Prima Secundae
59. Summa I-II Q20 a.5–6 and Q21 a.1: Whether Consequences Add to an Act's Goodness, Whether One Act Can Be Both Good and Bad, and Rightness and Sin
Class of 2012-03-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/059-summa-i-ii-q20-a-5-6-and-q21-a-1-whether-consequences-add/

[0:00] In the name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, enlighten lights of our minds, ordains lumina, our images, and rouses to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Help us to understand what you've written.

[0:37] I was reading the Catena Aurea this morning. there one about the ninety-nine animals you know that are okay, you know, and one of them is lost, right? So, the good shepherd leaves the ninety-nine in the mountains, right, and goes after the one that's lost, huh? Well, one way the Church fathers, you know, understand that is that the ninety-nine that are left in the mountains, those are the what?

[1:02] Angels, right, and and the one that is lost is the human race, right? So, was it Gregory that was talking about left in the mountains, right, up in the high cultivation of you know seeing God and so on? So they are left in the mountains, you know, and then he'd come down, you know, to take care of us. But it got beautiful all the way. Those things they said.

[1:33] I was looking away. I suppose biography there, Thomas again, you know, and he insists upon the importance of the Catena Aurea you know, for Thomas's, you know, theological development. He really thinks it's kind of a generic. I mean, a masterpiece, right? That he could select these things. They're so relevant to the text, you know, and and you know, select the right ones, you might say, you know, the ones that really illuminate and so on.

[2:01] Interesting. Okay, we're up to Article Five here in Question Twenty. That's what we're told here by the machine. Okay. Why? Okay, to the fifth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the what event following upon right adds to the goodness or badness of the what act. For effects exist in virtute, right, in the power of their what cause, huh?

[2:40] But events follow acts as effects follow what causes. Therefore, they pre-exist in the power in the acts, right? But each thing, according to its virtue or power, is judged good or bad. For virtue is what makes its have or good, and is act good as Aristotle says in the Ethics, huh? Therefore, the events add to the goodness or badness of the act. That seems

[3:12] definitive. Moreover, the goods which what? Hewers. Yeah, our effects follow upon the what preaching of the teacher? Yes, these are all the Dominicans. You can see them here to say, "Oh, yeah, this is nice objection here, right?" Yeah. But these kinds of good redound to the merit of the what Teacher. preacher? Yeah. Okay, that's what they call op, right? Ordo Praedicatorum right? Yeah, there's a good one.

[3:44] Father Jacob. Father Jacob Restrick. Very good. He was a big chaplain at the Dominican nuns in West Springfield. Oh, that's he's now down in Hawthorne, New York. So anyway, these goods redound to the merit of the preacher. It is clear through that which is said in Philippians four. My brothers, right, most dear and desired, my joy and my crown, right? Okay.

[4:14] It's like when they say in the Psalms, or see your children's children, right? It doesn't mean just you know be grandfathers, but you know when you teach somebody, then they teach somebody else, and you preach to then someone else. Okay. Therefore, the events following add to the goodness or badness of the act.

[4:36] Moreover, punishment is not added except when the guilt what increasing? As is said in Deuteronomy twenty-five, for the measure of the sin there will be the measure of what? Scourges. Scourges, yes. But from the event following is added to the pain, punishment added. For it said Exodus twenty-one that if the what? The ox is born with horns. from the from the day before the day before that.

[5:14] And then it's what? denuded of the horns, I don't know. And. Brother, what does it say there from Exodus? How? Hmm. In the third objection, if the ox was to push with his horns, was what? Yeah. Gory. Gory. Gory. Yeah. And his and his dominion was what contested, right? And his lord, yeah. Yeah. And was not what locked up, I guess, right? And killed a man or woman.

[5:56] Yeah. Then he's going to be killed with stones, I guess, right? And they'll kill the lord too. Yeah. And he kills the lord, right? Yeah. Pretty bad, right? Yeah. Pit bulls there. Yeah. I mean, give this all for them, yeah.

