Prima Secundae
58. Summa I-II Q.20 aa.2-4: The inner will and the outward act, one goodness or two, and what the deed adds
Class of 2012-02-23
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/058-summa-i-ii-q-20-aa-2-4-the-inner-will-and-the-outward-act/

[0:00] To the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the whole goodness and badness of the exterior act depends on the what? Will. For it said in Matthew chapter seven that a good tree is not able to produce bad fruits, nor a bad tree is able to produce good fruits. But through the tree, however, is understood the will, and through the fruit, the work of the. According to the gloss,

[0:42] they say in my footnote, this is a gloss of Augustine. But anyway, therefore, there cannot be it cannot be possible that the interior will be good and the exterior act be what bad or the reverse.

[1:03] Moreover, Augustine says in the Book of Retractions that one does not sin except by the will. If therefore there is not a sin in the will, there would not be a sin in the exterior act, and thus the whole goodness and badness of the exterior act depends upon the will.

[1:29] Moreover, the good and bad about which now we speak are differences of the moral act, but differences per se divide the genus, not per accidens, according to the philosopher in the seventh book of Wisdom. There, since therefore the act is moral from the fact that it is what voluntary, and there he knows the word "morals" doesn't mean good, huh? Okay.

[2:00] It seems that good and bad are taken in the act only from the what side of the will. The voluntaries with knowledge. But against this is what Augustine says in the book against lies, against the lie,

[2:22] that some things are there are some things which, by no good end, right, or good will, are able to come about well, right. Some people deny that, right? it's crazy theologians nowadays. So Thomas says the answer should be said, but as has been said, in the exterior act, one can consider a twofold goodness or badness. One is by the suitable matter and circumstances.

[3:01] Another by its order to the end, and that which is by its order to the end, the whole depends upon the what? Will. But that which is from a suitable matter or circumstances depends upon reason, and from this the goodness of the will depends, according as it is carried towards that act.

[3:35] Now it should be considered that it has been said above that in order that something be bad, it suffices one singular defect. Great quote there from Dionysius, remember? Bonum ex integra causa, and that the bad from any defect. And in order that it be simply good, it does not suffice one individual good, but is required the integrity of goodness.

[4:12] If therefore the will is good, both from its own object and from the end, as a consequence, the exterior act will be good. But it does not suffice, and this is the key point now, that the exterior act, in order that the exterior act be good, that the goodness of the will, which is from the intention of the end, but if the will is bad, whether from the intention of the end or from the what, the act will, as a consequence, the exterior act is what bad.

[4:58] And therefore, it corrects that understanding of that text to Matthew there, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the good will, insofar as it is signified to the good what tree,

[5:13] should be taken according as it has goodness from the act will and from the end what intended, right? And in the second one, to the second, it should be said that not only does someone sin by the will will when he wills a bad end, but also when he wills a bad way. So what about my friend Robin Hood?

[5:45] Well, he got a weapon. He won. Can't do it. Good intention is good enough. If I steal to give alms, sir. That's good enough. That's good enough. Tough. This is tough. Scorpions for breakfast.

[6:20] So in the text of Augustine, not saying that one sins only by the will, right? If therefore there is not a sin in the will, there is not a sin in the exterior act, right? But there can be a sin in the will not only from the wrong end, but from the what wrong act being willed, yeah.

[6:44] And the third objection is taking voluntary in what too narrow a sense, right? Just for the act of the will itself, right? But something is called voluntary not only the interior act of the will, but also the exterior acts. That's where taking up the exterior acts, insofar as they proceed from the will and reason, and therefore concerning both acts, there can be a difference of good and bad.

[7:23] I'm glad I'm not a confessor I think Saint Alphonsus says if a priest is worried about hearing confessions, especially if he's newly ordained, because he's like, who can do this? Who can be responsible for all anything that walks in the door? You know. Yeah. And he says, well, as long as he's not been negligent he's not guilty of neglecting his duty to inform him. about, He'll have the grace to pray for the grace, and if his spirit says do it, then he'll have the grace to do it because nobody can do it.

[7:56] Nobody can do it. But as long as he hasn't neglected, he doesn't have to worry. Just say the prayer. That's the patron of confession, right there. Okay, now. The article three here.

[8:16] The third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that is not the same the goodness and badness of the interior act of the will and of the what? The exterior and interior. Yeah, interior act of the will and exterior. act. Oh, I'm sorry. I was looking at the title.

