Prima Secundae
60. Summa I-II Q21 a.1–3: Malum, Peccatum and Culpa, Praise and Blame, and Merit and Demerit Toward the Community
Class of 2012-03-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/060-summa-i-ii-q21-a-1-3-malum-peccatum-and-culpa-praise-and/

[0:00] In my edition here, it's got a nice little quote here from De Malo. You know, the disputed questions on evil. Kind of clears up the words here a bit here. And Thomas is making the same point that he makes in the body of the first article that malum is in plus, right? It's said of more, right? Okay. He says, "Kind of translate it for you. Malum communius est.

[0:26] Malum, evil or bad, is more common, right? Than peccatum, right? He says in anything whatsoever, right? Whether in a subject or in an act, right? There is the privation or the lack of form, or of order, or of a suitable measure, right? It then has the rationem, the ratio of of bad, right? So any lack of what the form or order or measure you should have, right?

[1:01] That has a notion of evil, right? Okay. But pecatum, right, is said some act actus, right? So it's an act, right? That's why it's more particular, right? Carens, lacking the suitable order or form or measure, uses those three words, not having its suitable or appropriate order or form or measure, right? Then,

[1:29] whence he says a tibia curva, that means the thigh, yeah. Is a mala tibia, right? A bad thigh, right? However, cannot be said to be a pecatum, right? Okay. But ipsa claudicatio. Yeah, lame, I guess it's. It means you're you're walking lame, I think. Yeah. Yeah. Can be called a pecatum, right? Well, it's not a moral pecatum, but it's okay, okay. Now, then he makes this general statement here: any disordered act, quilibet actus inordinatus, potestici can be called a what?

[2:21] Peccatum vel naturae either of nature, vel artis, right? Vel moris, right? So that's the broad sense of pecatum, right? Kind of surprises us, right? But,

[2:40] but now said rationem cupae, the guilt, right? Does not a sin does not have the rationem cupae, except from the fact that it is what voluntary, right? Okay. So as you go down then from malum, bad, to what pecatum. To culpa, right? We're getting something more what particular, eh? Okay. So every culpa is is pecatum, right? But pecatum is bad, but not perverse, right? Um.

[3:21] So he says the rationum culpa a pecatum doesn't have except from the fact that it's voluntary. For to no one is imputed al culpa

[3:33] to guilt some disordered act except that it's in his what power, right? Okay. And thus it is clear that pecatum est in plus that same expression, you know, quam culpa. Just as malum is in plus quam pecatum, right? Huh? Okay. But that's the last thing he says there because this is more like we say, licet secundum communum usum loquendi, although according to the common what? Custom is speaking, right?

[4:06] Apud theologas, apud theologians, pro eodem sumanter, for taking the same pecatum et culpa. That's that's our use of the word too, right? So it already crept in, right? But still, you know, in the text there, Thomas says that that's not the original meaning of the word, right? Pecatum meant any what disordered or unmeasured or what unformed

[4:37] act, right? Huh? Whether it be of nature or of art or of morals, yeah. Because when we're reading the the Book of Places last night, there you know talking about these hamartemata, you know, which would be a sin, right? So he had that same use in Greek, right? And to sin now of art, right? Now, but your logic, right? Yeah, I was thinking like that one, the fine arts.

[5:07] Somebody makes a he just blunders and executes his work. Yeah. That's a pecatum, but he doesn't know it. With the way so many modern arts do. Yeah. But we're accustomed to use it there, communum usum loquendi, right? We're speaking, right? So we're taking pecatum, you know. Already crept in the custom that we have. It's so established now that it seems strange to speak of a. assembled nature.

[5:31] of act Yeah, yeah. But now, what is the name for a disordered act or a lack that an act that is lacking the order or measure or they should have?

[5:45] Often it's just a mistake or blunder or something. Yeah, you know, like Sherlock Holmes says there, you know, in the the Norfolk builder, you know that one story. And at the end there, he's kind of you know having you know all these talk about the case sometimes at the end and and how he'd almost fooled him, you know, but then he'd gone too far, right? So he said he lacked the supreme gift of the artist, knowing when to stop, and that's why they praise, you know, you know Titian, you know, he knew when to stop, and Mozart, you know, they often say this, you know, they say the great artist knows when to stop, and that's really something, huh?