[6:14] But he would not be killed if the cattle had not what killed the man, right? Huh? Even not what. Corrupt. Yeah. Therefore, the event adds to the goodness or badness of the act. Okay, if you're punished for that. Further, the fourth argument now is someone what engenders the cause of death by striking or giving a what

[6:44] sentence, huh? And death does not follow. No irregularity is what contracted, but it is if death follows. Therefore, the event following adds to the goodness or badness of the act. So you see these things in the paper there, you know, you know, the person you've assaulted now dies, and you're in even more trouble than you are, right, for having assaulted,

[7:14] right? But against this is that the event following does not make the act bad, which was good, nor good, which was bad, right? Huh? As if someone gives what alms to the poor one, which he abuses for what sinning, nothing is left or lost to the one who what gives you know alms, right? And likewise, if someone patiently bears the injury done unto him,

[7:46] the one who did it is not, on account of this, excused, right? Therefore, the event following does not add to the goodness or badness of the act. So the guy who chopped off the head there. St. Dennis. Who's the one that rose from the dead? Who chopped his head off? He walked around telling everybody. That French one in Paris. Was it Saint Denis? Was it Saint Denis?

[8:17] Well, Thomas is not going to simply dismiss those arguments on the other side, right? I answer it should be said that the event or result following is either for what known praecogitatis or not, right? If it is known before, it is manifest that it adds to either the goodness or the what badness of the act, right? That you can see it's usable. For when someone thinking that from what he does, from his work, many bad things can what follow, right?

[8:57] Then. Nor, on account of this, does he what stop. From this it appears that his will is even more disordered, right? But now, if the event following is not foreknown, right? Well then, Thomas says you nevertheless have to distinguish here, right?

[9:24] Because if it follows per se as such and such an act, and for the most part, right, according to this, in this case, the event following adds to the goodness or the badness of the what act.

[9:48] For that is manifestly a better act, which from its own kind, right, many goods are apt to what follow, right? And that is. Worse, peiorum, right? From which are apt to follow what many things, right?

[10:08] So divorce, right? A lot of bad things follow from that, right? But if it is per accidens, right, by chance, right, and ut in paucioribus, right,

[10:28] then the event following does not add to the goodness or the badness of the act, huh? For a judgment is not given about something according to that which is what per accidens huh? But only according to that which is what per se, right?

[10:48] So, it's distinction between the per se and the per accidens is a very important what distinction. So, he made No no you went out the other door Oh okay

[11:02] So implied the first objection that he's agreeing with it if it's taken in the per se sense, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the what power of a cause is judged according to the effect per se, right? Not, however, according to the effect what Per accidens, right?

[11:30] That makes sense, huh? So you're on the firing range and you're shooting at the target. and it ricochets off and kills a man Yeah. I send you down the drugstore to get some some medicine, and you get shot in there, when the place is being held up, right? Yeah. Well, does this make my sending you down there worse? Yeah That's per accidens right?

[11:57] I was still held responsible that time when I went the winter day there to Assumption there when the school was closed. Got hit by a car coming back. I got caught out in his driveway, right? Oh yeah. So was his old Ford car, you know. So I never did tough if I had a radio and I could listen. Yeah. Before.

[12:20] The second should be said that the good which here is due, right, that follows from the preaching of the of the doctor, are effects what per se, right? Hence they redound to the award of the preacher, huh? And especially when they are what intended beforehand, right? So I remember that now. You got there to to give your sermon there, and especially you go up high, you know, of pride going for.

[12:59] To the third, it should be said that that event, for which that what pain is inflicted or commanded, it what per se follows from such a cause, right? Then, and likewise, it is laid down as something that should be foreknown, right? And therefore, it is intended to what Punishment right What happens if I drive my car too fast and I hit somebody?

[13:30] It's not necessarily. It's dangerous, but it doesn't always. You don't always hit somebody just for driving fast. No, no. But it's it's not why a place where I can't see, you know, you're doing the street for everyone, so on.