[8:39] What's this exactly over here? Yeah. For the act of the what? Beginning. Excuse me. The beginning of the interior. Yeah. The beginning of the source of the interior act. Then is the power of the soul, the interior power that is either grasping, knowing, right, Desiring. or desiring, right. So Thomas uses that term, apprehensiva, right? Grasping the mind, because the knowing power, what? Grasps. Yeah, contains the object in itself.

[9:10] Huh? I was giving the students last night. There, they my nice sophism, right? Huh? And I said, a square is a what? Equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. And an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral is the definition of square. So both statements are true, right? Got a syllogism there. Conclusion is, therefore, a square is the definition of square. Now,

[9:45] what's wrong with that? Or how do you know? You know, let's take a simple question there first. How do you know it's false to say that a square is the definition of square?

[10:07] Because what you're defining is in the definition. at least Well, that's probably the problem of why this thing arises. But you know, one of the students that very good said the definition is not four-sided. So how can the definition of square be a square if it's not four-sided, right? Okay. And yet, is there some truth in the argument, right? That it is the definition of square in some sense, right?

[10:44] The nature of the square, right, is the nature of the square in some way contained in the definition of square. It is, right? Yeah. And so it's not sort of saying what kind of mistake is being made here, right? Huh? Is is mistake of simply and not simply, right? Because the conclusion is, you know, the square is simply without question the definition of square. But in some imperfect way it is, right?

[11:13] And that's because this act is named from the grasping of the hand, right? The first act of the mind is grasping what something is, and when I grasp something, it's contained in my what? Hand. And so, when the mind grasps something, it's contained in the mind. Some way, yeah. So it's beautiful the way Thomas uses that word there, huh? To kind of name the knowing power, right?

[11:40] Now, the grasping power and the wanting power, you know. See, well, in the case of the will, the object, the will's act is more in the object than the object in it, right? Or your treasure, as our Lord said, you know, that your heart shall be, huh? Okay, so if they have these treasures in heaven, then your heart will be in heaven, right? And they get no treasure down here.

[12:08] You know, you're giving it all away or something, right? And so, beautiful way of describing these two powers, right? Goes back to Aristotle points out in many places, but when I first studied logic, they used to call the first act simplex apprehension, right? Simple grasping, right?

[12:36] So that's the perfection of the mind to grasp something, you know. But is that perfection of the will to be grasping? Some of them was like avarice or something, right? Defect of the will, huh? But anyway. But the act of what, the principle or source, you might say, of the exterior act is the power carrying out the motion, right? Okay.

[13:03] But where there are diverse principles of action, there there are diverse what? Acts. Acts. But the acts are is the subject of goodness or what? Badness. And there cannot be what? Same accidents in diverse subjects, right? Same numerically, right? Now, if there's whiteness in your face, it can't be the whiteness in my face. Okay. Can't be the same whiteness, huh? Same in kind, but not the same in numerically.

[13:43] Therefore, there cannot be the same goodness of the interior and the exterior act. This is tough stuff. Moreover, and this is the famous definition of Aristotle in the second book Book of the Ethics: virtue is what makes its haver good and renders his what act good, huh? Okay. So when you introduce the idea of virtue, I always quote this little plaque that Uncle Warren has. Yeah. Has on the much virtue in herbs, little in men.

[14:21] So the herb has what makes it to be a good herb, and its act to season the food it seasons it good, right? Huh? Like Warren comes down to my house, you know, he says this herb is always thought out. I got a new one. It's lost its virtue, right? And Aristotle uses an example when he compares it. You are the salt of the earth, right? If it loses its what virtue, we might say, huh?

[14:45] You know, you thawed out and trampled under, right? Yeah, yeah. So that's the same way with you guys, you know, you do that, and so you got to make virtue kind of you know more accessible to people, right, to see what it is.

[15:02] So I always take the example of the knife, right? The virtue of the knife is what? Yeah. Cutting well is not the virtue of the knife, right? But it's a quality of the knife that enables it to cut well, right? Okay. What's the the vice of the knife? Dull. You'll see that right? And then when you want to have what is the virtue of man? Oh, what is that?

[15:28] It's a little harder to know. It's got to be sharp too. Dull man. So, moreover, virtue is what makes its haver good and renders his work good, huh? But other is the what intellectual virtue in the power what commanding, and other the moral virtue in the power what commanded, huh? As is clear in the first book of the Ethics, right? So that's at the end of the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle distinguishes between the virtues of reason itself, right, and the virtues of what the will and the emotions, the moral virtues.

