Prima Secundae
56. Aquinas on the Will (ST I-II q.19 aa.8-9): How Much Good Intention Adds, and Conforming Our Will to God's
Class of 2012-02-16
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[0:00] To the eighth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the quantity of goodness in the will depends upon the quantity of goodness in the intention. I've seen the saints say something like that, huh? You know, the merit of the thing depends upon the purity of the intention, huh? Because upon that of Matthew chapter twelve, verse thirty-five, the good man from the what good treasure of his heart brings forth what good things.

[0:41] Whence the gloss there, huh? So much of good does he do as he what intends, right? For as much as he intends, so much of good he does.

[1:03] But the intention not only gives goodness to the exterior act, but also to the will. Therefore, so much one has of good will as much as he what intends, huh?

[1:19] Moreover, the cause being what augmented, so the effect is augmented. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good what will. Therefore, the more one intends, or as much as one intends the good, so much the will is what good, huh?

[1:42] Moreover, in the bad things, the more one intends them, the more one what sins, huh? For as someone throwing a stone intends to commit homicide, he's guilty of homicide, right?

[2:03] Therefore, saying if I miss you, I'm guilty, I guess. If I even might car at you and run you down, kill you, I miss you, hit the telephone pole or something. Attempted homicide, right? Yeah. Therefore, for like reason, in good things, so much is the will good, the more it intends the good.

[2:30] But Against this, it is possible for the intention to be good and the will to be bad. Therefore, for like reason, the intention can be more good and the will less good good, huh?

[2:51] So he says, answer. It should be said that as regards the act and the intention of the end, a twofold quantity can be what considered, right?

[3:09] That's why he prayed to our guardian angel to consider more correctly, right? Because without Thomas, we wouldn't consider correctly, unfortunately. One on the side of the object, because one wills a what greater good, right? Huh? Or one what does, I guess, huh? Greater good.

[3:36] And another is from the intention of the act, because one intensely wills or acts, which is more from the side now of the agent than of the what object, right? Huh? Well, some saints talk about doing something with great love, right? Doing even little things, right? Giving you a cup of water, huh? Great will, great love, right?

[4:05] If therefore we speak of the quantity of both as regards the what object, right? It is manifest that the quantity of the act does not follow the quantity of the what intention,

[4:26] which on the side of the exterior act can happen in two ways. In one way, because the object that is ordered to the end intended is not proportional to that end,

[4:44] just as if someone gives ten what pounds or something, he cannot carry out his intention if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds, huh? How did you

[5:05] put that? The symbol in the English. Was that like an L? Yeah. that was that quite L. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, and then the abbreviation for pound is L B. Yeah. And uh for the weight. Yeah, it's come from the Latin one. I wonder, I just thought that as you said that asking about the money. So it's one thing.

[5:30] In another way. On account of the impediments that can come upon the external act, right? Which are not in our power to remove, as if someone intends to go As far as Rome, and there occur to him impediments that is not able to do this, right?

[5:55] But on the side of the interior act of the will, it is not except in one way. Why? Because the interior acts of the will are in our power, but the exterior acts are not, so they're wholly within our power, right?

[6:18] Spending these millions of dollars in these attack ads, you know. If I don't have millions of dollars to attack you with, it's still without my power, baby,

[6:29] too. But the will is able to what? Will some object that is not proportional to the end intended. And thus the will, which is carried in that object, absolutely considered, is not as good as the what intention, huh? But because also this intention, in some way, pertains to the act of the will, in so far as it is what a reason for it, right? On account of this, it what flows back upon you might say, right?

[7:17] The quantity of good intention on the what will, in so far as the will wills some what great good as an end, even though that through which he wishes to achieve that great good is not what worth that good, right? Not worthy of that good, huh? If, however, one considers the quantity of the intention and the act according to the intensity of both,

[7:59] thus the intention of the intention redounds both in the what interior act and in the exterior act of the will, because the intention, in a way, has itself formally to both,

[8:20] huh? Although materially speaking, the intention existing intense is possible for there to be what an interior or exterior act not so intense, materially speaking.

[8:42] Just as when someone does not intensely, as intensity, wish to take the medicine as he wishes, what health? Yeah. For it's sure if you're gonna have to cut off an arm or something, right, or a leg, you know.