[13:47] Yes, do you know? We're coming from St. Paul. There, you had two rows of houses like this, right? Then you had a kind of an alley in between, huh? And the delivery people, like milk and so on, they used to go down that alley and hit too many kids. So they stopped doing that, right? So on, right? But obviously, you're going fast down that alley. That would be.

[14:20] Yeah. That would be, I would think, adding to the the badness of your act, right? The judge had come down more severely upon you.

[14:40] Okay. Oh, we didn't read the fourth objection. We didn't read the fourth reply. Yeah. He says that argument proceeds if the what. The irregularity follows. The guilt, huh?

[15:03] Does not, however, follow the guilt, but the thing what done on account of some defect of the sacrament, huh? Oh, I see. The irregularities, you know, impediment to the sacrament. Yeah.

[15:23] And my guess is, is it what we say certainly sacrament of orders? I don't. know. Yeah, this is also impediment for marriage. Marriage. Now, whether the same exterior act can be good and bad, I don't know. Sounds highly suspicious, huh? And to the sixth, one goes for it. Thus, it seems that one act is able to be good and bad, right?

[15:55] For one emotion is one that is continuous, as is said in the fifth book of Natural Hearing, the Physics. But one continuous motion can be good and bad. If, example, someone what continually going towards the church first intends an aim glory, right? Afterwards, he intends to serve God, right? So, walking to church, which is one act, right? One continuous act is both good and what bad, yeah.

[16:29] Therefore, one act can be good and bad. That's the objection, right? Moreover, according to the philosopher in the third book of the physics, acting upon and undergoing are one act, right? So, my kicking you and you're being kicked is the same thing. Aristotle's saying,

[16:56] But a undergoing can be good, as example, that of Christ, right? And the acting upon bad is that of the Jews, right? Therefore, one act can be both good and what bad, right?

[17:13] So, you're taking good spirits, you're being kicked, but it's bad for me to be kicking you, right? With you in humility and so on, preparation for your sins, you accept. Preparation for yours, good. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Except you're you're being kicked, right? So, one of the same thing, then, right? Is both good and bad, right?

[17:39] Huh? Moreover, since the servant or slave is a what tool of the Lord, huh? The action of the servant is an action of the Lord, right? Just as the action of a tool is the action of the what artist, right? But it can happen that the action of the servant proceeds from the goodwill of the Lord, and thus it is good, right? And from the bad will of the servant, and thus it is what bad.

[18:12] Therefore, the same act can be what good and bad. Against all this, contraries are not able to be in the same. But good and bad are contraries. Therefore, one act cannot be both what good and bad, huh? Now, what distinction is Thomas going to see here, right? He's always thinking out some distinction, this guy, huh?

[18:42] I answer: It should be said that nothing prevents something to be one, as it is in one what genus, and to be multiple, according as is referred to another genus. Just as the surface, continuous surface, can be one when it is considered in the genus of what quantity, right? But it can be multiple when it is referred to the genus of color, if part of it is what white and part black.

[19:16] huh Oh yeah Cutting board Cutting boards. And according to this, nothing prevents some act to be one, as it is referred to the genus of what nature,

[19:35] which nevertheless is not one when it is referred to the genus of morals. Just as the verse has been said, right? Now, walking ambulatio continuous is one act in the genus of what nature, but it can happen that there are many, according to the genus of what. Morals. Yeah. If the will of the one walking changes. If the will of the one walking is changed, right? Because that is the beginning source of moral acts, right?

[20:15] So you guys considered that we are walking today, huh? That you might have one natural act, but morally speaking, you might have had what two or three. Who knows? You know, you might have changed your mind and your will in the course of that walking, right? Right.

[20:42] If therefore one takes one act in so far now as it's in the genus of morals, right, it is impossible that it be what good and bad by the goodness and badness of morals, right?

