Prima Secundae
57. Summa I-II Q.19 a.10 and Q.20 a.1: Must our will match God's will, and is goodness first in the will or in the outward act?
Class of 2012-02-23
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/057-summa-i-ii-q-19-a-10-and-q-20-a-1-must-our-will-match-gods/

[0:00] Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand all that you have written.

[0:39] The Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. So we're up to Article Ten, I guess, in Question Nineteen. So to the tenth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the will of man ought not always to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed.

[1:02] For we are not able to will what we don't know, but the good grasped is the object of the will. But what God wills, we are what.

[1:22] Therefore, the human will is not able to be conformed to the divine will in the what. Yeah, happened to be reading in Saint Gertrude last night. You know about how you're supposed to pray for someone who's sick, right? He's supposed to pray for them that they be healed, or that the will of God be done, whether it be to heal them or to let them suffer. And

[1:54] what is it? Saint John the Cross said to his friends, "Pray that I have my purgatory on earth. " That's pretty brave. Pretty brave to pray for, right?

[2:11] Apparently, it's better to have your purgatory on earth than the next world. So, yeah, so maybe we should all pray for that. I don't know, but you kind of hesitate to say that, you know. Bugs. Oh, okay. Okay. Beelzebub there, or something. However, God wishes to what? Damn someone whom He foreknows to die in mortal sin.

[2:56] The grace is kind of you know he talks about Judas there right now, but if he'd not been born, right. If therefore man is held to conform his will to divine will, the thing willed, it would follow that man would be held to will his own what? Damnation, which is inconvenient, not fitting.

[3:23] Moreover, no one is held to will something that is against what? Piety. But if man wills that which God wills, this wouldn't sometimes be against piety, right? As when God wills that someone's father die, right? If the son willed that his father would die, this would be against what? Piety.

[3:53] And therefore, man is not held to conform his will to the divine will in the thing willed. Well, that's pretty convincing, right? I'm convinced now of this, and I'll have to change my mind, I guess, shortly. But but it's that's a good good objections are easy to see, right? That they are objections.

[4:21] But against this is because upon that of Psalm 32: 1, that praise befits thee what? Rectified. He has a rectified heart who wills what God wills.

[4:44] But every one is held to what? Yeah. Therefore, each one is held to will what God wills, right? Moreover, the form of the will is from its object, just as the form of any object, any act, is its what? Object. If therefore man is held to conform his will to the what? Divine will. It follows that he must he's held to conform it to what? In thing willed.

[5:23] Moreover, the repugnance of wills consists in this that men will diverse things, but whoever has a will that's in opposition, repugnant to the divine will, has a bad will. Therefore, whoever does not conform his will to the divine will in what he wills has a bad will.

[5:47] Well, now I'm what perplexed. It's funny. We look at the example there in the book on places there of Aristotle last night, and he's talking about those who define what doubt as the equality of contrary arguments.

[6:07] Naristado is saying, well, is that what doubt is, or is that's the cause of doubt? Yeah. No. See, so the equality of contrary arguments is not what doubt is, but it's what produces doubt, right? So you really haven't defined. This is the book six of the place book of places, which is about definition, right? Huh? And this is not to define, right? Huh? Okay. Or another definition there of pain there, that's pulling apart of of what parts that are what naturally involved.

[6:44] He says, was that what pain is, or is that the cause of pain? Right? Huh? You know. So there's another one more subtle there about the the sleep being the adunamia, the lack of power of the senses, right? Well, which is cause and which is effect?

[7:17] Is being asleep the reason why I don't hear what you're saying or see what you're doing? Or is my inability to see or hear at that time?

[7:33] Lay in bed that night. Sometimes the fact that if I could manage not to think about something, you know, maybe I go sleepier. Had this adunamia of thinking, you know.

[7:51] Well, let's see what the master says. Huh? I answer. It should be said that as is clear from the things foretold, the will is carried toward its object, right? According as that object is proposed by reason.

[8:12] Now it happens that something can be considered by reason in diverse ways. Thus, that for one reason something is considered to be good, right? And by another reason it is what not good, right? My Lord's there in the garden of Gethsemane, right? Huh? It'd

[8:40] be good to have a legion right of angels to try to drive these gnats out, right? But maybe for some other reason would not be good, huh? To have a legion of angels sent down. And therefore, the will, someone, if he wills that to be, according as it has a reason to be good,

[9:06] is good. And the will of another, if he wills that same thing not to be, according as it has some reason of being bad, his will could also be what? Good. Good, yeah.