[16:22] Therefore, other is the goodness of the interior act, which is of the what? Commanding. Commanding power. Yeah, and other is the goodness of the exterior act, which is the act of the power commanded, huh?

[16:39] Moreover, cause and effect are not able to be the what same, for nothing is a cause of itself, huh? That's a what axiom, yeah. But the goodness of the interior act is a cause of the goodness of the exterior act, or the reverse, as has been said. Therefore, there cannot be the same goodness of both. Huh? Keep on getting convinced of. the false, against this guy, huh?

[17:06] Very, very, very dangerous. Yeah. I put it on the index. Yeah. The index. It gets us all confused. It was. It's like Bellarmine's book, Controversies. I don't know if it was put on the index, but they loudly objected to it because they said he's giving the Protestants all these better arguments than they give themselves. And then he pointed out, Yeah, but I answer that. What's the problem?

[17:44] But against this is what has been shown above, right? That the act of the will has itself to the exterior act as something what form is form to matter, But from form and matter material there comes about one thing.

[18:01] Therefore, there is one goodness of the interior act and the exterior act. Okay, well, let's have some enlightenment Thomas. beg you, to enlighten us,The superior angel. And so Dion, David was comparing, you know, this order. You know, we got Aristotle and then Thomas proportioning to us to the angels. You know, it's not as fixed as the angels, but there's something like that, you know.

[18:33] You try to read a book, of Aristotle, that Thomas has not commented on. It's pretty hard to proportion Aristotle to yourself. So he says, I answer. It should be said that it has been said above, the interior act of the will and the exterior act, in so far as they are considered in the genus of what, one what, act.

[19:04] But it can happen sometimes that the act which is one in what, subject, has many reasons of its goodness or what, badness, and sometimes only one.

[19:21] And there, thus, therefore, it should be said that sometimes there is the same goodness or badness of the interior and the exterior act, sometimes what, other and other.

[19:39] For just as has already been said, the foresaid two goodnesses or badness, to wit of the interior and exterior act, are ordered to each other, right? But it can happen in those things which are ordered to another that something is good from this only from this only, that it is what, ordered to another. Just as a bitter potion from this alone is good, that it is ordered to what, health, right?

[20:15] protective of health. Whence there is not another goodness of what health and the potion, but one and the what, same. Sometimes, though, that which is ordered to another has in itself some ratio of good, even apart from its order to another good. Just as a medicine saporosa, savory medicine,

[20:50] has the aspect of a delightful good, apart from this that it is what, sanativa. So I remember when they gave me this little medicine. when I was a kid, there and had kind of cinnamon the outside, you know. This tastes pretty good, you know. And one time, sucked it too long. and I went, oh! oh, oh, oh, oh. And! I got the pochio amaro. you know And I never sucked them again.

[21:20] I learned my lesson. Thus, therefore, it should be said that when the exterior act is what good or bad only from its order to the end, then altogether there is the same goodness and badness of the act of the will, which per se regards the end, and of the exterior act which regards the end by means of the act of the will. When, however, the exterior act has goodness or badness by itself,

[22:06] to wit, according to its matter, right, or its circumstances, right, then the goodness of the exterior act is one, and the goodness of the will, which is from the end, is other.

[22:23] Thus, nevertheless, that the goodness of the end from the will redounds, flows over to the exterior act, right, and the goodness of the matter and the circumstances redounds upon the act of the will. This has been said, huh?

[22:47] Now the first objection, huh? It's saying that you have different powers, right, and different acts, huh? We say that argument proves that the exterior act and the interior act are diverse in the genus of what nature, right?

[23:08] But nevertheless, from these thus diverse is constituted something one in the genus of what? Yeah. So it's a subtle distinction there. Now to the second objection here.

[23:32] To second, it should be said that, as said, as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics, the moral virtues are ordered to the what acts of the virtues, which are as their ends.

[23:50] But prudence or foresight, which is in reason, is what to those is ordered to those things which are for the end, right, the means, huh? In account of this, they require what diverse virtues, huh? But right reason about the what end of the virtues does not have another goodness than the goodness of the virtue, according as the goodness of reason itself is partaken in each what virtue.