[21:01] If, however, it is one by the unity of nature and not by the unity of morals, it can be both what good and bad. Yeah, so the walking, right? So one act, naturally speaking, right, can be both good and bad because it's not one act morally speaking. Distinction that he sees, huh?

[21:29] To first, therefore, it should be said that that motion, that continuous motion, which proceeds from a diverse intention, although it is one by the unity of nature, is nevertheless not one by the moral unity Yeah.

[21:50] It's funny how the word "moris comes from "mos" means what? Custom, you know. But it's taken on a different sense than just custom, right? Wouldn't sound right to translate to say, you know, in the genus of the customary, you know. But

[22:14] in a sense, the things talked about in ethics, a lot of them are by what? By custom, right? When you speak of moral virtue, right? Or let's say moral quality, there whether it be virtue or vice, it's produced by what? Repeated acts, right? And therefore, it's a it's custom, right? But I've

[22:40] always been a little puzzled still on that word, you know. Yeah. How you should translate it. Okay, but here I mean I translate, you know, morally speaking, you know, but as naturally speaking. To

[22:59] second should be said, acting upon and undergoing pertain to the genus of moral, in so far as they have the notion of what being voluntary, right? And therefore, according as they are what voluntary by a diverse will, according to this, they're two morally right. And from one part, it can be good, and the other one bad, right? So my kicking you is what bad in terms of my will, right?

[23:34] But you're taking this as something you deserve from your past sins, right? You deserve to be kicked and so on. Then it's a good act, right? You're being kicked. So being kicked can be good, and kicking can be bad. Yeah. Right. That we're saying, the mass. So yeah, that's that's always about the past. Well, we got redemption on it. So who's blame? He always answers that at the same time as the father does.

[24:06] We're responsible because we did what was in our power to do something bad. We did whatever it was in us to do something bad, which is to offend our Lord to kill

[24:22] That's always an interesting thing in the third book of the physics there about acting upon undergoing. That's where Thomas gets into a whole discussion of the categories and so on, where these different categories.

[24:36] So it's called acting upon, in so far as it's from the. Agent, right? And it's called undergoing. Insofar as in the, undergoer. Yeah, yeah. From another, agent You can stamp the wax or something like that, right? Is it? I was reading Saint Gertrude. She's talking about. Yeah.

[25:09] That's what that off the course. I was thinking about these different expressions we have of being made in the image of God or to the image of God. Yeah. I think the image that the comparison with the wax and the stamp expresses more the image to, as it corresponds to the exemplar. When made in, might refer more to something considered. I was reading Gertrude the other night there, where she asked our Lord, you know, to protect the nuns in the convent, right? He s he calls the angels down.

[25:43] Oh They just surround the whole place, you know. Yeah It's kind of interesting. Yeah Keep the de the demons away, you know, from from interfering with the saying of the office of the nuns—it's kind of beautiful, beautiful kind of images. Kind of nice thing to read. Just for you you know, to fall off the sleep reading those things They're kind of nice. Somebody, I think, one of the priests in the order, Father Robert, was in the fourth day.

[26:10] Some—I don't remember the details of the story. I don't know if it was in Mexico or Central or South America. Somewhere there was a convent of nuns, and some soldiers were around. They were going to attack and abuse the nuns, and they prayed, prayed to the angels. And the soldiers came, and they they left. And somebody asked them later, "Why did you leave?" They said, "Well, we saw all those soldiers up on the roof.

[26:28] They were all loaded with weapons, so we said, 'No, we're not going to attack. '" To third, it should be said that the act of the servant of the slave, in so far as it what goes forth from the will of the servant, is not the act of the what Lord, right? Morally speaking, right? But only in so far as it proceeds from the command of the what Lord, right?

[27:01] Once it does not make it bad by the bad the bad will of the servant, right? Does not therefore make it something what In itself bad, right? Is his act. Now we come to question twenty-one. Then we have to consider about those things which follow upon human acts by reason of their goodness or what. Badness This is a reckoning now. I guess coming up. What reckoning? All right.