[6:23] But since they're talking about what would be a peccatum then, right now they didn't know when to stop, right? Yeah, yeah. So I think that's kind of a good little quote that they had here in the Marietti edition, if you had in your editions or not, but but okay. I think another little quote he has from the sentences is kind of interesting in terms of this, you know, lighting up, right?

[6:49] Ah, he says the rectum, right is said to be that whose middle does not go out from the extremes, right? I say that reminds me of geometry, right? Um, for he says an act is considered as between two dual two things, as it were, extrema, right? To it, the principium agens, the agent acting, and the finem intentum, right? Um, well, it almost looks back to the original meaning of beginning, which is you know where a point is at the beginning of a line and another point to be the end of the line, and so you kind of and when Euclid, you know, or they describe now kind of what a straight line is, right?

[7:34] Well, a straight line is one where you line up two points, nothing, you know, gets out of the the straight line, right? I think to use this thing here. Nothing goes out. Quies medium non exit, huh? Of extremes, right? So that's kind of where they're saying, where you pair them

[8:01] up, you know, because the translation. I think one of the one of the translations we had Euclid, he said something like all the points lie evenly. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of interesting that you're going back to the first meaning of beginning and and end, right?

[8:17] Aristotle gives you know the the meaning of end and sense of purpose, right? It's the third meaning of end there. you know there's the meanings there in the fifth book, and the first meaning would be you know the end of the line, right? The end of the end of the table. So it's kind of beautiful to see the way the mind is carried over from one to the other.

[8:40] Do I make myself clear? Yes. Yes. The word is carried over, right? The point. I'm trying to explain this this thing about the the if you compare the human reason to say the center of a circle right

[9:14] is it to all statements right like the center of the circle is to all points on the circumference of the circle. You can't say you know everything equally No, no, you say the the center of the circle is equidistant, right, from all points on the circumference of the circle, right? So is that the way our reason is regard to statements that they're all equidistant from the mind?

[9:51] No, some statements are closer to the mind than others, right? And so the mind has to use those statements that. are. Closer to it to know those statements that are what further away, right? Okay. The Pythagorean theorem is Proposition forty-seven there in Book one, right? And most of these ones that come before that are just there to get there, right? So there are statements that are you know progressively closer to reason as you go back, right?

[10:20] Yeah. Yeah. So you could say that that in the center of the circle, if that represents reason, it would be to what points on the line on the radius, right? Where some point is closer or further away from reason, right?

[10:41] Why why these crazy people that Benedict talks about there, you know, and everything's you know equal to where you know, huh? I mean it's kind of it's kind of you know carrying off the the what does the talk show say you know that the democratic mind is more interested in equality than freedom. You know, freedom sounds more noble, you know, and it's brought out in revolutions. But they're really more concerned with equality, right?

[11:11] And they'll take equality in place of freedom if that's something they can get there. Equality, right? Just like in public schools now. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You say you say all any you might say, you know, all things are equally, you know. I mean, they're all equidistant from the market. They're all equal. Those statements are are privileged, you know, huh? You know, I mean that's terrible. You know, some statements should be used to determine the truth about other statements, right?

[11:40] That you should judge, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's like one man, you know, judging other men, right, or something like that, right? That's not. And you can't you can't you can't one statement. All statements are equal, right?

[11:52] That's crazy, huh? Go back to the old axiom that the through itself is before the through another, right? And you can't even do another. There's nothing through itself. So there's got to be some statements that are known through themselves, right? And not through other statements.

[12:18] The modern mind now, you know, the agnostic mind, what it calls it. Everything's relative, right? The mind says, well, no statements are known. Nothing's known.

[12:32] One thing we know is nothing's known really about cholesterol. Nobody really knows about cholesterol. Yeah. Yeah. What this this cardiac expert was saying, you know, what we're doing is actually creating the problem for them. That's why the it's his number people dying of heart attack is going up, right? So what we're doing is not really the problem. The problem is inflammation of the food rather than the cholesterol.