[24:41] That's interesting. To the third, it should be said. The objection is what the cause and effect can't be the same, right? When something is derived from one thing to another, as from a what?

[25:03] The identical agent. Yeah. Produces something like it. Then, its other what is in each, right? other than America, right? Huh? So my father and the son are not the same, right? But they're one, but identical agent, right? Same nature. Just as when the hot heats, other in number is the heat of the heater and of the heated, right? Although they're the same in species or kind, huh?

[25:35] But when something is derived from one to another by analogy or proportion, then is only one in number, huh? Just as from the healthy, which is in the body of the animal, is derived healthy to what medicine and urine, huh?

[26:01] Because medicine is what is productive that very same medicine, right? And urine is where yeah the sign of that very same medicine. Health, right? So there's not a different health involved in healthy being said of your urine and healthy being said of your what medicine, right? But it's the same health you're talking about when you say the body is healthy, right?

[26:25] So not other is the health of medicine and of urine than the health of the animal, right? Which the medicine makes and the urine signifies, right? That's example Aristotle uses when he's showing how metaphysics is one science, right? He uses that example. It's a humble example. Yeah, yeah. He was the son of a medical doctor, you know Aristotle. Oh. He was the court physician there for. Alexander.

[26:51] For Philip, at least, yeah. Okay. Gets Aristotle became known to the throne there and became the teacher of Alexander the Great, right? And in this way, from the goodness of the will is derived the goodness of the exterior act, the conversal. According to what, the order of one to the other, right? This is awfully subtle stuff, isn't it?

[27:40] Okay. Let me know. if it's Okay. That's your machine there. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah. That was working out there or something. Yeah, that's the phone machine we have. But we have a problem with Bernardo. Can you come back tomorrow? Oh no. Because I got a long stay. So he's Mexican, right? Yeah. So I got a cheap ticket. That's Air Canada. When he's going to stop over in Toronto, they won't let him do that because he doesn't have a visa to go to Canada.

[28:12] Yeah. So that's four hundred bucks down the drain. Oh, you can't get a refund? on that? Oh gee. No, that's not comfortable. So he's going to have to come back Tuesday. If I, can... I don't know. I'll figure it out. I'll have to route to a different airport or something. Yeah.

[28:29] The convenience of the modern world. Okay. Article four, I guess. Whether the exterior act adds something to the goodness and badness, of goodness and badness, over the act that's interior, right? To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that the exterior act does not add in goodness or badness, over the act that's interior.

[29:05] For Chrysostom says upon Matthew, huh? The will is what is what rewarded, I guess, for good, or condemned for what the bad. But works are the testimonies, the witnesses of the will. Therefore, God does not seek the works, for their own sake, that you might know in what way He judges, right? But in account of others, so that all what. I understand.

[29:42] But bad and good more should be estimated, according to the judgment of God, than according to the judgment of men. Therefore, the exterior act adds nothing to the goodness and badness over the interior act. Moreover, one and the same is the goodness of the interior and exterior act, as has been said, huh? Previous article, right? This this article seems to be contradictory to the previous one, right?

[30:12] You know, very very subtle, huh? But growth or augmentation, growth is by the addition of one to the other. Therefore, the exterior act does not add in goodness or badness over the interior act; it is the same, right? Okay, so Duane Berquist plus Duane Berquist is no more than Duane Berquist, right? Mm-hmm. So it's the same goodness, badness here. It's adding the same thing to itself, right?

[30:48] That that's no more. Moreover, the whole goodness the creature adds nothing over the divine goodness, huh? That's the thing that says or struck me is very, very interesting, you know, huh? That God and creatures is not better than God alone, right? Yeah. And I told you the two ways that Thomas tries to lead us by the hand. Understand that. He says that

[31:22] the goodness of the creature is not the goodness of God, like a shorter line is to a longer line. Yeah. Which would make the line longer. Mm-hmm. But because God is infinitely good. It's like a point to a line. Yeah. Now you had a point to a line. How much longer is a line? Oh, yeah. So God and creature is what no better than God alone, just as a line and a line and a point is no longer than the line.

[31:52] Then the other argument is sometimes is that the goodness the creature is partaking of the goodness of God, right? And as the word partake means taking a part of, so to speak, right? Well, the the whole and one of its parts is no more than the whole. So you and your arm is no more than you alone, right? So it's still hard to understand, right? You know how good God is, right?

