogue, I see the young man comes knocking on the door of Socrates, and Socrates is still in bed, right? And getting up, and what's the matter? What's up? Protagoras is in town.

[53:57] Protagoras is in town. I got to go meet Protagoras, and Socrates says, "Well, it's kind of early to go, you know, to meet Protagoras. Stay at some, you know, wealthy man's house, you know, and so on. We better wait, but you know, before we go over there, you know." In the meantime, Socrates says, "What do you know about him? Oh, he's wonderful."

[54:18] But then when they go over there, right, and begin the conversation, the first thing you see is that the road, might say, that Protagoras wants to take is to give speeches rather than to engage in a dialectical conversation, right? So the very way he wants to proceed is not right. And then when Socrates finally gets him to answer some short things, then Protagoras starts to what contradict himself, right?

[54:51] So it's kind of a lesson there in whom you should listen to, right? Because the first criterion we have for listening to somebody, reading him, is his fame, right? So Protagoras is more famous than Socrates at the time, right? So you might want to listen to Protagoras because you've heard so much about him, right? But then when you see the way Socrates what wants to proceed, the way Protagoras proceeds, well, I don't think that Protagoras is what proceeding correctly.

[55:23] Yeah, yeah. So now you begin to trust Socrates more, maybe. And then finally, when Protagoras starts to contradict himself, then well, yeah. My old teacher Kasurik, you know, he's at one of these conventions, and gets the guy to contradict himself, right? Kasurik says, "Now, what are you going to do about that?" The guy says, "Well, that's a contradiction I've learned to live with."

[55:51] That's a good example there. So if you come to college and you say, "How many chambers in the frog's heart?" right, and the Biology professor gives you one answer, and the biology student gives you another answer. Whom do you believe? The biology professor. Yeah, because, he's got fame or position, right? But then, if you say, "Now, how'd you arrive at this?" and the student says, "Well, I've been working in the lab there, and every frog I cut open seemed to have this number of chambers, right?"

[56:21] And the professor says, "How'd you arrive at? Well, I took a deck of cards, and this came out. Say, well, despite his reputation and his position, right, better follow the other guy, right? And that's a little bit what you see with Socrates there in Protagoras, right? Not quite as obvious, but... okay.

[56:53] So we didn't finish quite the Article Seven, did we? Yeah, we're on the third one here. Okay, to the third, it should be said. This has been said, and now he's quoting again. What our good friend Dionysius, right? Malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus, right? The bad happens from what From individual defects, right? The good from a whole and integral cause, right? Isn't that true about about the beautiful, right?

[57:36] And if your nose is too long or yours are too big or whatever it is, right, you can be ugly, right? Ex quacumque defectu right? All your arms, you know, like which of the three is longer or shorter, the other, right? Oh, see, but all these things have got to be right to be beautiful and handsome, right? We've said if Cleopatra's nose had been a millimeter longer than it,

[58:02] Bonum vero, right? Ex tota et integra causa, right? Whence, whether the will is of that which is in itself bad, even under the what reason of something good, or is is of something good, but under the what reason of something bad, always the will is bad, right? Okay.

[58:35] So if you're willing something that is in itself bad, but under the what appearance of the good, it's still not good, right? And if you're what willing something about the good, but under the aspect of appearance of bad, right?

[58:53] Semper always the will is bad. But in order that the will be good, it's required that it be of something good, and under the what.

[59:07] Yeah, under the aspect of something good or under the appearance, right? Something good, and that is that it wills the good and it counts the good, right? So, a lot of demand there to be good, right? Huh?

[59:29] Just like with your checkbook, you know, you got the wrong number in there, you add or subtract, you're gonna get the wrong answer, right? And if you have the right numbers, but you add or subtract incorrectly, you're gonna what? Yeah. And most people that I talk to, and my own experience with checkbooks, they never seem to balance, exactly right, you know.

[59:56] My mother would just spend the whole afternoon trying to make the thing come out exactly right. I don't know if she always succeeded or not but she used to

[1:00:06] feel sorry what Who cares if a few dollars off? But this, the thing is similar to some, you know, there's some filler vagin made or, something you don't know about, or some other stupid thing. But

[1:00:21] so, in many, you know, defects, right? You got to have the right numbers, and you got to add subtract correctly, right? So everything's got to be good for the good, right? But if you have a wrong number, or you add subtract incorrectly, then you're going to get the wrong final number, right? So the the bad is from any defect, right?

[1:00:46] Aristotle's what? The prior and the posterior analytics, right? The two books are about argument that produces knowledge in the strict sense, certitude. But the prior analytics is about seeing that the argument conclusion follows necessarily from the what? Premises, right? And then the posterior analytics is what the premises themselves are necessarily true, right? So you have two things you need for the conclusion to be certain. It has to follow necessarily from the premises, and the premises themselves have to be what necessarily true, right?

[1:01:28] So either defect. It doesn't add up. Yeah, yeah. I used to always beautifully, you know, get the but this argument. I always put on my exams, you know. I'd say

[1:01:45] every mother is a woman. No man is a mother. Therefore, no man is a what? Is he what? Woman is a woman, yeah. Most students think that's okay, right? And it's true that every mother is a woman. It's true that no man is a mother, and no man is a woman, right?

[1:02:23] None of my statements are all true. But does this statement in fact follows from this too? I fiendishly designed this, right? Because they know this is true, right? And there's some connection between the fact that a man is not a mother, and a mother is always a woman, right? Connection between that and the fact that no man is a woman, right? So it fits very tight for most of them, right?

[1:02:54] But now I notice, huh? If we look at the, um, if you take the form there, right? Every B is A, no C is B, right? You say, let's say every cat is an animal,

[1:03:29] and no dog is a cat. No one would say it follows, so it knows false that no dog is an animal, but it has exactly the same what form? Every B is A, no C is B, right? On the prior analytics of Aristotle, you learn that the form every B is A, no C is B, nothing follows necessarily about C and A, right?

[1:04:06] But because of the matter, you're kind of thinking, "It looks like a good argument to me," you know, but it's actually a bad argument, right? You know, hit so many points off.

[1:04:26] So in calculating and in what reasoning, huh? Any defect is going to be a bad argument, right? So this has a defect, now, and there's nothing wrong with the matter, but the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. So that's the great principle there, right? Malum contingit singulari defectibus, right? He's always quoting the great Dionysius, whom he thought was the disciple of Saint Paul, Saint Paul, converted somebody at the Areopagus, right?

[1:05:05] So he's known as Dionysius the Areopagite. Now they call him the Pseudo-Areopagite But anyway, so take a little break here, then, before we continue here.