[13:08] So I don't know. Who knows? when you read about bloodletting, you know, and how much blood they took out of George Washington, you know, You realize the medical arts are not. altogether a crapshoot.

[13:29] Okay, so article two here. The second one proceeds thus. It seems that a human act, from this, that it is either good or bad, right? Does not have the what ratio Blame. Blame. of being praiseworthy or. blameable Blameable Peccatum in contingit, etiam in his quae aguntur a natura. sicut happens also in those things which are done by nature, as is said in the second book of physics.

[14:17] But nevertheless, those things which are what Naturalia. are not what praiseworthy or what. So should you praise a woman for being beautiful? Depends on how much work she did. How much time she spends beautiful? Then you're buying the the one who's ugly, you know, you know.

[14:48] They they think you know that these women who are regarded as as what witches right now, for the way they look, you know, that they determined that they must be witches. There in the early history of our country here.

[15:04] Therefore, a human act, from the fact that it is what malus, right, bad or a sin, does not have the notion of what or the aspect of guilt, right? Definition of guilt, and consequently, neither from this that it is good does it have the notion of what.

[15:25] It's kind of arguing from peccatum in nature, right? You can go out there and praise a tree for growing straight, and the other tree crooked, or you know, castigated.

[15:46] Moreover, just as there happens sin in moral acts, right? The peccatum in moral acts, so also in the acts of art, right? That's the we've seen that text from the De Mala, right? You know, the one where he put those what in the one sentence where he had them. He said, "quilibet, inordinatus actus any disordered act, potest dici peccatum, can be called a peccatum. Vel nature, vel artis, vel moris, right?

[16:23] Either of nature or of art or of. morals. Okay, so this work has some problems here. So also, therefore, in the acts of art, right? This is not comparison to art rather than nature, because as is said in second book of the physics, peccat the grammarian right? huh? Not recte scribens huh? And the medicus, the doctor, not giving. The right potion. Yeah. So. Yeah. Some of those potions are kind of expensive too, you know.

[17:00] They make me actually worse. But one does not hold the artist guilty because he does not what. Do something, for instance, he does something bad. Yeah.

[17:20] Because to the industry of the artist, it pertains that he is able to what both make a good work and a what bad when he wishes, huh? You know Mozart's musical joke is called. Kershaw Five Twenty Six, something like that. Five Twenty Six, but around there, but it's supposed to show you know how not to write music, right? It's got some you know obvious you know mistakes anybody recognizes, you know, but then there are more subtle things, you know, he's putting out What's wrong.

[17:49] with contemporary composers, right? So is that a sin of Mozart? The musical joke, I just tell me I want to buy the musical joke. I've heard it, but it's it's one thing. I don't have my collection. I need to buy all Mozart. I never got out to buy the musical joke. It's actually kind of a nice piece, but shows how much I know about music. One time I remember the breakfast being

[18:15] said. What do you think of that? It's not something nice. Yeah. That's the musical joke. Something because about I just sat up to buy the darn thing. I hear somebody sour wine. What do you think of that wine? Very good.

[18:30] My father-in-law, the big Italian, my father-in-law, he comes home with some bottle of his friends had made. You know, it was like picking vinegar. I mean, really, it was. You couldn't really enjoy it. It's like maybe you don't put in a salad or something. That's what Father Robert's brother, brother Basil, Father Basil, when somebody they made some wine down in Brazil, they tried to make something, and he tasted it, he said.

[18:56] He said, "What do you think?" He said, "Well, we let it sit a little bit longer, and made a great vinegar." Okay. Therefore, it seems also that a moral act, right, from the fact that it is bad, does not have the notion of something. blameable Yeah.

[19:24] I mean, Ben Jonson had a book there, "101 Plots Used and Abused." So that thing for would-be artists, you know. It's interesting when you see some of these. I think they noticed that Shakespeare, you know, get one of these editions, it gives you all the background. Yeah. A lot of times, it took you know a story or plot from somewhere else in European literature, but he's you know sometimes you know changes the plot a bit makes it better, you know.