[9:26] Just as the judge has a good will when he wills the death of the what thief, huh? Because it is what? Just, huh? So, what a punishment for stealing, right? But the will of another, as of the wife, let's say, or of the son, right,

[9:51] who wishes him not to be killed, right, huh? In so far as by nature. Yeah, is also what good, right? They can both have a good will, right? I don't want my daddy to die. Maybe why he uses the thief instead of murder. Well, obstructing justice in those days, I guess. Is that proportionate to the crime Well, that's so you might wonder.

[10:33] Okay, since, however, the will follows the what grasp of reason or the understanding, according as the ratio of the good apprehended was what more common, right?

[10:55] According to this, the will is born in the good, more commonly. Now you're talking about the common good, there. Seems to be a little bit right, or universal good.

[11:11] Justice is clear in the example proposed, for the judge has care of the common good, which is what justice, right? And therefore, he wills the killing of the thief, which has the aspect of good by its relation to the common what status, huh? But the wife of the thief considers

[11:43] has to consider the private good of the what family, family. and according to this, she wishes the what Husband, thief Thief not to be what Killed. killed, right? Okay.

[12:00] So sometimes, you know, taking an example, we're in the time of war, right? Now, government might want to draft the services of some father, right? Because he's good for the what? Yeah, and the mother, I mean, the mother, the wife, children. It's not good for the father to be moved from the family, right? So they wish that he would not, right? So they both have a good will, right?

[12:28] But the good will, but the one is for a greater common good. The good of the nation is better than the good of the family, right?

[12:39] But the wife's will to be good, would she have to will the greater good, the common good? Maybe so, yeah. She'd have to submit to that, right? Because he's just trying to point out that they can both. The other kind of question is: Is the wife's will really good if she wants her husband to stay for the private good of the family? He hasn't got that part yet.

[13:04] Yeah, he's just saying both these objects are good, relatively speaking. That whether he reasons out, I think he will. Now they both have a good reason for willing the opposite things, right?

[13:22] Now the good of the whole universe is that which is grasped by God, right? Who is both the maker of the universe and the what governor of it?

[13:37] Whence, whatever he wills, he wills under the reason of the common what good, which is his own what goodness, which is the good of the whole what universe.

[13:55] See the Aristotle, no? But the grasping of the creature by his own nature, right, is of some particular good proportion to his own what nature.

[14:15] Now it happens that something is good by some particular reason that is not good by the universal reason or the reverse, as has been said.

[14:34] And therefore, it happens that some will is good willing something according to a particular reason considered, right? Which nevertheless God does not will according to a universal reason, and the reverse can take place, right?

[14:57] And hence it is also that there can be diverse wills of diverse men, right? About opposites being good, right? Insofar as under diverse particular reasons they wish this to be or not to be, right?

[15:19] Now it is not a what right will? As you were saying, is not a right will of some man willing some particular good unless he refers that to the what common good as in a what end?

[15:42] Because also the natural desire of any part is ordered to the common good of the whole, right? An example Thomas always gives is that of the what hand without thinking goes like that to protect the head, right? Because the head is more important for the. Will being of the body, right? And even the hand, right? So the hand, in a sense, sacrifices itself, right, to protect the the head, right?

[16:20] Whence, in order that someone, by a right will, will some particular good, is necessary that that particular good be willed what, materially. But the common good, the common good, the divine common good, be willed what, formally, right? So the human will is held to conform to the divine will, in what is willed formally.

[16:58] Is held then to will the divine good and and the common good, right? Formally, But not materially, for the reason now what said. I think there's a sentence missed there. He said from the end is taken as was a formal reason of willing. Yeah. That which is worked to the end. Yeah, in my text, it's got a a passage from the De Veritate, right? Huh? In the object of the will, it says two things should be considered.

[17:43] One is, as it were, material, to wit, the very thing will, right? Another, as it were, formal, is the reason for willing, which is the end. Huh? Just as in the object of sight, color, it says it were material, light, formal, because through it, color is rendered visible and act. Huh? And thus, on the side of the object, a twofold conformity can be found. Huh? One on the side of the thing willed, as when a man wills something that God wills, and this is, as it were, according to the material cause, huh?