[9:05] Nevertheless, this, which is to intensely intend health, flows back formally in that which is to intensely will what medicine, right? But nevertheless, this should be considered that the intention or intensity of the interior act or the exterior act can be referred to the intention as a what object, huh? As when someone intends to intensely will or to intensely what do something. Nevertheless, not in account of this does he intensely will or operate, eh Because the Quantity of the good intended does not follow the what?

[9:59] Because the goodness of the interior or exterior act then does not follow the quantity of the good intended, right? And hence it is that what?

[10:13] Not to the extent that someone intends to merit, does he merit, right? Because the quantity of the merit consists in the intention of the act. That's confusing enough, isn't it? I can

[10:30] go back and read over again. If I can read it in English, that's hard. Let's look at the reply to objection. Let me go back. Go back to the body article.

[10:52] Now the first objection says that a good man from the what good treasure of his heart brings forth what good things. And as much of good someone does, as much as he what intends, says the gloss, right?

[11:13] I says to the first, therefore, it should be said that that gloss speaks as regards the what? Reputation. Yeah, not the reputation of God in her sense, but what God reputes it to be, right? Which especially considers the intention of the end, right?

[11:39] Once another gloss says there that the treasure of the heart is the what? Intention. Yeah, I don't know if a footnote here but that's uh refers you to a text here from Rabanis, huh? But. Anyway,

[12:09] for the goodness of the intention, as has been said, redounds in a certain way for the goodness of the will, right? Because it makes also the exterior act meritorious before God.

[12:37] That's interesting. God especially considers the intention of the what end, right? So if I give you what you want because I love you, or because I want you to can't stand your complaints any longer, you know the guy, the woman who the story there, the judge who didn't want to give her, you know, what his intention was, you know, she's just a troublemaker, you know. Maybe I'll give her, I'll settle her case, right?

[13:14] Remember that case in the Bible, and our Lord gives that, right? The woman, the widow was there or something, was demanding her thing. and the unjust. Yeah, yeah, And she's can't stand her screaming and ranting so much, so I'll render her right. Now, is he doing what's just, but not? He's not intending to do what is just, right? He's tending to put a silence to this woman, right?

[13:44] Or keep her from assassinating him or something. But if someone was was rendering her case out of justice, right, then that would be, I would say, much more meritorious than to render it. I'd give himself some peace, you know, for that woman.

[14:13] The second objection: you augment the cause, you augment the effect, right? But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the goodwill. It's a good argument. Thomas argues there. To the second, it should be said that the goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of the goodness of the what will. Once the argument does not what follow,

[14:42] quite clear mind he had, huh? You tell the story enough. Thomas coming in to thing, and the students, you know, opposing him, you know, his position, you know, and everybody's kind of shocked, you know. The great Thomas is there, you know, and so Thomas sits down very calmly, you know, and explains the thing, you know, something to the students, you know. Oh, yeah, okay. So.

[15:19] In the middle there, right? The Socrates seems to be what speaking badly the great men of Athens, right? The hearer gets very angry with Socrates, you know, and Socrates says, "Go and try to calm that guy down, you know, for the good of Athens." For the good of Socrates too. but. One of those who brings the. Charges against Socrates.

[15:50] And the third argument, in bad things, right? The more one intends something, the more he what? Sins, right? Huh? Thomas said, "Well, the badness of intention alone suffices for the badness of the what? Will, right?

[16:15] And therefore, also, the more bad is the intention, the more bad is the what? Will. But it's not the same about what? Goodness, as has been said, huh? Why isn't the same about goodness? It was that about the badness, right? Then go back and look at the body of the article.

[16:44] So he says, Thomas, I answer that about the act and the intention of the end, a twofold quantity can can be considered. One on the side of the object, because he wishes a what? Greater good, huh?

[17:09] Or he does a greater good, right? Another from the intention or intensity, I guess, huh? Of the act, huh? Because he intensely wills or acts, right?

[17:31] Which is greater from the side of the what? Agent, huh? You ever see that article that we saw in the talking about God's love and so on? Does God love us equally, or does He love

[17:57] Mary and the apostles more than us? What's the distinction that Thomas gives there, right? How the thing is about. Well, he talks about the good that God wills for somebody, right?

[18:24] And the one that He wills a greater good for, he said to love what? More. More, right? So He wills to Mary a greater good than He wills to the apostles, right? Huh? But He wills to the apostles a greater good than He does to the other saints in the church, huh? Okay.