[19:56] So that guy had, you know. Tried to write the story, but didn't write it well, you know. Sin, yeah. There's a story about a British general that captured the city of Sindh in India or something, and he wrote back to his higher ups. Said, "Peccavi I have sinned." You always talk nowadays about how there's kind of a loss of the sense of sin, right? Yeah. We should revive this.

[20:47] Probably use the word sin. Yeah. Oh yeah. To reduce the particular sin that's concerned. Archbishop of Manila was cardinal sin. Yeah. Yeah. Oh yeah. We walked into his house. He always said, "Welcome to the house of sin."

[21:08] Moreover Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names, that the bad is what weak and impotent. But in weakness or impotence, either takes away or at least what diminishes the guilt, right? Therefore, human act is not what culpable, guilty, I guess, huh? From the fact that it is what bad, huh? But against all this is what the philosopher says on himself, Aristotle, and that praiseworthy are the what works of virtue.

[21:47] And vituperabilia, right, worthy of vituperation and blame, right, huh? Are culpable the contrary works, huh? You've heard Aristotel was supposed to set up a stone in honor of Plato, you know? Plato, if he died, the first man to show by both word and deed that the virtuous life is a happy life. It's quite a compliment, right? Most men couldn't do both, right? Show by argument and by the life he lived, right?

[22:16] The virtuous life is a happy life. Now you got to admire these, these, you know, pagan. You know, sometimes you know what they they they saw. But good acts are what acts of virtue. He quotes. What do you mean by virtue there? For the virtue is what makes its act or good and his work good, right? Okay.

[22:42] So we've been speaking of the virtue of a knife, right? Sharpness is the virtue of a knife, right? Makes it a good knife when it's sharp, right? And makes its own act, which is cutting, good, right? Good. Good cut of steak. Well, no. Okay. It's left. Oh, sorry. They have these barbershops

[23:16] to say great cut, you know, great cuts, you know. And I thought, you said that is a you know butcher, but no. Okay, we'll change it. It's a good cut of salmon. It's left.

[23:31] Okay. Once the opposite acts are what bad, right? Therefore, a human act, from the fact that it is good or bad, has the notion of something praiseworthy or culpable. First, Thomas says.

[23:52] I answer. It should be said. Thomas says that malum is in plus, right? It's in more than what sin. Than peccatum, yeah, sin. And so also peccatum is in more than what culpa. We saw that in the text, the de malum, right? Huh? Okay.

[24:15] The number of these examples there, you know, like when Aristotle talks about beginning, cause, element, right? When Thomas explains that in the fifth book of wisdom, or even the use of those three words in the beginning of physics, right? He always says, "Well, principium or beginning is more general than cause, and cause is more general than what element, Element, right? So every element is a cause, but not vice versa.

[24:41] And every cause is a beginning, but not every beginning is a cause, right? And where Aristotle will say, you know, that next touch continuous, right? You know, next is more general,

[25:03] is more particular, and continuous is yeah, yeah. So the that is said to be next when there is nothing in between of the same kind, right? But there can be a distance, like the next house, right? Huh? The next student, right? Huh? Okay. The Next chair, right? But there is some narrow space between them, right? But if two things are touching, right, then it's not only next, but they're now they're what?

[25:31] Okay. Their extremities are together, right? Huh? But then the continuous they're not only together, but they're what now one, right? So a number of examples we have these, you know, more universal, less universal.

[25:47] I think you can do that with with the three words: two distinction, division, and what definition. Because the definition is, in a way, a division, but not every division is a definition. And a division is a distinction, but not every distinction is a division. That's why you know you talk about the distinction of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, right? Thomas will always say you can't speak of this as a division.

[26:16] You know, but there's a distinction between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Okay, so distinction is more what general. So distinction, division, and here you give another example, right? If in Latin you have malum, peccatum culpa, right? So you have it. usus loquendi problem, I mean, basically he's kind of you know laid it out. So there's a lot of nice examples of this sort of thing.