[27:42] And about this, four things are asked. First, whether a human act, in so far as it is either good or bad, has the what? Character. Character, yeah. It's always a curious question of how to translate rationem right? Thomas is so free in the use of that word, huh? Sometimes thinking we're forced to read reason there somewhere, you know. Yeah. I know somebody told us. Father Peter told us years ago, in Italian, "ragione generale" or something like that was rooted in ratio, is the name for an account.

[28:22] He has to give an account of something. So it's kind of the same notion here. It has to be counted for this. So whether it should be accounted praiseworthy or something like that, or yeah, okay.

[28:44] Whether it has first of all rectitude or what sin, right? Then whether it has what the notion of something praiseworthy that one should be guilty of. Whether it has the notion of merit or demerit, right?

[29:07] And whether it has the what aspect of merit or demerit before God? It's funny to article this, right? Yeah, because do a good act and still go to hell. Why, why,

[29:24] Wasep was saying. No, it could be good acting. I mean, the masons do all kinds of charity work for little children. And they sell Christmas trees. Certainly, communism in China. Wasep was saying that Thomas, you know, is going to teach the beginnings of Dominican beginners there in Roman province with the sentences of Peter Lombard, right? He realizes it's too difficult a thing, you know, to obscure a thing for them to think.

[29:52] And that's when he starts to write the what, the Summa Theologiae, you know, for. Oh really? Yeah. So they could have something, you know.

[30:10] Okay. To the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that a human act, in so far as it is good or bad, does not have the aspect of what rightness or sin, right.

[30:29] For sins are what Monsters. monsters in nature, right? As is said in the second book of the physics. But monsters are not what acts, Acts, but they are things generated outside the order of nature.

[30:53] But those things which are by art and reason imitate those things which are by what nature. And therefore, acts—an act from the fact that it is what Disordered and bad—does not have the what. Notion of sin. Yeah.

[31:20] Does it mean that it's going to be restricted to monsters in nature? I don't know Is it—is he saying just like some of the born handicapped, you wouldn't say that's a sin? Yeah. So they're

[31:38] monsters, though. Or sometimes a woman gives birth to it's like a stillborn or something. It's not even developed as a child. We're missing all kinds of parts.

[31:52] Further, peccatum sin, right? Huh? As is said in the second book of the physics, happens both in nature and in art, when one does not arrive at the end intended by nature or art.

[32:12] But the goodness or badness of a human act most of all consists in the intention of the end, and its carrying out. Therefore, it seems that the badness of the act does not bring in a sin.

[32:36] So you didn't achieve your end, right? That's what is sin, right? There's a word like "peccatum" there in the book on the places, right? And the definition is not what should be. Moreover, if the badness of the act induces the notion of sin, it would follow that wherever there is something bad, there would be sin, right? Huh? But this is false. For punishment, although it has the aspect of something bad, it nevertheless does not have the definition of what sin.

[33:18] Therefore, not from this, but some act is bad, does it have the aspect of being a sinner. But against all this, the goodness of a human act, as has been shown above, chiefly depends upon the what eternal law, and consequently its badness consists in this that it doesn't fit together, right? It discords, it clashes with eternal law. But this makes for the what definition of sin? For Augustine says this kind of definition of Augustine, right, in the twenty-second book against Faust,

[34:04] that peccatum is either something said or done or desired against the what eternal law. Therefore, human act from this that it is bad, and that therefore against what eternal law has a notion of sin, right? That's from Augustine.

[34:29] Well, now Thomas is going to see some distinctions here. The answer, it should be said, Thomas says that malum, which means what bad, includes in more. It's said of more, right? And then peccatum, right? So every peccatum is what malum, but not every malum is peccatum, right? Just as good is in more than what rectum,

[35:01] which means that the rectum is what good, More. but not everything good is rectum, right? Okay. How do you translate rectum? Right? Yeah. Again, not in the new gen translation change there in the mass, there, you know, and they start the

[35:27] yeah. They say right and just. Yeah, then we we reply, you know, that thank God, right? It's right and just, right? Rectum and just to vest. Okay.