[18:54] But what about the intensity, right? Does is God's love of Mary or His love of the apostles is the act of love, right, more intense for them than for us, huh? I think he said he says no, right? Okay.

[19:22] Why you say for us, right? I can will the same good, right, for two people, but will it more intensely, right, for one than another, right? So I might want this stranger in the hospital not to die, right? I want him to have a successful operation, whatever it is, you know. And I want the same thing for my child or my wife or something, right? But I more intensely will the what?

[20:03] Yeah. So I'm not willing a greater good for my child than for this stranger in the hospital, right? I want them both to what recover from whatever the illness is, right? So on. I didn't say they have the same illness. It could be even, right? And but yet I will more intensely, right? Okay. But I could even will more intensely a lesser good for my child,

[20:32] ah, and will a greater good for somebody else, right? But I will this greater good not as intensely, right? Huh? Okay. So there is ah in us, right?

[20:53] This both of these, but not in God, right? God doesn't will more intensely the good of what the apostles than of us, right? But He does will a greater good to them, right? In that sense, He He loves them more, right? I think that's the way Thomas explains it in the The Prima Pars, Remember that? See, but for us, you have both of these, right? Huh? So it's a twofold quantity to be considered.

[21:22] One is on the side of the object because he wishes a what a maius bonum a greater good, right? The other from the intensity, I guess, right?

[21:36] Of the act because he intensely, huh, intensely wills it or does it, right? Which Thomas says is not now so much on the side of the object but more on the side of the what? The agent. The agent, right?

[21:59] If therefore we speak of the quantity of both as regards the what object, right? Huh? It is manifest that the quantity of the act does not follow the what? Quantity of the intention. Intention, right?

[22:25] Now, what does this mean? Which, from the part or side of the exterior act, he says, can happen in two ways, huh? In one way, because the object that is ordered to the end intended is not what? Proportional to the. That it to that end.

[22:53] Just as if someone gives ten pounds. He is not able to achieve his intention if he intends to buy a thing. What? It's a hundred. Yeah.

[23:10] It's like the man who sets out to build the tower. Our Lord says, right? And he doesn't what? Calculate. What he needs to to buy that, right?

[23:26] In another way, an account of impediments that can come upon, right? That can arise, I suppose. Suppose you translate supervenire, arise, right? To come upon, arise above. In regards to exterior act, right? Which are not in our power to remove, right? As when someone intends to go all the way to Rome, and there occur impediments that he's not able to what? To to do this, right?

[24:11] But on the side of the interior act of the will, it is not except in one way, right? Because the interior act, the inward act of the will, are in our power, right? But the exterior acts are not.

[24:34] But the will is able to will some object not proportional to the end but intended, huh? And thus the will, which is carried to that object absolutely considered, but it's not proportional to the end, right? Is not as good as is the what? The intention.

[25:06] But because that intention, in some way, pertains to the act of the will, in so far as it is what the reason for it, on account of this, the quantity of the good intention downs to, you might say, right? Comes back upon, right? The will, right?

[25:34] In so far as the will wishes some what great good as an end, even though that to which he wishes to achieve so great a good is not what

[25:53] worthy of that good, right? So is it as good as his intention? If, however, one considers the quantity of the intention and the act according to the intensity of both, thus the intensity of the intention redounds both upon the interior act and the exterior act as well, because that intention in some way has itself formally to both.

[26:35] For though materially the intention existing intense, there can be what an interior or exterior act not so intense, materially speaking, right? As when someone does not so intensely wish to take medicine as he wishes what health, right?

[27:05] Nevertheless, this very thing which is to intensely intend health redounds formally flows back upon that which is to intensely will be what medicine. But nevertheless, this should be considered that the intention of the interior or exterior act can be referred to the intention as a what object when someone intends to intensely will or something else other to or to do something intensely, right? But nevertheless, on account of this, he does not intensely will or act because the quantity of the good intended, or because the goodness of the interior exterior act, does not follow the what quantity of the good intended.

[28:10] And hence it is that not as much as one intends to merit does one merit, because the quantity of the merit consists in intensity of the what act. Let me see what it is. But you know, you talk about

[28:28] a plenary indulgence, and you if you intend to gain a plenary indulgence, right? Well, that's a big thing, right? But there are certain conditions you have to, you know. And I guess you have to have a repugnance not only to mortal sin but even to what venial sin they say, right? Says that in the most

[29:03] appropriate way to us, okay. So you really do want that that plenary indulgence, right? But maybe you're not fulfilling the means, right, in a way that really is such a what?