[26:48] Now, from this, some act is said to be what culpable or laudable. That it is what imputed to the agent, he's responsible for it, right?

[27:03] For nothing, there's nothing other than what to praise or to blame, yeah, than to impute to someone the very badness or goodness of his act, right? Okay.

[27:20] But then an act is imputed to the agent when it is in his what power, right? Huh? So that he has dominion over his act, right? But this is the case in all voluntary acts, right? And in the Lord of my act, right?

[27:42] Because through the will, man has dominion over his act, right? Okay. Hence, it remains that the what good or the bad in only the acts that are voluntary, right, constitutes the notion of praise or what guilt, right?

[28:04] In which the same thing is malum, peccatum et culpa, right? Okay. So it has all those. Yeah. So C is is a element of cat. The word cat, and it's the cause of the word cat, and it's the beginning of the word cat. C, right? Okay. So likewise, a voluntary act can be what. Yeah, sin, culpa, peccatum and malum, right? Okay. If you get those three words down now, malum, peccatum et culpa, how do they translate those anyway in English text?

[28:45] Because you must have run into a problem. How do you translate peccatum right? Yeah, yeah. This is action, evil, and sin. And guilt. Evil, sin. and guilt. You will send and help you.

[29:13] The first, therefore, it should be said that natural acts are not in the power of a natural agent, since nature is determined to one, like Shakespeare says, nature not being able to be more than one thing. Right? You see, understood that?

[29:34] And and therefore, although in natural acts there is a peccatum, right? There's nevertheless that there what culpa, culpa, right? Yeah. Often I know in moral readings where you see culpa, it's translated sin. Yeah, culpa, yeah culpa, yeah maxima culpa. Yeah yeah. What do they call that? in Fault. the new translation you have. My fault. To my most grievous fault. To just the word fault.

[30:19] Now, to the second, it should be said. This is the one now expressed in what? peccatum in art, right? To the second, it should be said that reason has itself otherwise in artificial matters and in what? Moral matters. For in artificial things, reason is ordered to a what? Particular end, which is something thought out by what? Reason.

[30:48] In morals, however, it is ordered to the common end of the whole of what human life. Now, the particular end is ordered to the what? Common end, right? Since, therefore, sin is by deviation from the order to the end. In the act of art, there can be a what? Twofold sin, right? In one way, by deviation from the what? Particular end intended by the artist, right? And this peccatum is proper to the art, right?

[31:28] As if the artist, intending to make a good what work, makes a bad one, right? Or intending to make something bad, he makes something what? Good. Good.

[31:45] In another way, now what's the famous distinction there about the man who what? Who's better, the man who knowingly does something bad or unknowingly? Well, from the point of view of art, right, the man who knowingly makes something bad, like the musical joke of Monsar. Yeah, yeah. Right? You know. Um... That's good. You would say he more possesses the art, right? When I taught logic, I knowingly would make a what?

[32:23] Absolutely, a bad solution is more. Yeah, yeah. The students would think it's good, right? You know. Um. What about the mother during the? Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Right, but you know, I know how to make an argument that looks good, right? That isn't good, right? Huh? You know. And you know, I told you, I tell the students, there's a whole more than the part, and so on. I say, well,

[32:53] man is an animal, but is he just an animal? No, he's animal that has reason, so. Man's animal nature is only part of what man is, and they all agree to that, right? And they say, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, and so on. So sometimes the part includes more than the whole. Yeah, yeah.

[33:18] But they can't distinguish the two different senses of whole and two different senses of part. That I'm what mixing up here right now. So I know how to make. a... Good argument and a bad one. Yeah. Yeah. And you're good at making bad ones. Yeah. So, but if I, so if I knowingly make a a bad argument, my command of logic is is good, right? Why, if I unknowingly right make a a bad argument, then am I not such a good logician, right?

[33:53] You see. But now, morally speaking, might be a different case, right? If I knowingly deceive my students, right, then I'm a bad guy. But if I unknowingly, Plato's one of those dialogues, of Plato there, early dialogues where Socrates gets kind of mixed up there because it seems that what you do knowingly is better, what you do unknowingly, you know, and you realize there's something wrong with this argument.