[35:46] For any what Privation. privation or lack of the good in something, right, constitutes the what notion of bad, right? But peccatum properly consists in an act which is done on account of some end, right? But an end that does not have a what Due order. order to that end, huh?

[36:23] For the Suitable order to some end is measured according to some what Rule. rule, which rule in those things which are by nature are done by nature is what The very powerful nature nature, which is inclined to such an end.

[36:52] When therefore the act proceeds from the natural what power, according to the natural inclination it has to some end, then there is observed rightness, right

[37:10] in the act, because the middle does not go out from the extremes. goes back to definition of a you know straight line, you know where if you look down the straight line and line up the two end points right. Nothing stands up or above or below, right? It's straight. This is

[37:36] kind of borrowed from geometry, you know, when it's straight lines. Of course, we speak of that too, you know, acting straight or straight thinker, straight actor. Okay.

[37:56] Because the middle does not go out from the extremes, right? That is to say that the act from the order of the active what power or source to the end, right? It's

[38:15] lined up with. Some of them say it's a straight shooter. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Straight versus. Well, that's it. That speaks volumes, especially in this

[38:29] part. When, however, from the rightness of such an act, someone recedes, and then he incurs, right, when the act is of that sort, right, incurs the notion of what sin.

[38:48] In those things which are done by the will, the rule, the proximate rule, is human reason itself, but the supreme rule is the eternal law.

[39:05] When, therefore, the act of man proceeds to the end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is what right. When however it is what oblique,

[39:26] it departs from the straightness, right? Then it is said to be a peccatum right? You might say it's skewed. Is manifest, or from the foregoing, that every voluntary act is bad through this that it recedes from the order of what Reason. reason and of the eternal law,

[40:00] and every good act is in agreement with what reason and eternal law. I was thinking there. I was looking at the treatise on on friendship there, and we talk about in the Latin text Thomas Concordia, right? And how should you translate concordia? What would be the common meaning of that in English? Concordia.

[40:30] I sometimes say it's a phrase more than a harmony of will. Yeah, I looked in the dictionary. It seems that the kind of the most common translation of concordia would be agreement, right? That doesn't seem quite as obvious. Concord does, right? But agreement, right?

[40:53] Okay. So you see, every act is good. Every good act concordia, huh? It agrees with reason and the what? Yeah, I think you translated that. And how should you translate English? Who's got the English? They translate by agree or they translate. Which word? Concord, concordant. Towards the end of this. Towards the end, yeah, yeah, okay, yeah. That's that's what seems to be the translation, you know.

[41:32] Thomas is always talking about the end of the state there being ordered agreement, huh? Those are the days. Yeah, because you can you can have a disordered agreement, I suppose. People agree to sin. Yeah, true. Once it follows that a human act from this that it is good or bad, it has the notion of what rightness or what sin, huh? Doesn't use the word wrong, does he?

[42:05] Huh? See, they're right or wrong. That would be quite interesting to study the word wrong. You know, the origin of that word is etymologically right.

[42:19] Yeah. To the first paragraph, it should be said that monstra are said to be what? Peccata. We call it peccata natura, right? You just find that phrase it kind of strikes you, you know. You translate the sin of nature, you know. You know, it seems like like we use the word sin there a little bit more restricted, right? Okay.