[18:23] For the object is, as it were, the matter of the act. Once it is minima among the others, right? The others on the part of the reason for willing, or on the part of the will, as when someone wills on account of this.

[18:46] When someone wills on account of this something on account of God, that's getting strange, though. It's interesting. And this conformity is according to the final cause. Huh? It's kind of distinction he's making in that. Texture,

[19:04] but nevertheless, as regards both, in some way the human will is conformed to the divine will, because according as it is conformed to the divine will, in common by reason of what is conformed to it in the what last end.

[19:28] According, however, as it is not conformed to it in the willed materially, is conformed to it according to the what efficient cause. Why? Because this proper inclination, following upon nature, right, or this particular what grasping or knowledge, right, of this thing, it has this from God, is from a what? Yeah. Whence it is accustomed to be said that is conformed, as regards this, that the will of man is what?

[20:12] To the will of God. Yeah. Because he wishes this, that God wishes him to wish. So suppose my God intends for my father to die now, right? And what should I be willing? My father die? I should will that he recover, right? Well, isn't you know the natural inclination to will that your father will recover, right? So you're in some way conformed to God as the efficient cause, because He gave you this nature whereby you are what?

[20:53] Desire good things. Yeah, but you're inclined to the to the good of your father, right? Okay. Should still be conformed to God's will, no matter what takes place, right? In this disease, huh?

[21:10] There is also another way of conformity, according to the reason of a what? Formal cause, huh? To wit, that man wills something from charity, just as God wills, right?

[21:27] And this conformity also is reduced to the formal conformity that is to be noted from the order to the last end, which is the proper object of charity, huh?

[21:42] So you have to will the same thing God wills. Hmm. Hmm. Essentially, close. Ultimate. Yeah, yeah. But here and now, this thing. You're willing that your father recover. That's not what God's willing.

[22:14] But what about Martha and Mary there, right? You're willing that their their brother did not die, huh? If he had been there, he would not have died. They thought. Christ will did

[22:39] he die so he could impress the apostles as well as the others there, right? Yeah. That's two, right? The Pharisees wanted to only kill Christ, but to kill the others. So that's how they get rid of the evidence. Association never was one.

[23:15] Okay, now what about this first objection? Now, let's clarify things a bit. First objection says we're not able to will what we don't know, but what God wills, we don't know for the most part, right?

[23:33] So, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the divine thing, what is will by the divine, according to a common what reason, what it is, we're able to know, right? For we know that God, whatever He wills, right, He wills it under the reason that it's good,

[24:01] and therefore, whoever wills something under whatever reason of good, right, has a will conform to divine will as regards the reason for the what will.

[24:19] We know, in other words, that God wills something because it is good, right? And therefore, we try to will what we think is good, right? And that we are conformed in a general way to God's will, right? Although not in particular, right? Said in particularity, right? But in the particular, we don't know what God wills, right? And therefore, as regards this, we are not held to conform our will to what divine will.

[24:58] So, when the parents, little baby there, or child there, becomes what ill and danger of dying, right? And if God wills that child to die, right, should the parents be considered bad and willing the child to to live?

[25:19] If they knew that God wills the child to die, that would be different, right? But if they don't know that God wills a child to die, they don't know that.

[25:30] Yeah, then they would not be willing what according to their natural inclination, right? They wouldn't be conforming to God who gave them that, right? But if the child does die, then they accept it. Yeah, it's like King David. He fasted and he wept and he prayed while the child was sick. When he died, he took him, took the bath, took him to the oil. Now, in the state of glory, however, right,

[26:05] all will see in what? Yeah, in the singular individual things that they will, right? The order of these things to that which God what wills about each of them, and therefore not only formally but materially in all things they will conform their will to God. So, what does we see in the Our Father there? That will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Yeah, but can His will be done on earth as fully as it is in heaven?

[26:44] Because I may not will in particular what God works in particular right now. Now, the way that Augustine divides the seven petitions, right, huh? The first three petitions are about what is not fully given in this life, right? But only in the next life, right? So God will not be fully hallowed, right? Praised in this life, and His kingdom will not fully come in this life, right?