[29:29] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Hence, your intention is greater than your act. You tend you intend to merit a plenary indulgence, but you're not going to get that much from what you do, right? Because you're not having intensity of what. Sorrow for your sins and praying for the pope and repugnance to even venial sin and so on, right?

[30:02] Want to go on eating candy nevertheless or something? Okay, let's let that rest in the mind and say, "Well, when I come back, I'll understand that article better some other day," right?

[30:24] Okay, it's time for the article, I guess. Yes. Okay. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the conformity to the divine will? I suspect that's so from the Our Father, right? Boom! Boom! To the ninth one proceeds thus. It seems that the goodness of the human will does not depend on its conformity to the divine will.

[30:58] For it is impossible for the will of man to be conformed to divine will, as is clear through what is said in Isaiah's chapter fifty-five. Just as the heavens are exalted from the earth above them, so are exalted my ways from your ways, and my thoughts from your thoughts, right? If therefore to the goodness of the will is required conformity to the divine will, is impossible. Good follow it's impossible?

[31:35] For the will of man to be what good, huh? You don't know God's will, right? It's above your weight. Moreover, just as our will is derived from the divine will, so our knowledge is derived from divine knowledge. But it's not required for our knowledge that it be conformed to the divine knowledge. For God knows many things which we don't know. Therefore, it's not required that our will be conformed to the what?

[32:10] Divine. will. Moreover, the will is a beginning of action, right? A principle of action. But our action is not able to be what conformed to divine action, right? Therefore, neither our will to his will, right?

[32:30] But against this is what is said in Matthew twenty-six, huh? Not as I will, but as you will. That's during the passion, I guess, right?

[32:44] Which is said, right? Because what he wishes to be what. Right, huh? To be directed to God, as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion. But the rightness of the will is its goodness. Therefore, the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the divine will, right? So we say, "Our Father, thy will be done," right? Why would we pray that? It's not. You know, something we need.

[33:17] Okay. I answer: It should be said that as has been said, the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end. But the last end of the human will is the highest what? Good. Good, huh? Which is God, huh? This has been said above.

[33:42] It's required, therefore, for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good, which is what? God, huh? Now, this good, which is God Himself, is first and per se compared to the divine will as its own what? Object, right? So God wills nothing except in willing His own what? Goodness. Goodness. Now, that which is first in any genus is the measure and reason of all things which are of that genus.

[34:26] It sounds like the tenth book of wisdom, right? Aristotle. And each thing is right and good in so far as it what reaches its proper what? Measure. Therefore, in order that the will of man be good, what's required is that it be conformed to the what? Divine will, right?

[34:54] Now, to the first. My ways are not your ways, and so on, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the will of man is not able to be conformed to the divine will by what? equiparantia, equality. But by what? Imitation. Imitation, huh? That's a little bit like you know when Christ says it the Sermon on the Mount, huh? And therefore, kind of summing up, be perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect, right?

[35:30] Well, what does that mean? Does it mean equiparantia? You can't be as perfect as God, right? So he doesn't mean that you should be, right? But you should imitate, right? As much as you can, the perfection of God, right, huh? Okay, know what it means, huh? Doesn't mean to be equal. It doesn't mean equiparantia but. imitation right? And likewise, the knowledge of man is conformed to the divine science, insofar as he knows the what truth, right?

[36:09] So Aristotle talks about wisdom. There, he says that it's what divine knowledge, right? He says, in what way is knowledge divine? He says, well, it's because either it's about God, right? Or it's because it's the knowledge that God alone or God most of all would what have, right? Aristotle has shown already in the proemium before he gets to that point that wisdom is about the first cause, right?

[36:41] The first cause is God. Therefore, wisdom is about God, right? But then he takes other thing, just the what in the great tradition of Greek philosophy that the origin of the word philosopher was from what Pythagoras, right? And Pythagoras had discovered wonderful things like the Pythagorean theorem, so that his contemporaries called him wise. And he says, but don't call me wise because God alone is wise, huh?

[37:09] Well, what's that we call you? Well, don't call me something. Call me a lover of wisdom, right? So there's kind of in the origin of the word philosopher, a lover of wisdom, a kind of humility, right? That that man is not wise in the way God is wise, right? So Aristotle, in that same tradition, he says that wisdom is divine knowledge, both in the sense that it's about God, right, and also in the sense as the knowledge that God himself would have or God most of all, right?