[34:26] So. So in the act of art, then it can happen in two ways for there to be a peccatum or sin, right? In one way, by deviation from the particular end intended by the artist, and this sin will be proper to what art, as if the artist, intending to make a good work, makes a bad one, or intending to make something bad, makes something what good, good, right?

[34:57] Another way, by deviation from the common end of human life, and in this way he is said to what sin, if he intends to make a what bad work, and does so, through whom another one is what deceived, huh?

[35:16] But this sin is not proper to the artist in so far as he's an artist, but in so far as he's a man, hence from the first sin he is what guilty, right? In so far as an artist, but from the second, the man is what guilty, in so far as he's a man, right? Then. But in morals, where there is to be noted the order of reason to the common end of human life, always sin and the bad is to be noted by deviation from the order of reason to the common end of what human life.

[35:58] And therefore, one is held guilty from such a sin. Man is held guilty, insofar, right? So he is a man, right? Insofar as it's what moral. Whence the philosopher said, "This is the common thing, right? The famous thing that in art the one willingly sinning is more what.

[36:23] Yeah. So Mozart willingly writes this. Yeah, yeah. He exercises his choice You know, you can see the Mozart knows how to write music from the fact that he knows how to write bad music, right? You see. Um, but in the case of Prudence, this is what. Yeah, just as the moral virtues, right? So the one willingly sinning is their worse, right?

[36:55] It reminds me of um, a skit these fellas did. This was some clowns. They were literally clowns on a television show when I was a kid, and they did this skit that they were. He was going to fix this table. The table, the legs weren't even. Yeah. So he's going to cut this, and the whole idea was, you know, they keep cutting, and it's going to be no legs left.

[37:15] One time he cut it, it was even. No, that can't be right. So he. He decided the art wasn't. he didn't intend that. Yeah. Good thing. Yeah.

[37:31] Same, I'm more of a grill master if I if I know that cooked the steak too much, right? You know, to get even with somebody, cook this roast steak for him. You know, a piece of charcoal. I see my professor Kasurik in the graduate there, he liked his steak, you know, well done, right? And so he's up in Quebec, I guess it was, and he sent the steak out to the door, and you know, he says, "Cook enough, " and so he sent it back about two, or three times, but he said I'll burn it for you

[38:05] So you know he's not going to force his French chef to cook the steak the way it should be cooked, You know, you want to ruin the steak? I'll ruin it for you.

[38:17] It's kind of funny though. that's what Aristotle's talking about here, right now. See, you can't criticize him as a cook. You might criticize him as a man.

[38:28] That's what he's doing. The third should be said that that infirmity which is in what bad voluntary things that's subject to what human power, right? And therefore, neither does it take away nor does it diminish the what. Yeah.

[38:54] Now, next two articles we're going to do is merit and demerit. Have we got time for another one or not? Okay. To the third, one proceeds thus: It seems that a human act does not have the character of merit or demerit, right, on account of its goodness or what, badness, huh?

[39:24] For merit and demerit are said by order to retribution, huh? Which has place only in those things which are what, towards another, right? But not all human acts, good or bad acts, are towards another, but some are towards what? One soul. Yeah. Therefore, not every human act, good or bad, has the notion of merit or demerit, huh?

[40:11] That's like the division of sin against sins against God, sins against yourself, sins against your neighbor, and it actually comes up. How, can you sin against yourself? Yeah, yeah. It sounds like related to that. No one merits punishment or reward from this, that, what he disposes, right, as he wishes, right, about that which he is the what Lord. Just as if a man destroys his own thing, right?

[40:40] He is not punished as he would be if he destroyed the thing of another, right? Do I take my car home tonight and I smash it up? You're going to punish me for that? Congratulations. No, it's I. Yeah. If people get fed up with the TV sets and like that, you know, they smash it up, and he's usually

[41:03] cheered, you know, about this. Did you smash somebody else's TV? Yeah. Was it the Fevers did that? Somebody in South Dakota, they had a big thing. The family they got together, they threw their television off a cliff. That was like a big event, you know. For a while, someone was selling these little like Nerf, you know, thing, but it was a brick. Oh, throwing a TV. Yeah.