[27:14] And then what? His will won't be fully done. Yeah. See, the last four are the ones that can be fulfilled in this life, right? Huh? So you know, question. I grew up saying the Our Father was always the priest was saying the Our Father. He would lead the first three petitions, right? And then the last four petitions, the congregation answered, right? Huh? Well, it kind of fits in with with Augustine's division, right?

[27:40] Huh? You know, because we probably divided, you know, the seven into the four concerned with the good and the three with the bad, right? So you put the first four against the last three, but Augustine puts the first three against the last four. It shows not his perverseness, but the the subtlety of his mind, right? Huh? You know.

[28:05] And Thomas divides them into three. Right, the first two for the the end, and the second two for the means to the end, the chief means doing His will, the correct, you know, to do His will, and then the last three, you know, to remove all the impediments to the to the end. Huh?

[28:26] So interesting thing in the church fathers are in the Patristic area. How do you understand the the seventh petition? Deliver us from evil. Deliver us from evil. Yeah.

[28:44] Evil one by evil mean evil one. Oh yeah. Oh, in that sense, yeah, that's one one way of understanding it. Yeah, Maybe it kind of fits the Greek, you know. But when the church fathers says that the. We pray, and us not into temptation, right? So we don't in the previous one, right? So we don't come into the power of the temptation, right? We're overcome by it, right now.

[29:05] But if we do, we're in a bad state, right? And then the last one, you know, as I said, never thought of that. I used to think of it in terms of other evils and sin or something, you know. As a child, I did always think of that way, right? That the you have two ones about sin there, and then you have one about other evils, you know.

[29:29] But now, deliver us from evil. Now, I succumb to the temptation. Not really in. I'm drowning. I'm quicksand. I'm going down. So now, now come and pull me out of the quicksand, you know, or something. You know, that's kind of interesting. You know,

[29:48] this is the you can say about Shakespeare says the brevity is the soul of wit, right? The brevity of that our Father, you know, how profound a prayer it is. Like Augustine and Thomas following Augustine, say you know you can't pray. You can rightly pray for is in the Our Father, right? No other prayers are just kind of what they're repeating or saying the same two different words, you know.

[30:15] Basically, you know, he said it all in that prayer, right? So that way, our will will be more conformed to the divine will, right? Even for the what the saints, right? Huh? Their will in heaven is even more conformed to the divine will because than it was in this life, right? Huh? In this life, it was not always conformed to divine will in regard to the particular thing that God was willing, right?

[30:59] But in there, it will be, right? Now, what about this second objection here about God willing somebody to be damned? Well, you got to be careful about saying that, right? To second, it should be said that God does not will the damnation of someone under the notion of what damnation, nor the death of someone in so far as it is what death, right? Because He wills all men to be saved.

[31:33] That's the antecedent wills, as Damascene says. But He wills this under the ratio of what justice, huh? Hence, it suffices about such things that a man wills the what justice of God, and that what the order of nature be observed, huh?

[31:57] And this is the way he answers the what third objection, right? Huh? About the death of his what father, right? But notice now, Thomas unusually he what he's going to answer the arguments on the other side, huh? That's strange, huh? That's real, too. Now to the first that is objected in the contrary, it should be said that God more wills that what He more wills what God wills who conforms His will to the divine will as regards the reason for the thing being willed, right?

[32:47] Then the one who conforms it as regards the very thing what willed, huh? Now what's the reason for saying that, right? Because the will chiefly is born to the end. Yeah. It means carried." It means carried to, right? Or born, born to you. Then to that which is towards the end, right?

[33:18] So you're more held to will the end, right? Than what is for the end, right? You might not know. We'd like the previous one about the justice of God, right? Yeah. When Saint Paul is praying for this, you know, stimulus his body, whatever that is, exactly, and he thinks it's going to be helpful to him in his preaching or whatever it is, right? And God says, "No, it's better for you to have this, right?

[33:49] Because it keeps him getting puffed up, right? " And because of the revelations, so he, you know, so humility, the humility of him, it's necessary that he have this what annoyance, to say the least, whatever it is, right? You know.

[34:09] So Saint Paul accepts that, right? He's been praying for it, right? See, was he bad praying for that? Didn't know in particular though that this was this is here for his humility, right?