[37:45] Now I sometimes, you know, instead taking the word divine, I say wisdom is the knowledge of God, right? And knowledge of God could mean the knowledge whose object is God, right? Or the knowledge that God has, right? And in both senses, wisdom is the knowledge of God, right?

[38:09] But when Aristotle says that wisdom is the knowledge that God alone has or God most of all, right? He's not saying that we can be wise the way God is, huh? But we can what imitate to some extent, right? However, remotely, huh? I have the same way of speaking there in Shakespeare's definition of what reason, right? Shakespeare's definition of reason is the knowledge of reason in both senses, huh?

[38:37] It's a knowledge about what reason is, and it's a knowledge which reason has about itself, right? So it's a knowledge of reason in both senses. Well, likewise, theology is a knowledge of God in both senses of the phrase, knowledge of God, right?

[38:56] I like those double meanings, right? We're not connected that way, huh? you can say in the the three books about the soul, it's a knowledge of the soul, right? In both ways, it's a knowledge about the soul and it's a knowledge which the soul has about itself, right? Where it knows itself through its powers and its powers through its acts and its acts through its what objects, right?

[39:23] huh? Though most souls don't get to the point of knowing it's about themselves, If you learn the three books about the soul, then you'll be a knowledge of the soul and both of those senses, right?

[39:48] It's kind of beautiful the way Aristotle presents that, huh? So he says, and likewise, the knowledge of man is conformed to the divine knowledge, in so far as he knows what truth, right? So in the second book of wisdom, Aristotle says that wisdom is what most of all the knowledge of truth, right? And he gives a very good reason for that. He says that the cause is more true than the what effect.

[40:21] That goes back to this great principle, which is propter quod unum quodque tale et illud magis, right? And it kind of works more so. Yeah. But I expand the principle when I say when the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the what cause, right? So if sweet is said of sugar and coffee, but of the coffee because of the sugar, which is sweeter.

[40:55] And if wet is said of the dishcloth and water, but of the dishcloth because of the water, which is wetter. Yeah. And so if true is said of the cause and the effect, but the effect is true because of the cause, which is more true. Cause. Yeah. And therefore, the first cause is most true, right? Huh? So Aristotle heard Christ saying, "I am the way, the truth, and the life," right?

[41:24] And as man, he's the way, and as God, he's the truth itself, right? So that makes sense. Aristotle would say, right? That would be a motive of what of credibility for Aristotle, just, like I am who am, is a motto of credibility for Hilary of Poitiers, right? And he comes to the Greek philosopher, and he reads in the Exodus, I guess, huh? The God says, "I am who am."

[41:52] He says, "That makes sense, right?" Here's a religion that makes sense, you know, more so than Homer and his his God was distracted by his wife, you know, from the governance of the universe. You know, the great the great Heraclitus, you know, he talks about the Greek gods, you know, and he's talking about how they they they pray to the statues and so on, right? He says if a man should you know talk to his house or something, you know.

[42:23] So they they they they can see that. So what's wrong with those, right? Yeah. Because the Greek Greek religion is a religion based on the imagination, right? They imagine. So they imagine the gods to be somewhat like us with our faults. So Heraclitus says, you know, Homer represents the gods as committing adultery and stealing and so on, all these things, right? Things which are shameful, you know, among men, you know, how can these be, you know, true gods, right?

[42:59] So he's very good but he does, right? You don't have those irrational things in Christian religion, right? He says this solves the okay, and the action of man to the divine action insofar as it is what equal to the agent, and this through imitation and not through what equality, equi comes from equal, and this solves the second objection and the what theory, right? Because they're both talking about the fact you can't equal, right?

[43:53] So you know they take that. I guess the meter bar is in Paris, right? Everything else is made equal to the meter bar, the standard meter bar, you know. You know, then you get equiparentia, right? You know, you get straight, you know, you know, down to the, you know, but you can't get that kind of conformity to God's what will or his knowledge or his what action, right?

[44:22] Huh? But you're supposed to do so by what imitation, right? Saint Paul said, "Be imitators of me, as I am of what Christ, right? " So we imitate Paul insofar as he imitates Christ. then we get to our preaching. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time.

[44:43] So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. We'll see you next time.