[42:56] And so, monster are said to be sins in so far as they are what. A sin Act of existing existing in the act of what nature, right? Okay. So you got to take care there, right? I was meaning last night the students there were reading the the extrinsic places there right in the sixth book there in definition And there's some example there, it's the word agnoia right and

[43:35] some people are trying to define agnoia as simply what ignorance right the lack of knowledge of the subject but I remember this from the post analytics here, the word agnoia can mean ignorance or being what deceived or mistaken right okay and so I don't think that's true in English so much right I don't think ignorance means does that mean you're mistaken does that one meaning of ignorance it's more like it's more like error yeah well mistaken error the same right mistake is English word and error is Latin word right but

[44:15] we're kind of discussing a little bit last night you know whether you have the same equivocation there in English right where ignorance can mean simply what not knowing right lack of knowledge and then can it mean also being what mistaken or deceived

[44:35] to me the word ignorance in English doesn't seem to bring out the idea of being mistaken right if I say you're you're you're ignorant of something I don't mean you're mistaken about it right I might in the context you know if you're mistaken about something I might say you know that you're ignorant because that's kind of the source of your mistake right but I don't think the word ignorance in English has that sense of being do you think or what do you think I think of it in terms of it can be a cause of mistake yeah yeah I mean ignorance seems to name more just the privation of lack right and so trying to you know understand the text of Aristotle right the Greek

[45:20] word you know has those two senses you know I have seen that in the in the like like you said in the post John Lydick says if there's there's two kinds of ignorance right one where you just don't know something right and the other where you're you think you know falsely right only meaning agnostic

[45:49] yeah I think it's related right agnostic is related to the root word agnostic yeah but agnostic in English would be I don't know right

[46:01] yeah it's used it's used differently I think yeah I mean if yes was an agnostic does he think that God does not exist or does he mean so I don't know what exists or not

[46:15] I think I Most people are still agnostic. Who think they don't, they don't want, want God to exist. Yeah, but that's how it's used popularly. Yes, Chesterton pointed that out about people say science is makes people agnostic, and he says now there's there's a humdinger. He says the word science means knowledge, and agnostic means ignorant. So since when does knowledge make the ignorant? He plays on that.

[46:39] Now, as growing up, I mean, these stories distinguished you know between agnostic and and atheist, right? It seems sometimes, practically speaking, a lot of people who say they're agnostic actually are atheists. Who's a changeable? Yeah, it seems that they don't. they don't it's Sort of evolved. Agnostic, maybe they're not so aggressive about it or something. Not on the warpath against theists or something. But if it took in the whole definition from the Greek, they would not only not know, it, it would be mistaken, too.

[47:14] Or it could be, it could be one and the other, because to be mistaken is to know something that you're wrong. If you just don't know you don't know Yeah

[47:33] Okay. I told you one time when I gave a little bit of a true/false private exam one time, you know, and I told the students now, if you, want to agree to some Socratic principles, right? So if you leave it blank, you get one point off. If you answer incorrectly, you get two points off.

[47:56] It was difficult. I figured afterwards, that if a guy had left the ball blank, he'd probably get the highest score, you know. But I said, you know, if you answer wrongly, you get two points off—one for not knowing, and one for thinking you know when you don't know, right? You just leave it blank, well then you get one point off for ignorance, but not for the this, you know, the thing that Socrates tried to corrupt you from—thinking that you know what you don't know, right?

[48:19] huh? In epistemology, The only thing worse than ignorance is error. Do like I don't know. Let's discuss the last name. Where where is folly? Where is foolishness? Where? What she?

[48:47] I was talking, you know, about the the word you find in Shakespeare. fond, right? And it means foolish, right? And so it's not used just in context of being fond of a girl or something, right? But so the original meaning of saying that I'm fond of this girl means that I'm acting foolish over her, right? And but you find it with other contexts. We speak, you know, somebody's you know proposing something stupid, you know, you're fond you know, that thing.

[49:14] So where where is this right? You see. Well, because people do foolish things when they they're attached to a girl, or they do foolish things when they're angry with somebody, right? And they, you know, hit somebody or do something that they wish they hadn't done, right? Afterwards, where is that folly then, right? Is it in the emotions? Or is the folly in the what?