[34:30] Interesting, huh? Some things that happen in life that are good for your humility. You didn't know at the time, but you see afterwards, as good as embarrassment, whatever it was, took place for me.

[34:51] It's good for my humility. They saw what a scoundrel I really was. If I kept on succeeding in deceiving them all, it's too much. You know, I'd be bad for my humility, right? Paroles, huh? Paroles. I guess he comes from gets his name from "words I read for "words" in French. Paroles, yeah. And he's and he's he's fairly exposed, you know.

[35:38] Yeah, yeah. But there's room for even me, you know. At the end, he says that I'm going back to London. Which, which plays? Let's see, which one is it now?

[35:53] Can't think which one it is now. Let it come to us. Okay. Ask me again. Break down. I don't know if I have it on. Yeah. I think I do have it on the other. Oh. Look at that name.

[36:13] Okay. Um. To the second one, that the species and form of an act is more to be what, according to the ratio of the object, than according to what is material in the object, right? It's kind of the same point.

[36:37] To the third, it should be said that there is not a repugnance of wills when some will diverse things, but not by the same of the same reason, right? But if under one reason there was something what willed by one that the other did not will, this would induce a repugnance of what wills, huh? Which nevertheless is not in the thing proposed, huh?

[37:07] So that was a close call there. I thought we might have really been troubled there. I have to know what I don't know. Because God requires you to know what you don't know.

[37:27] And maybe if someone had lived longer, you would have been exposed to temptations that he would have succumbed to, right? It was better for him to go then, right?

[37:40] Whom the gods love dies young, as it says. in the Greek proverb. So now we get to. The third thing on the goodness and malice of human acts, right? And I guess you had what? One question was on in general, right? The goodness or badness of human acts, and then the question just finished was on the what? Goodness or badness of the interior acts, right? Of the will, and now we're going to deal with the what?

[38:12] Exterior acts, right? Then, we ought to consider about the goodness and badness as regards the exterior acts, and about this, six things are to be asked, are asked.

[38:32] First, whether goodness and badness is found before in the act of the will or in the exterior act. Second, whether the whole goodness or badness of the exterior act depends upon the goodness of the will. Seems to answer the first question. Well, there are minds, Thomas.

[39:01] I don't know. Just thinks everything you think about, even more. That's like, yeah. If an infinite number of lines can pass through a point, God knows all points. That's an infinity of infinities.

[39:23] what does Mozart say? You know, there are things in the concertos. He says only a connoisseur can truly, you know, appreciate. He says, but to write in such a way that everybody will like them, he says. Yeah.

[39:37] And sometimes, you know, my friend Warren Burley's more educated in music, you know, technically so, he'll talk about some subtlety and all these things, and and the first time he did this, you know, he said, "Do you like the Jupiter Symphony?" And I said, "Yeah." You know, he's doing the fourth movement, and I say, "well, kind of." And he says, "well, at the end, he's combining four or five melodies together, right?"

[40:00] I said, "He is." I said, I can't listen again, you know. So you keep on hearing these things, right? That's the way Thomas is, right?

[40:14] I told you that time they were doing the Charles De Koninck and Monsignor Dionne were in Rome. You know, Second Vatican Council, they were a parity you might call, them but they carried nothing back. And Monsignor Dionne pointed something out, you know, and the physics there to de De Koninck you know. De Koninck says, "How could I have talked it all these years and missed that?" You know, but he'd come into class, you know, he would say, you know, you know, he'd been teaching these since the 1930s, right?

[40:40] You know, because I had him in the you know 50s, 60s, and he says he still, you know, sees something new every time he goes through these things. It's kind of marvelous, you know. I knew him coming down the hall there before we're doing the, the fourth book there, the physics there, one course in the place there, you know. Come down, you know, and he just kind of he's kind of a sharp man, De Koninck, you know.