[32:28] It's goodness itself, right? You think of it just as a quantity of the pile. I think as well. That's like the two part: the small line and the big line. We just default into that way of thinking. Yeah. Yeah. So, moreover, the whole goodness the creature adds nothing over the goodness the divine goodness, because the whole is derived from the divine goodness. But the goodness of the exterior act sometimes the whole is derived from the goodness of the what interior act.

[33:06] Sometimes the reverse. Therefore, one of them doesn't add in goodness or badness over the other, right? But against this is that every agent intends to achieve the good or to avoid the bad. If therefore through the exterior act nothing was added to goodness or badness, it would be in vain that whoever has a good will or a bad one would make a what good work or the system of bad work, which is unfitting to fit together with the truth, right?

[33:46] Aristotle says in the Ethics, truth all things fit, harmonize. Huh? Thomas says, "It's going to distinguish here." I answer: It should be said that if we speak of the goodness of the exterior act, that goodness which it has from the willing of the end, then the exterior act adds nothing to what goodness,

[34:20] unless it happens that the will itself, by itself, becomes better in good or worse in what evils. Which it can happen in three ways, huh? In one way, by number, huh? As when someone wills something to to do something

[34:48] for a good end or a bad one, and then what? Doesn't do it. Not do it. But afterwards, right? He wills and does it. For the act of the will is what? Doubled. And thus there comes about a twofold good or a twofold what? Evil, yeah. In another way, as regards extension, as when someone wills to do something, right? For a good end or a bad one, and encounters some impediment, he what?

[35:26] Desists, huh? But another one continues the motion of the will until he perfects what? Does the deed. Yeah. It is manifest that the will such a one is longer in either good or what? Bad. And according to this, it is worse or better, right?

[35:56] What did Buckley spoke about the tenacious ill will of his opponents? That was all chosen. We're tenacious, you know, huh? Yeah. Yeah. I just got a quick get him a little bit tenacious, you know. It's like persevering, right? Yeah. You know, ill will that some of these people had for you.

[36:28] Third, according to what? Intensity. Yeah. For there are some exterior acts which, in so far as they are what pleasant or painful, right? Are apt to what intensify the will or to make it more remiss, right?

[36:53] Now it stands to reason that when the will more intensely tends towards the good or the bad, right? To that extent, it is either better or what worse, right?

[37:10] If, however, we speak of the goodness of the exterior act, which it has by its matter and its suitable circumstances, thus it is compared to the will as a limit and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or badness of the will. Because every inclination or motion is perfected in this that it what? Obtains its end or it reaches its term, right? Whence it is not a perfect will, unless it be such that, given the opportunity, it what acts.

[37:51] Yeah. If therefore the poss if already possibility is absent, right? The will existing perfect that might operate if it was able to, right? The defect of perfection, which is from the exterior act, is simply something involuntary, right? The involuntary just as does not merit pain or reward in operating the good or the bad, so it does not take away anything from the what. It takes away something.

[38:31] It does not take away something. Oops, this is either. It to none. This is either totally. This could be wrong. Yeah. Okay. It doesn't take away something on the reward or the punishment. Yeah.

[38:54] If man involuntarily simply fails from what doing something good or bad, right? No, no. Just as the involuntary deserves neither punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil acts, so neither does the involuntary reward or punishment. This is lacking that.

[39:32] Now, what about the text from what? Chrysostom. Chrysostom. yeah. To the first, therefore, it, should be said that Chrysostom speaks when the will of man is what consummated, right? And does not cease from act except on account of what inability to do it. Yeah. To

[40:06] the second, it should be said that that argument that the same goodness of both, right, proceeds from the goodness of the exterior act, which it has from the willing of the end, right? But there is the goodness of the exterior act, which it has from its matter and circumstances, and that's other from the what goodness of the will, which is from its end.

[40:36] But not other from the goodness of the will, which it has from the act willed. But is compared to it as the reason and cause of it,

[40:49] and in this way is clear the solution to the what. There you go. So he digested all that. He made some turns. Don't don't don't be in confession out there and figure this out.

[41:12] He sits in the confession and they're reading the Prima Secundae there, right? That's not even down to the details. The Secundae, Secundae. Well, that's what St. Leopold Mandic, the Capuchino, was in Padua. Yeah. He was like a Padre Pio figure, about this tall. Yeah. And he had outside the confession, he was one of these people confessed him all over. And and his little desk he had in his cell.

[41:41] He had the Summa right on his desk.