[49:43] Reason judgment. Yeah. In other words, Aristotle is saying when you give a lack or something of that sort, you've got to see what's a lack of, and and what it is, right? Okay. He's an example he's giving is that of blindness, right? Blindness is a lack of sight, but in the eye, right? And so, what is is folly or foolishness? I'm saying, right? You know, is it in the anger or in the concupiscence, or is it in the reason and?

[50:17] The other is just someone when the cause of it, right? Huh? Was not the subject of the thought, right? Yeah. Right. I think I hit him because I'm angry, right? You know, and or shoot him or something even worse, you know.

[50:39] Okay. To the second, it should be said that twofold is the end, right? To wit, the last end and the what? The proximate end, yeah, the near end.

[51:00] In the what? The peccatum, the sin of nature, right? There we are. So I know how you translate the peccatum there. You know, usually. That's the word they use for sin, right? Yeah. You

[51:20] could translate a mistake, but then it's you get confused with a mistake judgment. Yeah. It's more generic. It seems a more generic word. Yeah. So in the peccatum of nature, right? Huh? The act what fails from its last end, which is the perfection of the thing what generated, right? Huh?

[51:50] It does not, however, fail from every what, from just any proximate end, for nature operates by forming something, right? Huh? Likewise, in the sin of the will, the peccatum voluntatis, always there is a defect from the what? Ultimate. Intended, eh? Yeah. Why? Because no bad voluntary act is able to be ordered to what? Yeah. Beatitude, right? Huh? Which is the what? Ultimate, last end. Yeah. Although it what?

[52:33] Does not fail from some proximate end, right? Huh? Which the will intends and achieves, right? Whence also, when the what intention of this end is ordered to the last end, right? Huh? In that, in the intention of this what end, can be found the notion of what rightness or or sin, huh? I was reading

[53:08] Thomas there. He's talking about divine providence, right? And how God is everything, right? Huh? Then there's a nice little distinction, right? Huh? Sometimes something is what ordered to another right, and something else is ordered to it. And if this proximate end is in accord with the last end, right, then it's ordered by God both what to something else, and something is ordered to what it. Okay, this goes back to what Aristotle says that the intermediary ends, right?

[53:51] Both something is ordered to them, and they're ordered to something else, right? So if I've got a what a headache, my last end is to get rid of the headache, right? I say, well, I can get rid of the headache by taking aspirin, right? But I don't have any aspirin, so now I intend to go to the drugstore, right? Where I can buy the aspirin, right? So I have a series of ends, right?

[54:24] And something is ordered to this each of these intermediary ends, but they are in turn ordered to a what? Yeah, yeah. But now you have something bad.

[54:39] How does God order that, right? He doesn't order other things to it. It's being bad is not the sort of thing that can be an end, right? And therefore, something else can go to it, right? So he orders the what? He orders something else. He says, sometimes he orders to the good of the individual. You know, he's going to humble him. You know, by discovering his defect.

[55:08] Other times, it's the order to his justice, right? Okay, but he doesn't order other things to it. It's kind of a nice distinction he sees, right? Okay.

[55:28] Well, if the proximate end is good and ordered to the ultimate end, then it's ordered in two ways. It's ordered to something else, and other things are ordered to it.

[55:55] So logic might be ordered to learning natural philosophy, right? The natural philosophy ordered to you know wisdom, right? Huh, and so on, right? And so something is ordered to it, and it's ordered to something, right? Okay.

[56:13] Now, if I've got a mistake or an error, right? Say things or do it, because good, good in the end, they're almost the same thing, right? So the bad can't be an end, and therefore God can't really order things to it. But He can order the bad thing, something else, right? Punishment or improvement of you, by humbling you, right? Okay,

[56:45] now down to the third objection. To the third, should be said that each thing is ordered to an end through its own what act, right? And therefore, the notion of sin, which consists in what, deviating, right, departing from the order to the end, properly consists in act. But punishment regards the person sinning.

[57:27] Because my bad act can be punished, or something can be punished. Yeah, it's a nice little thing, huh? Take a little break down here before we go on to the.