[41:05] I mean, I was looking down at him, you know, and I look him in my eyes, and he says, you know, isn't this wonderful? You know, he was saying, you know, he had more wonder than anybody in the class, right? You know, even though he taught it many times, you know, just just a marvelous, marvelous man, De Koninck De Koninck too of course

[41:31] Okay. Well, there, there is the same goodness and badness of the interior and exterior act. Whereas Tom talks about some people not liking this, this precision, right? Huh? And they think it's it's stingy, right? I think I'd be a little more relaxed, you know, about these things, you know. More pastoral. Yeah, yeah,

[42:03] yeah. Shakespeare sometimes speaks as if what the truth is stingy, right? Huh? So you flatter somebody, or you're what going beyond, right? But if you just say the truth about somebody, you're being stingy, you know. You're stingy in your praise, right? Because you say no more than he does.

[42:29] But then there's rhetoric. I know. Well, Aristotle there in the eighth book of the Nicomachean Ethics he was talking about friendship, you know, and he talks about does friendship consist more in loving or being loved, right? And before he determines the truth about this, he says, you know, many men or maybe most men are more interested in being loved, right, than in loving, right. And then he sees a connection between being loved and honored, right, and that to be loved in a way is to be what honored, right?

[43:07] Because honor is a testimony to some excellence in you, and being loved is does something good in you, right? Huh? So some want to be loved, you know, for the sake of honor, right? Huh? And then he says, but

[43:22] which is better, to be loved or to be honored? He says, well, why do you want to be honored, right? He said people want to be honored either by those who are in power and can do them some good, right? And so they figure if they honor them, they're going to get something out of them, right? Or they want to be honored by those who are virtuous and excellent in something as a kind of confirmation that there's something good in them, right?

[43:50] Huh? Okay, but in either case, you want to be honored for something other than being honored. By being loved, you want to be loved for its own sake. So what's per se is better than what's per livelihood right? So you never listen, guy. You know. Then he goes on, you know, to argue that friendship consists more, though, in loving than being loved, right? Now, but he doesn't give the reason at that point.

[44:17] He just gives example of the woman who gives up her baby to be what Nursed nursed by another woman because she can't, and therefore she's what loving the good of the child, but she won't be loved in return because the child won't know his mother.

[44:38] So he takes a woman as being you know more better than a man in terms of love, right? But it's all about it. That's why I kind of really admire that prayer of Saint Francis. You know, where one of the things he prays for that he more more seeks to love than to be loved, right? I used to say to students, "I mean, if this saint had to pray for this, what about the rest of us slobs, You know, you know that we we probably want more to be loved than to love, right?

[45:09] That's why we flatter people, right? Because then you know they think we love them, you know. And a beautiful thing in Julius Caesar, there, you know, where they they get into kind of a squabble there, Cassius and Brutus. You know, Cassius, friend of that, always criticizing my faults and all. So, so a flatterer not, but a friend would, you know. Brutus has a beautiful understanding there, Shakespeare

[45:38] examples in Shakespeare so clear, you know. If people knew them, you know, I mean, you could teach ethics from the plays of Shakespeare with those examples.

[45:49] Thomas, in some places, you know, he quotes Terence. You know, who's good example of moral things. Okay, so whether quarto, whether the exterior act adds something to the goodness or badness above what the interior act has, right?

[46:21] If I want to commit adultery and then I go out and actually commit it, is that adding something bad to my wanting to commit adultery, or is that if I want to rob you and I go out and rob you, that's going to add some some badness to? I suppose, according to law, you can be punished for conspiracy even if you didn't do it. But you're punished more if you do it.

[46:46] Did as well. He kind of was. Well, fifth, whether the events following suppose the act right add something to the goodness or badness as regards exterior act. And six, whether the same exterior act can be good and what? bad, and in dangerous territory there, right? Okay. To the first, then one proceeds thus: it seems that good and bad before consist in the what exterior act, than in the act of the what will, huh?

[47:32] Yeah, look at the commandments there. The first one for us about the bad there is, "Thou shalt not commit murder." I guess, huh? The fifth commandment. See what? That's exterior act, isn't it, murder? Then next one is, "Thou shalt not steal."Fifth adultery, adultery,

[47:53] and then that's not stealing. Because these are all the exterior acts, right? And then later on, it gets to the other ones, though. But this kind of stands out. You know, you think of the things your, you know, do's and don'ts. As people say, that's what ethics is about. They think do's and don'ts. Rules. Rules. Yeah. Yeah. Don't be all these rules. But when we're simply to say do's and don'ts, right?