[41:22] You're right. Destroy the guy. The father comes home at night, you know, and the little girl is in front of TV, you know, and he says something to her, you know, I don't. Shut up, Daddy! Watching TV. Yeah. So he took the TV set out. Bang! Man. Smash it up. That's the job.

[41:44] Of course, now the way they are now, they probably go after him. Yeah, but they deny him. Yeah. And the kids, we didn't have any TV sets in the house, you know. I didn't. We're not allowed in the house, and people say, you know, and they're getting really old TV, you know, they're like, "Because they're old TV, I don't want it," you know, smashing it. Yeah. So the guy looks at me and he says, "Dude, you said you must be kidding yourself.

[42:09] You don't have running water or something, you know? You must be a Neanderthal." Internet is considered one of the basic human needs. Nah, it's all on email. Okay. Moreover, third argument now.

[42:41] From this that someone what acquires something good for himself, right? He does not merit that what something well be done to him by another, right? Okay. And the same way about the bad things. But the good act is a certain good and perfection of the agent, and the disorderd act is a certain evil of him. Therefore, not from this that a man does a what good or bad act does he merit or what demerit?

[43:20] Just in him, right? Okay. But against this is what is said in Isaiah three. Say to what just man, quoniam bene for well, right? Um, because what he eats the fruit of his inventions, right? Way woe to the impious man you know. For the retribution of his hands will come to him.

[43:57] Okay. Now this is going to bring in the common good, right? And I think this is kind of very striking. I answer: It should be said that merit and demerit are said in order to a retribution which is made according to justice, right? But retribution according to justice comes to someone from this that he acts for the what perfection or or progress or the well being of or the harm of another, right?

[44:29] Now it should be considered that someone living in some what society is in some way a part and a member of the whole what society, right?

[44:42] Whoever therefore does something in the good or bad of something existing in the society, this redounds to the what Just as who what hurts one's hand consequently hurts the what? The whole man.

[45:03] When therefore someone acts. For the what good or bad of another singular person, there falls there a twofold reason of merit or demerit. In one way, according as there is owed to him retribution from the singular person that he either what aids or offends, right? In another way, according as there's owed to him a retribution from the whole college.

[45:39] When therefore someone orders his act directly in the good or bad of the whole college, there is owed to him retribution, right? First, chiefly from the whole college; secondly, from all the what parts of the college.

[46:02] When our someone acts towards what is what. His own. good or bad. Yeah, his own good or bad. There is also owed to him retribution, right? In so far as this also bears upon the common that he is a what part of the college, although it is not owed to him retribution in so far as it is the good or bad of a singular person, which is the what Same agent is the agent,

[46:40] except perhaps from himself according to a certain likeness. In so far as we can speak become a metaphor of justice of a man to himself, owed to yourself. That's what the priest told us. Be good. Give yourself what you really deserve. Penance for your sins. Be good to yourself.

[47:03] Thus, therefore, it is clear that a good or bad act has the aspect of something praiseworthy or culpable, according as it is in the power of the will, right?

[47:19] It has a notion of rectitude or of sin, according to its order to the end. But it has the ratio of merit or demerit, according to the what retribution of justice to another, right?

[47:43] To the first thing, then, it should be said that sometimes the acts of men, the good or bad ones, although they are not ordered to the good or bad of another individual person, right? Nevertheless, they are ordered to the good or the bad of another.

[48:04] That is the community what itself. So contained in the communion of saints, right? To the second, it should be said that man, who has dominion of his own act, he also, in so far as he is of another, to wit, of the community which he is a part, merits something or what?

[48:39] Yeah. In so far as his what acts, he disposes them well or badly, right? Huh? Just as if other things about which he ought to what serve the community, right? He dispenses well or badly, right? Huh? To the third, it should be said that this good or bad that someone does to himself through his own act redounds to the what? Community, right, huh?

[49:21] Okay. Hmm? Still still works. Yeah.