[48:16] The do's and don'ts seem to be the exterior acts, right? People think about those things. So, for the will has its goodness from the object, as has been said, right? But the exterior act is the object of the what? The interior act of the will, right? For one is said to will theft, right? Huh? Or one is said to will to give alms, okay?

[48:49] Therefore, good and bad are before an exterior act and the act of the will. Okay, so the object of the will is before the act of the will, right? The object of the will here seems to be the exterior act, right? So, if the theft is a bad exterior act and the giving of alms is a good one, right? Then the interior act of the will is good or bad according to which you're willing, right?

[49:14] According to its object. Moreover, good before belongs to the what end? Huh? Because those things which are towards the end or for the end have the notion of good from their order to the end. But the act of the will is not able to be the end, as has been said above.

[49:43] Therefore, the act of some other power, but the act of some other power can be the what end? The first thing you will is the end, and the first thing you will is not the act of the will itself. Okay. Therefore, before good consists in the act of some other power than in the act of the what will.

[50:06] Moreover, the act of the will formally has itself to the exterior act, as has been said. But that which is what formal is after, for the form comes to the matter. Therefore, before is good and bad in the exterior act than in the act of the will. So you're all convinced. Should be. But Stuart, at this point is convinced, right? No, I'm confused.

[50:39] But against this is what Augustine says in all books, the Book of the Retractions, right? I've often said, you know, that Augustine in the book of the Retractions has given a lesson to all of us. You know, all these philosophers should be forced to write a book of retractions.

[50:59] Some of these guys are constantly changing their minds, you know. So they've written many books of retractions. Yeah. But anyway, in that book, Augustine says that the will is that by which one sins and what lives rightly. Therefore, the good and bad moral are before found in the what will.

[51:28] Let's see what the master says now. Answer: It should be said that some exterior acts can be called good or bad in two ways. What distinction is this?

[51:48] In one way, by their what genus, huh? By their kind, and according to the circumstances considered in them, right? Just as to give alms, observing the appropriate suitable or owed circumstances, right, It's said to be good, right?

[52:16] In another way, something is said to be good or bad from its order to an end, and thus to give alms on account of inane glory is said to be what bad, right?

[52:35] So to teach is what. In first sense, first sense, but it could be bad in second sense if it's some kind of inane glory that one teaches, right? Okay.

[52:51] And there's a lot of that going on in the world. Now, since, however, that the end is the what the will's own object, right?

[53:16] It is manifest that the aspect of good or bad which an exterior act as from its order to the end is found before in the act of the what will, and from this is it is derived to the what exterior act.

[53:47] So if I teach you to make you know more. To make you more like God, who knows everything, that's good, right? If I teach you to gain inane glory, that's bad, right? But that's in there is in the will more than the. Yeah.

[54:10] Now the goodness or badness which the exterior act has by itself, on account of a what suitable matter and suitable circumstances, right, is not derived from the will, but more from what reason, huh?

[54:36] Whence, if the goodness of the exterior act is considered according as it is in the ordering and grasping of reason, it is before the what of the will.

[54:55] But if it be considered according as it in the carrying out of the work, it follows the goodness of the will, which is its what.

[55:07] That's an interesting distinction she's making there, right? Now, what about the first objection? It says the will has its goodness from its object, and the object is exterior act.

[55:25] Well, to the first, it should be said that the exterior act is the object of the will. How, in so far as it is proposed to the will by reason, right, as a certain good grasped and ordered by reason, and in this way it is before the good act of the will.

[55:51] But then it's more in reason than in the exterior act itself, right? In so far as it consists in the carrying out of the work, it is an effect of the will, and it follows the what will, huh?

[56:06] So the will there is is before, right? Now, second objection here. To the second, it should be said that the end is before in what,

[56:29] But after in execution. right. It's a famous principle, right. It seems to be what governs his whole response. Distinction. Senior, yeah. To the third, it should be said. That the form, according as it is received in matter, is after in the way of what generation than the matter, although it is prior in nature in being more perfect, right? But according as it is in the agent cause, it is in all ways what before, right?

[57:15] But the will is compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause. Whence the goodness of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act as existing in its what agent cause. Might have to to adjust there, Vedam.

[57:39] Gives a lot to think about, Thomas. There, right? Take a little break here now. Up to Article Two now. I guess